Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jennifer Dell Peach sued, among others, Lester Thomas asserting claims arising from a multivehicle accident that took place after Thomas, a State trooper with the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, allegedly blocked both lanes of a highway to perform traffic stops of speeding drivers. Thomas moved for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that he was entitled to State-agent immunity. The trial court denied that motion. Thomas petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in his favor on the ground of State-agent immunity. The Supreme Court determined that based solely on the arguments and evidence presented to the trial court, Thomas did not establish a clear legal right to an order granting his motion for a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity. Therefore, Thomas's petition for the writ of mandamus was denied. View "Ex parte Lester Lee Thomas." on Justia Law

Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center ("Mobile Infirmary") appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc. ("Quest"). Quest and Mobile Infirmary entered into a Laboratory Management Agreement ("the LMA"), in which Quest agreed to manage Mobile Infirmary's onsite clinical laboratory facilities and to provide clinical testing services used by Mobile Infirmary's medical staff to diagnose and treat patients. The LMA also contained indemnity provisions. In 2015, James Ward went to Mobile Infirmary's emergency room after suffering weakness, dizziness, loss of fluids, a mild cough, and severe body aches. Ward was eventually diagnosed with diabetic ketoacidosis. When his condition did not improve, Ward was moved into the intensive-care unit, at which point his doctor ordered him to undergo glucose finger-sticks and a basic metabolic panel every four hours to help monitor his serum glucose, kidney function, acid/base status, and electrolytes. According to Mobile Infirmary, those basic metabolic panels were supposed to be performed by Quest, but they were allegedly canceled by one of Quest's employees. At some point, he suffered an "anoxic brain injury" and later died "as a result of multisystem organ failure secondary to severe sepsis and septic shock." Ingrid Mia Ward ("Mia"), Ward's wife and the personal representative of his estate, commenced a wrongful-death action against Mobile Infirmary and other defendants responsible for Ward's treatment and care. Quest was not named as a party to Mia's action. Mobile Infirmary informed Quest of the action and, as the case progressed, apprised Quest of the status of the proceedings, including its negotiations with Mia for potential settlement of the lawsuit. Mia and Mobile Infirmary ultimately settled the wrongful-death action. Before Mia's claims against Mobile Infirmary were dismissed pursuant to a joint motion of those parties, Mobile Infirmary filed a third-party complaint against Quest in which it sought contractual and equitable indemnity related to its defense and settlement of Mia's action. Quest filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted in part by dismissing Mobile Infirmary's equitable- indemnity claim. The Alabama Supreme Court found that nowhere in the LMA did the parties expressly agree or clearly provide a formula that, in the event there was a claim that arises out of partial liability or concurrent acts by both parties, indemnification will be required for a proportionate share. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Mobile Infirmary Association v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law

Todd Destafino had a longstanding business relationship with his (now former) mother-in-law, Georgia Lay, that soured after Destafino and Lay's daughter divorced. In the aftermath of the divorce, Lay began interfering with Destafino's property and business interests. Destafino eventually sued, claiming that Lay had trespassed on his property, interfered with his business operations, created a nuisance, and improperly failed to acknowledge his ownership interest in a company that he and Lay had jointly formed. After a bench trial, the circuit court entered judgment in Destafino's favor, awarding him $167,369.03. Lay appealed. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lay v. Destafino" on Justia Law

Jessica Tutor was driving three passengers in her automobile when she hit another vehicle head-on. Two of the passengers, Jack Sines and Devan Frazier, were injured and later sued Tutor. The case went to trial solely on Sines's and Frazier's claims of wantonness, and the jury found in their favor. The trial court then entered judgment against Tutor. She appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tutor v. Sines, et al." on Justia Law

