Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Patricia Campbell appeals from an order of the Mobile Circuit Court adjudicating J.R.C., J.L.C., R.L.C., and J.H.S., minor children, as the heirs of the estate of her son, Remano Campbell. Remano died intestate in October 2011, the victim of a homicide perpetrated by his wife, Eugenia Campbell. At the time of his death, Remano was the insured under a $200,000 life-insurance policy issued by United of Omaha Life Insurance Company ("Omaha"). Because Eugenia was not considered to be Remano's surviving spouse, the proceeds of the insurance policy would pass to Remano's issue; if there was no surviving issue, then to his parent or parents equally. Remano and Eugenia were legally married in June 2002. During their marriage, Remano and Eugenia had three children, J.R.C., J.L.C., and R.L.C. Eugenia also had another child, J.H.S., who was born approximately 18 months before her marriage to Remano and who lived with Remano and Eugenia throughout their marriage. In January 2017, the administrator ad litem of Remano's estate filed a complaint in the interpleader action, seeking a judgment declaring that the Campbell children and J.H.S. were Remano's heirs and thus were entitled to the life insurance proceeds. After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order adjudicating the Campbell children and J.H.S. to be Remano's heirs and further finding that Patricia lacked standing to challenge the paternity of the children. Accordingly, the circuit court ordered disbursement of the insurance proceeds in the interpleader action and directed that the estate administration be remanded to the probate court. Patricia filed a postjudgment motion, which was denied. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court’s judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed adjudication of the children as Remano’s heirs. View "Campbell v. J.R.C." on Justia Law

Linda Unger, as personal representative of the estate of Marshall Unger ("Unger") deceased, appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., and its employees, Naomi Phillips (the store greeter) and Billy Odom (the store manager, collectively referred to as "the Wal-Mart defendants" or “defendants”). On May 20, 2014, Unger, who was 77 years old, and his wife, Linda, visited a Wal-Mart discount store in Mobile. In an attempt to dislodge a stuck shopping cart from the front of the store, Unger lost his balance and fell to the floor, allegedly suffering two fractured vertebrae in his thoracic spine. Several Wal-Mart employees went to Unger's assistance and offered to call an ambulance, but Unger told the employees that he did not require an ambulance. In January 2015, Unger sued Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., Billy Odom, and fictitiously named defendants alleging that, on the day he was injured, Phillips, the store greeter, had been negligent and/or wanton in failing to "stage a clean [shopping] cart for easy access in violation of Wal-Mart's policies"; that "the Wal-Mart employee collecting carts from outside the store overloaded the machine used for collecting carts creating an unsafe condition that consumers would have no knowledge of"; and that Wal-Mart had been negligent and/or wanton in failing to train and/or supervise its employees. Unger died in April 2016, while his action was pending. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded plaintiff failed to establish by substantial evidence that Wal-Mart had a legal duty to provide Unger, a business invitee, with a staged shopping cart when he entered the store on May 20, 2014. Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of the Wal-Mart defendants was affirmed. View "Unger v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P." on Justia Law

William Norvell appealed the grant of summary judgment in an action he filed against his brothers Carter and Samuel Norvell. This case arose from a dispute concerning a transaction in which their mother, Martha, sold Carter a certain house on lakefront property ("the lake house"). Martha established a revocable trust ("the trust") and executed a deed transferring title to the lake house to the trust. Carter was both the trustee and the beneficiary of the trust. Martha also executed a will that, because her husband has preceded her in death, divided her estate in equal shares among three of her four sons, Carter, Samuel, and Neal Norvell, expressly excluding William. A few years later, Martha executed a "revocation of trust agreement" pursuant to which she revoked the trust and expressed her desire to transfer title to the lake house from the trust to herself; shortly thereafter, Carter, as the trustee, executed a deed transferring title to the lake house to Martha. Martha also executed a codicil to her will to devise and bequeath her assets to Carter, Samuel, Neal, and William in equal shares and to appoint Carter and William co-personal representatives of her estate. The Alabama Supreme Court determined William failed to demonstrate the circuit court erred by entering a summary judgment in the defendants' favor on his "interference-with-inheritance-expectancy" and undue influence claims. Accordingly, the Court affirmed summary judgment with respect to those claims. However, the circuit court erred by entering a summary judgment in the defendants' favor based on William's lack of "standing" to prosecute his declaratory-judgment, breach-of-fiduciary-duty, and conspiracy claims. Accordingly, the Court reversed summary judgment with respect to those claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Norvell v. Norvell" on Justia Law

