Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Karen Wheeler, as administrator of the estate of Eugene Drayton, appealed a probate court judgment declaring Kristin Marvin was the biological child of Drayton, and was therefore an heir of Drayton for purposes of intestate succession. The probate court appointed Wheeler, who was Drayton's daughter, as the administrator of Drayton's estate. In her filings with the probate court, Wheeler identified herself and her brother as Drayton's only heirs. Marvin, however, later filed a petition with the probate court in which she claimed to also be a biological child of Drayton. She requested that the probate court consider the results of a DNA test allegedly showing that Drayton's half brother was Marvin's uncle and, therefore, indicating that Marvin was Drayton's daughter. Wheeler testified that she was unaware that Drayton had any children other than herself and her brother. She asserted that no one, including Drayton, had ever stated to her that Marvin was Drayton's child. Wheeler claimed to have met Marvin for the first time at a funeral held after the death of Drayton's mother, but, she said, Drayton did not introduce them. On appeal, Wheeler argued primarily that the probate court erred in considering the DNA test result, because the DNA samples were collected not by disinterested parties but by Marvin and Curtis, who then mailed them outside the presence of disinterested parties. Wheeler asserts that "there is a possibility that the samples were switched because they were in the exclusive possession of interested parties prior to being mailed to [the laboratory that performed the test]." She points out that the test result itself disclaims any responsibility for how the samples were collected and is based on the assumption that they were collected correctly. The Alabama Supreme Court found after review that Wheeler did not present any authority suggesting that the probate court could not admit and consider the DNA test if it believed the testimony of Curtis and Marvin describing how the DNA samples were collected and submitted. Accordingly, she did not show the probate court erred in considering the DNA test result based on how the samples were collected and submitted. View "Wheeler v. Marvin" on Justia Law

The City of Birmingham ("the City") appealed a circuit court's denial of its motion to vacate a quiet-title judgment in favor of Metropolitan Management of Alabama, LLC ("Metropolitan"). In 1999, the State of Alabama purchased a parcel of property at a tax sale. The City's Director of Finance conducted a public sale, selling and conveying a delinquent demolition assessment against the property. The City purchased that assessment interest and, in February 2007, recorded a deed showing the conveyance. In 2017, the property was sold by the State, and Michael Froelich, who was the managing member of Metropolitan, obtained title to the property by a tax deed. Froelich conveyed the property to Metropolitan by quitclaim deed. In 2018, Metropolitan commenced a quiet title action, naming Constance Wambo as a defendant possessing an interest in the property, and identified as fictitiously named defendants "any individuals and/or entities who may claim an interest now or in the future in the property ..., whose true identity is currently unknown to [the] Plaintiff." Metropolitan filed an affidavit in which Froelich averred that he, after a diligent search with the assistance of an attorney, had been unable to identify any other interest holders. In November 2019, the court entered a judgment quieting title to the property in Metropolitan, conveying to Metropolitan fee-simple title to the exclusion of all others, voiding any claims of the defendants, and making Metropolitan's claim of interest superior to any other. In early 2020, Metropolitan's attorney contacted counsel for the City regarding the City's recorded assessment interest. In June 2020, the City filed a motion to intervene in the quiet-title action and a motion to vacate the judgment as void under Rule 60(b)(4). The court denied the City's motion to vacate without stating grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, finding the law imputes to purchasers knowledge of the contents of recorded documents, and that such constructive notice of a defendant's residence generally suffices for "know[ledge]" of that residence under Rule 4.3(b). Metropolitan did not provide any reason why a reasonable probate-records search would not have disclosed the City's deed. Because Metropolitan had knowledge of the City's residence, Metropolitan's service by publication without first attempting another means of service failed to comply with Rule 4.3(b). View "City of Birmingham v. Metropolitan Management of Alabama, LLC" on Justia Law

In an earlier action, 623 Partners, LLC, obtained a default judgment against Bart Bowers. But 623 Partners never collected on that judgment. About nine years after obtaining the judgment, 623 Partners filed this case, alleging that Bart and members of his family had orchestrated the fraudulent conveyance of a property that should have been used to pay the judgment. While this case was pending, the judgment in the earlier action reached the 10-year mark, meaning the judgment was presumed satisfied. 623 Partners tried but failed to revive the judgment. The defendants in this case then moved for summary judgment on the sole basis that 623 Partners could not enforce the judgment -- effectively arguing that the 623 Partners' fraudulent-conveyance claims were moot. The trial court granted that motion. Because the Alabama Supreme Court presumed the judgment against Bart and its underlying debt were satisfied, the Court affirmed. View "623 Partners, LLC v. Bowers et al." on Justia Law

