Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Andrew Barnwell appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of CLP Corporation ("CLP"). CLP owned and operated a McDonald's fast-food restaurant. In 2013, Barnwell visited the restaurant. Barnwell stated that after he entered the restaurant, he went straight to the restroom to wash his hands. Upon exiting the restroom, Barnwell alleged he slipped and fell, and complained of leg and back pain shortly thereafter. Barnwell sued CLP, asserting a claim of negligence. After a review of the facts entered in the trial court record, the Supreme Court held the circuit court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of CLP. "CLP failed to present substantial evidence supporting its affirmative defense that the [floor's] condition that allegedly caused Barnwell to slip and fall was an open and obvious danger." View "Barnwell v. CLP Corporation" on Justia Law

On January 23, 2015, Judge Callie Granade of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, issued an order declaring unconstitutional both the Alabama Sanctity of Marriage Amendment, and the Alabama Marriage Protection Act, as violating the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thereafter, the federal court entered an injunction prohibiting the Alabama Attorney General from enforcing any Alabama law that prohibited same-sex marriage. The injunction was to allow time for an appeal of that decision to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. On January 27, 2015, Roy Moore, Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, sent a letter, on Supreme Court of Alabama letterhead, to then Governor Robert Bentley regarding Judge Granade’s orders, expressing "legitimate concerns about the propriety of federal court jurisdiction over the Alabama Sanctity of Marriage Amendment." In his three-page letter, Chief Justice Moore laid out his arguments as to why Judge Granade’s federal-court orders were not binding upon the State of Alabama, and ultimately directed Alabama’s probate judges not to recognize marriage licenses for same-sex couples. Months later, the Alabama Supreme Court released a per curiam opinion ordering the probate judges named as respondents to discontinue issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in compliance with Alabama law. Chief Justice Moore’s name did not appear in the vote line of this opinion, nor did he author or join any of the special writings. On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in “Obergefell,” holding that "same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States" and that "there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character." The Court of the Judiciary ultimately suspended Chief Justice Moore for his defiance of the laws. He appealed, and the Alabama Supreme Court determined it was “obligated to follow prior precedent” that it had no authority to disturb the sanction imposed by the Court of the Judiciary: “[b]ecause we have previously determined that the charges were proven by clear and convincing evidence and there is no indication that the sanction imposed was plainly and palpably wrong, manifestly unjust, or without supporting evidence, we shall not disturb the sanction imposed.” View "Moore v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission" on Justia Law

In 2004, Walter Price, Alan Goode, William Lunsford ("Lunsford"), and Cathy Lunsford (Lunsford's wife) formed Riverfront Development, LLC ("Riverfront"), with the goal of developing certain real estate located in Tuscaloosa ("the Riverwalk property"). Price and Goode each owned a one-third interest in the property, and Lunsford owned the remaining third. They took title to the Riverwalk property individually, not through Riverfront. Price and Lunsford were involved in other real-estate ventures together. In 2005, Price loaned Lunsford one million dollars for "Summit," a venture unrelated to the Riverwalk property. In October 2008, Lunsford was in default on the loan. Price made several proposals to Lunsford regarding curing Lunsford's default. In November 2008, Lunsford wrote Price a letter agreeing with Price's proposal that Price would not have to pay his current capital contribution related to the Riverwalk property in exchange for his ameliorating part of Lunsford's debt to Price on the unrelated venture. Lunsford thought his only alternative was to sell his interest the Riverwalk property. However, one month earlier, Lunsford had purchased Goode's one-third interest in the Riverwalk property. Price was unaware at that time that Lunsford had purchased Goode's interest. The record reflected that Lunsford was able to acquire other interests in Riverwalk, which lead Price to sue Lunsford under several negligence and contract theories. The Supreme Court concluded after review of the trial court record, that the evidence, on balance, may have favored Lunsford's version of events with respect to the real estate deals at issue here, but it could not be said that Price did not present a genuine issue of fact as to a scenario under which he could possibly prevail. That is, the Court found Price detailed and supplied evidence of a fraudulent scheme, the true nature of which he did not discover until years after the transaction occurred, and, therefore, the applicable statutes of limitations were tolled. The Court, therefore, reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Walter B. Price" on Justia Law

