Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A teacher who had previously attained tenure in the Montgomery County public-school system resigned from that position in September 2019 after accepting an offer for a probationary teaching job with the Alabama Department of Youth Services School District (DYS). The teacher received an email in mid-September confirming the job offer, with instructions to begin work on October 7, 2019, after completing mandatory training. The teacher’s salary, benefits, and job responsibilities with DYS all began on October 7, and he completed multiple school years in the new role before receiving notice in April 2023 that his contract would not be renewed.The teacher filed suit in the Montgomery Circuit Court, seeking a declaration that he had acquired tenure under the Students First Act of 2011, which would entitle him to due-process protections before dismissal. The trial court held a bench trial and concluded that the teacher was tenured at the time of his nonrenewal, reasoning that his employment was “effective” upon the agreement in September 2019 and, in the alternative, that DYS was estopped from denying him tenure because he relied on the September email when resigning from his previous tenured position.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s decision. It held that, for purposes of the Students First Act, “effective employment” occurs when a teacher is required to report for work and is paid, not at the time of an offer or acceptance. Because the teacher’s employment with DYS became effective on October 7, 2019—after the statutory October 1 cutoff—he did not accrue a “complete” school year for 2019-2020 and did not acquire tenure before his contract was nonrenewed. The Court also rejected the application of equitable estoppel, finding no misleading conduct by DYS. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded. View "Smitherman v. Roberts" on Justia Law

A woman visited a Huntsville shopping center in May 2021, where renovations were underway, including the installation of new sidewalks in front of a Staples store. The construction zone was marked with barricades, caution tape, signage, and fluorescent paint to warn pedestrians of uneven concrete resulting from recent work. Despite these measures, the woman tripped and fell while walking through the marked area, attributing her fall to a slight elevation change in the concrete. She later filed suit against the property owner, the general contractor, a concrete-cutting subcontractor, and Staples, alleging negligence, wantonness, premises liability, and respondeat superior.The Madison Circuit Court entered summary judgment in favor of the shopping center owner and the general contractor, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The subcontractor was dismissed by agreement, and the plaintiff later settled with Staples’ successor. The circuit court did not specify its reasoning for the decision. After her postjudgment motion failed, the plaintiff appealed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the summary judgment de novo, considering whether the alleged hazard was open and obvious, which would negate the defendants’ duty to warn or maintain. The court concluded that, as a matter of law, the multiple warnings—including barricades and fluorescent paint—rendered the uneven concrete an open and obvious condition to a reasonable person. Therefore, the defendants owed no additional duty to warn, and the plaintiff’s claims for negligence and wantonness failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment of the Madison Circuit Court. View "Walter v. Branch Hays Farm SC Associates, LP" on Justia Law

A homeowner alleged that he hired a roofing company in 2011 to install a specific type of roof on his residence. After installation, problems with roof materials became apparent, including issues with a protective layer that remained unresolved despite multiple repair attempts by both the roofing company and the manufacturer over more than a decade. The homeowner asserted that these defects persisted, and that communication from the roofing company ceased in early 2024. As a result, he filed a lawsuit in Etowah County, Alabama, alleging breach of express and implied warranties, as well as negligent or wanton installation and repair, and sought damages.The roofing company moved to dismiss the lawsuit for improper venue, arguing that a forum-selection clause in a “Service Agreement” required all disputes to be heard in Madison County, Alabama. The company attached an unsigned and undated sample agreement to its motion, but did not produce a copy signed by the homeowner or any evidence that the homeowner had agreed to such a clause. The homeowner responded that he had never signed, nor was he aware of, the agreement submitted by the company and also challenged the clause’s reasonableness. The Etowah Circuit Court denied the company’s motion to dismiss for improper venue.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the company’s petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought to compel the lower court to dismiss the case or transfer it to Madison County. The Supreme Court held that the company failed to meet its burden of proving that the forum-selection clause applied, as it did not present evidence linking the blank agreement to the parties’ actual contract. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition, concluding that the circuit court did not clearly err in refusing to dismiss or transfer the case. View "Ex parte Continental Roofing Company, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman alleged that her boyfriend assaulted her during their relationship and filed a petition for protection from abuse (PFA) in Madison Circuit Court. Judge Linda F. Coats, serving as a special circuit-court judge, granted an ex parte protection order and scheduled a hearing. Subsequently, the boyfriend was charged criminally with domestic violence arising from the same incident. At the PFA hearing, Judge Coats held a pretrial immunity hearing under Alabama’s stand-your-ground statute, determined the boyfriend acted in self-defense, and denied the PFA petition, stating he was immune from criminal and civil prosecution.In the criminal case, Judge Patricia D. Demos dismissed the charge against the boyfriend, relying on Judge Coats’s immunity determination from the PFA case. The State, through the Madison County District Attorney’s Office, petitioned the Madison Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus, arguing Judge Coats lacked authority to grant immunity in the PFA proceeding without notice to the State and that Judge Demos erroneously dismissed the criminal charge based on the PFA order. The Madison Circuit Court (Judge Donna S. Pate) granted the writ, ordering Judge Coats to vacate the immunity portion of her PFA order and Judge Demos to reinstate the criminal case.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed appeals by Judge Coats and the boyfriend. The Court held that Judge Coats lacked standing to appeal and that the portion of the circuit court’s mandamus order directed to Judge Coats was void, as Judge Pate did not have supervisory jurisdiction over a special circuit-court judge. The Court dismissed Judge Coats’s appeal and the corresponding part of the boyfriend’s appeal. The remaining portion of the boyfriend’s appeal, which concerned the mandamus to Judge Demos in the criminal case, was transferred to the Court of Criminal Appeals, as it fell under its appellate jurisdiction. View "Coats v. State of Alabama" on Justia Law