Johnny Lee Self petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for review of a Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to affirm the summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. In September 2003, Self pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment; the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree was a Class C felony. Self did not appeal. In 2019, Self petitioned to challenge his convictions and sentences, arguing he had been improperly sentenced to serve 25 years in prison because the maximum sentence authorized for a Class C felony was 10 years, and, Self asserted, he "was not sentenced as a [h]abitual [o]ffender." Self also alleged "that nothing in the record shows that his sentence was properly enhanced." In 2020, the State responded, arguing Self's claim was not a jurisdictional claim, and was barred by the limitations period set forth in Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P. The circuit court summarily dismissed Self's Rule 32 petition, interpreting Self's claims in his Rule 32 petition as (1) a claim "that the State failed to adequately prove [Self's] prior felony convictions that were used to enhance his sentence" and (2) a claim "that the record does not reflect application of the Habitual Felony Offender Act." The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision was in conflict with Barnes v. State, 708 So. 2d 217 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), the facts of which were similar to those presented in this case. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision was in conflict with Barnes, thus reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment. View "Ex parte Johnny Lee Self" on Justia Law

Mobile Infirmary Association ("MIA"), doing business as J.L. Bedsole Rotary Rehabilitation Hospital ("Rotary Rehab") and doing business as Mobile Infirmary Medical Center ("Mobile Infirmary"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for mandamus relief from a complaint filed by John McBride alleging medical malpractice. According to McBride's complaint, he had undergone a craniotomy, hospitalization, and treatment at Mobile Infirmary for a subdural hematoma he had suffered while at home. He alleged that, in early June 2018, he was transferred to Rotary Rehab "to receive skilled and specialized nursing, medical and rehabilitative therapy." McBride further alleged that, while he was a patient at Rotary Rehab, he "suffered a decubitus pressure ulcer to his left and right heels, causing severe pain and suffering, infection, hospital treatment, financial loss, emotional distress, and eventually amputation below his left knee." McBride's complaint asserted counts of negligence and wantonness against the defendants, based on several alleged breaches of the applicable standards of care. MIA, in its capacity doing business as Rotary Rehab and in its capacity doing business as Mobile Infirmary, moved to dismiss McBride's complaint, arguing that his claims are barred by the limitations period set out in 6-5-482(a), Ala. Code 1975. Specifically, MIA contended the complaint was not filed until July 22, 2020, more than two years after the date of accrual of any potential claims against Mobile Infirmary or Rotary Rehab. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the statutory bar was apparent from the face of McBride's complaint. Therefore, MIA demonstrated a clear legal right to an order dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, MIA's mandamus petition was granted, and the writ of mandamus was issued directing the circuit court to vacate its order denying MIA's motion to dismiss, and to enter an order granting the motion. View "Ex parte Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a J.L. Bedsole Rotary Rehabilitation Hospital and d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center." on Justia Law

The Utilities Board of the City of Roanoke ("the Utilities Board") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate an order purporting to reinstate a case that the circuit court had previously disposed of. Because the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to issue the order purporting to reinstate the case, it granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Utilities Board of the City of Roanoke." on Justia Law

The petitioners in six cases before the Alabama Supreme Court were brothers Michael Todd Scoggins and Matthew Tyler-Crimson Scoggins. The brothers sought to set aside orders in some of the cases, to intervene in some of the cases, and to order the Circuit Court to permit the interpleader of funds by a third party in one case. The proceeds of a wrongful death settlement were to be used to purchase four annuities for the brothers; their father died in an industrial accident when they were children. The annuities provided for periodic payments and lump-sum payments on various dates. In 2010, the brothers' paternal grandfather Thomas Scoggins (through an attorney) petitioned to have Thomas named conservator for the brothers in order to "reopen" the wrongful-death action for the purpose of obtaining a ruling that a sale of the structured settlement-payment rights was in the best interests of the brother. Court documents would later reveal that the brothers' grandfather did not have authority to sell the payment rights, and that the attorney their grandfather hired to help with the payment rights paid himself from the brothers' trusts with "nearly every single disbursement .... made to himself with virtually no money being paid to the beneficiaries, Michael and Matthew." The brothers sued multiple parties relating to the sale of the payment rights and the mismanagement of their trusts. They moved the circuit court to set aside orders that empowered Thomas to sell certain structured-settlement-payment rights. The motion was denied without a rationale for the ruling. The Alabama Supreme Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus in case number 1200107, which pertained to the circuit court's denial of the brothers' motion to set aside the circuit court's August 11, 2011, and November 21, 2011, orders in the wrongful-death action; the Court denied the petitions for the writ of mandamus in case numbers 1200103, 1200104, 1200105, and 1200106, which pertained to the circuit court's October 7, 2020, order denying Michael's motion to intervene in the Stratcap actions; and the Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus in case number 1200102, which pertained to the circuit court's October 1, 2020, order denying American General's motion for interpleader relief in the 2019 action. View "Ex parte Michael Todd & Matthew Tyler-Crimson Scoggins." on Justia Law

