Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A series of appeals arose from a will-contest dispute between siblings. After their mother died, William C. Harper and Alice Lynn Harper Taylor disagreed about which version of their mother's will governed the disposition of her assets. After a purported transfer of the will contests from probate court to circuit court, the siblings submitted their dispute to a jury, which returned a verdict for Alice Lynn. William appealed and Alice Lynn cross-appealed. Because jurisdiction never properly vested in the circuit court, the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed these appeals. View "Harper-Taylor. v. Harper." on Justia Law

Raymon Means, Jr., an employee of Sanders Lead Company, Inc., was burned in a workplace accident when molten lead splashed out of a kettle following an explosion. In an effort to recover outside Alabama's Workers' Compensation Act, Means sued, among others, several of his co- employees and an independent contractor, alleging that they had engaged in willful conduct that caused his injuries. While the Act generally barred an employee injured in a workplace accident from recovering damages from a co-employee who allegedly caused the accident, section 25-5-11 provided an exception when the accident was caused by the co-employee's willful conduct. Means sued the Sanders Lead defendants claiming that the exception applied to his case. The trial court entered a summary judgment against him, holding that his claims were all either barred by the statute of limitations or not supported by substantial evidence of willful conduct. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Means v. Glover, et al." on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals involved a dispute between Cortney Brooks and her brother Chad Svenby about the administration of the estate of their deceased mother Dorothy Clare. In appeal no. 1190405, Brooks challenged a circuit court order removing the original administrator of the estate. After the circuit court appointed Svenby to be the executor of the estate and granted his motion to enter a final settlement, Brooks filed appeal no. 1191037 contesting that settlement. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded Brooks established the circuit court erred: (1) by removing Colley as the administrator of Clare's estate; and (2) by entering an order approving a final settlement of Clare's estate. Accordingly, the circuit court was directed on remand to vacate those orders and to reinstall Colley as the duly appointed administrator with the will annexed of Clare's estate. View "Brooks v. Svenby" on Justia Law

Shamblin Hamilton appealed a circuit court judgment concluding he had no interest in a Birmingham property, and ejected him from the property. In 1992, the property was conveyed to Shamblin and Carol Hamilton by general warranty deed. The Hamiltons owned the property in fee simple subject to a mortgage to Compass Bank recorded in 2003. In 2004, Shambin and Carol divorced, and pursuant to that divorce judgment, Shamblin was awarded sole ownership of the property. In 2009, the divorce judgment was modified by an agreement of the parties, and a court order adopting that agreement declared that Shamblin had assumed sole responsibility of a home-equity line of credit that Shamblin and Carol had jointly executed with Compass Bank. In his filings in the circuit court in this case, Shamblin asserted that he was still making payments on the home-equity line of credit as the litigation ensued. The Hamiltons failed to pay the ad valorem real-property taxes on the property, and in 2014, the State sold the property at auction to Mercury Funding, LLC ("Mercury"). Mercury conveyed its interested to Guardian Tax AL, LLC (“Guardian”) by quitclaim deed. In 2018, Guardian filed a complaint for ejectment and to quiet title to the property against the Hamiltons and Compass Bank. Shamblin denied not paying the ad valorem property taxes on the property, and he asserted that he had no notice of delinquency even though he had retained physical ownership of the property since 1992. Shamblin asserted a counterclaim for judicial redemption of the property, arguing he, not Carol as part title-holder, had a right to redeem. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in holding Carol had a right to redeem, and reversed. View "Hamilton v. Guardian Tax AL, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Clay County Animal Shelter, Inc. ("the animal shelter"), appealed a circuit court judgment declaring Act No. 2018-432, Ala. Acts 2018, to be unconstitutional. The animal shelter was a nonprofit “no-kill” organization that provided food, water, medical care, spay and neutering services, and adoption services for stray and abandoned animals in Clay County, Alabama. Most of the people working at the animal shelter were unpaid volunteers. The animal shelter incurs numerous expenses associated with operating the shelter and caring for the animals. The legislature sought to provide funding to the animal shelter with proceeds from the tobacco tax authorized in Clay County pursuant to section 45-14-244, Ala. Code 1975. It was undisputed that Act No. 2017-65, the appropriation measure at issue, did not receive the vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house. The Clay County Commission argued that that portion of Act No. 2017-65 purporting to distribute funds to the Clay County General Fund to be disbursed to the animal shelter was, therefore, unconstitutional. After careful consideration, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in declaring Act No. 2018-432 as unconstitutional. Judgment was reversed. View "Clay County Animal Shelter, Inc. v. Clay County Commission et al." on Justia Law

