Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tamera Erskine, as the personal representative of the estate of Joann Bashinsky ("Ms. Bashinsky"), deceased, appealed: (1) a probate court order awarding fees to the temporary guardian and conservator for Ms. Bashinsky previously appointed by the probate court; and (2) an order awarding fees to a guardian ad litem appointed to represent Ms. Bashinsky in a proceeding seeking the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator filed by John McKleroy, Jr., and Patty Townsend. McKleroy and Townsend separately appealed the probate court's dismissal with prejudice of all remaining pending matters following Ms. Bashinsky's death. Ms. Bashinsky was the widow of Sloan Bashinsky, who owned the majority stock in Golden Enterprises, Inc., and who was the founder, chairman, and chief executive officer of Golden Flake Foods ("Golden Flake"). McKleroy and Townsend, two former Golden Flake employees who had professional relationships with Ms. Bashinsky, alleged that Ms. Bashinsky was incapable of caring for herself and for her assets, which were then valued at approximately $218 million. McKleroy and Townsend's allegations of Ms. Bashinsky's incompetence centered on her request that Level Four Advisory Services LLC, which held approximately $35 million of Ms. Bashinsky's personal assets, transfer $17.5 million to David Heath at investment firm Morgan Stanley. McKleroy and Townsend further alleged that the transferred assets would end up being controlled by Ms. Bashinsky's grandson, Landon Ash, whom they alleged had already accumulated $23.5 million in total indebtedness to Ms. Bashinsky and whom they alleged exerted undue influence upon Ms. Bashinsky. The Alabama Supreme Court granted McKleroy and Townsend's motion to dismiss. The Court determined the order awarding attorney fees was not a "final settlement" of a guardianship or conservatorship, and it was not otherwise a final judgment, and therefore it was not an appealable order. Accordingly, Erskine's appeal was dismissed, and the matter remanded for the probate court to enter a proper final judgment in this case. View "Erskine v. Guin, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Gulf Shores City Board of Education and Kelly Walker appealed a circuit court's dismissal of their complaint seeking certain declaratory and mandamus relief against the Superintendent of the Alabama State Board of Education; the Revenue Commissioner of Baldwin County; certain Baldwin County Commissioners; the Baldwin County Board of Education; a Baldwin County Circuit Judge; the Baldwin County District Attorney; and Coastal Alabama Community College ("CACC"). This case involved the interplay among § 16-13-31(b), § 40-12-4, and § 45-2-244.077, Ala. Code 1975, a part of § 45-2-244.071 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the local-tax act"), which authorized the Baldwin County Commission to levy a 1% sales tax in Baldwin County paralleling the state sales tax found in § 40-23-1 through § 40-23-4, Ala. Code 1975. In 2017, the Gulf Shores Board was created to oversee an independent city school district pursuant to a resolution adopted by the City of Gulf Shores. The Gulf Shores Board and the Baldwin County Board entered into negotiations that resulted in a separation agreement pursuant to which the Gulf Shores Board obtained certain assets and assumed certain liabilities of the Baldwin County Board. Additionally, the separation agreement provided that taxes collected specifically to fund public schools in Baldwin County would be apportioned according to the apportionment provisions in § 16-13-31(b) and § 40-12-4(b) so as to include the Gulf Shores Board as a recipient. However, the separation agreement did not address apportionment of the proceeds of the local tax. The president of the Gulf Shores Board stated in his affidavit that the "parties specifically agreed to disagree [as to] whether the [local] tax was required to be apportioned." The Gulf Shores Board demanded but did not receive a share of the local-tax proceeds. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint against the superintendent, the revenue commissioner, and the county commissioners, seeking mandamus relief requiring that the local-tax proceeds be apportioned to include the Gulf Shores Board as a recipient and/or a judgment declaring that the local-tax act was unconstitutional. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Gulf Shores Board lacked standing to bring its constitutional claim, and Walker could not show that the local tax was a levy of special taxes on her as a citizen of a definite locality expended in some other locality. Accordingly, dismissal was affirmed. View "Gulf Shores City Board of Education, et al. v. Mackey, et al." on Justia Law

Communications Unlimited Contracting Services, Inc. ("CUI") appealed a circuit court judgment that granted Steve Clanton's motion for a remand for clarification of arbitration award issued by Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. ("JAMS"). Because the awards of money damages for each party were clearly stated and unambiguous in amount and scope, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in remanding the arbitration award to JAMS for clarification. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Communications Unlimited Contracting Services, Inc. v. Clanton." on Justia Law

