Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Alabama resident Joan McCullough Scott petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Probate Court to vacate its order requiring all Alabama resident-beneficiaries of the estate of Kathryn Marie Lange to pay the probate court distributions they received from a concurrent administration of the estate in London, England. Lange was born in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1930. In 1953 she married a Danish citizen and moved to Copenhagen. She divorced her husband in 1961, and in 1962 she became a resident of London, where she resided until her death in 2010. Despite living overseas for the majority of her adult life, Lange retained her United States citizenship, and she never became a British citizen. At her death, Lange owned the several parcels of real property in England, a small sum of money in an English bank account, some personal property located in England, and approximately $350,000 in personal property located in Alabama. The probate court granted Lange's nephew, Charles Lange Clark's petition on the day it was filed and issued him letters of administration. Clark hired legal counsel in London to assist in the administration of the estate overseas. At some point in the relationship, Clark terminated the London firm, and the firm invoiced Clark for work done to the point of termination. Clark did not pay the invoice, and the firm sued him in England. Clark sought indemnification as to costs incurred in defending against the London law firm, and asked the Alabama Probate Court for relief. At the time of Clark's motion, he had already distributed all but approximately $70 of the assets under his control. Scott did not object to the motion for indemnification, nor the probate court's order granting the motion. An "Order of Escrow" was entered, requiring all beneficiaries of the estate in Alabama to pay the probate all monies that had been previously paid out so that a determination could be made about Clark's indemnification claim. The monies asked for included money any Alabama beneficiary received from the English administration of the estate. In her writ application, Scott argued that the probate had no jurisdiction as to the estate assets she received from the English administration. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed, granted Scott's petition, issued the writ, and directed the probate court to vacate the escrow order. View "Ex parte Joan McCullough Scott." on Justia Law

Kiva Lodge Condominium Owners' Association, Inc. ("Kiva Lodge") was an Alabama nonprofit corporation formed for the purpose of administering and maintaining the Kiva Dunes Clubhouse and Condominium ("Kiva Dunes") located in Gulf Shores. In 2009, Kiva Lodge contracted with Hudak & Dawson Construction Co., Inc. ("Hudak") to be the general contractor for the remediation of deficiencies in Kiva Dunes buildings that were allowing water to enter the buildings. Hudak subcontracted the stucco and/or sealant portion of the work to Don Colvin d/b/a Colvin Plastering ("Colvin"). The Hanover Insurance Company ("Hanover"), as surety for Hudak, issued to Kiva Lodge a performance bond ensuring and/or securing the full performance of Hudak's contractual obligations. In September 2012, Kiva Lodge informed Hudak and Colvin of leaks and bubbling in the stucco exterior of the buildings at Kiva Dunes caused by water intrusion. Kiva Lodge alleged that Hudak and Colvin failed to determine and/or disclose the course of the problems and the proper scope of repairs necessary. It also alleged that Hanover breached the terms of its performance bond by failing to promptly remedy the default, complete the work within the scope of the contract in accordance with the terms and conditions, or arrange for payment of an alternative contractor to complete the work. Hanover filed a motion to dismiss Kiva Lodge's claims against Hanover on the ground that, under its performance bond, its claims were time-barred, falling outside of a two-year statute of limitations. In 2015, the circuit court heard arguments concerning Kiva Lodge's motion to compel arbitration, eventually granting the stay and ordering the parties to arbitration. The court also denied Hanover's motion to dismiss. Hudak, Colvin, and Hanover timely appealed the circuit court's order. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's order and affirmed. View "Hanover Insurance Co. v. Kiva Lodge Condominium Owners' Association, Inc." on Justia Law

Jennifer Watters petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to stay proceedings in her criminal trial, and to conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing to consider whether she was immune from prosecution on the ground of self-defense under the then existing version of § 13A-3-23(d), Ala. Code 1975. In 2015, Watters was charged with second-degree assault. In response to the trial court's actions, Watters filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, seeking a writ directing the trial court to conduct a pretrial hearing on her immunity defense. A majority of that court, noting that "[t]here are no Alabama cases interpreting the application and scope of section 13A-3-23(d), Ala. Code 1975, to criminal charges," denied Watters's request for relief. Watters then filed another petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court. Although the Supreme Court offered no opinion as to the factual merit of Watters's immunity claim, it nonetheless held that she was entitled to attempt to prove its application before she was required to stand trial. The Court therefore granted the petition and issued the writ directing the trial court to conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing considering whether Watters was immune from criminal prosecution on self-defense grounds. View "Ex parte Jennifer Watters" on Justia Law