Scott and Janet Lopas filed suit against, among others, Performance Builders, LLC, Chris White, Shana Tyler Clark, and DSKAT Holdings, LLC, d/b/a A-Pro Home Inspection Services Birmingham (collectively, "the movants") asserting various causes of actions based on the inspection, appraisal, and sale of a piece of real property purchased by the Lopases. The movants moved to compel arbitration of the Lopases' claims, which the circuit court denied. The movants appealed the circuit court's order. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the movants met their burden of establishing the existence of an agreement containing an arbitration provision between the parties, and that that agreement involved a transaction affecting interstate commerce. Furthermore, the arbitration provision dictated that the issue of enforceability raised by the Lopases had to be submitted to the arbitrator for determination. Therefore, the circuit court's order denying the movants' motion to compel arbitration was reversed. View "Performance Builders, LLC, et al. v. Lopas" on Justia Law

Abbott Laboratories and Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (collectively, "Abbott"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to dismiss all claims asserted by the Mobile County Board of Health and the Family Oriented Primary Health Care Clinic (collectively, "Mobile Health") against Abbott on the basis that those claims are barred by the rule of repose or by the applicable statute of limitations. Mobile Health alleged that Abbott had participated in the marketing of a specific prescription drug, OxyContin. Mobile Health alleged that this marketing campaign "precipitated" an "opioid crisis" in the United States, and specifically in Alabama, because it caused an astronomical increase in the use of opioids by patients who quickly became dependent upon the drugs. Mobile Health asserted that it brought this action because of the burdens it had to bear as a result of the "opioid epidemic." The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the applicable statutes of limitations barred Mobile Health's claims against Abbott. Therefore, the Court granted Abbott's petition for a writ of mandamus, and directed the circuit court to enter an order dismissing Mobile Health's claims against Abbott. View "Ex parte Abbott Laboratories and Abbott Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law

The State of Alabama appealed a circuit court order that dismissed the State's claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief "to abate a public nuisance of unlawful gambling," pursuant to section 6-5-120, Ala. Code 1975, against some, but not all, of the defendants. The circuit court certified its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. However, we determine that the order was not appropriate for Rule 54(b) certification; therefore, the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Alabama v. Epic Tech, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Ann Langford appealed a trial court judgment in favor of Harriett Broussard regarding the administration of an estate and the sale and division of real property. Mary Walker Taylor died in January 1998 leaving a will that appointed two of her daughters, Ann and Harriett, as coexecutors. The coexecutors petitioned to have the will admitted to probate. The sisters filed a waiver of notice in which they each accepted service of notice of the filing of the petition for the probate of the will and waived further notice of the proceedings. The record reflected no other action was taken in the probate court with respect to the administration of the estate. In October 2017, Harriett petitioned to, among other things, remove the administration of the estate from the probate court to the trial court. In her petition, Harriett sought either the sale for division of certain real property or, if the trial court determined that any of the real property was "heirs property," the partition by sale. The trial court granted Harriett’s request, removing the administration of the estate from the probate court and allowing the sale. Ann responded to Harriett’s petition denying the real property could not be equitably partitioned, and asserted the real property could not be sold or divided. Finding, however, that the trial court did not err with respect to the sale and division of the estate property, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed judgment. View "Langford v. Broussard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeremy K. Hon appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Kevin Duane Hon, individually and as trustee of the Jeremy K. Hon Irrevocable Family Trust ("the Trust"), Emily Louise Hon Castellanos, and Jason Jeremy Hon. Jeremy K. Hon and Lynda L.B. Hon were married and had three children -- Kevin Duane Hon, Emily Louise Hon Castellanos, and Jason Jeremy Hon. In 2012, plaintiff signed an agreement creating the Trust. Over time, plaintiff transferred assets to the Trust, including his and Lynda's principal Alabama residence; a condominium in New York; his 50% interest in L&L Enterprises LLC; and over $1,000,000 in cash and securities. Lynda died in 2017, and Kevin succeeded her as the sole trustee of the Trust. In 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint against Kevin, individually and as trustee of the Trust, Emily, and Jason seeking rescission of the Trust agreement. Plaintiff alleged he had signed the Trust agreement based on "his mistaken understanding of the effects thereof"; that he had "transferred assets to the Trust based on his mistaken understanding of the effects of the Trust Agreement"; and that, "due to mistake, the Trust Agreement does not accomplish his intent." He also alleged that he had paid amounts on behalf of the Trust that "the Trust, in equity and good conscience, should be required to repay" to him and that the Trust "has received and retained an improper benefit ... and has been unjustly enriched." The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, finding plaintiff did not present any evidence to establish that Lynda had engaged in any fraudulent or inequitable conduct that resulted in his alleged misunderstanding, and he did not present any evidence indicating that Lynda had been aware of his alleged misunderstanding. Also, the plaintiff did not present substantial evidence to establish that the mistake was not mixed with his own negligence. “Rather, by his own testimony, the plaintiff admitted that he did not read the Trust agreement before he signed it; that he might have skimmed the Trust agreement; that he did not ask Burwell any questions about the provisions of the Trust; and that he instead relied on comments made by his business partner about the effects of his own separate trust.” View "Hon v. The Jeremy K. Hon Irrevocable Family Trust, et al." on Justia Law