Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Larry Lang appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Cabela's Wholesale, LLC ("Cabela's"), in his product-liability action against Cabela's based on the alleged failure of a hunting tree stand. On November 29, 2016, Lang was starting to climb down the ladder of a hunting tree stand. A telescoping mechanism in the ladder failed, and Lang fell to the ground and was severely injured. As a result, he had limited ability to walk, incurred significant medical bills, and incurred expenses to modify his home. The Alabama Supreme Court found that under the clear language of 6-5-521(b)-(d), Ala. Code 1975, commonly known as the innocent-seller act, Cabela's was not entitled to a summary judgment on Lang's claims against Cabela's as the seller of the tree stand. Cabela's was entitled to a summary judgment, however, on Lang's claims against Cabela's as the designer and manufacturer. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in part and reversed it in part. View "Lang v. Cabela's Wholesale, LLC." on Justia Law

Hunter Halver Brown petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari review in which a circuit court had denied Brown's motion to dismiss the indictment against him notwithstanding the State's purported failure to comply with the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, 15-9-80 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the Act"), a codification of the federal Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 18 U.S.C. App. 2 ("the IAD"). The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to consider whether, as a matter of first impression, its Court's statewide suspension of jury trials in response to the COVID-19 pandemic tolled the Act's 180-day time limit for bringing a prisoner to trial. The Court held that it did, and affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to affirm the circuit court. View "Ex parte Hunter Halver Brown." on Justia Law

Warren Averett Companies, LLC, sought a writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to vacate its order denying Warren Averett's motion to strike the jury demand asserted by Gerriann Fagan and to enter an order granting the motion to strike the jury demand. The underlying dispute involved a business proposition Warren Averett made to Fagan to to build a human-resources consulting practice. Fagan would wind down the operations of her company, The Prism Group; Fagan would then become a member of Warren Averett, and Warren Averett would purchase The Prism Group's equipment and furniture, assume responsibility for The Prism Group's leases; and that Warren Averett would assume The Prism Group's membership in Career Partners International, LLC. The "Standard Personal Service Agreement" ("the PSA") entered into by Fagan and Warren Averett drafted by Warren Averett included, in pertinent part, a dispute-resolution clause. Fagan resigned from Warren Averett after a salary dispute, and, on February 28, 2019, Fagan filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). The AAA determined that, under its rules, Fagan owed $300 and Warren Averett owed $1,900. The AAA also stated that any dispute regarding the filing fees should be raised before the arbitrator for a determination once all the filing requirements, including payment of the fees, had been satisfied. Warren Averett refused to pay its share of the filing fees as requested by the AAA, and the AAA closed the file in the matter. Thereafter, Fagan sued Warren Averett alleging multiple causes of action. Fagan demanded a jury trial. Warren Averett moved to dismiss the claims, and concurrently moved to compel arbitration. The Alabama Supreme Court determined Fagan did not show prejudice by the almost two-year delay between the filing of Fagan's amended complaint and the filing of Warren Averett's motion to strike the jury demand: "The trial court granted Warren Averett's motion to compel arbitration, and Fagan sought review of that decision. We reversed that decision; on remand, the trial court set a scheduling conference, and Warren Averett filed its motion to strike Fagan's jury demand. Although there was a delay between the time that Fagan demanded a jury and the time that Warren Averett sought to strike that demand, Fagan has not shown that she was prejudiced by that passage of time." Warren Averett's petition was granted and the writ issued. View "Ex parte Warren Averett Companies, LLC." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Terri Anderson appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants. At issue was an agreement to purchase certain residential property located on Ono Island in Baldwin County, Alabama ("the property") for $1.4 million. In 2012, Robert Bowling III acquired the property and executed a promissory note in favor of Merchants Bank. Merchants Bank subsequently assigned the promissory note and its mortgage interest in the property to Wells Fargo Bank ("Wells Fargo"). In 2018, Bowling conveyed his interest in the property to Robin and Michael Coleman via a vendor's lien deed. The Colemans executed a promissory note evidencing a debt to Bowling. In 2020, the Colemans conveyed a partial interest in the property to their friends, France Frederick and Thomas Sparks. In March 2021, the Colemans, Frederick, and Sparks entered into a purchase agreement regarding the property with Anderson. In April 2021, the sellers decided they had made a mistake by agreeing to sell the property. Robin Coleman eventually sent a communication to Anderson's realtor explaining, in relevant part: "We have voided the contract you sent us and have decided to keep our property." Anderson then initiated this action seeking an injunction prohibiting the sellers from violating the terms of the purchase agreement and a judgment requiring specific performance under the terms of the purchase agreement or, as an alternative to specific performance if the court were to determine that such relief was unavailable, damages for breach of contract. The sellers moved to dismiss Anderson's complaint, arguing that title to the property was unmarketable due to Bowling's and Wells Fargo's respective unsatisfied interests in the property. Accordingly, they contended, the language of the purchase agreement required a refund to Anderson of her earnest-money deposit and an automatic termination of the purchase agreement. The Alabama Supreme Court held only that the sellers could not invoke the marketability requirement of the termination provision set out in the purchase agreement to unilaterally rescind the purchase agreement under the circumstances presented by the record because it appeared that Anderson was willing to waive marketability of the sellers' title to the property to purchase whatever interest they were able to convey and because the sellers have expressly agreed to sell their interest in the property to Anderson, provided that the other pertinent contingencies of the purchase agreement were met. Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Coleman, et al." on Justia Law

