Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners George Cowgill and Elise Yarbrough, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant their motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's substitution of them for fictitiously named defendants was made after the expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Petitioners owned Black Mark 2, LLC, a Birmingham bar. On New Year's Eve 2012, plaintiff Paul Thomas was with his friend Brian Pallante. Pallante and another patron, Dalton Teal, got into an altercation. Staff from Black Market removed Teal. An unidentified female patron returned a handgun Teal had dropped inside Black Market. Teal waited outside for Thomas, Pallante and another to leave. Within five minutes, a second altercation ensued, ending with shots fired, and leaving Thomas injured. The Supreme Court that although Thomas disputed knowledge of petitioners' precise duties, it was undisputed he possessed sufficient information from which he should have known or was at least placed on notice of a factual basis for his eventual claims against them. "Because [he] knew of [petitioners'] involvement in [training and supervision of Black Market employees], it was incumbent upon [Thomas], before the statute of limitations on [his] claim expired, to investigate and evaluate the claim to determine who was responsible for [his injuries]." Therefore, the Court concluded the undisputed evidence demonstrated Thomas failed to exercise due diligence in identifying petitioners as proper party defendants; the trial court thus erred in denying petitioners' motion for partial summary judgment. The Court issued the writ and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Cowgill" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Warner Wiggins appeals a circuit court's order compelling him to arbitrate his claims against Warren Averett, LLC. Warren Averett was an accounting firm. Eastern Shore Children's Clinic, P.C. ("Eastern Shore"), a pediatric medical practice, was a client of Warren Averett. In September 2010, while Wiggins, who was a medical doctor, was a shareholder and employee of Eastern Shore, Warren Averett and Eastern Shore entered an agreement pursuant to which Warren Averett was to provide accounting services to Eastern Shore ("the contract"). The contract contained an arbitration clause. Thereafter, Wiggins and Warren Averett became involved in a billing dispute related to the preparation of Wiggins's personal income-tax returns. In 2017, Wiggins filed a single-count complaint alleging "accounting malpractice" against Warren Averett. Warren Averett filed an answer to Wiggins's complaint, asserting, among other things, that Wiggins's claims were based on the contract and were thus subject to the arbitration clause. A majority of the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the determination of whether Wiggins' claims were covered under the terms of the arbitration clause was delegated to an arbitrator to decide. Therefore, it affirmed the trial court's order. View "Warner W. Wiggins v. Warren Averett, LLC" on Justia Law

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm"), a defendant below, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to challenge Clarke Circuit Court's failure to dismiss the underlying action or to enter a judgment in its favor on the claims of the plaintiffs, Samuel Boykin, Lucretia Boykin, Reginald Berry, and Ida Berry (collectively referred to as "the respondents"). Specifically, State Farm contended respondents' claims were barred by section 27-23-2, Ala. Code 1975 ("the direct-action statute). In denying the writ, the Supreme Court found it “never recognized an exception to the general rule that would permit interlocutory review of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss or for a judgment on the pleadings for cases that turn on whether the plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim under the applicable law. We will not make an exception here. Accordingly, the petition is denied.” View "Ex parte State Farm Fire & Casualty Company." on Justia Law

Shannon Robbins, the former county engineer of Cleburne County, Alabama, sued the Cleburne County Commission ("the Commission") alleging breach of contract after the Commission denied the validity of a renewal option in his employment agreement. To decide his appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court had to determine whether the Commission was authorized by the legislature to enter into that employment agreement. Because the Supreme Court determined Robbins could not prevail regardless of which potentially applicable statute gave the Commission authority to contract for the employment of a county engineer, it affirmed the trial court's dismissal of his case. View "Robbins v. Cleburne County Commission" on Justia Law

Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Allstate") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to grant Allstate’s request for a jury trial in a pending action there. In August 2013, a vehicle occupied by Danielle Carter was involved in an accident with a vehicle being driven by Alvin Lee Walker. Carter sued Walker, alleging negligence and wantonness in the operation of his vehicle. In the same action, Carter also sued her underinsured-motorist carrier, Allstate, seeking underinsured-motorist benefits. In her complaint, Carter demanded a jury trial. Likewise, Allstate demanded a jury in its answer to the complaint. Pursuant to Lowe v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 521 So. 2d 1309 (Ala. 1988), Allstate opted out of active participation in the litigation. Opting out under Lowe keeps the jury in a vehicle-accident action from learning that insurance coverage might be available to pay damages. As the trial date approached, Carter and Walker decided that they would rather try the case without a jury. Allstate, however, demanded a jury trial. The trial court denied Allstate's demand and set the case for a nonjury trial. The Supreme Court determined that Lowe demonstrated there was a strong policy in Alabama against tainting a jury with knowledge of the possible availability of insurance to cover a party's damages. “There is also a strong policy of preserving the right to have a jury determine the extent of a party's liability.” Accordingly, the Court held Allstate could insist that a jury determine liability and damages and, at the same time, keep its involvement from the jury pursuant to the opt-out procedure adopted in Lowe. View "Ex parte Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company." on Justia Law

