Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Barbara Roberts sued Steve Lanier and his firm Steve Lanier, PC, and Rodney Stallings and his firm Coggin & Stallings, LLC. In 2006, Ms. Roberts was arrested on murder charges and sent to the Cherokee County jail. She contacted Attorney Lanier, who then met with her and agreed to represent her in her criminal proceedings. The contract between them provided that Ms. Roberts would pay a "nonrefundable retainer" of $50,000. At that time, Ms. Roberts executed a power-of-attorney authorizing Mr. Lanier to withdraw the retainer from her bank accounts. Ms. Roberts testified at trial that she first learned that Mr. Lanier was not licensed to practice law in Alabama when she appeared for her first hearing at the district court. It was then that she was introduced to Mr. Stallings, who "associated" on her case. Seeing no need for two lawyers, she tried to terminate Mr. Lanier's representation. Mr. Stallings eventually managed Ms. Roberts' case, having all her mail sent to his office so that he could "oversee every aspect" of her personal life, including payment of all outstanding bills and expenses. Ms. Roberts alleged that instead of using her money for the purposes she intended, Mr. Stallings misappropriated approximately $100,000 of her funds. Ms. Roberts was eventually convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole. She later learned that the "nonrefundable retainer" language in her contract with Mr. Lanier was unenforceable under Alabama law, and sued her former lawyers for legal malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the lawyers. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the lawyers only with respect to employment contract and the "nonrefundable retainer" and the misappropriation of Ms. Roberts' money for expenses while she awaited trial. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Roberts v. Lanier " on Justia Law

Grandparents, E.R.G and D.W.G., challenged the constitutionality of the state Grandparent Visitation Act. The Grandparents and E.H.G. and C.L.G (the Parents) had a very close relationship. The failure of a business shared by the father and the grandfather caused financial difficulties for both families, and eventually the relationships between all involved disintegrated. Desirous to maintain relationships with their grandchildren, the Grandparents petitioned the circuit court for visitation under the Act. The Parents argued in their response to the Grandparents' petition that the Act was unconstitutional on both its face and as it applied to them. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted by the parties and the applicable legal standards, the Supreme Court held the Act was unconstitutional. "Because the Act authorizes a court to award visitation to a grandparent whenever doing so is 'in the best interests of the minor child,'" the Act could potentially override a parent's decision to deny the grandparent visitation without regard for the fundamental right of a fit parent to direct the upbringing for of his or her child. View "In re E.H.G." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Branded Trailer Sales, Inc. (Branded) appealed a circuit court judgment that dismissed its case against Universal Truckload Services for lack of personal jurisdiction. A customer contacted Branded about having some flatbed trailers designed and manufactured. Branded contacted Universal for a recommendation for companies that could do the work. Universal recommended Liddell Trailers, LLC to design and manufacture the trailers. Branded entered into a contract with Liddell. The contract provided that Universal would buy several of the specially-designed trailers from Branded. Liddell later contacted Branded that the price for each trailer would increase from their previously-agreed cost, and that it would take longer for the components to be assembled. Branded would later learn that Universal negotiated a deal directly with Liddell to provide the same trailers at a lower price, excluding Branded from the agreement. Branded filed suit alleging that Universal and Liddell had intentionally interfered with the Branded-Liddell contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence that Branded made detailed assertions regarding its theories of personal jurisdiction, and the record reflected Branded presented that evidence to support those assertions. Therefore, the Court found that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it granted Universal's motion to dismiss. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Branded Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Universal Truckload Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Greens at Auburn, The Greens at Auburn Land Development and the Loachapoka Water Authority (LWA) all appealed a partial summary judgment in favor of the Water Works Board of the City of Auburn (AWWB). As Auburn grew westward and southward, the city limits expanded to include certain portions of the territory to which LWA is authorized to provide service. Several disputes have arisen between AWWB and LWA concerning which entity will provide service in their overlapping areas. In 2009, AWWB filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it could provide water services to several discrete locations within the disputed areas. The Greens companies petitioned to intervene in the suit because they held interests in the disputed areas. In June 2010, the trial court entered a partial summary judgment in favor of AWWB on a majority of claims asserted in its complaint, including to those claims pertaining to The Greens at Auburn. In the same order, the court dismissed an LWA counterclaim, and certified the partial summary judgment as final. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court exceeded its discretion by certifying the partial summary judgment as final. The Court set the certification aside and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Loachapoka Water Authority, Inc. v. City of Auburn" on Justia Law

