Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

EB Investments, LLC and Pavilion Development, LLC filed separate appeals to challenge elements of a circuit court order holding that Pavilion was entitled to redeem certain property in Madison County in which EB Investments and other parties held legal interests. In 1997, Pavilion initiated an action to redeem 19 acres of land purchased at a foreclosure sale. In the years since, the Supreme Court has issued three opinions deciding various issues stemming from Pavilion's attempted redemption of that property. The property was subject to bankruptcy protection. In connection with a settlement agreement, three mortgages were executed on the property. Pavilion, as one of the mortgagees, sought to enforce its right of redemption to the property. In 2010, a trial court entered judgment outlining the steps Pavilion needed to take to perfect and complete its redemption. EB Investments and Pavilion took opposing sides on most legal issues in this case; however, they both argued that the trial court's judgment is not an appealable judgment because it does not address all the pending issues and resolve all the pending claims in this case. Other interested parties who filed responses in this case argued that the trial court's order was sufficient and urged the Supreme Court to end this long-running dispute. Upon review, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and offered guidance to the trial court to help expedite a resolution. View "EB Investments, L.L.C. v. Pavilion Development, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Matador Holdings, Inc. and HoPo Realty Investments, LLC filed separate appeals to challenge elements of a circuit court's order involving commercial property owned by Matador. Matador sued HoPo for payment for materials and services Matador provided to HoPo's lessee Stratford Plastic Components of Alabama. The lease agreement contained provisions allowing for HoPo or its agents to enter the property during the lease-term to make inspections or repairs. Stratford had applied for and received a line of credit with Matador. After taking possession of the leased property, Stratford ordered materials from Matador to convert the property into one suitable for Stratford's production needs. Stratford vacated the property before the lease term expired without paying Matador for the materials. HoPo's agents testified that Stratford did not request any changes be made to the leased property and had no knowledge that Matador would supply materials to the lessee. To resolve the dispute, the trial court denied Matador's claim that HoPo was unjustly enriched by the services provided to Stratford that were unpaid, but the court placed a lien on HoPo's property for the unexpired portion of the Stratford lease. Upon review of the trial court record and its order, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of Matador's unjust enrichment claim. Furthermore, the Court reversed the lower court's order insofar as it enforced any portion of a lien against HoPo's property or the improvements made to the property. The Court ruled the lien void. View "Matador Holdings, Inc. v. HoPo Realty Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellee Compass Bank and Amy Hovis petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to dismiss an action filed in that court filed by Appellant Jerome Sirote based on Alabama's abatement statute. Appellant filed suit against the Bank and several of its employees alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, fraud, deceit, and violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Appellant alleged that the Bank improperly processed transactions in his deposit account and misstated material facts related to that account. The Bank moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court entered an order dismissing Appellant's federal claims with prejudice. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on the state law claims. The Bank moved to dismiss the remaining charges under the Abatement Statute, arguing that Appellant was barred from prosecuting two actions simultaneously in different courts if the claims alleged in each action arose from the same underlying operative facts. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the Bank's petition and issued the writ to direct the lower court to dismiss Appellant's state claims. View "Sirote v. Compass Bank" on Justia Law