Jessie Phillips was sentenced to death for the intentional killing of his wife and their unborn child. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Phillips's conviction but remanded the case for the trial court to address certain defects and errors in its sentencing order. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review 13 issues raised in Phillips's petition related to jury instructions on transferred intent and intent and knowledge; the application of section 13A-1-6, Ala. Code 1975, known as "the Brody Act," to the facts of this case; the chain of custody of a urine sample taken during Erica's autopsy and used to conduct a pregnancy test and the requirements of the Confrontation Clause in regard to the sample; the trial court's consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances; the use of peremptory strikes under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); the admission into evidence of an autopsy photograph; the amendment of or material variance from the indictment; the comments that the jury's sentencing verdict was advisory; the "double counting" of capital offenses; and the disparate nature of Phillips's sentencing. After review, the Supreme Court concurred with the Court of Criminal Appeals, and affirmed its judgment. View "Ex parte Jessie Livell Phillips." on Justia Law

Rhonda Stephan as the personal representative of the Estate of Bobby Gene Hicks, appealed an order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by Millennium Nursing and Rehab Center, Inc. Stephan contends that Hicks, her father, died in 2015 while he was a resident at Millennium Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, a skilled-nursing facility owned and operated by Millennium ("the Rehab Center"). During Hicks's hospitalization at Crestwood Medical Center ("Crestwood"), Stephan signed all the paperwork arranging for her father to be discharged from the hospital and transferred to the Rehab Center; however, she did not hold a power of attorney or other actual legal authority to act on Hicks's behalf or to contract in his name. Hicks did not sign any of the paperwork, but he is named as a party to the contracts included within that paperwork. On October 26, 2015, Hicks was transferred from Crestwood to the Rehab Center. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded Stephan could not be bound to the arbitration provision in her capacity as personal representative to Hicks' estate when she signed the agreement at issue here in her capacity, in what amounted to, Hicks' relative or next friend. View "Stephan v. Millennium Nursing and Rehab Center, Inc." on Justia Law

In May 2017, Jerry Tarver, Sr., sued the Utilities Board of the City of Tuskegee ("UBT") and numerous other defendants seeking damages based on alleged exposure to contaminated water purportedly caused by defendants' combined and concurring negligence. The UBT petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to vacate its December 2017 order disqualifying UBT's retained counsel, Huie, Fernambucq & Steward, LLP (the Huie Firm) from representing it in Tarver's suit. The Supreme Court determined Tarver did not present evidence indicating that a Huie firm lawyer, in his capacity as a commissioner of the Alabama Environmental Management Commission, was a conflict of interest regarding the attorney's representation of UBT. Therefore, the attorney was not disqualified under Rule 1.11(a), Ala. R. Prof. Cond., and no disqualification could be imputed to the Huie firm. View "Ex parte Utilities Board of the City of Tuskegee." on Justia Law

Aqua Marine Enterprises, Inc. ("AME"), and AME's chief operating officer and vice president Brent Mitchell appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of K&B Fabricators, Inc. ("K&B"), following a bench trial in a dispute alleging the usurpation of corporate opportunities in the business of fabricating storm shelters. In 2006, Mitchell began discussions with Kendall Blaxton, who owned a welding-supply company used by AME, about starting a storm-shelter-fabrication business in Alabama because Mitchell believed it would be more efficient to deal with a local shelter fabricator. Those discussions led to the formation of K&B, a closely held corporation with three shareholders, Mitchell and two brothers, Kendall and Kenneth Blaxton. From 2006 to mid 2014, all of AME's steel storm-shelter orders were fabricated by K&B. AME entered into a non-compete/non-disclosure agreement with K&B. Kendall testified that in 2009 he and his brother had a dispute about how K&B was being managed, and Kendall ended up buying out Kenneth's ownership interest in K&B. Kendall then owned 90 percent of K&B's stock and Mitchell owned 10 percent. In early 2012, Kenneth formed Compliance Construction with two others; the company was to "take advantage of business opportunties that did not involve storm-shelter fabrication." By 2014, the relationship between AME and K&B had soured, and ended with AME accusing K&B of violating the noncompetition agreement between them. AME contended the trial court erred in concluding K&B did not violate the agreement. The Alabama Supreme Court found that AME failed to demonstrate Compliance's involvement in storm-shelter fabrication constituted a violation by K&B of the noncompetition agreement. The Court affirmed a finding of liability against Mitchell and its imposition of a constructive trust upon AME; the Court also affirmed the ruling in favor of K&B on AME's allegation of breach of the noncompetition agreement. The Court reversed, however, part of the trial court's judgment awarding damages, finding the award was not based upon the profits earned by AME in its fabrication. View "Aqua Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. K&B Fabricators, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury entered a verdict against defendant HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Gadsden, LLC in a medical malpractice case brought by plaintiff Regina Honts, as personal representative of the estate of Doris Green. HealthSouth Gadsden then filed a postjudgment motion seeking a judgment as a matter of law ("a JML"), a new trial, or a remittitur of the damages award. After an evidentiary hearing as to the request for a remittitur, the trial court denied the postjudgment motion. HealthSouth Gadsden appealed; Honts cross-appealed, challenging rulings on discovery issues. As to HealthSouth Gadsden's appeal, case no. 1160045, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remand the case for a new trial. As to Honts' cross-appeal, case no. 1160068, the Court affirmed. Honts' complaint pinpointed the start of Green's decline at a time during her residency at HealthSouth Gadsen, a nurse administered medication to Green that Green later had an adverse reaction to. Honts sought discovery of the nurse's personnel file; the trial court determined Honts failed to show what would have been in the personnel file that could establish a breach of the standard of care by HealthSouth Gasden with respect to Green. The Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the hospital standard of care, reversed the jury verdict as to that issue, and remanded for a new trial. View "HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Gadsden, LLC v. Honts" on Justia Law