Ninety-year-old Mary Shaw was admitted to the emergency room at the Mobile Infirmary Medical Center in 2008. After surgery, she developed pressure sores while a patient at the Center. She was transferred to Defendant Infirmary Health System, Inc.'s (IHS) long term acute care center. Within a day of her transfer, she died. The Shaw family wanted to sue IHS for its alleged negligent care of Ms. Shaw. According to the attorney, The Shaws' counsel called IHS's counsel to ask which entity the Shaws should sue. IHS's counsel allegedly told him to sue IHS, and "the identity of the proper parties would be sorted out later." Subsequently the Shaws filed suit against IHS, which went unanswered. The Shaws attempted to amend their complaint to reflect the proper legal entity to sue, but IHS moved to dismiss, citing the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable in wrongful-death cases. The trial court denied IHS's motion. IHS in turn petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel dismissal of the case. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Shaws' attorney did not exercise due diligence in attempting to ascertain the proper party to sue. The Court found that IHS established a clear right to have the wrongful-death action against it dismissed. Accordingly, the Court issued the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to enter judgment in IHS's favor. View "Shaw v. Infirmary Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Leroy Bandy and David Russell appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of the City of Birmingham. In 2009, Plaintiffs challenged the results of the City Council and Board of Education elections on the basis that a change in a local ordinance governing the election was unconstitutional. Plaintiffs argued that only the legislature could make changes to the local laws pertaining to elections. Plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the swearing in of the newly elected council members. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the City had the authority to change its election procedure by ordinance rather than through the state legislature. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly entered its judgment in favor of the City. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Bandy v. City of Birmingham" on Justia Law

EB Investments, LLC and Pavilion Development, LLC filed separate appeals to challenge an a court order that held Pavilion was entitled to redeem certain property in Madison County in which EB Investments, and multiple other parties, held legal interests. In 1997, Pavilion sought to redeem nineteen acres of land purchased by JBJ Partnership at a foreclosure sale. The land was purchased from a development project that went bankrupt. In 1995, the bankruptcy trustee supervised a settlement agreement through which the developer would make payments on the development to its creditors. When the developer defaulted on the settlement agreement, the property was foreclosed and sold. Over the following months and years, a host of counterclaims, cross-claims, and separate lawsuits were filed by various parties who had interests in the property. At issue in this particular case was which party is entitled to redeem the disputed property. The trial court determined that Pavilion was entitled to redeem the property. In its order, the court specified how Pavilion should perfect its redemption. If Pavilion failed to pay all sums required by the court's order, it would waive its right to redeem the property. The court denied the remaining post-judgment motions and certified its judgment as final. EB Investments and Pavilion both appealed that judgment. Though they took opposing sides on most issues in the case, both EB Investments and Pavilions challenged whether the trial court's order was indeed final. They argued that the judgment did not address all other pending issues before the court. JBJ and other parties responded and essentially asked the Court to end this long-running dispute. Upon careful review of the sixteen-year history of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's attempt to end it was ultimately insufficient. The Court found that the trial court exceeded its discretion by certifying its judgment as final. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "EB Investments, L.L.C. v. Pavilion Development, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Petitioner Brady Farr appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Respondents The Gulf Agency, Orange Beach Insurance Agency and Lexington Insurance Company. Mr. Farr finished renovating his house in 2003. In 2004, he decided to sell his property to a developer who wished to turn the property into condominiums. In anticipation of the sale, Mr. Farr obtained a $1 million loan, secured by a mortgage. As part of the loan process, the mortgage company ordered an appraisal of the property. The property was appraised at $1.3 million and the improvements were valued at $313,000. In 2004, Mr. Farr contacted Orange Beach to insure the property against "total loss." Lexington, acting as