Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Nella Ruth Braswell passed away in 2014, leaving behind an estate valued at over $2,000,000, 6 cats, and 13 dogs. In her will, she provided for the care of her animals until their death, with the remaining funds to be given to The Humane Society of the United States. The Jefferson Probate Court accepted her will and appointed Marion Kristen McLeroy as the personal representative of the estate. However, The Humane Society became dissatisfied with McLeroy's management of the estate and had the estate proceeding removed from the probate court to the Jefferson Circuit Court. McLeroy objected to this move, but the circuit court refused to relinquish the case.The Humane Society and McLeroy had a working relationship initially, but it deteriorated over time. The Humane Society requested deeds to all the property Braswell had owned, as well as a formal accounting of both the estate and the Animal Trust. The Humane Society also asked the circuit court to remove McLeroy and her husband as cotrustees of the Animal Trust and to order them to reimburse the Animal Trust for any losses caused by their alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and found that once a probate court begins the final-settlement process for an estate, a circuit court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the administration of that estate. Therefore, when the probate court began the final-settlement process for Braswell's estate, the Humane Society's right to remove the proceeding to the circuit court was cut off. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted McLeroy's petition and issued a writ directing the circuit court to vacate its order consolidating the estate proceeding with the Humane Society's other action against McLeroy and her husband and to enter an order remanding the administration of Braswell's estate to the probate court. View "Ex parte McLeroy" on Justia Law

The case involves National Trust Insurance Company ("National Trust") and Whaley Construction Company, Inc. ("Whaley"). Whaley was a general contractor on a project at a Lockheed Martin facility. Smith's Inc. of Dothan ("Smith's of Dothan") was a subcontractor hired to install an HVAC system on the project, and Phoenix II Contracting, LLC ("Phoenix II"), was a subcontractor hired to install the roofing. Smith's of Dothan's subcontract with Whaley provided that Smith's of Dothan would name Whaley and Lockheed Martin as additional insureds on its liability policies. National Trust issued Smith's of Dothan a commercial-package policy and a commercial-liability umbrella policy ("the subject policies") through Harmon-DennisBradshaw, Inc. ("HDB"). Whaley and Lockheed Martin were additional insureds under the subject policies. Timothy L. Bozeman was working as a roof laborer on the Lockheed Martin project when he fell through an opening in the roof and was seriously injured. Bozeman sued Phoenix II and various fictitiously named defendants in the circuit court ("the state-court action").National Trust commenced a declaratory-judgment action in the Northern Division of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ("the federal-court action"). The complaint in the federal-court action named Smith's of Dothan, Whaley, Lockheed Martin, and the estate as respondents and included the following factual allegations: "25. A dispute has arisen as to whether Respondents Smith's [of Dothan], Whaley, and Lockheed [Martin] are entitled to a defense and indemnification as to the claims asserted in the Underlying Lawsuit. National Trust asserts that, based on the terms, conditions, and exclusions contained in the [subject] policies, Respondents Smith's [of Dothan], Whaley, and Lockheed [Martin] are not entitled to a defense in the underlying lawsuit or indemnification against settlement, award, or judgment therefrom.On April 14, 2023, Whaley filed a third-party complaint against National Trust and Continental Insurance Company ("Continental") in the state-court action. The third-party complaint alleged claims of breach of contract and bad-faith refusal to pay against National Trust and Continental. On May 4, 2023, National Trust filed a motion to dismiss in the state-court action. In the motion, National Trust asked the circuit court "to reconsider its previous Order … dated April 21, 2023, granting Whaley's motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against [National Trust] and further move[d] pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss both of Whaley's claims asserted against [National Trust] in the Third-Party Complaint." In its motion, National Trust asserted that Whaley's claims against it were due to be dismissed "because they were compulsory counterclaims that Whaley was required to file in the federal[-court] action pursuant to § 65-440, Ala. Code 1975." On June 7, 2023, the circuit court entered an order denying National Trust's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. National Trust subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking this Court to direct the circuit court to enter an order dismissing National Trust from the state-court action.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted National Trust's mandamus petition in part and issued a writ directing the circuit court to enter an order dismissing Whaley's breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims in the state-court action that were based on National Trust's refusal to indemnify Whaley for the amount it had paid to settle Lockheed Martin's indemnity claim against it. However, the court denied the petition as to Whaley's contingent claims for a defense and indemnification. View "Ex parte National Trust Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case involves a wrongful-death action initiated by Veronica Edwards and Corey D. Hatcher, Sr., following the death of Corey Demills Hatcher, Jr. The deceased died from injuries sustained when his vehicle collided with horses on a road. The plaintiffs sued the owners of the horses, Kimberly Johnson Crowder and Carole A. Phillipsen, as well as Southern Sportsman Hunting Lodge, Inc., its owners, and the McCurdy Plantation Horse Association, which hosted a trail ride on Southern Sportsman's property. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to use proper fencing to corral the horses, leading to the accident.The Lowndes Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court determined that the plaintiffs' wrongful-death claim was the exclusive remedy available under Alabama Code § 3-5-3(a), which provides a cause of action against livestock owners who knowingly or willfully place their animals on a public highway. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to produce substantial evidence to support their claim that the defendants knowingly placed the horses on the highway.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court clarified that § 3-5-3(a) creates a cause of action that did not exist at common law, rather than shielding certain defendants from liability. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to present substantial evidence that the defendants knowingly placed the horses on the highway, as required by § 3-5-3(a). Therefore, the plaintiffs could not pursue any cause of action against the defendants. View "Edwards v. Crowder" on Justia Law

