Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Geranda Harris was convicted of third-degree burglary, and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. That sentence was split and Harris was ordered to serve 3 years' incarceration followed by 3 years' probation. Harris was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $889.63. Harris appealed his conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the case with instructions that Harris be granted a new trial. The State appealed. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not reopen the case and allow the presentation of new evidence after the case had been submitted to the jury; thus, the trial court did not err. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Alabama" on Justia Law

Todd Hill, Roy Hill, Brian Hill, and Debra Hill Stewart were the children of Leroy Hill, who died testate in 2009. Deborah D. Hill, Leroy’s second wife, offered Leroy's will for probate. The Hill children hired attorneys Vincent Kilborn III and David McDonald to bring a breach-of-contract action against the estate and Deborah, alleging breach of an agreement between Leroy and the Hills' mother at the time Leroy divorced the Hills' mother in 1984 to make a will leaving the Hills a coffee company and a family ranch. The Hills and the attorneys entered into a retainer agreement, which required the Hills to pay the attorneys "40% of any recovery, in the event there is a recovery, with or without suit." According to the agreement, "recovery" included cash, real or personal property, stock in the Leroy Hill Coffee Company, and all or part ownership in the family ranch. After a trial, a judgment was entered for the Hills ordering specific performance of the contract, which required the conveyance of the coffee company and the ranch to the Hills. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, without an opinion. At issue before the Supreme Court involved the attorney fee. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court exceeded the scope of its discretion when it failed to order the payment of the attorney fee in accordance with the retainer agreement. The Hills petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate two order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, they argued that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to determine the 40% contingency fee owed the attorneys was an administrative expense of the estate and, consequently, that the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction when any subsequent order at issue in this case. The Supreme Court concluded the circuit court had jurisdiction over the administration of the estate, so the petition for a writ of mandamus (case no. 1150162) was denied; the orders pertaining to payment of the retainer were reversed (case no. 1150148) and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Hill v. Kruse" on Justia Law

Genesis Pittman, D.M.D., P.C. ("Pittman, P.C."), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order setting aside a prior summary judgment entered in favor of Pittman, P.C. In August 2014, respondent Debra Blackmon filed a pro se action against Pittman, P.C., alleging negligence and dental malpractice. Blackmon further alleged that she suffered an allergic reaction necessitating emergency medical treatment as well as a related fall resulting in physical injury after treatment from Pittman. Blackmon apparently failed, in accordance with the trial court's scheduling order, to timely disclose the identity of an expert witness she had retained. After the expiration of the disclosure deadline, Pittman, P.C., filed a motion requesting a summary judgment in its favor on the primary ground that, based on the above-described failure to identify an expert, Blackmon could not prove her case. Blackmon, who had, by that time, retained legal counsel, filed a response in opposition that included her own affidavit testimony and medical records. After a hearing, the trial court, entered a summary judgment in favor of Pittman, P.C., as to all counts against it. Blackmon filed a postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate the summary judgment in favor of Pittman, P.C. The trial court scheduled Blackmon's motion for, and ultimately conducted a hearing in May 2016. According to Pittman, P.C., however, by the time of the hearing, Blackmon's motion had been denied by operation of law in April 2016. On May 6, 2016 –- 110 days after the filing of Blackmon's postjudgment motion –- the trial court entered an order purporting to grant Blackmon's postjudgment motion. In response, Pittman, P.C., applied for mandamus relief, contending, in part, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant Blackmon's motion. The Supreme Court concluded that Pittman, P.C. demonstrated a clear legal right to the requested relief and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Genesis Pittman, D.M.D., P.C., et al." on Justia Law

LERETA, LLC, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ mandamus to direct the Colbert Circuit Court to vacate its order denying LERETA's motion to set aside a default judgment entered against it in the action brought by Fronia Warhurst, and to enter an order setting aside the default judgment. Because the Supreme Court concluded that Warhurst did not perfect service of process on LERETA, it granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte LERETA, LLC." on Justia Law

Defendants April Steele Benton and John Benton and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"), petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Bibb Circuit Court to vacate its July 18, 2016, order denying the Bentons' and State Farm's motion to transfer this action from the Bibb Circuit Court to the Shelby Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. In 2014, April Steele Benton, a resident of Bibb County, and Amir Alan Ebrahimi, a resident of Shelby County, were involved in a two-vehicle collision in Shelby County. Following the collision, Ebrahimi was transported from the scene of the accident by Regional Paramedical Services to the University of Alabama at Birmingham Medical Center ("UAB"), where he received treatment for his injuries. Ebrahimi filed a complaint in the Bibb Circuit Court against April Steele Benton; John Benton, the owner of the car April was driving; and State Farm, Ebrahimi's underinsured-motorist carrier. The Bentons filed a motion to transfer the action to Shelby County based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Bentons argued in their motion that Shelby County had a stronger connection to the case because: (1) the accident occurred in Shelby County; (2) the Pelham Police Department, located in Shelby County, investigated the accident; (3) Ebrahimi resided in Calera, located in Shelby County; (4) the first responders, employees of Regional Paramedical Services, were located in Shelby County; (5) Ebrahimi was treated at UAB, which was closer to Shelby County than to Bibb County; and (6) the only connection this action has with Bibb County was the fact that the Bentons, resided there. The Supreme Court found that the trial court should have granted the Bentons' motion for a change of venue, and accordingly, issued the writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to deny the motion and transfer the action to Shelby County. View "Ex parte Benton et al." on Justia Law

