Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Helena ("Helena") appealed the issuance of a preliminary injunction by the Shelby Circuit Court in favor of the Pelham Board of Education ("the Board") and its officers and/or members, in their official capacities (collectively, "the Board defendants"). In June 2021, the Board purchased approximately 52 acres of undeveloped land located within the corporate limits of Helena. The land has not been annexed by the City of Pelham or the Board. Helena collects property taxes on the land, and the land was zoned for single-family residential use under a Helena zoning ordinance. After purchasing the land, the Board began clearing the land for the purpose of constructing one or more athletic fields and a parking lot as part of the Pelham High School campus. Pelham High School was located adjacent to the land but lied within the corporate limits of the City of Pelham. The athletic-field project was originally scheduled to be completed on or before January 17, 2022, but it was delayed by Helena's attempts to enforce its zoning ordinance, which was an issue in this case. Helena asserted in its complaint, among other things, that the Board has no statutory authority to construct the athletic-field project within the corporate limits of Helena. The Board defendants counterclaimed, seeking sought declaratory and injunctive relief based on their position that the athletic-field project served a governmental purpose and, therefore, was not subject to Helena's zoning ordinance. Finding that the trial court did not follow the mandatory requirements of Rule 65(d)(2), the preliminary injunction was dissolved and the order issuing the injunction was, therefore, reversed and the case remanded. View "City of Helena v. Pelham Board of Education, et al." on Justia Law

The Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission ("the JIC") filed a complaint against Judge John Randall "Randy" Jinks, the Probate Judge for Talladega County, Alabama, alleging that he had violated the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics by frequently exhibiting an inappropriate demeanor, by inappropriately using a work-assigned computer and a work-assigned cellular telephone, and by abusing the prestige of the Office of Probate Judge. The Alabama Court of the Judiciary, ("the COJ") found that the evidence supported some of the charges alleged and removed Judge Jinks from office. Judge Jinks appealed. After reviewing the record in this case, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that the judgment of the COJ was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the COJ was affirmed. View "Jinks v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission" on Justia Law

John Bodie, as guardian ad litem for G.A., D.P., and M.P. ("the children"), has filed three separate petitions for the writ of certiorari, one on each child's behalf, regarding a decision of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing judgments of the Jefferson Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") that terminated the parental rights of H.P. ("the mother") to the children. The Alabama Supreme Court granted the petitions, and, after review, concluded the Court of Civil Appeals erred in rejecting the possibility that the juvenile court could have reasonably determined lear and convincing evidence had been presented demonstrating that no viable alternative to termination of the mother's parental rights existed. Judgments were therefore reversed and the cases remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte John Bodie, as guardian ad litem for G.A., D.P. and M.P." on Justia Law

