Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A circuit court judge petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Criminal Appeals to quash a writ of mandamus it issued to the circuit court through an unpublished order. Kevin Byrd pled guilty to first-degree assault. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. That sentence was suspended, and Mr. Byrd was ordered to serve 180 days in “boot camp” followed by years on probation. The Mobile County District Attorney’s office began collecting unpaid restitution from Mr. Byrd. In 2007, the DA’s office requested a hearing for Mr. Byrd to show cause why he should not have been held in contempt for failing to pay restitution. The trial court held hearings in January and October 2008, and May and September 2010. In October 2010, Mr. Byrd petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to set aside all orders respecting restitution since December 2000, the date which Mr. Byrd said his probation expired. In February 2011, the court granted Mr. Byrd’s petition and issued the writ. In its unpublished decision, the court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Byrd. Upon careful consideration of the trial court and appellate court records, the Supreme Court found that nothing in the state restitution act prevented the trial court from taking the action it took in this case. "The Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding otherwise." Accordingly, the Court issued the writ of mandamus to quash its decision. View "Alabama v. Byrd" on Justia Law

Defendant Wakilii Brown was convicted on three counts of capital murder. The jury returned a death sentence. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence. On appeal, Defendant challenged the admissibility of the testimony of a child witness and alleged that there was an error in the trial court’s instructions to the jury. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the record did not support the conclusion that the child’s testimony should have been excluded. Furthermore, the Court did not commit plain error when instructing the jury. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s conviction and Defendant’s sentence. View "Brown v. Alabama" on Justia Law

The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Alabama certified a question to the State Supreme Court. The Court was asked whether the failure of an insured to give notice of a proposed settlement to an insurance company causes the insured to forfeit underinsured motorist coverage (UIM), regardless of the insured’s actual knowledge of that coverage, and regardless of prejudice to the insurance company if the insured has a copy of the policy that contains the coverage. In 2007, Delbert and Lou Ann Downey were stopped at an intersection on their motorcycle when a vehicle driven by Wyndell Thompson failed to stop and hit them. At the time of the accident, multiple insurance policies were in force. The Downeys had underinsured motorist coverage. The Downeys, in consideration of $10,000 and while represented by counsel (but without having notified Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Company that they were doing so), executed a general release to discharge Mr. Thompson and his insurance company from all liability arising out of the accident. Subsequently, and with different counsel, the Downeys notified Travelers of the accident for the first time and that they were making a claim under their underinsured motorist policy. Travelers denied the claim and the Downeys sued. The Supreme Court found that the Downeys were at all relevant times in possession of the policy, and it clearly provided UIM coverage. However, the Downeys did not meet the threshold of showing any condition under which their lack of notice could be excused. "In other words, the Downeys have ‘forfeit[ed]’ UIM coverage." View "Downey v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

First Union National Bank of Florida (First Union) appealed a judgment in favor of the Lee County Commission (Commission) and Philip Summers. Mr. Summers executed a mortgage on property he owned within the County on which he built a summer home. The home was ultimately subject to a tax sale by the County. The trustee for Mid-State Trust IV sued the Commission and Mr. Summers in 2009 seeking the excess redemption proceeds from the tax sale of the Summers property. The trustee later filed a motion to substitute First Union as the real party in interest. The trial court eventually entered a judgment finding that Mr. Summers was entitled to the excess funds from the tax sale because he was the last "owner" as defined by state law against whom the taxes were assessed. Upon careful consideration of the trial court’s record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "First Union National Bank of Florida v. Lee County Commission" on Justia Law