Mark Weaver, the owner of a commercial property in Gadsden, entered into a ten-year lease with Frios Gourmet Pops, LLC, managed by Andy Harp, in 2016. The lease required monthly rent payments of $4,800, with Harp as a personal guarantor. The lease contained specific provisions addressing default, termination, and the parties’ obligations in the event of breach. In 2018, Harp assigned the lease to Frios Manufacturing, LLC, involving Kevin Harper as a new guarantor. After the original business moved out of the property in early 2019, Harp attempted to find new tenants and eventually established Gardens on Air, LLC on the premises. However, this venture ended in July 2019, and by early 2020, the Frios defendants stopped paying rent. Weaver subsequently terminated their right of possession and reentered the property, later reletting it at a lower rent and ultimately selling it.The Etowah Circuit Court first denied Weaver’s request for summary judgment and instead partially granted summary judgment to the Frios defendants, concluding that Weaver’s recovery was limited to the rent accrued before the termination of tenancy. The trial court excluded evidence of damages beyond that amount and, after a bench trial, awarded Weaver damages limited to unpaid rent, interest, and attorney’s fees up to the time of termination. Weaver’s postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law, and he appealed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo, holding that the lease provisions allowed for posttermination damages, including the difference between reserved rent and rent received from reletting, and reasonable costs incurred due to breach. The Court found that the trial court erred in limiting Weaver’s recovery to accrued rent only and excluding evidence of further damages. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "Weaver v. Frios Gourmet Pops, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman underwent cervical spine surgery and subsequently developed neurological symptoms, including balance problems, dizziness, and sensory changes. Her surgeon referred her to a neurologist at a specialty clinic, where she was evaluated by a physician who ordered a brain MRI. The MRI report noted findings that could not exclude multiple sclerosis (MS), but the neurologist did not inform the patient of these results, believing there were no dangerous findings that required immediate notification. The patient was not scheduled for further follow-up and continued to experience worsening symptoms over the next 19 months. Eventually, her primary doctor referred her to another neurologist, who diagnosed her with MS and began treatment, after which her condition stabilized.The patient and her husband filed a medical malpractice suit in Madison Circuit Court, alleging that the neurologist and the clinic negligently failed to inform her of her abnormal MRI results and failed to provide appropriate follow-up, leading to a significant delay in her MS diagnosis and treatment. During discovery, the plaintiffs’ expert testified that the delay worsened her symptoms, but when questioned, he stated he could not say with certainty that an earlier diagnosis would have changed her outcome. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding insufficient evidence of causation, and later struck the expert’s postjudgment affidavit as untimely.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court’s decision to strike the late-filed affidavit but reversed the summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that, when viewing the expert’s testimony as a whole and in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to decide whether the neurologist’s failure to inform and follow up probably worsened the patient’s condition. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Keister v. Neurology Consultants of Huntsville, P.C." on Justia Law

Murray and Kimberly Lee hired Debra Champion to clean their home, with Champion’s son, Alex Brandon Burkett, sometimes assisting. Over time, the Lees noticed cash, prescription medication, foreign currency, silverware, and jewelry missing from their house. After suspecting Champion, they continued to employ her due to her plausible explanations. Eventually, after another acquaintance reported missing property following Champion’s cleaning, the Lees discovered their Gorham silverware gone and filed a police report. Detective Sergeant Richard Pollard investigated and identified Burkett as a suspect. LeadsOnline records indicated Burkett conducted numerous transactions with EFS, Inc., d/b/a Quik Pawn Shop ("Quik Pawn"), selling silverware and jewelry believed to be the Lees’ property. The Lees were unable to recover their stolen items.The Lees sued Quik Pawn in the Jefferson Circuit Court, alleging negligence, wantonness, and civil conspiracy, later dismissing most claims except wantonness. Quik Pawn moved for summary judgment, which was granted for conspiracy and emotional distress, but denied for wantonness. Quik Pawn’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of the value of stolen items was granted. At trial, the jury found for the Lees on the wantonness claim and awarded $250,000 in punitive damages. Quik Pawn’s postjudgment motions were denied by operation of law. Quik Pawn appealed, and the Lees cross-appealed the exclusion of valuation evidence.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It held that the Lees failed to present substantial evidence that Quik Pawn’s acts or omissions proximately caused their loss, as the property had been sold long before the Lees discovered the theft or reported it. The Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and rendered judgment for Quik Pawn, finding the cross-appeal moot due to this disposition. View "EFS Inc. v. Lee" on Justia Law