Jerry Nix appealed the entry of summary judgment which found he was an adult in need of protective services under the Adult Protective Services Act of 1976. The Franklin County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") alleged that Nix, then 78 years old, was an "adult in need of protective services." The petition claimed that Nix had not been taking his medications for diabetes and hypertension and that he had been the victim of a postal scam costing him thousands of dollars. DHR further alleged that Nix urgently required nursing-home care to protect his health and safety and that, otherwise, Nix was in immediate danger. DHR requested emergency-protective placement for Nix and that the court set a hearing to determine Nix's need for protective services. The trial court thereafter ordered DHR to provide protective services for Nix, appointed a guardian ad litem to represent Nix in the proceedings, and appointed Nix's son, Darren Nix, as conservator of Nix's estate and guardian of his person. While the Alabama Supreme Court did not question that all involved in this case desired the best for Nix, it was troubled by the "apparent lack of urgency and attention to statutory formalities in the prosecution of this petition for protective services," finding the trial court granted DHR's emergency petition on December 7, 2015; Nix was entitled to a hearing within 30 days. Seven months passed before the trial court entered the summary judgment finding Nix to be an adult in need of supervision, and fifteen months had passed since Nix was removed from his home. "It may very well be that an assisted-living facility is the appropriate and lawful protective placement for Nix, but he is still entitled to all the procedural safeguards due him under the Act, including a timely adjudication of his need for such services. Indeed, without a faithful adherence to the Act and the due process protections owed to each person protected by the Act, we risk unnecessary and wrongful deprivation of liberty and property. For those 'protected persons' dispossessed of their house and their assets, this may seem a fate far worse than a foreign-lottery postal scam." View "Nix v. Franklin County Dept. of Human Resources" on Justia Law

Defendants were members of the Birmingham Board of Education and the superintendent of the Birmingham City School System. Defendants appealed the circuit court’s judgment in favor of twenty-four "classified employees" of the Birmingham Board of Education ("the plaintiffs"). The trial court held that the plaintiffs' salaries had been miscalculated and awarded them monetary relief. The defendants argued, among other things, that they were entitled to immunity from the plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court agreed that the defendants were entitled to immunity. For that reason, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and its judgment was void. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Woodfin v. Bender" on Justia Law

J.J.V. ("the child") was the daughter of J.V. ("the father"). In 2009, the Marshall County Department of Human Resources (DHR) removed J.J.V. from the custody of mother M.M.T. At that time, J.V. was living in Florida, where the child and the mother had resided until the mother left the father. The father came to Alabama to locate the mother and the child only to learn that DHR had removed the child from the mother's home. Without the aid of counsel, the father attempted to work with DHR, and he briefly reunited with the mother. A DHR caseworker informed him that the child would not be returned to the parents if they resided together; shortly thereafter, the father left the mother's residence. In 2010, with the aid of counsel, the father secured supervised visitation with the child. By early 2011, the father was granted unsupervised visitation with the child; he had a total of five unsupervised visits with the child. Later that year, after the child had returned from an unsupervised visit with the father, the child's foster parents contacted the child's DHR caseworker, reporting that the child had reported the father had 'hurt her butt.' After the accusation, the father's visitation was changed to supervised visitation. The child cried and said that she did not want to attend visits with the father. When at the visits, the child barely interacted with the father. The father was ultimately charged with sexual abuse, arrested and placed in the Marshall County jail, where he remained for approximately 18 months. DHR filed a petition to terminate the father's parental rights; however, the juvenile court denied that petition. DHR appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment declining to terminate the father's parental rights and remanded the case for reconsideration of DHR's petition. DHR petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the juvenile court to set aside or vacate its April 3, 2016 order, addressing the transfer of legal custody and physical custody of the child to the father. The Supreme Court granted the writ. “Given the allegations made by DHR and the contents of the report prepared by …the clinical psychologist, the juvenile court could not conclude that the concerns raised by DHR and [the psychologist] could be ignored as a matter of law. Instead, the juvenile court should have scheduled a hearing so that it could properly evaluate any evidence DHR might present (including any testimony from [the psychologist]) as to the alleged change in the child's circumstances after the entry of the April 2016 order.” View "Ex parte Marshall County Department of Human Resources." on Justia Law

This case began as an interpleader action filed by El Paso E&P Production, L.P. ("El Paso"), to determine who owned the mineral interest in a piece of property located in Walker County ("the Landon parcel"), on which El Paso operated a methane well. The competing claimants for the mineral interest were Simmons Group, LTD, and the Caine O'Rear, Jr. Family Trust, Mary Lou Foy, Susan Foy Spratling, Paula Robertson Rose, Stacy Baker Carson, and Warren Dane Baker (referred to collectively as "O'Rear"). Simmons Group claimed ownership by an unbroken chain of conveyances starting with an 1883 quitclaim deed from Elizer Taylor to Musgrove Bros. purporting to convey the mineral interest ("the 1883 deed"). O'Rear claimed ownership by a separate chain of conveyances originating in the adverse possession of the Landon parcel by J.K.P. Chilton and allegedly ripening into ownership sometime before 1921. O'Rear argued that the 1883 deed did not validly convey the mineral interest and that the mineral interest was not severed from the surface estate until after Chilton adversely possessed the Landon parcel. O'Rear did not dispute Simmons Group's chain of title subsequent to the 1883 deed. Thus, it was undisputed that, if the 1883 deed validly conveyed the mineral interest to Musgrove Bros., Simmons Group was the rightful owner. Ownership of the mineral interest was the dispositive issue in this case. The circuit court determined that Chilton had adversely possessed the Landon parcel with the mineral interest still attached and that O'Rear therefore owned the mineral interest. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the first conveyance of the mineral interest recorded after the total destruction of the Walker County land records was the 1883 deed. As such, the 1883 deed was the presumed beginning point of the chain of title, and O'Rear offered no evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption. Therefore, the Court held that title to the mineral interest in the Landon parcel vests in Simmons Group. View "Simmons Group, LTD v. Caine O'Rear, Jr. Family Trust" on Justia Law

