Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Robert S. Grant Construction, Inc. (the corporation), Robert S. Grant (RSG), and Pam E. Grant (PEG) (collectively referred to as "the Grants") appealed an order striking their jury demands in an action commenced by Frontier Bank (the bank) against the Grants and others alleging breach of contract, fraud, and the fraudulent conveyance of real estate. This case arose out of a loan from the bank to the corporation. The loan ultimately involved a number of related agreements, including a construction-loan agreement between the corporation and the bank and a series of "continuing guaranties," whereby RSG personally guaranteed repayment of the loan. The Supreme Court was unable to reach the merits of the Grants' contentions, and dismissed the appeal because, despite the invocation of Rule 54(b), the trial court's order was not final and appealable. View "Robert S. Grant Construction, Inc. v. Frontier Bank " on Justia Law

Sammy Thomas and Pam Thomas appealed the Blount Circuit Court's order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by Sloan Homes, LLC ("Sloan Homes"), David Sloan, and Teresa Sloan in the Thomases' action alleging breach of contract and tortious conduct in relation to the construction of a house by Sloan Homes, the grantor under the residential sales agreement. The question presented by this appeal was whether, under the doctrine of merger, the execution and delivery of the deed in this case nullified an arbitration clause included in the antecedent residential sales agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration clause was still valid, thereby affirming the circuit court's order granting Sloan Homes and the Sloans' motion to compel arbitration of the Thomases' claims. View "Thomas v. Sloan Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Cantrell Brown appealed the grant of the writ of mandamus by the Court of Civil Appeals to Arlington Properties, Inc. Arlington filed an unlawful detainer claim against Brown in district court in 2009. After a trial, the district court rendered judgment in favor of Arlington on July 21. The court advised Brown that she had until August 4 to appeal the judgment. The judgment was entered into the State Judicial Information System on July 27; Brown filed her appeal August 4. Arlington moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed, which the district court denied. At issue in this case before the Supreme Court was the delay between the court's judgment at trial and the official entry of the judgment, and whether Brown's appeal was indeed timely filed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Brown's appeal was timely filed, and that the circuit court properly denied Arlington's motion to dismiss. View "Arlington Properties, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Don Drennen Motor Co., Inc. ("Drennen"), an automobile dealership, appealed a Jefferson Circuit Court order requiring it to pay the costs of arbitration stemming from an action filed by one of Drennen's former employees, William B. McClung. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court's decision "is due to be reversed insofar as it orders Drennen to pay the entire costs of arbitration." The arbitration agreement provided that the parties must "share equally the costs, fees and expenses incurred by arbitration." The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Don Drennen Motor Co.,Inc. v. William B. McClung" on Justia Law

April Mack, mother of "Baby Mack" appealed the grant of summary judgment in her action against Thomas Carmack and Matthew Taul for the wrongful death of her unborn child. In 2007, Mack and her fiancee Reginald Thomas (father of Baby Mack) needed to go to the grocery store, but were without transportation. Mack contacted Thomas Carmack and asked him to take her and Thomas to the grocery store. Carmack agreed to do so after Mack offered to pay for the trip. En route, Carmack's vehicle was struck by Taul's vehicle when Carmack "knowingly proceeded to turn left even though the traffic light was red . . . [in] violation of the law to do so." The force of the collision caused severe damage to Carmack's vehicle and injuries to Mack and Thomas. While hospitalized, Mack suffered a miscarriage. The trial court found that the state Wrongful Death Act did not allow for a cause of action for a nonviable fetus and entered summary judgment on behalf of Carmack. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding "it is an unfair and arbitrary endeavor to draw a line that allows recovery on behalf of a fetus injured before viability that dies after achieving viability but that prevents recovery on behalf of a fetus injured that, as a result of those injuries, does not survive to viability . . . We cannot conclude that 'logic, fairness, and justice' compel the drawing of such a line; instead, 'logic, fairness, and justice' compel the application of the Wrongful Death Act to circumstances where prenatal injuries have caused death to a fetus before the fetus has achieved the ability to live outside the womb." The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mack v. Carmack" on Justia Law