After Clifford Bufford, an employee of Borbet Alabama, Inc., injured his left arm in a workplace accident, he sued seven of his co-employees claiming that his injury was the result of their willful conduct. The co-employees sought summary judgment, arguing that they were immune from suit under Alabama's Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act") because, they said, there was no evidence to support Bufford's claims. Bufford voluntarily dismissed his claims against all the defendants except the petitioner, maintenance supervisor Jeffrey Varoff. The circuit court then denied Varoff's motion for summary judgment. He petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter judgment in his favor on the basis of the immunity afforded by the Act. We grant the petition and issue the writ. The Supreme Court concurred there was not evidence in the trial court record that would support a finding that Varoff had engaged in willful conduct as that term was described in § 25-5-11(c). The Court held Varoff was immune from liability under § 25-5- 53. Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying Varoff's motion for summary judgment. His petition was therefore granted, and the trial court directed to vacate its order denying Varoff's motion. View "Ex parte Jeffrey Varoff." on Justia Law

Defendant-petitioner Sunset Digital Communications, Inc. ("Sunset") sought a writ of mandamus to direct an Alabama circuit court vacate its order denying a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by plaintiffs Point Broadband, LLC ("Point Broadband"), and Point Broadband Fiber Holding, LLC ("PBFH") (collectively, "plaintiffs"). In 2018, Sunset and Sunset Fiber, LLC, entered into a "First Amended and Restated Asset Purchase Agreement" ("the APA") with PBFH, which was then known as Sunset Digital Holding, LLC. In 2021, plaintiffs filed a complaint against Sunset seeking a judgment declaring that PBFH was not liable for certain unpaid taxes and penalties; that PBFH did not owe defense or indemnity obligations to Sunset relating to those unpaid taxes; that PBFH did not owe legal fees in connection with any audits or other investigations relating to Sunset's tax liability; and that Sunset owed PBFH defense and indemnity obligations in the event a third party sought to bring a claim or attempted to collect any unpaid taxes from PBFH. Sunset moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., in which it alleged, among other things, that the APA included a mandatory outbound-forum selection clause that "requires the parties to submit exclusively to the jurisdiction of the United States federal courts or the Virginia state courts located in Bristol, Virginia." In its order denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court stated, in pertinent part: "At issue is if the language ('may') creates a mandatory forum selection clause or clause that consents to jurisdiction. Language such as 'shall' or 'must' would be used in cases where the clause was to be considered mandatory. As this is a consent to jurisdiction clause and not a mandatory one, Alabama Courts have held that imperative language such as 'shall' or 'must' are required to find that the clause is a mandatory one. However, the word 'may' results in language that is much more permissive or rather a 'consent to jurisdiction' clause." Sunset argued the trial court erroneously found that the forum-selection clause in the APA was permissive rather than mandatory. Specifically, it asserted that the trial court "wholly ignored the 'exclusive jurisdiction' language of the forum selection clause." To this the Alabama Supreme Court concurred, granted the writ and directed the trial court to vacate its February 2022 order denying Sunset's motion to dismiss. View "Ex parte Sunset Digital Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

Milton Turner died on July 25, 2018. On September 20, 2018, Mildred Williamson petitioned for letters of administration of Turner's estate in the probate court. In her petition, Williamson asserted that Turner had died intestate and that Williamson was Turner's only surviving heir. In 2019, Williamson, individually and in her capacity as the personal representative of Turner's estate, entered into a contract agreeing to sell to Matthew Drinkard and Jefferson Dolbare ("the purchasers") real property belonging to the estate for $880,650. The real-estate sales contract specified that the closing of the sale was to occur on or before May 31, 2019. On February 7, 2019, Williamson, individually and in her capacity as personal representative of Turner's estate, executed a deed conveying other real property that was part of Turner's estate to Marcus Hester. On February 13, 2019, Callway Sargent, alleging to be an heir of Turner's, filed a claim of heirship in Turner's estate. Sargent also moved for injunctive relief in which he acknowledged the February 7, 2019, deed, but asserted that Williamson had agreed to sell and had conveyed real property belonging to Turner's estate without the approval of the probate court, and requested that the probate court enjoin "Williamson from engaging in any further administration of [Turner's] estate until so ordered by [the probate court]." Williamson petitioned to have the case removed fro probate to the circuit court. From February 28, 2019, to March 18, 2019, a number of individuals came forward, all claiming to be Turner's heirs. Williamson moved to have the circuit court approve the pending property sales. Williamson and the purchasers did not close on the sale of the property that was the subject of their real-estate sales contract by May 31, 2019, as required by the contract. Some of the purported heirs petitioned the circuit court to stay or vacate the order approving the purchasers contact until matters regarding the heirs was resolved. Drinkard and Dolbare filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings regarding the administration of Turner's estate, but the circuit court denied the motion. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of the purchasers' motion to intervene in the administration of Turner's estate. View "Drinkard, et al. v. Perry, et al." on Justia Law

