Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Andrew Hugine, Jr., Ph.D., Daniel Wims, Ph.D., and Mattie Thomas, Ph.D., petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Circuit Court to vacate its order that denied their requests for qualified immunity and State-agent immunity from all claims filed against them in their individual capacities by Regina Colston in an action stemming from the termination of Colston's employment at Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University ("the University") and to enter a summary judgment in their favor. Colston was hired as an instructor at the University to teach telecommunications for the School of Arts and Sciences in the Department of English, Foreign Languages, and Telecommunications. She taught broadcast journalism and other similar classes at the University continuously for the next 32 years. It was undisputed that the University was facing budget problems when Hugine was hired as president in 2009. The University evaluated faculty for potential dismissal. In the case of Colston, the University found that she was not tenured, and she was placed on the list recommending dismissal. Colston filed a grievance upon being fired. Colson filed suit, and the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendant as to all claims by Colston seeking compensatory and/or punitive damages against any defendant in the defendant's official capacity. The trial court denied summary judgment as to all other claims. Subsequently, Hugine, Wims, and Thomas filed the present petition for a writ of mandamus in which they asked the Supreme Court to vacate the trial court's judgment. After review, the Supreme Court determined that the trial court erred in not holding that Wims and Hugine were entitled to qualified immunity from Colston's retaliation claims based on alleged violations of her free speech and free-association rights. The Court likewise concluded that Hugine, Wims, and Thomas were entitled to State-agent immunity with respect to Colston's state-law claims against them individually alleging wrongful termination, fraud, and tortious interference with a contractual relationship. View "Ex parte Andrew Hugine, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

Kevin McGough, then a firefighter employed by the City of Birmingham ("the city"), alleges that he sustained an injury to his left knee on April 30, 2011, during the course of his employment. For approximately one year after he injured his left knee, McGough received medical treatment from numerous doctors and continued to work as much as he was able. In 2012, McGough filed a claim with the Retirement System for extraordinary-disability benefits and ordinary-disability benefit to be paid out of the City Retirement and Relief System. The Retirement System denied McGough's request for extraordinary-disability benefits and granted McGough's request for ordinary-disability benefits. It was undisputed that the Retirement System did not notify McGough by certified mail of its decision. More than one year after the Retirement System's final decision denying McGough's application for extraordinary-disability benefits, the Retirement System sent McGough a certified letter. The parties submitted to the circuit court two different certified letters sent by the Retirement System to McGough, both dated December 3, 2013. One notified him of the Retirement System's November 14, 2012, decision to approve McGough's application for ordinary-disability benefits; the other notified him of the Retirement System's November 14, 2012, decision to deny McGough's application for extraordinary-disability benefits. The latter certified letter was delivered to McGough on December 5, 2013. In 2014, McGough filed a mandamus petition in an effort to challenge the Retirement System's decision denying his application for extraordinary-disability benefits. The circuit court denied the Retirement System’s motion to dismiss. The System thereafter petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus relief to direct the circuit court to grant its motion. After review, the Supreme Court found that McGough’s mandamus petition was untimely, and as such, reversed the circuit court’s judgment. View "City of Birmingham Retirement & Relief System v. McGough" on Justia Law

In 2004, Deborah and Brian Blackmon executed an agreement establishing a home-equity line of credit with Renasant Bank secured by a mortgage on the Blackmons' house. In addition to making withdrawals on the home-equity line of credit, the Blackmons also made payments on the home-equity line of credit during that time. In 2013, Brian Blackmon died. Following Brian’s death, Deborah made five separate payments on the home equity line of credit. The payments made did not satisfy the entirety of the money the Blackmons owed Renasant Bank under the terms of the home-equity line of credit, and Deborah failed to make any additional payments. Deborah denied that she had executed the home-equity line of credit or the mortgage and, thus, denied liability for any outstanding balance due under the home-equity line of credit. Renasant Bank sued Deborah and the estate seeking a judgment declaring that the Blackmons had executed the agreement establishing a home-equity line of credit with Renasant Bank and a mortgage on the Blackmons' house securing the home-equity line of credit and asserting a claim of breach of contract seeking to recover the amount of money owed under the terms of the home-equity line of credit. Deborah and the estate filed an answer to Renasant Bank's complaint and asserted a counterclaim, requesting a judgment declaring that the mortgage on the Blackmons' house was not enforceable. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the bank and the Blackmons appealed. After review, the Supreme Court dismissed this appeal as the Blackmons’ appeal was of a nonfinal judgment. View "Blackmon v. Renasant Bank" on Justia Law