Harold Wallace, a tenant of the Housing Authority of the City of Talladega, fell while descending the back-porch stairs of his apartment due to missing handrails. Wallace sued the Housing Authority for negligence and wantonness. The Housing Authority moved for a summary judgment, arguing that the lack of handrails was an "open and obvious" danger and that Wallace had conceded in his deposition that he was aware of this. The trial court granted the Housing Authority's motion for a summary judgment. Wallace appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals.The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Housing Authority. The Housing Authority then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari review, arguing that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision conflicts with a prior decision in Daniels v. Wiley, where the court affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant landlord after concluding that the landlord had no duty to the plaintiff tenant with respect to risks created by the muddy condition of a sidewalk within her apartment complex because the danger was "open and obvious."The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals, concluding that the decision does not conflict with Daniels. The court clarified that while the Daniels decision is sound, it should not be interpreted as rejecting a landlord's duties under the circumstances described in §§ 360 and 361 of the First Restatement and the Second Restatement. The court found that the Housing Authority failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the principles set forth in §§ 360 and 361 apply to the circumstances in this case, and therefore, the Housing Authority was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. View "Ex parte The Housing Authority of the City of Talladega" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed a case involving a dispute over an undeveloped island ("the island") located within a canal system on Ono Island, a residential subdivision. The island was created during the development of the canal system and was later sold in a tax sale. F Family South, LLC ("FFS") acquired the island and sought to construct a boat shelter on it. The Property Owners Association of Ono Island, Inc. ("the POA") objected, arguing that the island was subject to certain covenants restricting its use.The Baldwin Circuit Court ruled in favor of the POA, finding that the island was subject to both express and implied covenants restricting its use. The court also invalidated the 1995 tax sale through which FFS had obtained ownership of the island, and declared the POA as the island's owner.FFS appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in voiding the 1995 tax sale and in concluding that the island was subject to the covenants. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's decision to void the tax sale, but affirmed the finding that the island was subject to implied restrictive covenants governing its use. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "F Family South, LLC v. Property Owners Association of Ono Island, Inc." on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, John Svensen wrote a check to Jeff Hester's company, Ginesis, for several thousand bottles of hand sanitizer. The check bounced, leading Ginesis to sue Svensen and his company, Marketpointe, for the owed money. After a series of legal proceedings, Hester pressed charges against Svensen for the bad check, resulting in Svensen's arrest. The Lauderdale Circuit Court later dismissed the criminal complaint due to the statute of limitations, and Svensen subsequently sued Hester for malicious prosecution.The Lauderdale Circuit Court initially entered a default judgment against Svensen and Marketpointe for failing to answer Ginesis's complaint. After Svensen successfully vacated the default judgment, the court set a bench trial. However, Svensen did not appear, leading to another default judgment against him. After Svensen provided an excuse, the court vacated the default judgment and reset the trial. Meanwhile, Hester, on the advice of his attorney, took the bounced check to the Lauderdale County Sheriff's Department, leading to Svensen's arrest.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of Hester. The court found that Hester had probable cause to believe that Svensen had committed the crime of negotiating a worthless negotiable instrument, as it is a crime in Alabama to knowingly write someone a bad check. The court rejected Svensen's argument that Hester lacked probable cause because the one-year statute of limitations for misdemeanor offenses had expired. The court reasoned that the expiration of the limitations period does not affect whether the defendant actually committed the offense charged. View "Svensen v. Hester" on Justia Law