Christopher Ellis worked for CSX Transportation, Inc. as a remote-control foreman at CSX's Montgomery yard. While riding on the ladder of a railcar during the course of his employment with CSX, Ellis was struck in the torso by the broken door handle and latch assembly of a railcar on an adjacent track. The impact of the blow knocked Ellis off the railcar on which he was riding, causing him to suffer significant injuries. On November 17, 2020, Ellis sued CSX asserting claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), and the Safety Appliance Act ("the SAA"). Ellis propounded 25 multipart interrogatories and 62 requests for production to CSX with his complaint. CSX petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to, among other things, vacate its order granting Ellis's motion to compel discovery and either enter an order denying Ellis's motion to compel or a protective order barring production of materials CSX contends to be protected work product or patently irrelevant. The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus relief in part and directed the trial court to vacate its order to the extent that it requires the production of materials contained in the company's risk management system ("RMS") in violation of the work-product doctrine. The Court denied the petition in all other respects. View "Ex parte CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Cathedral of Faith Baptist Church, Inc., and Lee Riggins appealed a circuit court judgment dismissing their complaint against defendants Donald Moulton, Sr. and Broken Vessel United Church on grounds that the claims asserted in the complaint were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Riggins was a stockholder and the chairman of the board of Cathedral of Faith Baptist Church, Inc. ("Cathedral"), which owned property located in Birmingham where it operated Cathedral Church. Worship services were conducted at Cathedral Church until the Church's membership dwindled and its services were discontinued; legal title to the Cathedral Church property ultimately vested in Riggins. In 2014, Riggins leased the Cathedral Church property to Moulton, the pastor of Broken Vessel United Church. Moulton and Broken Vessel agreed to pay the commercial-liability insurance that Cathedral maintained with Planter's Insurance. In July 2016, Moulton and Broken Vessel changed the insurance carrier from Planter's Insurance to Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company without Cathedral and Riggins's knowledge or consent. The application for insurance that Moulton submitted to Nationwide contained multiple false statements. On November 26, 2016, Cathedral Church was destroyed by a fire. Moulton made a claim to Nationwide regarding the Cathedral Church property and its contents. In August 2017, Riggins discovered a "property settlement with Nationwide." Riggins subsequently discovered both a general warranty deed, dated January 1, 2012,1 that had been filed in the Jefferson County Tax Assessor's office on January 16, 2015, purporting to convey title to Cathedral Church from Riggins to Broken Vessel for $150,000, as well as a corrected deed that had been filed in January 2018. Deficiencies existed on the face of both the original warranty deed and the corrected deed. The trial court ultimately entered an order dismissing the claims against defendants. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, finding the complaint was filed within the 10-year limitations period set forth by the applicable statute. View "Cathedral of Faith Baptist Church v. Moulton, et al." on Justia Law

In January 2018, Whitney Jones, an inmate in the Mobile County Metro Jail and a participant in the jail's work-release program, left her work-release job and did not return to the work-release barracks. As a result, Jones was charged with, and convicted of, second-degree escape, a felony. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review to consider whether an inmate, like Jones, who escapes from a county work-release program authorized pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, §§ 14-8-30 through 14-8-44 ("the county work-release statutes"), could be convicted of escape pursuant to one of the escape statutes in the Alabama Criminal Code, Ala. Code 1975, §§ 13A-10-30 through 13A-10-33 ("the escape statutes"), which would be punishable as a felony, or whether such an escape is punishable only as a misdemeanor pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, §§ 14-8-42 and 14-8-43. The Supreme Court concluded that escapes from county work-release programs were governed by the escape statutes. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. View "Jones v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Premier Plastic Surgery, P.C. ("Premier") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Premier's motion for a change of venue in this medical-malpractice action brought by plaintiff Deborah Bush, and to enter an order transferring the action to the Shelby Circuit Court. Premier offered cosmetic and reconstructive surgery at its medical facility located in Shelby County. Bush went to Premier's medical facility to receive a consultation from Dr. Peter Van Hoy. It is undisputed that all of Bush's treatment by Dr. Van Hoy occurred at Premier's medical facility. In December 2017, Dr. Van Hoy died. Because he was Premier's sole shareholder, director, and owner, Premier was dissolved in September 2018. In June 2019, Bush filed suit at the Jefferson Circuit Court relating to her surgical procedure and treatment by Dr. Van Hoy. Bush's complaint also alleged that she was a resident of Jefferson County. Premier denied all allegations and argued that because the surgical procedure and treatment at issue in Bush's action occurred at Premier's medical facility in Shelby County, venue was proper in Shelby County. In her response to Premier's motion, Bush did not dispute that Shelby County was the proper venue for the action. Instead, she argued that because Premier's motion was filed almost three years after the litigation began and only three weeks before the scheduled trial, the motion cannot be deemed timely. The Supreme Court concurred that Premier's challenge to venue had been waived and denied the petition for mandamus relief. View "Ex parte Premier Plastic Surgery, P.C." on Justia Law