In 2007, Massachusetts Defendant No. 1 Steel Products, Inc. (No. 1 Steel) was a subcontractor on a construction project at a health rehabilitation center in Massachusetts (Cape Regency project). While working on the project, No. 1 Steel determined that it needed to hire out some of the steel fabrication for which it was responsible. No. 1 Steel found Alabama Plaintiff Garrison Steel Fabricators, Inc. (Garrison). No. 1 Steel was dissatisfied with Garrison's work and refused to pay Garrison anything beyond what it had previously paid. In an attempt to collect the remaining amount owed, Garrison sent No. 1 Steel notice that it intended to file mechanic's liens on the project unless it was paid. Upon receiving the notice, No. 1 Steel filed a motion in Massachusetts court to discharge and release the not-yet-filed-lien, arguing that Garrison was not registered to do business in Massachusetts and that no written contract of the parties' agreement existed. The Massachusetts court granted the motion without stating a rationale. In 2009 Garrison sued No. 1 Steel in Alabama court, asserting claims of open account, implied contract and labor and work performed. No. 1 Steel moved to dismiss, arguing a lack of personal jurisdiction. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found the "specific contacts" No. 1 Steel had were not sufficient enough that it should have anticipated being haled into court in Alabama; No. 1 Steel's relationship with Garrison was limited to a one-time purchase of customized goods. The Court directed the trial court to dismiss Garrison's case because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over No. 1 Steel. View "Garrison Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. No. 1 Steel Products, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs James Adams, Stanley Dye and Ed Holcombe were all shareholders in Altrust Financial Services, Inc. They sued Altrust, the Peoples Bank of Alabama (collectively, Altrust) and Dixon Hughes, LLC, Altrust's public-accounting firm, for violating the Alabama Securities Act. Altrust is a holding company that fully owns, controls and directs the operations of the Bank. Altrust and the Bank share common officers and directors and issue consolidated financial statements. Shareholders voted to reorganize the company in 2008 from a publicly held company to a privately held company. The move would have freed the company of certain reporting obligations imposed by the federal Securities Exchange Act and allowed the company to elect Subchapter S status for tax purposes. Relying on information in a proxy statement, Plaintiffs elected not to sell their shares of Altrust stock and instead voted for reorganization. Plaintiffs alleged that the proxy statement and financial reports contained material misrepresentations and omissions that induced them to ultimately sign shareholder agreements that made them shareholders in the newly reorganized Altrust. Plaintiffs contended that if (in their view) instances of mismanagement, self-dealing, interested-party transactions and "skewing" of company liabilities had been fully disclosed, they would have elected to sell their shares rather than remain as shareholders. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs' allegations were not specific to them but to all shareholders, and as such, they did not have standing to assert a direct action against the company. Because Plaintiffs did not have standing to assert claims against Altrust, they also lacked standing to assert professional negligence claims against the accounting firm. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Altrust Financial Services, Inc. v. Adams" on Justia Law

Petitioner Delta International Machinery Corporation (Delta) sought a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate an order that granted Respondent Brandon Landrum access to "certain technology" in its control. Respondent was operating a portable bench saw manufactured by Delta. His hand came into contact with the sawblade and ended with injuries to his hand and amputation of his index finger. In 2007, Respondent sued Delta alleging the saw was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Though the parties agreed to a protective order which forbade certain confidential materials from being released to Respondent's expert witness who happened to be employed by one of Delta's competitors, the trial court allowed Respondent's expert to review certain technology in Delta's possession pertaining to design of safety features of the saw. The technology Respondent sought to discover had pre-dated technology that had been developed by a joint venture of all saw manufacturers, of which Delta was a part. Delta claimed that its "flesh-sensing" technology was not discoverable because it did not exist at the time Respondent's saw was manufactured, and pre-dated the joint venture. Delta objected to Respondent's discovery request as "irrelevant" and "confidential." The trial court granted Respondent's motion to inspect. Delta subsequently filed its petition to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the flesh-sensing technology was both a trade secret and was not relevant to Respondent's claims. As such, the Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in allowing discovery of that technology and in allowing access to the technology by Delta's competitor. The Court granted Delta's request for the writ, and directed the trial court directed the trial court to vacate its order granting Respondent's motion to inspect. View "Landrum v. Delta International Machinery Corp." on Justia Law