In October 2020, Larry Knight's residence was damaged by Hurricane Zeta. He filed an insurance claim with Foremost Insurance Company, which was denied. Knight then sued Foremost, claiming that the company had insured his residence. Over the course of the litigation, Knight amended his complaint six times, eventually adding claims related to a rental property that Foremost admitted to insuring. He also added Karen Bradford and Bradford Agency, LLC as defendants. Foremost moved to strike Knight's latest amended complaint, while Bradford and the Agency moved to quash service of process and to be dismissed from the case, arguing that service on them had been insufficient. The trial court denied these motions.Foremost, Bradford, and the Agency petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus, arguing that they were entitled to relief. The court agreed, finding that Knight had failed to demonstrate good cause for amending his complaint for a sixth time and that allowing the amendment would result in actual prejudice to Foremost and unduly delay the trial. The court also found that service on Bradford and the Agency was ineffective, as Knight had failed to comply with the service requirements in Rule 4 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. The court therefore granted the petition and issued the writ, directing the trial court to strike Knight's sixth amended complaint and to grant Bradford and the Agency's motions to quash service of process and to dismiss them from the lawsuit. View "Ex parte Foremost Insurance Company v. Foremost Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In November 2015, Raymond Shane Greene was convicted of rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse of a child under 12 years of age. The trial court sentenced Greene to life imprisonment for the rape conviction, 99 years' imprisonment for the sodomy conviction, and 10 years' imprisonment for the sexual-abuse conviction. Greene had initially been tried for these offenses in August 2015, but a mistrial was declared due to the State's inadvertent failure to provide defense counsel with certain evidence. Greene was retried in November 2015 and convicted.Following the mistrial, Greene filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him on the ground of double jeopardy stemming from alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court presumably denied that motion, as Greene was retried and convicted. On July 7, 2023, Greene, acting pro se, commenced an action in the Mobile Circuit Court, arguing that his November 2015 criminal convictions were due to be set aside on double-jeopardy grounds. He accused Nicki E. Patterson, the assistant district attorney who had prosecuted him, of prosecutorial misconduct. The Mobile County District Attorney's Office, on behalf of Patterson, filed a motion to dismiss, which the circuit court granted.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that Greene could not use a rule of civil procedure to collaterally attack a criminal judgment; rather, Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., provides the exclusive remedy for challenging a final judgment of conviction. Because the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain Greene's civil action, it properly granted Patterson's motion to dismiss. View "Greene v. Patterson" on Justia Law

The case involves Carl Michael Seibert who appealed a summary judgment by the Madison Circuit Court in favor of Lorri Stricklen and Zoe Aldige. Seibert had filed claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process against Stricklen and Aldige. The case originated from a divorce proceeding between Seibert and Stricklen. Seibert believed Stricklen was having an affair and began gathering evidence. Stricklen filed a criminal complaint against Seibert for stalking, leading to his arrest and indictment. The criminal case ended in a mistrial, and Seibert subsequently filed his complaint alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process.The Madison Circuit Court granted a summary judgment in favor of Stricklen and Aldige, noting that Seibert's case had effectively languished due to his failure to conduct meaningful discovery or prosecute the case. The court found that if Seibert could not defeat a motion for a summary judgment after 58 months, a trial on his claims would be useless. Stricklen and Aldige also filed a motion for an award of attorney fees and costs under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act ("the ALAA"), which the court granted in part.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed in part and reversed in part. It affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of Stricklen on the malicious-prosecution claim and in favor of Stricklen and Aldige on the abuse-of-process claim. However, it reversed the trial court's implicit determination that Seibert's lawsuit was filed without substantial justification, remanding the case to the trial court with instructions to set forth its reasoning as to why Stricklen and Aldige are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under the ALAA. View "Seibert v. Stricklen" on Justia Law

The case involves siblings Kim J. Washington and Katrina J. Williams who filed a lawsuit against their brother Elrick Earl Johnson seeking to partition a jointly owned real property. The property in question is "heirs property" under the Alabama Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act ("the Heirs Act"). The plaintiffs proposed to sell the property, a plan Johnson disagreed with, arguing that the property could be partitioned in kind.The Baldwin Circuit Court conducted a bench trial on the matter. The plaintiffs argued that the property was incapable of being equally and equitably partitioned in kind, hence their request for the property to be sold and the proceeds divided among the parties according to their respective ownership interests. Johnson, on the other hand, disputed this claim, suggesting that the property could be partitioned in kind.The trial court granted Johnson's motion for a judgment as a matter of law, finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof that the property could not be equitably divided. The court did not order that the property be partitioned in kind or otherwise equitably divided.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the trial court's finding that the property could be partitioned in kind. However, it reversed the trial court's judgment to the extent that it failed to order that the property be partitioned in kind, as required by the Heirs Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Washington v. Johnson" on Justia Law