William Barrett ("Bill") appealed a circuit court order entering summary judgment in favor of George Harvey Barrett ("George") and the trustees of the George Harvey Barrett Trust--Gail Ledbetter Cole Kaphan, Curtis L. Barrett, Jr., and Charles Ledbetter (collectively, "the trustees"). He also challenged the denial of his motion for a partial summary judgment on the basis that the circuit court lacked the authority to modify the trust. In 1999, Ben and Janet Barrett died in a plane crash. The Barretts' wills, the applicable provisions of which were identical, established the "Children's Trust" for the benefit of George and his two younger siblings and provided that each child would receive his or her portion of the trust proceeds upon reaching age 25 and that the trust would terminate when the youngest child reached age 25. In June 2000, the circuit court, on the petition of the trustees, modified the Children's Trust to establish separate trusts for each Barrett child and to provide that the trustees "are required to pay 40% of the trust assets to each Barrett child upon his or her attainment of 25 years of age and the remaining 60% of said trust assets upon the attainment of 35, at which time said Trust shall terminate." The trust assets were largely Central Alabama Bancshares, Inc. stock. In August 2014, George offered to sell a share of his bank stock to his cousin Bill because the trustees refused to give him enough money from the trust to meet his financial needs. While George was an inpatient at a rehabilitation center, Bill's attorney wrote a letter to Curtis informing Curtis that George would be turning 35, and requested the trustees transfer either to Bill or to George the bank stock and all dividends that had been paid on the stock since August 22, 2014. The trustees informed Bill that they would not turn over the bank stock to him absent a court order. George was discharged with instructions that he have a conservator, due to his memory and attention impairments. The trustees thereafter petitioned to modify the trust because George was unable to manage his financial affairs. The trustees did not name Bill as a necessary party to the trust-modification proceeding despite knowing that he had a claim against the trust assets. The Alabama Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred in finding the agreement between Bill and George void ab initio, thereby precluding Bill from enforcing his rights under that agreement. "The circuit court's interpretation of the shareholders agreement does not comport with the plain language of the agreement, and, in fact, dictates an inequitable result." View "Barrett v. Barrett" on Justia Law

Defendants collectively referred to as "Advanced Disposal" petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for mandamus relief to direct the circuit court to either join the City of Tallassee as a necessary and indispensable party, or dismiss this suit entirely. Advanced Disposal entered into an "Agreement for Acceptance and Treatment of Leachate" with the City ("the agreement") in which the City agreed to accept and treat, for a fee, leachate from Advanced Disposal's landfill. After the City accepts title to the leachate, it treats the leachate with chlorine at its stabilization pond. The City then discharges the effluent into the Tallapoosa River ("the river") pursuant to a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit ("the NPDES permit"). The effluent mixes with the river water, which flows several miles downstream to the intake point for the Utilities Board of Tuskegee ("the utilities board"), which treats the river water with chlorine and uses other methods to prepare the water for consumption by its consumers, including the plaintiff, Jerry Tarver, Sr. In May 2017, Tarver sued Advanced Disposal, the utilities board, and fictitiously named defendants seeking monetary damages as well as injunctive relief for exposure to allegedly contaminated water that had been illegally "discharged" into the river and ultimately sold by the utilities board for consumption by its customers. Although the Supreme Court concluded the City was a necessary party to Tarver's action, it could not determine whether its joinder is feasible, insofar as the City, once joined, might object to venue in Macon County. Accordingly, the Court issued the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to join the City as a necessary party under Rule 19(a). If the City, once joined, objects to venue, Rule 19(a) requires the trial court to dismiss it from the action and then proceed under Rule 19(b) to determine, in accordance with the stated factors, "whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the [City] being thus regarded as indispensable." View "Ex parte Advanced Disposal Services South, LLC, et al." on Justia Law