The Jefferson County Board of Education ("the Board") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to dismiss the action brought against the Board by Alabama Lockers, LLC. Alabama Lockers provided services regarding school lockers. In July 2020, Alabama Lockers sued the Board, alleging breach of contract. Alabama Lockers also alleged that the Board had failed to follow both "state bid laws" and its own policies and procedures regarding bidding on locker-services contracts. In September 2020, the Board filed a motion to dismiss, asserting, in relevant part, that Alabama Lockers' action was barred by State immunity. "Because county boards of education are local agencies of the State, they are clothed in constitutional immunity from suit." Thus, the Board, as a county board of education, was entitled to State immunity in this case. Accordingly, the Board established a clear legal right to have the action against it dismissed. View "Ex parte Jefferson County Board of Education." on Justia Law

Deborah Hillard and Holland Hillard Warr jointly petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, raising numerous issues. The Court ordered answers and briefs on one issue raised by Warr: whether the circuit court erred in denying her summary-judgment motion on the counterclaim brought against her by her former husband, Rik Tozzi, which Warr claimed was barred by principles of res judicata. Warr specifically requested that the Supreme Court issue the writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to grant her summary-judgment motion. The Court denied the petition as to that issue. "Warr does not provide meaningful discussion of the precedent she cites or the other relevant precedent ... She has not established that the instant case is controlled by opinions holding that a former spouse was barred from pursuing a tort claim against the other former spouse based on conduct that occurred before a divorce. For example, she has not shown that the allegedly tortious acts and omissions surrounding the execution and delivery of the promissory note were fully litigated in the divorce action or that Tozzi's tort allegations were resolved by a settlement agreement entered in the divorce action or by the final divorce judgment." Because Warr did not demonstrate a clear legal right to a judgment in her favor on Tozzi's counterclaim based on principles of res judicata, the Supreme Court denied the petition. View "Ex parte Hillard and Warr." on Justia Law

Amy Williamson petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in her favor based on State-agent immunity. Twenty-year-old Re.W. was a student in the CrossingPoints program, a collaborative program between the University of Alabama, the Tuscaloosa City Board of Education, and the Tuscaloosa County Board of Education that served college-aged students with mental disabilities. Williamson was a teacher in the program and an employee of the Tuscaloosa City Board of Education, and Amy Burnett was a "para-educator" with the program. In 2015, Williamson and Burnett transported Re.W. and three other students to various businesses to submit job applications. While Williamson and Burnett took two students into a Lowe's home-improvement store to submit applications, Re.W. and a male student stayed in the CrossingPoints van. Re.W. stated that, during the short time that the others were inside the store, the male student touched her on her breast and between her legs. In 2019, Re.W., by and through her parents and next friends, Ro.W. and V.W., sued Williamson on counts of negligent, wanton, and/or willful failure to perform ministerial acts and the tort of outrage. Williamson filed an answer to the complaint denying the material allegations and asserted multiple affirmative defenses. Williamson later moved for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that Re.W.'s claims were barred by the doctrine of State-agent immunity. Because the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Williamson established that, at the time of the incident, she was performing a discretionary function, and because the Court concluded Re.W. did not present any evidence to establish that an exception to State-agent immunity applied, Williamson established that she was entitled to State-agent immunity. Accordingly, the petition for the writ of mandamus was granted and the trial court directed to vacate its order denying Williamson's motion for a summary judgment, and directed to enter a summary judgment for Williamson. View "Ex parte Amy Williamson." on Justia Law