Escapes! To the Shores Condominium Association, Inc. ("the Association"), individually and on behalf of certain condominium-unit owners, appealed an order denying a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P. motion to vacate a judgment entered on an arbitration award in favor of Hoar Construction, LLC ("Hoar"), and Architectural Surfaces, Inc. ("ASI"). The arbitration award in favor of Hoar and ASI stemmed from the construction of a condominium building located in Orange Beach known as "Escapes! To the Shores." Hoar was the general contractor for the construction project; Stephen Hill was the architect for the construction project; and ASI was the subcontractor responsible for the installation of the exterior surfaces to the condominium building. After construction of the condominium building was substantially complete, the developer of the project sold the units and transferred ownership and management of the common areas to the Association. The Association thereafter filed suit against Hoar, ASI, and Hill seeking damages arising out of alleged construction and design defects to the condominium building, specifically, "stucco blistering and water intrusion." The Association's claims against Hoar and ASI proceeded to arbitration, but its claims against Hill remained pending in the trial court. A panel of three arbitrators issued a final award in favor of Hoar and ASI, concluding, in relevant part, that the defects to the condominium building were the result of a design defect and not a construction defect. Once the trial court entered a judgment on the arbitration award, the Association thereafter filed a Rule 59 motion to vacate that judgment. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Association has failed to demonstrate that the arbitration panel engaged in misconduct that would warrant vacatur. Accordingly, the order denying the Association's Rule 59 motion and the judgment entered on the arbitration award were affirmed. View "Escapes! To the Shores Condominium Association, Inc. v. Hoar Construction, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Philip and Jennie Bowling purchased their house via a promissory note in 1986. The loan was secured by a mortgage, which was eventually assigned to U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank"). A little over a decade later, the Bowlings began missing loan payments. Litton Loan Servicing, LP ("Litton"), the original servicer for the loan, sent the Bowlings several notices of default between July 1999 and June 2011, before eventually transferring service of the loan to another entity, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC ("Ocwen"). In September 2011, Ocwen allegedly notified the Bowlings that they were in default. Ocwen then scheduled a foreclosure sale, which took place in October 2012. A company called WGB, LLC ("WGB"), purchased the Bowlings' house at the foreclosure sale, but the Bowlings refused to vacate the property. A few weeks later, WGB filed an ejectment action against them. The Bowlings answered by asserting that they had not defaulted on the loan and that the foreclosure sale was invalid. The Bowlings also named as third-party defendants U.S. Bank, Ocwen, and Litton (collectively, "the banks"), alleging that the banks had mishandled the loan, the foreclosure sale, and related matters. In total, the Bowlings asserted 15 third-party claims against the banks. Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure gives a trial court discretion to certify a partial judgment as final, and thus immediately appealable, even though some piece of the case remains pending in the trial court. This appeal stemmed from a Rule 54(b) certification. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Jefferson Circuit Court exceeded its discretion in certifying its partial judgment as immediately appealable. Because an improper Rule 54(b) certification cannot support an appeal on the merits of the underlying judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bowling v. U.S. Bank National Association, et al." on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals arose from circuit court judgments in two identical medical-malpractice actions commenced by Cynthia Diane Dennis Thomas against Tarik Yahia Farrag, M.D. In appeal no. 1200541, Dr. Farrag appealed the trial court's judgment denying his Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion seeking relief from a default judgment entered against him in case no. CV-18-2. In appeal no. 1200542, Dr. Farrag appealed from the judgment dismissing case no. CV-18-900005. On appeal, Dr. Farrag first presented an argument that was not raised in his Rule 60(b) motion -- that Patrick Hays, Dr. Farrag's personal attorney, was not authorized to accept service on Dr. Farrag's behalf and that, therefore, the default judgment was void because of insufficiency of service of process. Similarly, Dr. Farrag raised several other arguments for the first time on appeal -- specifically, that he did not receive proper notice of Thomas's filing of her application for a default judgment and that the damages awarded to Thomas were excessive. Dr. Farrag also argued he was entitled to relief from the default judgment on the basis of "excusable neglect" and that the trial court, therefore, erred in denying his Rule 60(b) motion. Dr. Farrag testified that, at the time he terminated Hays's representation of him, Hays had told him that the malpractice action had been dismissed. Dr. Farrag argues on appeal that his reliance on that purported representation by Hays constitutes excusable neglect warranting relief from the default judgment. The Alabama Supreme Court determined Dr. Farrag did not preserve his service or notice issues, and disagreed that Dr. Farrag was not prevented from appearing and defending the action due to excusable neglect. Regarding the appeal in case number 1200542, which was the dismissal of a duplicate action, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as the judgment was in Dr. Farrag's favor. In appeal no. 1200541, the judgment denying Dr. Farrag's Rule 60(b) motion was affirmed. Appeal no. 1200542 was dismissed. View "Farrag v. Thomas" on Justia Law