Charles Breland, Jr., and Breland Corporation (collectively, "Breland") appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the City of Fairhope in Breland's declaratory action based on alleged negligent conduct by Fairhope in relation to real property owned by Breland. In 2000, Breland filed applications for permits and certifications from the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") in order to fill approximately 10.5 acres of wetlands on the property. Fairhope opposed the fill project. Breland purchased the mitigation credits required by the Corps permit, and hired engineers and consultants for the project sometime before he began actual filling activity. Eight years later, actual work on the fill project began, but the City issued a stop-work order that halted operations. Because his Corps permit would expire in late 2008, Breland sued Fairhope for declaratory relief and an injunction against the effects of multiple City ordinances passed in attempts to stop Breland's work. Fairhope moved to dismiss the complaint. Charles Breland testified that he dismissed his lawsuit against Fairhope when both his Corps permit had been extended (to 2013), and that "there [were] conversations that the city [initiated] about buying the property." According to Breland, by late 2011, he got the impression that Fairhope had been negotiating with him to buy the remainder of the property under false pretenses and that Fairhope actually was trying to delay Breland from resuming the fill project until the Corps permit expired. In early 2013, Breland sued again seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Fairhope's attempts to stop the fill project. The trial court dismissed Breland's case on statute of limitations grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that each time Fairhope enforced its ordinances to stop Breland from filling activity on his property, Fairhope committed a new act that served as a basis for a new claim. Fairhope's last stop-work order was issued in November 2011; Breland filed this action on August 7, 2013. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations did not bar a claim for damages stemming from the 2011 stop-work order. View "Breland v. City of Fairhope" on Justia Law

On June 24, 2007, Florian Hinrichs was riding in the front passenger seat of a 2004 GMC Sierra 1500 pickup truck owned and operated by his friend Daniel Vinson when they were involved in a motor-vehicle accident. It was undisputed that Hinrichs was wearing his seat belt. A vehicle operated by Kenneth Smith, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, ran a stop sign and collided with the passenger-side door of the Sierra. The Sierra rolled over twice, but landed on its wheels. Hinrichs suffered a spinal cord injury in the accident that left him a quadriplegic. The accident occurred in Geneva County, Alabama. Hinrichs alleged that his injuries were caused by the defective design of the roof of the Sierra that allowed the roof over the passenger compartment to collapse during the rollover and by the defective design of the seat belt in the Sierra, which failed to restrain him. At the time of the accident, Hinrichs, a German citizen, was a member of the German military; he had been assigned to Fort Rucker for flight training. He and Vinson were in the same training program. Vinson had purchased the Sierra at Hill Buick, Inc., d/b/a O'Reilly Pontiac-Buick-GMC and/or Hill Pontiac-Buick-GMC ("the O'Reilly dealership"), in Pennsylvania in 2003. He drove it to Alabama in 2006 when he was assigned to Fort Rucker. General Motors Corporation, known as Motors Liquidation Company after July 9, 2009 ("GM"), designed the Sierra. GM Canada, whose principal place of business was in Ontario, Canada, manufactured certain parts of the Sierra, assembled the vehicle, and sold it to GM in Canada, where title transferred. GM then distributed the Sierra for sale in the United States through a GM dealer. The Sierra ultimately was delivered to the O'Reilly dealership for sale. Hinrichs, appealed the trial court's decision to dismiss General Motors of Canada, Ltd. ("GM Canada"), from the case. Finding that the trial court correctly concluded that it had neither general nor specific jurisdiction over GM Canada, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hinrichs v. General Motors of Canada, Ltd." on Justia Law

Margie Wylie appealed the circuit court's affirmance of the Montgomery Probate Court's decision removing her as personal representative of the estate of Derrell Cockrell, appointing a successor personal representative for the estate, and assessing over $19,000 in costs against Wylie. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the circuit court did not exceed its discretion in affirming the probate court's decision to remove Wylie as personal representative. The record lacked supporting documentation of the probate court's fee award to the guardian ad litem, however, and orders from neither the probate court nor the circuit court provided sufficient information to perform a meaningful review of that decision. The Court therefore reversed that portion of circuit court's judgment affirming that award and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wylie v. Estate of Derrell Cockrell" on Justia Law