Rose McClurg sued Birmingham Realty Company ("BRC") based on injuries she sustained when she fell in the parking lot of a shopping center owned by BRC. The circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of BRC, and McClurg appealed. Because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the hole in which McClurg stepped was an open and obvious danger, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed summary judgement. View "McClurg v. Birmingham Realty Company" on Justia Law

Dow AgroSciences LLC ("DAS"), a counterclaim defendant, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus challenging a circuit court’s refusal to dismiss a fraud claim filed against it by defendant Robert Ward in an action filed by Andalusia Farmers Cooperative ("AFC") against Ward. Specifically, DAS contended that Ward's fraud claim was plainly barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Supreme Court agreed and granted the petition. View "Ex parte Dow AgroSciences LLC." on Justia Law

BBH BMC, LLC, d/b/a Brookwood Baptist Medical Center ("Brookwood") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order compelling Brookwood to respond to certain interrogatories and requests for production. Donna Gaston arrived at Brookwood Baptist Medical Center ("the medical center") to participate in a voluntary psychiatric outpatient-treatment program. At approximately 8:40 a.m., Donna registered for the 9:00 a.m. outpatient group-therapy session in which she had enrolled. She then left the therapy area, accessed a parking deck on the premises of the medical center, and leaped to her death. Charles Gaston, Donna's husband, filed a wrongful-death action seeking to hold Brookwood liable for Donna's suicide. Specifically, he alleged the conduct of Brookwood's nurses and security fell below the applicable standard of care. The Supreme Court determined that although Gaston could discover information concerning those acts or omissions by those employees whose conduct was detailed specifically and factually described in the complaint as rendering Brookwood liable for Donna's death, Gaston was not entitled to discovery regarding acts or omissions by Brookwood related to other incidents. Therefore, because the requested discovery sought evidence of other acts or omissions of Brookwood and its employees beyond the alleged standard of care owed to Donna, Brookwood had shown a clear legal right to have the trial court's discovery order vacated. View "Ex parte BBH BMC, LLC, d/b/a Brookwood Baptist Medical Center." on Justia Law

Zambia Player appealed two circuit court orders issued in regard to her administration of the estate of her brother, Jabari Player. Jabari died intestate in 2013, leaving as his sole heir at law his 14-year-old daughter J.C. In 2017, Zambia filed a "Petition for Letters of Administration," and, after posting a bond, she was appointed administratrix of Jabari's estate. Zambia filed an "Inventory of the Estate of Jabari Player," which showed the value of Jabari's estate to be $20,862. J.C. protested this inventory through counsel. For reasons that were not clear, a guardian ad litem was not appointed on J.C.'s behalf until four years later. For several years Zambia did nothing to close the estate or to surrender the property in the estate to J.C. Through her guardian ad litem, J.C. filed a petition to remove the estate to the Etowah Circuit Court. Following the removal of the estate, J.C. moved to compel an accounting. Zambia failed to comply with the accounting order; thereafter, J.C. moved to remove Zambia as personal representative of the estate. In response, Zambia filed a “petition for final settlement” of the estate. The circuit court still insisted on a “formal accounting.” At the hearing on J.C.’s motion to remove Zambia, Zambia appeared pro se and testified concerning her administration of the estate. Zambia essentially testified that she had relied upon her former attorney for all of her actions and that she did not mean to mismanage the estate, but Zambia essentially admitted that she had commingled estate funds and property with her personal accounts and property. The following day, the circuit court entered an order that, among other things, removed Zambia as personal representative of the estate, and it denied Zambia's petition for approval of her final accounting. The Supreme Court determined Zambia's appeal of the order removing her as personal representative of Jabari's estate was not timely; therefore that part of Zambia's appeal was not properly before the Supreme Court and was dismissed. Zambia also did not demonstrate that the circuit court erred in its order assessing damages against her for malfeasance in administering the estate. Therefore, that order was affirmed. View "Player v. J. C." on Justia Law

William "Will" Willimon, the former bishop of the North Alabama Annual Conference, United Methodist Church, Inc. ("the Conference"), and Debra Wallace-Padgett, the current bishop, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Talladega Circuit Court to grant them protective orders or, alternatively, to quash their deposition notices in an action against a former youth pastor alleging sexual abuse. Charles Terrell, one of the defendants in the underlying action, was a former youth pastor at First United Methodist Church of Sylacauga ("the Church"). The plaintiff, J.N., was a minor male congregant in the Church who filed the underlying action alleging Terrell had sexually abused him. The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding the bishops failed to demonstrate that J.N.'s requested depositions were merely a fishing expedition to discover impeachment evidence. Thus, they failed to demonstrate they had a clear legal right to a protective order or to an order quashing their deposition notices on that basis. View "Ex parte Willimon & Wallace-Padgett." on Justia Law