Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Virginia McDorman, conservator for Sim Moseley, appealed a probate court judgment awarding Ralph Moseley, Jr., attorney fees pursuant to the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act ("the ALAA"). Sim had a brother, Ralph Carmichael Moseley III ("Mike"), who was born during the marriage of Virginia and Ralph. Sim also had a half brother, Slate McDorman, who was born during the marriage of Virginia and her current husband, Clarence McDorman, Jr. In February 2013, Mike, as brother and next friend of Sim, petitioned the probate court to remove Virginia as Sim's conservator; among other things, he asked Ralph be appointed as successor conservator, and asked for an accounting of the conservatorship. During the pendency of the proceeding, a dispute arose about an IRA Ralph created and funded for Sim's benefit. During discovery, Virginia requested Ralph produce proof of contributions he made to the IRA; Ralph denied an IRA was established. Virginia submitted an accounting, along with a "Settlement Agreement" executed by Sim and by Virginia as conservator releasing Ralph from any and all claims related directly or indirectly to Ralph's funding or removing funds from the IRA Ralph attempted for Sim. Virginia also filed an affidavit signed by Ralph stating he agreed to withdraw any request that Virginia be removed as conservator for Sim's estate and affirming that his payment of $5,000 pursuant to the agreement was in exchange for a full release of all claims against him. In December 2015, more than a year and a half after the agreement and Ralph's affidavit were executed, Virginia and Sim moved to set aside the agreement, alleging Ralph had fraudulently induced them to execute the agreement by failing to truthfully answer discovery and by withholding information about the IRA. They stated Ralph closed the IRA and filed a fraudulent tax return on behalf of Sim, listing the IRA distribution as income, causing Sim to owe federal taxes and impacting his qualification for various governmental disability benefits. Ralph responded that Virginia and Sim were aware of the IRA when they signed the agreement; Ralph requested attorney fees he incurred as a result of responding to and opposing the motion to set aside the agreement. The Alabama Supreme Court determined an award of attorney fees relating to to defending the validity of the agreement in the probate court action was not erroneous; the Court reversed the probate court's amount of fees, remanding the issue for a determination of the appropriate amount of fees attributable to defending the validity of the agreement in the probate court action. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the judgment in favor of Ralph. View "McDorman v. Moseley, Jr." on Justia Law

Protective Life Insurance Company ("Protective") appealed a circuit court judgment entered on a jury verdict against Protective and in favor of Apex Parks Group, LLC ("Apex"), in the amount of $11,495,890.41. Apex, a California-based corporation, owned and operated 16 moderately sized amusement parks, water parks, and family-entertainment centers nationwide. Apex's founder and chief executive officer was Alexander Weber, who had possessed 43 years' experience in the industry and who was critical to Apex's success. Because of Weber's importance, in early 2016 Apex sought a "key-man" insurance policy on Weber. Protective is a Birmingham-based insurance company owned by the Dai-ichi Corporation. At that time, Weber was 64 years old. Answers from Weber's interview with a paramedical examiner were incorporated into the Apex application for insurance. Weber underwent a series of medical examinations, all of which were reported and incorporated into the key-man policy. In November 2016, after the first premium payment was made and the policy went into effect, while on vacation with his wife, Weber died. Shortly after Weber's death, Apex submitted its claim under the policy for the $10-million benefit. Protective then began a contestable-claim investigation, contending Weber's complete medical history was not disclosed, thereby voiding the policy. Protective thereafter refunded the premium Apex paid. Apex sued Protective asserting claims of breach of contract and bad faith in failing to investigate all bases supporting coverage and in making false promises that the claim would be paid. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court determined Protective was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Apex's claim of breach of contract, and the trial court erred by submitting this claim to the jury for consideration. Accordingly, that portion of the trial court judgment was reversed. "Because Protective demonstrated that Weber made a material misrepresentation and Apex failed to introduce substantial evidence to the contrary, Protective was entitled to rescind the policy, which was a complete defense to Apex's claims of breach of contract. Thus, the trial court erred in denying Protective's motions for a judgment as a matter of law." View "Protective Life Insurance Company v. Apex Parks Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Kathleen Hendrix ("Hendrix"), as administratrix of the estate of Kenneth Morris Hendrix, deceased, appeals a circuit court judgment dismissing Hendrix's medical-malpractice wrongful-death claim against United Healthcare Insurance Company of the River Valley ("United"). Kenneth, who was covered by a health-insurance policy issued by United, died after United refused to pay for a course of medical treatment recommended by Kenneth's treating physician. The trial court determined that Hendrix's claim was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), because the claim "relate[s] to" the ERISA-governed employee-benefit plan pursuant to which United had issued Kenneth's health-insurance policy. In October 2015, Kenneth was injured in an automobile accident. His physician recommended Kenneth be admitted to an inpatient-rehabilitation facility. Hendrix claimed United "imposed itself as [Kenneth's] health care provider, took control of [Kenneth's] medical care, and made a medical treatment decision that [Kenneth] should not receive further treatment, rehabilitation, and care at an inpatient facility." Instead, Hendrix contended United made the decision Kenneth should have been discharged to his home to receive a lower quality of care than had been ordered by his physicians. Kenneth died on October 25, 2015, due to a pulmonary thromboembolism, which, the complaint asserts, would not have occurred had United approved inpatient rehabilitation. The Alabama Supreme Court concurred with the circuit court that Hendrix's claim related to an ERISA-governed benefit plan, and thus preempted by the ERISA statute. View "Hendrix v. United Healthcare Insurance Company of the River Valley" on Justia Law