The Wilcox County Board of Education ("the Board") and individual Board members were defendants in a lawsuit filed by Jane Doe. Defendants petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Wilcox Circuit Court to grant their motion for a summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled to immunity. On November 11, 2010, Doe, at that time, was a 12th-grade student at Wilcox County Central High School, was sexually assaulted by the principal of the school, James Thomas. According to Doe, Thomas made inappropriate comments of a sexual nature to her while she was serving as an aide in the school office and later called her into his private office, closed the door, and began kissing her and touching her. Doe reported the incident, and, as a result, Thomas was arrested the following day by the Wilcox County Sheriff's Department. After his arrest, Thomas was suspended from his duties as school principal and placed on administrative leave. He was ultimately convicted of having sexual contact with a student under the age of 19 years. In 2012, Doe initiated an action against Thomas, the Board, the individual members of the Board, and other individuals identified as former Wilcox County school-system superintendents. Doe asserted negligence and wantonness claims against the Board and the Board members, contending that those defendants had had knowledge of previous instances of similar misconduct by Thomas that they had allegedly failed to properly investigate or report. Doe also asserted claims of negligent or wanton hiring, training, and/or retention of Thomas against the Board and the Board members. The Supreme Court concluded the Board and the Board members, insofar as the Board members were sued in their official capacities, are entitled to immunity from the claims asserted against them but that the Board members were not entitled to State-agent immunity from the claims asserted against them in their individual capacities. View "Ex parte Wilcox County Board of Education" on Justia Law

Susan Hoff ("Susan") and Eliot Hoff ("Eliot") were mother and son and the purported beneficiaries under a will executed by Susan Bibb Kidd ("Kidd"), Susan's mother. Probate was initiated in 2011. In 2020, Eliot filed a "Verified Petition for Removal Pursuant to Ala. Code 12-11-41," in which he asserted, among other things, that he was an heir of Kidd and that the estate could be better administered in the circuit court. Although Eliot's signature appeared on his petition, the signature was not notarized or signed under oath. While Eliot's petition was pending, Susan filed her own verified petition for removal that was sworn to under oath and notarized. The circuit court granted Susan's removal petition. Later that same day, however, the circuit court entered an order in which it vacated its previous order granting Susan's removal petition, directed Susan to serve notice of her removal petition to all interested parties, and indicated that it would set the matter for a hearing. After reconsideration was denied, Susan appealed, and the case was transferred to the Alabama Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed when Susan failed to respond to a show-cause order. In 2021, Susan moved the circuit court seeking an order removing the administration of the estate. On October 18, 2021, the circuit court entered an order dismissing Susan's removal petition without prejudice, "[f]or failure to comply with th[e] Court's Orders of November 16, 2020, June 8, 2021 and September 1, 2021." On October 21, 2021, Susan and Eliot each filed a notice of appeal to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals; that court again transferred the appeals to the Supreme Court based on a lack of appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ultimately found that because Eliot (eventually)filed a sworn removal petition that included a statement regarding his standing to bring the removal petition as an heir of Kidd and a statement that, in his opinion, the estate would be better administered in the circuit court, Eliot's removal petition satisfied the requirements of 12-11-41. Accordingly, the circuit court was required to enter an order of removal. The circuit court's order "denying" Eliot's removal petition was reversed. The Supreme Court did not reach Susan's appeal because its decision to grant Eliot's removal petition effectively awarded Susan the relief she sought. View "Hoff v. The Estate of Susan Bibb Kidd" on Justia Law