A Delaware limited liability company entered into an agreement to purchase real property in Jefferson County, Alabama, from an Alabama limited partnership. The agreement included provisions for the recovery of attorneys’ fees by the prevailing party in litigation arising from the contract. Disputes arose regarding whether the buyer satisfied conditions to extend the closing date, leading the seller to declare the agreement terminated. The buyer sued the seller, the seller’s general partner (a California corporation), and various individual limited partners (in both their personal capacities and as trustees of family trusts), seeking among other relief, damages for breach of contract and a declaration of rights under the agreement. The contract also provided for reimbursement of transaction costs and attorneys’ fees under certain circumstances.The case proceeded in the Jefferson Circuit Court. The court granted summary judgment for the buyer on liability, finding the seller had breached the agreement, and set the issue of damages for a jury trial. Subsequently, disputes arose about whether attorneys’ fees should be decided by the jury or the court. The circuit court ruled that attorneys’ fees recoverable by the prevailing party under the contract would be determined by the court after trial, not by the jury. The seller, general partner, and limited partners sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of Alabama, arguing they were entitled to a jury trial on attorneys’ fees.The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition for writ of mandamus. The Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to a jury determination of prevailing party attorneys’ fees under the contract, because they did not adequately show that the Alabama Constitution or statutes provide such a right for this type of claim. The Court declined to overrule the circuit court’s decision to reserve the issue of attorneys’ fees for judicial determination following the trial on damages. View "Ex parte Vestavia Hills, Ltd." on Justia Law

A woman who had resided at an apartment complex in 2021 was injured when a bullet, fired from outside her apartment, struck her. She filed a pro se complaint with the Montgomery Circuit Court before the expiration of the statute of limitations, seeking to hold the apartment management responsible for her injuries on the basis that tenants were supposed to have 24-hour security due to increasing crime. The complaint, in the form of a letter, did not explicitly name a defendant or assert specific legal claims, but accompanying documents identified Hubbard Properties as the defendant and provided an address for service. However, she did not include summonses or provide instructions regarding service of process.No action was taken in the case until a status conference was held nearly two years later. Several months after that, and after the limitations period had expired, the plaintiff amended her complaint with the assistance of counsel, formally naming both Stonebridge and Hubbard Properties as defendants and asserting claims of negligence, wantonness, and failure to provide safe premises. At that time, she also included summonses and requested service by certified mail, and both defendants were served after the limitations period expired. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations because the plaintiff had not made a bona fide attempt to have the original complaint immediately served. The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the motions to dismiss without explanation.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that, although the complaint was filed before the statute of limitations expired, the plaintiff did not have the bona fide intent to have it immediately served, as objectively required for timely commencement of an action under Alabama law. Because of this, and because service occurred after the limitations period, the court directed the circuit court to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. View "Ex parte Stonebridge, LLC" on Justia Law

Two sisters, aged twelve and nine, were sexually abused by their tutor during sessions at public libraries owned by two Alabama municipalities in 2017. The abuse was witnessed by library employees who allegedly failed to intervene or report the misconduct. The sisters disclosed the abuse to their mother later that year, prompting a police report. In 2023, the tutor was convicted of sexual abuse. In 2024, the sisters and their mother sued the municipalities, asserting negligence in failing to respond to the abuse.The initial complaint named nonprofit corporations associated with the libraries as defendants but was amended to substitute the municipalities themselves. Prior to filing the amended complaint, the plaintiffs served notices of claim to each municipality, but these were submitted more than six years after the alleged tortious conduct. Both the City of Irondale and the City of Birmingham moved to dismiss, arguing noncompliance with Alabama Code § 11-47-23, which requires notice of claim against a municipality within six months of claim accrual. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted their motions, dismissing the claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered whether minors are exempt from the six-month notice requirement under § 11-47-23. The plaintiffs argued that minority status should toll the notice period, referencing statutory provisions that extend the time for filing suit by minors. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that § 11-47-23 contains no exception for minors and that the statutory tolling provision applies only to statutes of limitations, not notice-of-claim statutes. The court affirmed the Jefferson Circuit Court's dismissal of the claims against both municipalities, holding that minors are subject to the same notice requirements as adults under Alabama law. View "A.G.R. v. The City of Irondale" on Justia Law