Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve, LLC ("Radiance") appealed a judgment from the Henry Circuit Court in favor of Bondy's Ford, Inc. ("Bondy's"). Radiance had garnished the wages of David Sherrill, who worked for Bondy's. Bondy's stopped paying on the garnishment, claiming Sherrill had left its employment, but continued to pay for Sherrill's services through a company created by Sherrill's wife. Radiance argued that Bondy's should still comply with the garnishment by withdrawing funds owed for Sherrill's services.The Henry Circuit Court had initially entered a garnishment judgment in favor of SE Property Holdings, LLC, which was later substituted by Radiance. Bondy's reported Sherrill's employment termination in September 2019, two months after the required notice period. Radiance filed a motion for judgment against Bondy's, arguing that Sherrill continued to provide services to Bondy's through his wife's company, KDS Aero Services, LLC. Bondy's responded with a motion to dismiss, claiming Sherrill was an independent contractor. The trial court granted Bondy's motion to dismiss and denied Radiance's motion.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Bondy's payments to KDS Aero Services were actually owed to Sherrill. The lack of a contract or invoices between Bondy's and KDS Aero Services, coupled with inconsistencies in Sherrill's representations about his employment and residence, suggested potential fraud or misuse of corporate form to hide funds. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, emphasizing that neither party had met the burden for summary judgment. View "Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve, LLC v. Bondy's Ford, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Helena appealed a decision by the Shelby Circuit Court that allowed the Pelham Board of Education (PBE) to acquire, develop, and use a piece of real property within Helena's corporate limits for an athletic field and parking lot to serve Pelham High School students. The property, purchased by the PBE in 2021, is adjacent to Pelham High School but located within Helena. Helena argued that the PBE lacked the authority to construct and operate school facilities outside Pelham's corporate limits and that the project violated Helena's zoning ordinance.The Shelby Circuit Court ruled in favor of the PBE, stating that city zoning ordinances do not apply to governmental functions performed by a government body. The court found that the PBE's construction of the athletic field was a governmental function related to public education, which is exempt from local zoning regulations. Helena appealed, arguing that the PBE's actions were not authorized under Alabama Code § 16-11-9 and that the project did not comply with Helena's zoning ordinance.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that § 16-11-9 does not restrict a city board of education's powers to the geographic boundaries of the city it serves. The court also concluded that the PBE's construction and operation of the athletic field constituted a governmental function related to public education, which is exempt from municipal zoning ordinances. Therefore, Helena's zoning ordinance could not be enforced against the PBE's project. The court affirmed the circuit court's order, allowing the PBE to proceed with the development and use of the property. View "City of Helena v. Pelham Board of Education" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a property deed. Earnest Coprich and Bessie Elizabeth Jones, who have known each other for about 50 years, disagreed over the terms of a property sale. Coprich claimed that he sold his residence to Jones for $15,000, while Jones contended that the sale price was $10,000. After Jones moved into the property and made several improvements, Coprich filed a complaint seeking to set aside the deed. He alleged that he was mentally incompetent at the time of signing the deed and that he was coerced and defrauded by Jones. Jones denied these allegations and asserted that she had purchased the property and occupied it since the transaction.The Montgomery Circuit Court, after a bench trial, ruled in favor of Jones. The court found that Coprich failed to present sufficient evidence to prove his incompetence or that Jones had committed fraud or misrepresentation. Coprich's postjudgment motion to vacate the order was summarily denied by the court. Coprich then appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama due to lack of appellate jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, determined that the Court of Civil Appeals should have jurisdiction over the case. The court noted that the case is a "civil case" as defined by § 12-3-10 and that the "amount involved" does not exceed the jurisdictional threshold of $50,000. Therefore, the Supreme Court transferred the appeal back to the Court of Civil Appeals. View "Coprich v. Jones" on Justia Law