Officer J.C. Clifton and Officer Jason Davis, law enforcement officers for the City of Homewood, and the City of Homewood petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on the ground of immunity. In 2013, the officers were dispatched to the Babies "R" Us retail store in the Wildwood Shopping Center in response to a shoplifting incident involving Bristinia Fuller and Bria Mines. When the officers arrived, they learned that Fuller and Mines were leaving the parking lot of the store in a vehicle being driven by Fuller. Officer Clifton and Officer Davis, driving separate patrol cars, attempted to stop the vehicle. Instead of stopping, Fuller eluded the officers by speeding through the parking area and onto Lakeshore Drive. The officers pursued. Fuller continued speeding and ran through multiple red traffic lights before losing control of her vehicle. The vehicle struck a light pole and a stopped vehicleat the intersection. Fuller was killed and Mines was seriously injured. 2015, Mines sued Officer Clifton and Officer Davis, both in their official and individual capacities, Homewood, and others alleging she was injured as a result of the negligent, reckless, and/or wanton conduct of the officers and Homewood during the officers' pursuit of Fuller's vehicle. She also alleged that Homewood was vicariously liable for the officers' conduct and was negligent in hiring and supervising the officers. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the officers established they were entitled to immunity as to Mines' claims against them in both their official and individual capacities. Moreover, because the officers were entitled to immunity, Homewood was also entitled to immunity. The Court therefore granted their petition and issued the writ, directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment for Officer Clifton, Officer Davis, and Homewood. View "Ex parte City of Homewood" on Justia Law

Jefferson County and the Jefferson County Commission (collectively "the County parties") appealed a circuit court judgment denying a petition for validation of the warrants filed by the County parties, pursuant to section 6-6-750 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, and opposed by the taxpayers and citizens of Jefferson County. Andrew Bennett, Mary Moore, John Rogers, and William Muhammad cross-appealed the portion of the trial court's judgment declining to address alternative arguments they raised. In 2004 and 2005, Jefferson County issued warrants to raise funds to make certain grants to local boards of education to construct school buildings and to retire other debt. All the revenue from Jefferson County's existing 1% education sales and use taxes levied under section 40-12-4, Ala. Code 1975, was pledged and required to pay the debt service on the outstanding warrants and certain related costs. Jefferson County experienced severe financial difficulties in recent years that eventually resulted in the County's filing a petition in bankruptcy. In 2009, the Alabama Supreme Court held that Jefferson County's occupational tax, imposed since 1987, was unconstitutional. In 2015, Jefferson County and its legislative delegation proposed local legislation in an effort to bolster the County's finances without an occupational tax. Jefferson County proposed a new 1% sales tax and a 1% use tax to replace its existing 1% education sales and use taxes, the purpose of which was to fund new warrants at lower interest rate and a lower required debt service that would allow the County to retire its existing warrants. In 2015, Bennett, Moore, Rogers, and Muhammad ("the class plaintiffs") filed a class action against Jefferson County challenging the constitutionality of Act No. 2015-226 which enacted the new Jefferson County sales and use taxes. The circuit court declared Act 2015-226 unconstitutional, and the County parties appealed. Finding that the circuit court erred in finding the Act unconstitutional, and finding no merit in the alternative grounds on which the taxpayers argued the Act was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court reversed (Case No. 1150326) and dismissed (Case No. 1150327). View "Bennett v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("Norfolk Southern") applied for a rehearing of the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision which reversed the Morgan Circuit Court's summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern in Jeff Cottles's action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") On original submission, the Court held that Cottles presented substantial evidence of Norfolk Southern's negligence through the testimony of his expert, Joe Lydick, concerning what Norfolk Southern should have done to inspect the defective switch. Norfolk Southern failed to offer any direct attack on this conclusion. Instead, it relied upon the idea that Lydick's testimony was irrelevant because FRA regulations did not require Norfolk Southern to perform track-switch inspections the way Lydick stated it should have in this instance. “In essence, Norfolk Southern's application for rehearing turns on whether the FRSA precludes claims arising under FELA.” Because Norfolk Southern's arguments concerning preclusion are not well founded, its application for rehearing was overruled. View "Cottles v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law