The United States Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation consolidated approximately 1800 cases involving claims that sought damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by exposure to welding fumes. Several dozen of these cases are governed by Alabama law, and the MDL court identified three issues of law that may be determinative in those cases. The Supreme Court responded in summary: (1) a plaintiff injured by long-term continuous exposure to a toxic substance is limited to recovering damages attributable to injuries occurring within the period of limitations; (2) a six-year statute of limitations applies to wantonness claims filed before the Court’s holding in "Ex parte Capstone" was released; and (3) a plaintiff injured by long-term continuous exposure to a toxic substance has the burden to establish what damages (if any) are attributable to his injuries occurring within the applicable limitation period. View "Jerkins v. Lincoln Electric Company" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether sufficient evidence on the element of "serious bodily injury" for the purposes of a first-degree assault offense could be established by the testimony of a lay witness, or, as a matter of law, it could be presented only through medical testimony or the victim’s testimony. The appeals court held that a mother’s testimony concerning her child’s suffering "serious and protracted disfigurement" was not sufficient evidence of the serious-bodily-injury element of first-degree assault to present the question to the jury. Defendant Timothy Reck was intoxicated when he drove his vehicle into the vehicle of Donna Loving. Her sons were passengers in the vehicle. She explained that her son’s face sustained numerous little scars caused by shattered glass that nicked his face. Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that "serious bodily injury" in the form of "serious and protracted disfigurement" could be established by the testimony of a lay witness. The Court reversed the appellate court’s holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reck v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Petitioner Beverly Scannelly petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate all orders it entered after she filed a notice of dismissal. Furthermore, Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower court from future attempts to exercise jurisdiction over her case. Petitioner sued her brother, Respondent Gary Toxey, in 2009, seeking to void certain real-estate transfers her father made to Mr. Toxey. Petitioner filed, sought dismissal, and refilled her complaint three times in three different circuit courts. Mr. Toxey "answered" Petitioner’s complaint approximately one year later by filing a responsive pleading that collaterally attacked her complaint under "res judicata." The circuit court dismissed her case in 2010, finding that Mr. Toxey essentially filed a motion for summary judgment and that Petitioner’s claims presented no issues of material fact. In affirming the circuit court’s decision, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner failed to demonstrate she had a clear legal right to her requested writs. Accordingly, the Court denied her petition. View "Scannelly v. Toxey" on Justia Law

In 1991, Defendant Carl Ward was convicted on murder charges and sentenced to life in prison. Acting pro se, Defendant challenged his conviction to the Supreme Court, alleging that recently discovered material facts warranted his conviction to be vacated. Central to Defendant's "newly-discovered facts" were the results of forensic tests performed on the key evidence that convicted him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that "the newly discovered facts at issue here relate[d] not to some procedural violation, but to [Defendant's] actual guilt or innocence." The evidence against Defendant was largely circumstantial; the only physical evidence in the record tying Defendant to the crime scene was the evidence subject to the forensic tests. Accordingly, the Court found that Defendant sufficiently pled a claim of newly discovered material facts, and that he was entitled to an opportunity to prove his allegations. The Court reversed the lower courts' decisions in this case, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ward v. Alabama" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the application of a six-year statute of limitations to a claim of "wantonness." Plaintiff William Walker filed suit against Capstone Building Corporation (Capstone) and several fictitiously named parties. Capstone had been the general contractor on a construction job on which he worked. While working at the construction site, Plaintiff stepped onto a manhole cover which flipped over, causing him to fall into the hole. Plaintiff asserted that Capstone had been responsible for providing a safe work environment at the site, but it failed to do so. Plaintiff alleged that Capstone's failure to secure the manhole cover constituted "negligence" or "wantonness." Alabama law provides that wanton conduct must be commenced within six years. Capstone moved to dismiss the claims, asking the Supreme Court to change Alabama case law in favor of a two-year limitation for this case. The Supreme Court engaged in an extensive review of the trial record and the applicable law. The Court overruled its previous holding in "McKenzie v. Killian" which mandated the six-year limitation on claims for wantonness, finding that if it "did not ... overrule 'McKenzie,' [the Court] would be enshrining in out law an erroneous decision." The Court found that "the law in Alabama concerning the proper legal analysis of wantonness was not settled and was in fact based on confusing and inconsistent discussions of causality rather than culpability." The Court applied its change prospectively to litigants as to whom the six-year limitations had begun but had not yet expired. To this end, the Court found that Plaintiff's case was timely filed under the McKenzie rule. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision that dismissed Plaintiff's wantonness claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Walker v. Capstone Building Corp." on Justia Law

The Town of Boligee appealed a circuit court judgment that denied it a declaration that certain acts by the Greene County Water & Sewer Authority (the Authority) were not properly authorized. In 2008, the Town brought suit complaining that the Authority's excavation, tree cutting and installation of water pipelines in Boligee's right-of-way were unlawful because the Authority did not obtain the town's permission first. The Town also sought tort damages to recover for all of the allegedly unauthorized excavation work. In 2003, the Town Council and the Authority had discussed building the pipeline, but ultimately voted against it. However, the Mayor signed a written agreement permitting the Authority to start construction. The trial court ruled that the Mayor had the authority to bind Boligee to the agreement, and dismissed its tort claims. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court found that although the Mayor is authorized to enter into and execute the type of contract at issue in this case, the Mayor was only allowed to do so to the extent directed by the Town council. The Court found the Mayor acted without authorization, and accordingly reversed the trial court's judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Town Of Boligee v. Greene County Water & Sewer Authority" on Justia Law