David McGilvray, a former investigator for the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners (the Medical Board), was terminated for sending a sexually explicit email to his coworkers. Following his termination, the Medical Board requested the Local Government Health Insurance Board (the Insurance Board) to cancel McGilvray's health-insurance benefits. McGilvray, claiming he had retired before the Medical Board ratified his termination, sought retiree-health-insurance benefits. His request was denied by the Insurance Board on the grounds that he had been fired for cause and had not retired.McGilvray filed two lawsuits in an attempt to obtain retiree-health-insurance benefits. The first lawsuit was against the executive director of the Medical Board and the CEO of the Insurance Board. The Montgomery Circuit Court entered summary judgment against him, ruling that his claims were time-barred. In the second lawsuit, which is the subject of this appeal, McGilvray sued the executive director of the Medical Board and the members of the Medical Board in both their official and individual capacities. The Montgomery Circuit Court dismissed this suit based on the doctrines of State immunity and res judicata.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that McGilvray's breach-of-contract claim, seeking damages from the Medical Board defendants in their official capacities, was barred by State immunity. Furthermore, the court ruled that all of his other claims were barred by res judicata, as they arose from the same set of facts as his claims in the prior action: the termination of his employment and the Insurance Board's denial of his request for retiree-health-insurance benefits. View "McGilvray v. Perkins" on Justia Law

This case involves a contractual dispute between Alabama Plating Technology, LLC (APT) and Georgia Plating Technology, LLC (GPT), DVEST, LLC, and Jin Kim. The dispute arose from an asset-purchase agreement for a brake-plating plant. After the purchase, APT claimed indemnity from the sellers for environmental issues, unpaid accounts payable, and certain inoperable assets, alleging these were retained liabilities or breaches of warranties by the sellers. The sellers sued APT for breach of contract due to setoff of losses against annual installment payments.The trial court found in favor of APT regarding the environmental issues and unpaid accounts payable, but sided with the sellers on the inoperable-assets claim. It also rejected APT's claim for attorneys' fees and legal expenses. Both parties appealed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's judgment denying APT relief on its inoperable-assets claim and its claim for attorneys' fees and legal expenses. It affirmed the trial court's judgment granting APT relief on its environmental-issues and unpaid-accounts-payable claims, and the denial of the sellers' request to accelerate the remaining installment payments owed to them by APT. View "Alabama Plating Technology, LLC v. Georgia Plating Technology, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Stacy G. Coats and Kendall Coats (the plaintiffs) who filed a private right-of-way condemnation case against Sandra F. Ayers, Tommy J. Ayers, and J. Jason Ayers (the defendants). The plaintiffs sought a right-of-way across the defendants' property to access their own landlocked properties. The properties in question include several parcels of land, some of which are low-lying wetlands often flooded and used for hunting and fishing. A private dirt road, referred to as the "farm road," crosses the defendants' property and has been historically used by the plaintiffs and their predecessors to access their properties.The Tuscaloosa Probate Court initially granted the plaintiffs a right-of-way across the defendants' property, concluding that the plaintiffs' property was landlocked. The defendants appealed this decision to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' property was no longer landlocked due to inheritance of additional land that touched a public road. The Circuit Court agreed with the defendants, granting a summary judgment in their favor on the grounds that the plaintiffs' property was no longer landlocked and they had reasonable access to their property from a public road.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the decision of the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. The Supreme Court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiffs have an existing, reasonable means to access their landlocked property. The court noted that the plaintiffs had presented substantial evidence indicating that they could not travel from the public road across their property to access their landlocked property. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had permission to cross an intervening property, and thus there was no requirement for them to seek a right-of-way over it. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Coats v. Ayers" on Justia Law

Joe Iskra and Rani Singh, the plaintiffs, entered into a contract to purchase a house from Kenneth Vinoski. Before closing, they hired a home inspection service that discovered a leak in the attic. The plaintiffs requested Vinoski to repair the leak before the sale, and Vinoski contracted Bear Roofing, LLC, the defendant, for the repair. The plaintiffs alleged that they were intended third-party beneficiaries of the contract between Vinoski and Bear, and that Bear breached the contract and an associated express warranty. They also claimed that Bear negligently performed the contracted repairs.The Jefferson Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of Bear, ruling that the plaintiffs were not intended third-party beneficiaries of the contract between Vinoski and Bear. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to provide substantial evidence that Bear intended to bestow a direct benefit to them at the moment the contract was formed. The court also noted that the contract did not mention or refer to the plaintiffs, and there was no evidence that Bear intended for anyone other than Vinoski to receive the benefit of its work performance.