Gwendolyn Barnett appealed orders granting relief to Robert Lee Hull, Jr. Barnett and Hull are siblings and the sole legal heirs of their father, Robert Lee Hull, Sr. ("Robert"), who died testate. Pursuant to Robert's will, Hull and Barnett were listed as beneficiaries entitled to equal shares of his estate and Barnett was named personal representative of his estate. Hull filed a complaint against Barnett, arguing that in her role as "a partial caretaker of [Robert]" before his death, had exerted undue influence over Robert and had gained control of Robert's personal property and assets. According to Hull, in the absence of Barnett's purported misconduct, items that Barnett allegedly misappropriated would "have become part of [Robert's] estate." Barnett moved ti dismiss her brother's tort action, claiming that Hull's complaint in the tort action realleged claims purportedly "identical" to claims that Hull had previously asserted in the estate administration, which had been dismissed. The trial court granted Hull's motion in full and denied Barnett's motion to dismiss. On appeal, among other things, Barnett contended the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Hull's claims in the tort action, which she described as "central to the administration of the estate," while the estate administration remained separately pending. In her filings to the Supreme Court, Barnett characterized Hull's claims as "seek[ing] to identify property which he alleges should have been considered property of the Estate ... in the [first-filed] estate administration." To this, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over matters relating to the pending estate administration, and lacked jurisdiction to enter the the injunctive order or the subsequent show-cause order compelling Barnett's compliance with the injunctive order. The Supreme Court thus reversed all orders entered by the trial court in the tort action and remanded the matter for that court to enter an order dismissing Hull's complaint. View "Barnett v. Hull" on Justia Law

This appeal and cross-appeal involved a residential lease agreement with an option to purchase executed by Tony Hiett, Sr., and his wife Kelly Hiett ("the tenants") and Beverlye Brady ("the landlord"). According to the tenants, they accepted the first option to purchase the property presented in the landlord's email and began making monthly holdover rental payments of $2,500. And, in April 2017, they informed the landlord that they had obtained financing and were ready to close on the property by April 30, 2017. The landlord, however, refused to convey title to the property because, she claimed, the tenants had never responded to her email; thus, according to the landlord, the option to purchase had expired. The tenants thereafter stopped paying rent under the lease agreement, but continued to occupy the property, and sued the landlord, seeking specific performance of the option to purchase. The landlord counterclaimed, asserting a claim for ejectment and a claim of breach of contract, based on unpaid rent and late fees owed under the lease agreement. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment entered on the jury's verdict in favor of the tenants on their specific-performance claim and against the landlord on her ejectment claim. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment entered on the jury's verdict in favor of the landlord on her breach-of-contract claim based on the inadequacy of damages awarded, and the Court remanded the case with directions to the trial court to grant a new trial as to only that claim, unless the tenants consented to an additur. View "Hiett v. Brady" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified a question of law to the Alabama Supreme Court. Dr. Dino Ferrante, a gastroenterologist, prescribed LIALDA, which is manufactured by Shire U.S., Inc., and Shire, LLC (referred to collectively as "Shire"), to help patient Mark Blackburn with his Crohn's disease. "LIALDA is the brand name for Shire's mesalamine drug, which is an anti-inflammatory drug specifically aimed at the gut. LIALDA is not approved by the FDA to treat Crohn's, but it is approved to treat ulcerative colitis, Crohn's 'sister' disease." After taking LIALDA for between 12 to 16 months, Blackburn discovered that he had developed kidney disease, specifically advanced chronic interstitial nephritis, which had resulted in irreversible scarring and had diminished his kidney function to 20% of normal capacity. As a result, Blackburn is awaiting a kidney transplant. The federal appellate court asked: (1) consistent with the learned intermediary doctrine, may a pharmaceutical company's duty to warn include a duty to provide instructions about how to mitigate warned-of risks?; and (2) might a plaintiff establish that a failure to warn caused his injuries by showing that his doctor would have adopted a different course of testing or mitigation, even though he would have prescribed the same drug? The Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative. View "Blackburn v. Shire U.S., Inc., et al." on Justia Law