TruckMax, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiary, Babco Engineering, LLC (collectively, "TruckMax"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to allow TruckMax to amend its answer in this workers' compensation/wrongful-death action so that TruckMax could assert as a defense that one of the plaintiffs, Latosha Caster-Harris, the wife of the decedent involved in this case, lacked the capacity to pursue claims against TruckMax. The parties agreed that TruckMax's lack-of-capacity defense was an affirmative defense that would be waived if not pleaded. Because the Supreme Court concluded that TruckMax did not establish that the trial court's ruling denying its motion for leave to amend its answer should have been reviewed pursuant to a mandamus petition, it denied the petition. View "Ex parte TruckMax, Inc., and Babco Engineering, LLC." on Justia Law

Ed Davis sued the City of Montevallo ("the City") claiming that the City was in breach of contract because, in terminating his employment with the City, it failed to follow certain discharge procedures set out in an employee handbook it had issued to him. The City responded by arguing it was not required to follow the handbook's procedures because Davis was an at-will employee. After entertaining motions for summary judgment from both sides, the trial court ruled in favor of the City. Davis appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the City. "The Handbook was an offer for a unilateral contract, which Davis accepted by continuing his employment with the City. Because the Handbook constitutes a unilateral contract, we reverse the trial court's denial of Davis's motion for partial summary judgment and direct the trial court on remand to determine whether, in fact, the City violated the Handbook's terms." View "Davis v. Montevallo" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, Brighton Ventures 2 LLC and the St. John Life Center ("the Life Center") appealed a circuit court judgment order forfeiting $446,897.19 that was found to have been used as bets or stakes as part of an illegal gambling operation. The City of Brighton ("the City") had an ordinance permitting the establishment of charitable bingo operations within its city limits. In early 2019, an application for a charity-bingo business license was submitted to the City on behalf of Super Highway Bingo ("the casino"); the Life Center was listed as the named charity. In February 2019, the City issued the requested business license, and, in March 2019, the casino officially opened. According to the record, Brighton Ventures was responsible for the day- to-day operations of the casino and, in exchange for its management services, received 85% of the casino's profits. The Life Center, in return, received 15% of the casino's profits. Around the time the casino opened, the Alabama Attorney General's Office began an investigation into "electronic bingo" activity occurring there. "Electronic bingo is illegal in Alabama." An undercover investigator from the Attorney General's office was able to play electronic bingo games at the casino. The State executed multiple search warrants at the casino during which it seized, among other things, over 200 "electronic bingo" machines and large sums of cash. Relevant to these appeals, the State then initiated separate actions, petitioning the circuit court for an in rem civil forfeiture of the $446,897.19. Brighton Ventures and the Life Center denied that the funds seized were "used as bets or stakes in gambling activity" as described in § 13A-12-30(c) and argued that the State had unlawfully seized the funds. They also asserted counterclaims in which they alleged, among other things, that forfeiture of the funds constitutes an "excessive fine" in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Alabama Supreme Court found no error in the circuit court's judgment and affirmed the order ordering the forfeiture. View "Brighton Ventures 2 LLC v. Alabama" on Justia Law