Advanced Disposal Services South, LLC, Advanced Disposal Services Alabama Holdings, LLC, Advanced Disposal Services, Inc., Tallassee Waste Disposal Center, Inc., and Stone's Throw Landfill, LLC (collectively, "Advanced Disposal"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to order the Macon Circuit Court ("the trial court") to dismiss, an action filed by Jerry Tarver, Sr., because, they claimed, the action cannot proceed in the absence of the City of Tallassee ("the City") as a party. In May 2017, Tarver sued Advanced Disposal, the utilities board, and fictitiously named defendants seeking monetary damages as well as injunctive relief for exposure to allegedly contaminated water that had been illegally "discharged" into the river and ultimately sold by the utilities board for consumption by its customers. The complaint alleged Advanced Disposal unlawfully discharged its leachate into the City's stabilization pond, knowing that the leachate could not be properly treated before the resulting effluent was discharged into the river. Tarver also alleged Advanced Disposal discharged "pollutants" into various creeks and tributaries flowing into the river in violation of its storm-water discharge permit. The Alabama Supreme Court denied relief, finding that this action could proceed in equity and good conscience without the City. "The City's role in the underlying dispute potentially makes the City a joint tortfeasor with Advanced Disposal, the utilities board, and MCWA; it does not, however, make the City an indispensable party under the particular facts of this case." View "Ex parte Advanced Disposal Services South, LLC" on Justia Law

Aaron Kyle Steward sued Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Nationwide"), seeking uninsured-motorist ("UM") benefits after he was injured in an accident at a publicly owned and operated all-terrain-vehicle ("ATV") park. The circuit court entered summary judgment in Steward's favor, ruling that the ATV that collided with the one on which he was riding was an "uninsured motor vehicle" for purposes of Steward's automobile-insurance policies with Nationwide, and Nationwide appealed. Because the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the roads on which the accident occurred were "public roads" under the policies, judgment was affirmed. View "Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Steward" on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court granted Mid-Century Insurance Company permission to appeal the denial of its motion for a partial summary judgment in an action seeking underinsured-motorist benefits filed by Rodney Watts, as the personal representative of the estate of his wife Leiah Watts, deceased, and others (collectively, "the Watts plaintiffs"). In 2016, Leiah Watts, Caiden Watts, Jackson Watts, Faye Howard, Mary Adair, Evelyn Watts, Tammy McBurnett, Renee Stone, and Victoria Stone were traveling in a 2014 Ford Expedition sport-utility vehicle when it was struck by a vehicle driven by Wiley "Pete" Whitworth. The collision killed Leiah Watts, Faye Howard, Mary Adair, and Evelyn Watts. Tammy McBurnett, Renee Stone, Caiden Watts, Jackson Watts, and Victoria Stone suffered serious injuries in the collision. The Watts vehicle was insured by a policy of insurance issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange to Rodney Watts, underwritten by Mid-Century. Mid-Century contended that, because the policy allowed for the stacking of up to three UIM coverages, the maximum amount of UIM benefits available under the policy for the accident in this case was $300,000, based on $100,000 per accident. The Watts plaintiffs contended that each of the nine occupants of the Watts vehicle involved in the accident (or his/her personal representative) was entitled to $150,000 in UIM benefits ($50,000 per person limit of the occupied vehicle plus the per person limit of $50,000 for two additional coverages under the stacking provision of the policy). Thus, the total sought by Rodney in UIM benefits was $1,350,000 (9 x $150,000). The case was removed to federal district court, and the federal court granted Mid-Century's motion to dismiss in part, granting the motion as to fraud claims as to Farmers Insurance Exchange and Mid-Century. The court dismissed without prejudice claims of breach of contract and bad faith on ripeness grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the Watts plaintiffs were unable to stack more than three coverages under the uninsured-motorist statute and insurance policy, and the fact that they could not do so did not render the coverage under the policy illusory. The Court reversed the trial court's order denying Mid-Century's motion for a partial summary judgment as to the UIM claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mid-Century Insurance Company v. Watts" on Justia Law