Dalen Gaines sought monetary and equitable relief against Walker County law-enforcement officers for their role in what Gaines claimed was a delayed bond hearing. After Gaines failed to appear at the Walker Circuit Court to answer criminal charges, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Three months later, Walker County Sheriff's Deputy Christopher Doeur executed the warrant and took Gaines into custody. Afterward, Deputy Doeur filed a certificate of execution, informing the Circuit Court that he had arrested Gaines and placed him in the County jail. After about a month, Gaines remained incarcerated and had not yet appeared in court. The trial court granted the law-enforcement officers' motion to dismiss Gaines complaint here, and Gaines asked the Alabama Supreme Court to overturn that decision. The Court declined to do so, and affirmed dismissal. View "Gaines v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Merlyn Clay appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Charles Chavis, Clay's grandfather. The dispute concerned Clay's purchase of real property from Chavis and Clay's alleged failure to fulfill certain requirements of a sale contract for the real property executed by the parties. The Alabama Supreme Court found there were several discrepancies between the stated terms of the sale contract and the terms the parties agreed were part of the transaction, as well as discrepancies between the stated terms of the sale contract and the performance of the parties. "Those discrepancies are crucial to the outcome of this dispute because Chavis's claims are premised on the contention that Clay breached the sale contract by failing to provide a promissory note and a mortgage and by ceasing to make monthly loan payments to Chavis. Yet, under the terms of the sale contract, Chavis likewise did not provide the deed to the river property in a timely manner, and the sale contract does not expressly state that Clay had to make monthly loan payments. Those discrepancies are also crucial to the relief granted to Chavis by the circuit court." Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further findings and proceedings. View "Clay v. Chavis." on Justia Law

Joshua Greer, a student at the University of Alabama in Huntsville ("the University"), and Young Americans for Liberty, a student organization at the University ("the plaintiffs"), appealed a judgment dismissing their action challenging the legality of the University's policy regulating speech in outdoor areas of the University's campus ("the policy"). The policy allowed University students and student organizations, among others, to reserve and use outdoor spaces on campus to engage in speech. Whether a reservation is required depends on the nature of the students' activities and expression. The general rule was that students had to make reservations for activities that make use of the outdoor areas of campus. No reservation was needed for "casual recreational or social activities," a term that the policy did not define. Similarly, no reservation was needed for "spontaneous activities of expression, which are generally prompted by news or affairs coming into public knowledge less than forty-eight (48) hours prior to the spontaneous expression." The policy then lists 20 designated areas on campus where spontaneous speech was allowed. Plaintiffs alleged that the policy violated the "Alabama Campus Free Speech Act" insofar as the policy generally required reservations for speech, creates the exception for "spontaneous" speech, and creates designated areas on campus for that spontaneous speech. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the judgment dismissing the action on two grounds: (1) the policy plainly violates the Act insofar as the policy creates designated areas for spontaneous speech; and (2) there is at least one unresolved factual issue concerning the evaluation of the policy's time, place, and manner restrictions. View "Young Americans for Liberty at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, et al. v. St. John IV, et al." on Justia Law

Dennis Morgan Hicks was convicted of one count of capital murder for the killing of Joshua Duncan. The murder was made capital because Hicks committed it while he was under a sentence of life imprisonment. Hicks was also convicted of one count of second-degree theft of property. By a vote of 11-1, the jury recommended that Hicks be sentenced to death on the capital-murder conviction. The Circuit Court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Hicks to death on the capital-murder conviction; it sentenced him to time served on the second-degree theft-of-property conviction. Hicks appealed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, and, on original submission, that court affirmed Hicks's conviction but remanded the case for the trial court to address some sentencing issues. The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately affirmed the death sentence. To the Alabama Supreme Court, Hicks argued the Court of Criminal Appeals erred: (1) in holding his right to counsel was not violated at the time of a pretrial mental evaluation; and (2) in holding that Dr. Karl Kirkland's testimony regarding Hicks' pretrial mental evaluation was admitted properly. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Ex parte Dennis Morgan Hicks." on Justia Law