Dolgencorp, LLC appealed the judgment entered on a jury verdict in the amount of $100,000 in favor of Michelle Spence in her action arising from her arrest for shoplifting. The charges against Spence were dismissed after two court appearances because no witnesses appeared to testify against her. Following a two-day trial, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Spence and against Dolgencorp in the amount of $100,000 in compensatory damages. Dolgencorp appealed the denial of its renewed motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (JML) and motion for a new trial. After review, the Supreme Court determined that the malicious-prosecution and defamation claims were improperly submitted to the jury. Dolgencorp submitted a motion for a JML specifically directed to the various claims; that motion was denied. "We cannot assume that the verdict was based only on those of Spence's claims that were properly submitted to the jury. Accordingly, the judgment based on the jury verdict for Spence must be reversed." The case was remanded for a new trial on Spence's claims that were properly submitted to the jury, i.e., negligent training, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. The Court reversed the judgment for Spence and remanded the case to the trial court for the entry of a JML in favor of Dolgencorp on Spence's claims of malicious prosecution and defamation and for a new trial on Spence's remaining claims of negligent training, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. View "Dolgencorp, LLC v. Spence" on Justia Law

Wilcox Investment Group, LLC, Foley Investment Partners, LLC, and Wilcox Communities, LLC ("Wilcox Communities") (collectively referred to as "Wilcox"), appealed a circuit court judgment awarding P&D, LLC, $122,291 on P&D's claims alleging the breach of two leases involving two condominium units formerly owned by P&D. P&D appealed the trial court's judgment on the grounds that the damages the trial court awarded were insufficient and that the trial court erred in failing to award it attorney fees. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that Wilcox was not bound by the leases, and it therefore could not be held liable for a refusal to pay rent under the leases. The trial court erred in concluding otherwise. This result pretermitted any need to discuss Wilcox's argument that the trial court awarded P&D a remedy to which it was not entitled under the leases. The Court's decision also mooted the issues presented by P&D's cross-appeal as to whether the trial court erred in failing to award P&D: (1) past-due rent; (2) the actual value of the two units lost as a consequence of the alleged breach of the leases; and (3) attorney fees. In sum, the trial court's judgment against Wilcox was reversed and P&D's cross-appeal was dismissed. View "Wilcox Investment Group, LLC et al. v. P&D, LLC" on Justia Law

In late 2015, Jimmy Lee and Jackie Mixon sued defendants Tier 1 Trucking, LLC and James Gray, Jr. in the Wilcox Circuit Court, alleging negligence and/or wantonness in connection with an automobile accident that occurred on November 3, 2014. Jimmy was driving his vehicle on a highway in Conecuh County when his vehicle collided with a tractor-trailer owned by Tier 1 and operated by Gray, who was an employee of Tier 1. Gray lived in Conecuh County. The accident was investigated by the Castleberry Police Department, also in Conecuh County. The Mixons lived in Wilcox County, and Tier 1 had done some business in Wilcox County. Tier 1's principal office is in Jay, Florida. Defendants filed a "motion to dismiss/transfer for improper venue." In that motion, defendants argued that Wilcox County was not a proper venue for this action because, they said, Tier 1 had not conducted business in Wilcox County and, thus, this civil action could not be brought in Wilcox County. When this motion was denied, they applied for a writ of mandamus to direct the Wilcox Court to vacate its order and transfer the case to Conecuh County. Finding that defendants demonstrated a clear legal right to mandamus relief, the Supreme Court granted their petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Tier 1 Trucking, LLC" on Justia Law

Kathy Torbert petitioned the Alabama Department of Public Health ("the Department") for a declaratory ruling with respect to a proposed garbage-transfer station to be built near Torbert's home. Among other relief requested, Torbert sought a declaratory ruling under Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-11(b), regarding the meaning of the administrative regulations defining the minimum required buffer zones around a solid-waste-transfer station. Pertinent here was the starting point for measuring the required buffer zones. The Department rejected Torbert's proposed interpretation of the buffer-zone regulations. Torbert appealed the ruling to the Circuit Court. The circuit court remanded the case to the Department for additional factual findings, including the preparation of a revised land survey. On remand, the survey was prepared and the Department made the necessary findings and reaffirmed its previous ruling. The circuit court subsequently affirmed the Department's decision. Torbert appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment, without an opinion. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review, and found that the Department's interpretation of its regulations was arbitrary and unreasonable, and accordingly, reversed and remanded. "The Department could have adopted regulations specifically defining the area of transfer activities as the tipping floor or regulations measuring the buffer zones from the tipping floor. It did neither but, instead, attempted to circumvent the regulations in this case by using an unreasonable definition of the phrase 'area of transfer activities.'" View "Ex parte Kathy Torbert" on Justia Law