C.E. (Mother) appealed the reversal of a Juvenile Court judgment originally in her favor. This case arose from T.C.'s (Father) proposal to relocate the parties' two minor children to New York State. In 2006, the Juvenile Court awarded T.C. primary physical custody of the children and awarded C.E. visitation. Both parties were awarded joint legal custody. In November 2008, T.C. sent C.E. a certified letter to notify her of his plan to relocate to New York with the children. The notice was in "substantial compliance" with the Alabama Parent-Child Relationship Protection Act. One month later, C.E. sent the father notice that she objected to the relocation. Furthermore, C.E. petitioned the court for an order to prohibit the relocation. The father filed a motion to dismiss as untimely filed. The court denied the father's motion, which he appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The appellate court concluded that C.E. had waived her right to file an action to oppose the relocation because her petition in Juvenile Court was not timely filed and reversed. A few days after the appeals court issued its judgment, C.E. filed an action in juvenile court to modify custody. T.C. moved to dismiss, and the court entered a "status quo" order. T.C. then petitioned for a writ of mandamus with the appellate court, arguing the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the modification action. The appellate court ultimately granted T.C.'s petition for mandamus, and ordered the Juvenile Court to vacate its status quo order. C.E. then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both the Juvenile Court and Court of Civil Appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in addressing the merits of the issues raised by the parties. The Court found that the Juvenile Court's decision that C.E. sought to reinstate was void for lack of jurisdiction; the appellate court likewise lacked jurisdiction and should have dismissed T.C.'s appeal. Ultimately, C.E.'s original objection to the relocation was indeed untimely filed. The appellate court should have dismissed the case, but proceeded on the merits despite this technical defect. The Supreme Court granted C.E.'s petition for certiorari in order to vacate the both appellate court's and juvenile court's decisions to dismiss the case in its entirety. View "T. C. v. C. E." on Justia Law

A.S. and C.S., adoptive parents of a minor child, appealed an appellate court's order that affirmed visitation to the child's paternal grandparents without an opinion. A.S. and C.S. argued to the Supreme Court that the no-opinion affirmation was in direct conflict with the Court's opinion in "Ex part E.R.G." (2010). Upon review, the Court reversed the lower court's no-opinion order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re: A. S. and C. S." on Justia Law

Alabama Title Loans, Inc., Accurate Adjustments, LLC and Kevin Sanders all appealed a trial court order that denied their motions to compel arbitration filed against them by Plaintiff Kimberly White. In 2009, Ms. White borrowed money from Alabama Title Loans (ATL), securing the loan with an interest in her automobile. ATL required Ms. White to surrender the title to the automobile. The title-loan agreement contained an arbitration clause. Ms. White subsequently paid off her loan and borrowed more money against her car several more times. In August 2009, Ms. White said she went to ATL ready to pay off her loan in full. In January 2010, ALT contracted with Accurate Adjustments to conduct a "self-help" repossession of Ms. White's automobile. The police were called, and Accurate and ATL were required to release the automobile when it could not produce the title they claimed gave them the right to repossess. Ms. White filed suit alleging multiple theories: assault and battery, negligence, wantonness, trespass, wrongful repossession and conversion. At trial, the court denied the title-loan parties' motion to compel arbitration without making any findings of fact. Based on the broad language of the arbitration clause in the title-loan agreements executed by Ms. White, the Supreme Court held that the trial court should have granted the title-loan parties' motions to compel arbitration. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Alabama Title Loans, Inc. v. White" on Justia Law

Thomasville Feed & Seed, Inc. (Thomasville Feed) petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Wilcox County Circuit court to transfer the action filed against it by Roy Saulsberry and Roy Saulsberry, Jr. (The Saulsberrys) to the Clarke Circuit Court. The Saulsberrys own and operate a cattle farm in Wilcox County. Thomasville Feed is located in Clarke County. In April 2010, the Saulsberrys sued Thomasville Feed in Wilcox County Circuit Court, alleging that fertilizer they purchased from Thomasville Feed was defective and that Thomasville Feed was liable for damages under Alabama tort law. Thomasville Feed moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Thomasville Feed only does business in Clarke County, and that Clarke County had jurisdiction over it. The trial court denied Thomasville Feed’s motion to dismiss. Thomasville Feed then filed a motion to transfer the case to Clarke County, which the trial court denied. Thomasville subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for extraordinary relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that venue was proper in Clarke County. The Court vacated the Wilcox County order that denied Thomasville Feed’s motion to transfer, and issued the writ of mandamus to direct the court to transfer the case to Clarke County. View "Saulsberry v. Thomasville Feed & Seed, Inc." on Justia Law