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs presented evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Bear intended to bestow a direct benefit upon them. The court also found that the plaintiffs presented evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether they were covered under Bear's warranty. Lastly, the court found that the plaintiffs presented evidence showing that they had relied to their detriment on Bear's performance in repairing the leak, and that Bear had known that it had been hired to repair a leak noted in an inspection report prepared in contemplation of the imminent sale of the house. Therefore, the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Bear on the plaintiffs' negligence claim. View "Iskra v. Bear Roofing, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves the Mabel Amos Memorial Fund, a charitable trust established to provide financial assistance to beneficiaries seeking higher education. The plaintiffs, Megan Carmack and Leigh Gulley Manning, individually and on behalf of Carmack's minor children, and Tyra Lindsey, a minor, represented by her mother and guardian, alleged that the trustee and board members of the trust breached their fiduciary duties. They sought to remove the trustee and board members, appoint new ones, and restore the allegedly misappropriated assets of the trust. The Montgomery Circuit Court appointed a special master under Rule 53, Ala. R. Civ. P., and Attorney General Steve Marshall, who was added as a party to the underlying actions, petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order appointing a special master.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Marshall's petitions and ordered the circuit court to vacate its order referring the cases to a special master. The court found that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in referring all matters in these cases to a special master. The court noted that the referral of matters to be tried without a jury did not indicate that an "exceptional condition" necessitated the referral, and the referral of the accounting did not indicate that the accounting would prove complicated in some way. Even if the accounting was properly referred to a special master, the referral of an accounting does not justify the referral of all the other matters in the cases. View "Ex parte Marshall" on Justia Law

In 2010, Crystal Kaye Coan purchased a property in Lauderdale County, which was subject to a mortgage. Coan defaulted on the mortgage, leading to a foreclosure by Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC, the mortgage assignee. Carrington sold the property to Championship Property, LLC in an online auction in May 2018. Championship then filed an ejectment action against Coan, claiming it was the title owner and seeking possession of the property. Coan countered that the foreclosure sale was void, and therefore, Championship had not acquired the title. In January 2023, Championship requested the trial court to require Coan to deposit $2,000 per month with the court clerk pending a final ruling in the ejectment action. The trial court, over Coan's objection, ordered her to deposit $800 per month.Coan failed to deposit the court-ordered payments for March, April, and May 2023, leading Championship to move the trial court to hold her in contempt. The trial court found Coan in contempt and, as a sanction, ruled in favor of Championship on its ejectment claim, awarding it possession of the property. Coan appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's decision to require Coan to deposit $800 per month with the court clerk, stating that the trial court had the authority to enter the escrow order. The court also affirmed the trial court's finding of contempt against Coan for failing to comply with the escrow order. However, the court reversed the trial court's sanction awarding Championship possession of the property, stating that the sanction was not appropriate given the current posture of the litigation. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Coan v. Championship Property, LLC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between the Alabama-West Florida Conference ("the Conference") of the United Methodist Church, Inc. ("the UMC"), and 44 Methodist churches in the Conference ("the churches"). Amid disagreements within the UMC over issues of human sexuality, the churches sought to leave the UMC with their properties under a provision of the Book of Discipline, the governing law of the UMC. After the Conference denied the churches the ability to vote to disaffiliate under that provision, the churches asked the Montgomery Circuit Court to order the Conference to grant them that vote. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.The Montgomery Circuit Court held an emergency hearing and heard evidence. The next day, the court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because, according to the court, the relief that the churches requested was "ecclesiastical in nature and would require Court interference in matters of church autonomy," which would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The churches appealed that judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The churches argued that the trial court erred in dismissing their suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because, they said, the case presents only "civil and property issues." However, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that the churches' central claims turn entirely on the interpretation of the provision of the Book of Discipline and whether their efforts to leave the UMC were consistent with that church law. Under existing First Amendment law and the court's precedent, that interpretive issue constitutes an ecclesiastical question that courts do not have jurisdiction to decide. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Aldersgate United Methodist Church of Montgomery v. Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc." on Justia Law