Orange Beach's agent, submitted an insurance application for policy limits based on the appraisal to The Gulf Agency, who ultimately served as underwriter for the policy. In the fall of 2004, Mr. Farr was concerned that the policy limits were not sufficient to adequately cover a total loss of the property. In September, Mr. Farr's concerns were realized when Hurricane Ivan destroyed the property. He filed a claim with Orange Beach. In November, Mr. Farr sold his property for $1.18 million. The sales agreement was amended to reflect the total loss he suffered as a result of the hurricane. Lexington's adjuster visited the property to determine the cause of Mr. Farr's loss. The adjuster found the hurricane was the "proximate cause". Lexington subsequently paid Mr. Farr $50,000 for the damage. Alleging that the policy did not provide adequate coverage and that Lexington failed to pay the proper benefits under the policy, Mr. Farr sued the insurance companies for breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, conspiracy, and bad-faith failure to pay an insurance claim. The trial court granted the companies' motion for summary judgment, finding that some of Mr. Farr's claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment pertaining to Mr. Farr's tort claims. The Court found that those claims were indeed barred by a statute of limitations. The Court however found that the breach of contract and bad faith claims should not have been dismissed through summary judgment. The Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Farr v. Gulf Agency" on Justia Law

In 1993, Defendant James Knight was convicted on theft and burglary charges. He was sentenced under the state Habitual Felony Offender Act (HFOA) to life in prison for theft and to fifteen years for burglary, both sentences served concurrently. In 2000, the legislature amended the HFOA to make certain sentences less severe. In 2009, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of his life sentence under the new HFOA. The judge who sentenced Defendant had since left office. Another judge was assigned pursuant to a standing administrative order that was entered in 2007. Without requiring an answer from the State, the court summarily dismissed Defendant’s motion. Defendant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals contending, among other things, that the judge was not the "sentencing judge" and that the administrative order did not appoint the judge to decide his motion as required by law. The appellate court was not persuaded by Defendant’s argument and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The issue for review by the Supreme Court was whether the administrative order gave the judge who decided Defendant’s reconsideration motion authority over his case. Upon review of the administrative order, the Court found that the order does not select the judge for any given case. The order provided that motions for reconsideration would be assigned to the judge holding the sentencing judge’s seat. The circuit clerk did not assign a judge to hear Defendant’s motion. Therefore, the judge that dismissed Defendant’s motion acted without authority. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for further consideration. View "In re: Knight v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Virginia McClung appealed a circuit court judgment that reformed a deed that conveyed an interest in land to her and her brother. In 1979 Ms. McClung’s parents divorced. Their separation agreement conveyed two parcels of property to their adult children, Ms. McClung and Charles Green, as "tenants in common, reserving unto [the parents] a life estate therein." At that time, none of the parties recognized a discrepancy between the separation agreement and the actual deed, which conveyed the property to the siblings as "joint tenants with the right of survivorship." The deed was recorded, the parents divorced, and the divorce decree "ratified and confirmed" the separation agreement. In 1992, Charles Green died. His sole heir was his 21-year-old daughter, Bridget Williams. Loretta Green, Ms. McClung’s mother died in 2007 leaving Ms. McClung as her sole heir. Subsequently, a dispute arose between Senior Green and his daughter over who was entitled to the rental income Loretta had previously received from the property. The father sued his daughter seeking all rents received from the property. In his suit, Mr. Green argued that he and his ex-wife intended that his children take the property as tenants-in-common after his and Loretta’s life estates expired. But owing to a mutual mistake, the deed had erroneously conveyed the property as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. Mr. Green’s granddaughter joined in the lawsuit because she inherited her father’s interest in the property if the court reformed the deed. A month after he commenced his suit, Mr. Green died. The trial court ruled in his (and his granddaughter’s) favor, and Ms. McClung appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial record, the court found that before the 1979 deed could be reformed, there must be evidence to indicate that Loretta Green did not intend to convey the property to her children as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Neither the separation agreement nor the recorded deed accurately reflected Loretta’s intent at the time either document was executed. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial court’s reformation of the 1979 deed was inappropriate. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McClung v. Green" on Justia Law