Callan Associates petitioned the Supreme Court for the writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Carol Perdue in her role as the legal guardian of Anna Perdue, who sued on behalf of the Wallace-Folsom Prepaid College Trust Fund. Ms. Perdue opened an account with the Trust Fund on behalf of her Daughter Anna. After making monthly payments, Anna would be entitled to reduced in-state tuition and fees. The Trust's assets pooled all such contributions and invested them so that designated beneficiaries would receive the promised benefits. The Trust hired Callan Associates as an investment consultant. The Trust's management notified beneficiaries that because of the stock market downturn of 2009, the Trust's assets were negatively impacted. Subsequently, Ms. Perdue sued on behalf of Anna and the Trust, contending that Callan and the Trustees mismanaged the Trust's assets. Callan moved to dismiss which the Circuit Court denied. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Callan argued that Ms. Perdue lacked standing to bring her claims. Furthermore, Callan argued that Ms. Perdue's claims were not ripe for adjudication since none of the beneficiaries have had tuition paid from the Trust. The Supreme Court concluded that "Callan's motion to dismiss in the trial court was well founded"; therefore the Court granted Callan's petition and issued the requested writ to direct the trial court to dismiss Ms. Perdue's claims. View "Perdue v. Callan Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Jean W. Reed, Mary W. Haynes, and Susan W. Stockham ("the sisters") sued Regions Bank ("Regions"), Morgan Asset Management, Inc. ("MAM"), Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. ("Morgan Keegan"), and Regions Financial Corporation ("RFC"), alleging several claims related to the investment of assets belonging to two trusts set up for the benefit of Reed and Haynes. MAM, Morgan Keegan, and RFC unsuccessfully moved the Jefferson Circuit Court to dismiss the claims against them, arguing among other things, that the claims were derivative in nature and could be asserted only in compliance with Rule 23.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., with which the sisters did not comply. MAM, Morgan Keegan, and RFC petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant their motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the sisters had not alleged an injury distinct from that suffered by the trusts' funds; the claims against MAM, Morgan Keegan, and RFC in their complaint were derivative and did not comply with Rule 23.1 for asserting such claims. The sisters therefore lacked standing to sue. The Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Reed v. Regions Bank" on Justia Law

Faye Gilmer sued Crestview Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. ("Crestview"), Garland Jones, Barry Taul, and Mary Caldwell, alleging claims related to services Crestview had provided with regard to the funeral of Mrs. Gilmer's husband. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all the claims against them. Mrs. Gilmer appealed, and the Supreme Court: (1) affirmed the trial court's judgment as to the claims against Jones, (2) affirmed the negligent-supervision claim against Jones and Crestview, and (3) affirmed the negligent- or wanton-conduct claim against all the defendants. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment as to the tort-of-outrage, suppression, and breach-of-contract claims against Crestview, Taul, and Caldwell. The case was then remanded the case for further proceedings. Taul and Caldwell were eventually dismissed from the action. The trial court granted Mrs. Gilmer's motion for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") on the breach-of-contract claim. The suppression and tort-of-outrage claims were submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in Crestview's favor on the tort-of-outrage claim and in Gilmer's favor on the suppression claim. Crestview appealed the trial court's judgment as to the breach-of-contract and suppression claims, as well as the compensatory-damages and punitive-damages awards. Upon re-review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remand the case for a new trial on the breach-of-contract and suppression claims: "Crestview presented substantial evidence creating a question of fact requiring resolution by the jury as to the materiality of the alleged breach of the contract, the trial court erred in entering a JML in favor of Gilmer with regard to that claim." Moreover, the Court was unable to determine from the lump-sum award of compensatory damages what damages were assessed with regard to the suppression claim and the breach-of-contract claim, respectively: "[t]herefore, we must reverse the trial court's judgment as to both claims and remand the case for a new trial on the suppression and breach-of-contract claims." View "Crestview Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. v. Gilmer" on Justia Law

Defendant Melvin Gene Hodges petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted for the limited purpose of determining whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment insofar as it affirmed the trial court's summary denial of Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief (alleging juror misconduct during the voir dire examination) conflicted with the Court's decision in "Ex parte Burgess." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it did: "The rule of 'Burgess' is that a petitioner seeking relief under Rule 32 for the alleged failure of jurors to respond accurately or truthfully to voir dire questioning is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim, unless it appears on the face of the record that he knew or reasonably should have known of the inaccuracy in time to raise it on appeal." When the State sought a summary dismissal of the claim, Defendant replied that his counsel could not have known about the alleged juror misconduct in time to raise the issue at trial or on appeal. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hodges v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Defendants Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company, L.P. (KKR), KKR Associates, KKR Partners II, and Crimson Associates, L.P., as well as several individuals, petitioned the Supreme Court for the writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to vacate its order that denied their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint because it lacked personal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs in this action were 46 individuals, partnerships, corporations, foundations, trusts and retirement and pension funds located throughout the country that invested in certain promissory notes issued as part of a leveraged recapitalization of Bruno's Inc., a supermarket-grocery business with its headquarters in Alabama. Plaintiffs contended that despite a negative due-diligence report from its forensic accountant, KKR decided to proceed with its acquisition of Bruno's. In order to achieve the recapitalization, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants made material, fraudulent misrepresentations to the Plaintiffs' investment money manger that induced them into purchasing the notes. Based on the torts allegedly committed by the individual defendants, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendants' motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court denied Defendants' application for the writ of mandamus, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "27001 Partnership v. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., L.P." on Justia Law