After her claim for coverage under the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Plan ("PEEHIP") was denied, Marilyn Player sued Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama ("BCBS") at the Macon Circuit Court ("the trial court") asserting claims of breach of contract and bad faith. BCBS sought a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to transfer Player's case to the Montgomery Circuit Court pursuant to section 16-25A-7(e), Ala. Code 1975. A complaint seeking judicial review of a decision of a PEEHIP claims administrator could be heard only by the Montgomery Circuit Court. Player argued that 16-25A-7(e) did not apply to her complaint because her claims, she contended, did not constitute an action for a dispute over the denial of benefits and her complaint could not be characterized as an appeal of any administrative action. Rather, the breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims, Player argued, were regular tort claims recognized by the common law of Alabama and therefore did not fall within the purview of 16-25A-7(e). The Alabama Supreme Court was not persuaded: "Player cannot avoid the legislature's exclusive-venue provision by recasting her claims using artful labels." The trial court exceeded its discretion in denying BCBS's motion for a change of venue from Macon County to Montgomery County. Despite Player's attempt to cast the issues in her complaint as regular tort claims, Player's breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims are, in essence, disputes over a final decision allegedly made by BCBS regarding Player's insulin medication. Section 16-25A-7(e) controlled in this action; therefore, venue was proper in Montgomery County. The Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ. The trial court was ordered to transfer the action to the Montgomery Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama." on Justia Law

Deborah Faison ("Deborah") died from cardiac arrest while she was a patient at Thomas Hospital in Fairhope, Alabama. Her husband Larry Faison ("Faison") then sued Gulf Health Hospitals, Inc. ("Gulf Health"), which owned and operated the hospital. Over a year after filing suit, Faison was allowed to amend his complaint by making additional factual allegations to support his claims. Gulf Health petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to strike the amended complaint. Gulf Health argued the the amendment was untimely and without good cause. The Supreme Court determined Gulf Health did not meet its burden of showing that a postjudgment appeal was an inadequate remedy. Therefore, petition was denied. View "Ex parte Gulf Health Hospitals, Inc., d/b/a Thomas Hospital." on Justia Law

James Kidd, Jr., and Carolyn Kidd appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Edwin and Dianne Benson in their action against the Bensons arising out of a real-estate transaction. In this case, the Kidds signed a purchase agreement expressly stating that they were accepting the property in its "AS IS, WHERE IS, CONDITION." Despite "heightened" knowledge, they did not have the property or its structures professionally inspected. Because the Kidds purchased the property in its "as is" condition, without having a bluff area inspected, they could not invoke the health-or-safety exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor in an attempt to impose upon the Bensons a duty to disclose. Accordingly, the Kidds failed to present sufficient evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact not only as to their fraud claims, but also as to their negligence and wantonness claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kidd v. Benson" on Justia Law

Kimberlee Spencer ("Kimberlee"), as personal representative of the estate of James Scott Spencer ("Scott"), her deceased husband, appealed a judgment as a matter of law entered by the circuit court at the close of Kimberlee's medical malpractice case against Michael Remillard, M.D., and Helena Family Medicine, LLC, the entity through which Dr. Remillard operated his family-medicine clinic ("the clinic"). On a visit in 2006 for a physical, Scott informed Dr. Remillard that his father had been diagnosed with early-stage prostate cancer. Scott had blood work and lab tests done during the 2006 visit, including a blood test used to assess a man's risk for developing prostate cancer. At that time, Scott's PSA level was 1.9, which was within the normal range for a man his age, 46 years old. In 2009, Scott again visited Dr. Remillard. Scott told Dr. Remillard that he had seen some blood in his stool, and Dr. Remillard performed a rectal examination on Scott. Dr. Remillard concluded from that exam that Scott's prostate was firm and normal, so he recommended that Scott get a colonoscopy to determine if there was a problem with his colon. Scott also had blood work done during the 2009 visit. At that time, Scott's PSA level was 14.3, which Dr. Remillard and Kimberlee's medical experts agreed was an elevated PSA level for a 49-year-old. A pivotal factual dispute in this case centered on when Dr. Remillard and Helena Family Medicine first informed Scott of the 2009 elevated PSA level. Scott next visited the clinic in 2011. During that visit, Dr. Remillard did not tell Scott about his 2009 elevated PSA level, but he did perform a rectal examination, and he determined that Scott's prostate was enlarged. Dr. Remillard diagnosed Scott with benign prostatic hyperplasia, and he prescribed Scott some medication for the condition. Scott was ultimately diagnosed with stage IV metastatic prostate cancer; he died as a result of the cancer on March 6, 2014. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded Kimberlee presented competent expert-witness testimony regarding the standard of care and causation. In the interest of judicial economy, the Court also addressed other rulings by the trial court challenged by Kimberlee in this appeal. Concerning those rulings, Kimberlee's CMA nursing expert should have been permitted to testify, but the trial court properly excluded Kimberlee's counsel from directly questioning Dr. Remillard about his failure to tell Scott about his 2009 abnormal PSA lab-test result during his April 7, 2011, visit to the clinic. The judgment of the trial court was reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial. View "Spencer v. Remillard" on Justia Law