PT Solutions Holdings, LLC ("PT Solutions"), petitioned for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the Barbour Circuit Court to vacate its order denying PT Solutions' motion to dismiss the underlying complaint filed by Laurie White based on an outbound forum selection clause and to grant the motion to dismiss. PT Solutions hired White as the clinic director of its Eufaula location. In September 2014, PT Solutions revised the employment agreements for its clinic directors. The letter agreement described a bonus structure, and included a noncompete clause. The agreement also contained a forum-selection clause, selecting Fulton County, Georgia as proper venue for disputes between the parties. White voluntarily resigned her position as clinic director of PT Solutions' Eufaula clinic and became clinic director for Eufaula Physical Therapy (EPT). She also recruited the office manager and two physical therapists who were working at PT Solutions' Eufaula clinic to come work at EPT. Because of White's actions on behalf of EPT, PT Solutions' counsel sent White a cease-and-desist letter in which he asserted that White had violated the noncompetition agreement. In response, White sued PT Solutions and fictitiously named defendants in the Alabama Circuit Court seeking a judgment declaring that the noncompetition agreement was unenforceable. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found that White failed to clearly establish that enforcement of the forum-selection clause would be either unfair or unreasonable. PT Solutions demonstrated a clear legal right to have the action against it dismissed on the basis that venue in the Barbour Circuit Court was, by virtue of the forum-selection clause, improper. The circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying PT Solutions' motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted PT Solutions' petition and granted the writ. View "Ex parte PT Solutions Holdings, LLC." on Justia Law

Brian Ray appealed a circuit court judgment in a will contest transferred to the circuit court from the Tallapoosa Probate Court. The will contest in this case was transferred to the circuit court pursuant to 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975. The Alabama Supreme Court held previously that the jurisdiction conferred on the circuit court by this section was statutory and limited. A circuit court, however, was not limited to the issues presented to the probate court prior to the transfer, and a circuit court could, in accordance with the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, allow additional issues in the will contest, "provided those issues can properly be raised in a will contest." In this case, it appeared that the only issues raised by the contestants were those issues set forth in their complaint contesting Huett's will, and the only ones properly before the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded after Ray's arguments on appeal, that the circuit court should have decided the case on the issues actually raised in the contest -- i.e., testamentary capacity, valid execution, and undue influence. Because it did not stick to the issues raised, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for the circuit court to decide the specific will contest issues before it, and to enter a judgment either upholding or denying the contest. View "Ray v. Huett" on Justia Law

Bugs “R” Us, LLC (BRU) appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration in an action filed by Autumn McCants for negligent and/or wanton termite inspection of a house she purchased. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that BRU met its burden of establishing the existence of an arbitration contract between the parties. Furthermore, the arbitration provision dictated that the issues McCants raised about the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act to this dispute, whether her claims were subsumed under the arbitration provision, and whether she was bound by the arbitration provision had to be submitted to an arbitrator for determination. Therefore, the trial court's order denying RU's motion to compel arbitration was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Bugs "R" Us, LLC v. McCants" on Justia Law

Advanced Specialty Pharmacy LLC, Meds I.V., Inc. (collectively referred to as "Meds I.V."), and several others were sued by individuals asserting various wrongful-death and personal-injury claims. Meds I.V. was insured by Pharmacists Mutual Insurance Company. Pharmacists Mutual filed an interpleader complaint in the action and submitted $4 million to the circuit court, which Pharmacists Mutual alleged was the limits to Meds I.V.'s insurance policies with it, and requested that the circuit court divide the insurance moneys among the claimants. The claimants alleged that the policy limits were $7 million. The parties filed cross-motions for a summary judgment, and the circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of the claimants. The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment insofar as it held that the general aggregate limit applied to limit Pharmacists Mutual's liability to $4 million. However, the Court reversed the circuit court's judgment insofar as it held that the products/completed-work-hazard aggregate limit also applied to expand Pharmacists Mutual's liability by $3 million to $7 million. The case was remanded back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Pharmacists Mutual Ins. Co. v. Advanced Specialty Pharmacy, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2005, Christopher Floyd was convicted of capital murder for the death of Waylon Crawford, for which he received the death penalty. The United State Supreme Court vacated the Alabama Supreme Court’s judgment in this case, and remanded for reconsideration in light of its recent holding in “Foster v. Chatman,” (136 S.Ct. 1737 (2016)). In selecting the jury for Floyd's case, the prosecutor and Floyd's counsel exercised a total of 36 peremptory challenges. The State used its 18 challenges to remove 10 of 11 African-American veniremembers and 12 of 18 female veniremembers. Floyd’s “Batson” or “J.E.B.” challenges to the venire (precedential cases prohibiting racial or gender discrimination in jury selection) were rejected by the trial court. The trial court found that Floyd had not demonstrated that the prosecutor had engaged in actual, purposeful discrimination during the jury-selection process, and that the prosecutor had proffered race- and gender-neutral reasons for his peremptory strikes. Floyd petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari review of the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to uphold the trial court’s judgment. The United States Supreme Court then vacated the Alabama Court's judgment upholding the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case for further consideration in light of “Foster.” In his supplemental briefing, Floyd contended that the record in his case, like the record in “Foster,” established that the State improperly focused on race and gender during the jury-selection process. Rather, it was during plain-error review of the record by the Court of Criminal Appeals that that court determined that the prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges created a prima facie case of discrimination under both Batson and J.E.B. and remanded the case for a Batson/J.E.B. hearing. After the Alabama Court’s reconsideration of the Batson/J.E.B. issues in light of Foster, as mandated by the United States Supreme Court, the Alabama Court reinstated its judgment in this matter and once again affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals. View "Ex parte Christopher Anthony Floyd." on Justia Law