Robert Newell’s wife Lisa passed away at their home in 2013. Newell requested that Lisa's body be transported to Mobile Memorial Gardens Funeral Home. However, unbeknownst to Newell, Lisa's body was transported to Radney Funeral Home. The following day Newell, accompanied by his sister, two daughters, and a son-in-law, went to Mobile Memorial Gardens Funeral Home to make the final arrangements for Lisa. Richard Johnson III, an employee of Mobile Memorial Gardens, informed Newell at that time that Lisa's body had been transported to Radney Funeral Home instead of Mobile Memorial Gardens. According to Newell, Johnson informed him that Lisa's body had been transported to Radney because Radney was now a part of the Dignity Memorial Company (both a part of SCI Alabama Funeral Services, LLC) and because Mobile Memorial Gardens did not have a crematory service. Newell informed Johnson during the meeting that he wanted Lisa's remains cremated and that he wanted to conclude the process as soon as possible. Newell executed a contract providing for the disposition of Lisa's remains by cremation. Newell contended that after Lisa's memorial service, SCI did not return any of his telephone calls or e-mails inquiring as to the status of Lisa's remains. Newell eventually went to Radney Funeral Home, learning at that time that Lisa had not yet been cremated because the funeral home had not yet received the death certificate. Newell alleged that he was emotionally distraught over the state of Lisa’s remains, and ultimately sued SCI for negligence, wantonness, the tort of outrage, and fraud. SCI moved to compel arbitration, but Newell resisted, arguing the terms of the arbitration provision at issue were grossly favorable to SCI and that SCI had overwhelming bargaining power over a grieving husband. The trial court granted the motion. Newell appealed. Finding no error in the judgment granting SCI’s motion to compel arbitration, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Newell v. SCI Alabama Funeral Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Timothy Bevel appeals from an order granting a motion to compel arbitration. In March 2015, Bevel financed the purchase of a used Bennington brand boat and a Yamaha brand boat motor from Guntersville Boat Mart, Inc., and he rented a boat slip on Lake Guntersville to dock the boat. The sale and boat-slip rental were documented by a one-page bill of sale, which contained an arbitration provision. According to Bevel, the boat was seized several months after the transaction for allegedly defaulting on payments on the boat and boat-slip rental. Bevel disputed that he owed those payments. The matter was submitted to arbitration. The Supreme Court found, however, that the arbitration provision at issue here did not become part of the contract between the parties, and, thus, it could not be enforced against Bevel. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order compelling arbitration, and the case remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bevel v. Marine Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Austal USA, LLC filed two petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the Mobile Circuit Court to dismiss certain claims asserted against it by plaintiffs Michael Keshock, Martin Osborn, Richard Fitzgerald, Tyrone Lucas, Riley Bodiford, Tommie Brandon, Justin Reed, and William White. Austal operates a shipyard in Mobile that builds naval vessels. Each of the plaintiffs is an employee of Austal who claims to have been injured while working in the course of his or her employment. Specifically, each plaintiff claimed to have been injured by a tool known as a "Miller saw." After a review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded that Austal did not show a clear legal right to the relief sought. Accordingly, the Court denied Austal's petitions. View "Ex parte Austal USA, LLC." on Justia Law

In June 2000, the Franklin Circuit Court entered a final judgment approving a settlement agreement in “Taff v. Caremark, Inc.,” a class-action lawsuit against the corporate predecessor of the petitioner, Caremark Rx, LLC ("Caremark). Approximately 16 years later, in July 2016, Taff class counsel moved the trial court to enter an order requiring Caremark to produce for them certain information regarding the members of the Taff class so that Taff class counsel could notify those members of a proposed settlement in a separate class-action lawsuit pending against Caremark at the Jefferson Circuit Court, “Johnson v. Caremark Rx, LLC,” in which some of the members of the Taff class might be able to file claims. The trial court ultimately granted Taff class counsel's request and ordered Caremark to produce the requested information. Caremark petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate that order. “The jurisdiction retained by the trial court after it entered its final judgment in Taff is limited to interpreting or enforcing that final judgment; the trial court could not extend its jurisdiction over any matter somehow related to the June 2000 final judgment in perpetuity by simply declaring it so.” The Court therefore granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Caremark Rx, LLC" on Justia Law