Defendant-petitioner Lisa Mestas petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order denying her motion for a summary judgment in this wrongful-death/medical-negligence action brought by David Lee Autrey, as the personal representative of the estate of his wife, Bridgette Ann Moore, and to enter a summary judgment in Mestas's favor on the basis of State-agent immunity. In May 2017, Autrey's wife, Moore, went to the University of South Alabama Medical Center to undergo a surgery required by the prior amputation of her right leg. The surgery was performed without incident, and Moore was transferred to a hospital room for recovery. At approximately 9:30 p.m. that night, nurses found Moore unresponsive. Attempts to revive her were unsuccessful, and Moore was pronounced deceased. It was later determined that Moore died as a result of opioid-induced respiratory depression ("OIRD"). Mestas argued that, at all times relevant to Autrey's lawsuit, she was an employee of the University of South Alabama ("USA") and served as the Chief Nursing Officer ("CNO") for USA Health System, which included USA Medical Center, various clinics, and a children's hospital. According to Mestas, as the CNO, her primary responsibilities were administrative in nature and she had not provided any direct patient care since 2010. Mestas argued that because Autrey's claims against her arose from the line and scope of her employment with a State agency,2 and because she did not treat Moore, she was entitled to, among other things, State-agent immunity. The Supreme Court concluded Mestas demonstrated she was entitled to state-agent immunity, and that she had a clear right to the relief sought. The Court therefore granted her petition and issued the writ, directing the trial court to grant her summary judgment. View "Ex parte Lisa Mestas." on Justia Law

Icylene Pearce, as the personal representative of the estate of her late husband, Dewitt Ray Pearce, appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the defendants in her wrongful-death action against the estate of Daniel Lea Day, deceased, and Enterprise Leasing Company-South Central, LLC ("Enterprise"). Dewitt was killed when the vehicle Day was driving collided head-on with Dewitt's vehicle. Pearce's appeal concerned the defense that Day suffered a sudden loss of consciousness before the collision. Pearce objected to the trial court's exclusion of certain evidence that she believed related to that defense, and she claimed that, even without considering that evidence, the trial court should have ordered a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Pearce v. The Estate of Daniel Lea Day, et al." on Justia Law

James P. Key, Jr. appealed a circuit court order denying his motion to compel arbitration of his claims against Warren Averett, LLC, and Warren Averett Companies, LLC (collectively, "WA"). Key alleged that he was a certified public accountant who had been employed by WA for 25 years and had been a member of WA for 15 years; that he had executed a personal-services agreement ("PSA") with WA that included a noncompete clause; and that WA had sent him a letter terminating his employment. Key sought a judgment declaring "that the Non-Compete Clause and the financial penalty provision contained in the PSA is not applicable to Key and is an unlawful restraint of Key's ability to serve his clients as a professional." The Alabama Supreme Court found that whether Key's claims against WA had to be arbitrated was a threshold issue that should not have been decided by the circuit court; nor was it appropriate for the Supreme Court to settle the issue in this appeal. Accordingly, the circuit court's order was reversed, and the case was remanded for the circuit court to enter an order sending the case to arbitration for a determination of the threshold issue of arbitrability and staying proceedings in the circuit court during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings. View "Key v. Warren Averett, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Dahlia McKinney, M.D., a defendant in the wrongful-death/medical negligence action, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate an order compelling Dr. McKinney, ostensibly under Alabama's discovery rules, to alter the contents of a registered death certificate she prepared in connection with the death of Paydro White ("Paydro"). On December 31, 2013, Paydro sought medical treatment at the emergency department of Princeton Baptist Medical Center where he was diagnosed with possible pneumonia; he was discharged on that same date. The following afternoon, Paydro returned to the emergency department seeking follow-up care; he was formally admitted for treatment by the emergency physician on duty at that time. Later that evening, after Dr. McKinney began her evening shift, Paydro become unresponsive. Although he was initially successfully resuscitated, Paydro later died in the early morning hours of January 2, 2014. Dr. McKinney, who completed and signed Paydro's death certificate, identified the contributing causes of Paydro's death as "Pulseless electrical activity" due to "Acute Myocardial Infarction." Subsequent postmortem examinations and the autopsy of Paydro's body revealed that "the most likely cause of ... death [was] pulmonary Thromboembolism" -- a final diagnosis with which Dr. McKinney's later deposition testimony indicated she agreed. Dorothy White ("Dorothy"), Paydro's mother, was the personal representative of Paydro's estate. In that capacity, she sued numerous defendants allegedly connected with Paydro's medical treatment, including Dr. McKinney, largely arguing Paydro's death had been caused by the defendants' purported failure to timely diagnose and treat the pulmonary thromboembolism that ultimately caused Paydro's death. Dr. McKinney, who had provided no medical treatment to Paydro other than in connection with emergency resuscitation attempts, informally requested her voluntary dismissal as a defendant. In an email communication to Dr. McKinney's counsel, the estate's counsel indicated that a decision on that request would be aided by Dr. McKinney's voluntary amendment of the original cause of death indicated on Paydro's death certificate to identify his cause of death as a pulmonary thromboembolism. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in compelling Dr. McKinney to amend the death certificate. Dr. McKinney therefore demonstrated a clear legal right to her requested relief. The trial court was ordered to vacate its order compelling Dr. McKinney to amend the cause of death on Paydro's death certificate. View "Ex parte Dahlia McKinney, M.D." on Justia Law