Teachers Becky Ingram and Nancy Wilkinson petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion for a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity as to all claims asserted against them in an action filed by a female student, L.L., by and through her mother, and to enter a summary judgment in their favor. At the time of the incident at issue, L.L. was an 11-year-old eighth-grade student, suffering from spina bifida, and paralyzed from the waist down. She is confined to a wheelchair; she does not have full use of her arms and hands; she requires a urinary catheter; and she wears a diaper. L.L. also has significant mental impairment. The other eighth-grade student involved in the incident was described as having mental retardation. In 2007 when the incident underlying this case occurred, Ingram was the eighth-grade science teacher and Wilkinson was a teacher's aide assigned to Ingram's class. M.M. had a history of aggressive behavior toward teachers and other students. The incident in question happened when the teachers assisted L.L. in going to the bathroom. In a moment after lunch when students returned to classes, a moment passed when M.M. was unaccounted for, and L.L. was in the bathroom by herself. L.L. was discovered partially undressed and exposed, because M.M. had “messed with her.” L.L., by and through her mother, originally filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against the Tuscaloosa City Board of Education, Sterling, and Ingram, alleging violations of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983; Title IX; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and the Americans with Disabilities Act. She also brought several Alabama state-law claims. The federal district court entered a summary judgment in favor of all defendants on L.L.'s federal claims. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found that by the written policy requiring that students be escorted back to their classrooms by teachers, Ingram reportedly did escort the students back to their classroom, and the Court found no basis for holding Wilkinson, who served merely as an aide to the classroom teacher, liable to the same degree as Ingram. Therefore the Court overturned the circuit court’s judgment with respect to Wilkinson, but declined to overturn the circuit court's decision to deny with respect to Ingram. View "Ex parte Ingram" on Justia Law

In 2008, Kimberly Bond sued her former attorney, James McLaughlin, alleging legal malpractice. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of McLaughlin. In February 2006, Bond hired McLaughlin to provide legal services involving the estate of her husband, Kenneth Pylant II, who was killed in a motorcycle accident in 2005. McLaughlin allegedly failed to properly contest a copy of Pylant's will that was admitted to probate on November 29, 2005, and, as a proximate result of McLaughlin's breach of duty, Bond was injured and suffered damage. The Supreme Court found that Bond did not contest the will before probate, and, because of McLaughlin's negligence, she did not properly contest the will within six months after probate by filing a complaint with the circuit court. The Supreme Court determined that Bond presented evidence sufficient to overcome summary judgment, and accordingly reversed the circuit court’s order. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bond v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Alabama High School Athletic Association ("the Association") and its executive director, Steven Savarese, filed petitions for a writ of mandamus challenging certain conflicting circuit court orders, issued by the Geneva and the Washington Circuit Courts. The Alabama Supreme Court issued an order granting the petitions and issuing the writs. In that order, the Supreme Court upheld a decision of the Association and declared the orders of the two circuit courts to be void. A.J.K. was a student at Washington County High School, and he played high-school football for the school during the 2016-2017 school year. During the high-school football playoffs, the Association determined that A.J.K. was ineligible to participate on the football team, and, because A.J.K. had participated for the school as an ineligible player, the Association removed the school from the playoffs. At the request of interested persons and entities, the Association's decision was reviewed by both the Geneva and Washington Circuit Courts. The Geneva Court issued an order directing that the Association's decision be enforced, but the Washington Circuit Court issued an order reversing the Association's decision and prohibiting the Association from removing Washington County High School from the playoffs. The Association and Savarese then filed petitions for writs of mandamus arguing that both the Circuit Courts improperly asserted jurisdiction, and asked the Supreme Court to void the orders. In this case, the requirements needed for the Circuit Courts to properly exercise jurisdiction were not present. The Supreme Court therefore granted mandamus relief, and the playoffs proceeded accordingly. View "Ex parte Alabama High School Athletic Assn." on Justia Law