Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tate & Lyle Sucralose, Inc. (TLS) petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Washington Circuit Court to vacate its December 1, 2010 order denying its motion to dismiss, and to enter an order dismissing as time-barred the negligence and wantonness claims asserted by William C.Anderson, Jr. against it. Upon review of the circuit court's record, the Supreme Court concluded that Anderson failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining TLS's identity, and that failure barred his attempt to amend his complaint to substitute TLS for a fictitiously named defendant so as to avoid the application of the statute of limitations barring his negligence claims. The Court also concluded that as to Anderson's wantonness claims, the limitations period had not yet expired. Therefore, the Court granted the petition in part and denied it in part and issued the writ. View "Anderson v. Tate & Lyle PLC" on Justia Law

Timothy C. Allsopp appealed a trial court's denial of his motion for relief from a judgment entered in favor of James and Kisha Bolding. The Boldings sued Naysa Realty and Investments, LLC, Deleana Davis, Keller-Williams Realty Co., and Allsopp. The Boldings alleged breach of fiduciary duty, and three counts of fraud arising out of real-estate transactions in Madison County. Davis was a principal in Naysa Realty and was employed by Keller-Williams as a real-estate agent. Davis advised the Boldings, who were purchasing property, to give Allsopp power of attorney to sign certain closing documents on their behalf. A default judgment was entered against Allsopp, with leave for the Boldings to prove damages against him later. Allsopp argued on appeal that the evidence against him was insufficient to support the judgment against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's decision and affirmed the judgment in the Boldings' favor. View "Allsopp v. Bolding" on Justia Law

Alabama Psychiatric Services, P.C. (APS) appealed a grant of summary judgment by the circuit court in favor of 412 South Court Street, LLC (Court Street). SRS Group, LLC, owned by Eugene Sak, began substantial renovations to the Court Street building, including gutting and rebuilding the interior of the structure. Sak entered into negotiations with Make Believe, LLC, to lease space in the building for use as a gym and exercise facility. While he was negotiating with Make Believe, Sak entered into discussions with APS about leasing office space. During the negotiations, APS voiced concerns about having a discreet entrance for APS's clients and about potential noise from a gym facility in the building and that there would not be sufficient parking for APS patients and staff because of the use of the parking lot by members of the gym. Sak assured APS that the noise problem would be solved, that parking would be sufficient for both the gym members and APS, and that when construction of the addition was complete, the gym would have its own separate entrance. Sak sold the building before construction was complete. The new ownership assumed AFS' lease but the discreet entrance was not built. On appeal, APS argued that it was fraudulently induced to sign a lease agreement for space in the building. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court record contained substantial evidence to support APS's claim that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether, through misrepresentation and the suppression of material facts, Sak fraudulently induced APS to enter into the lease agreement. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Alabama Psychiatric Services, P.C. v. 412 South Court Street, LLC. " on Justia Law

Defendants Lafarge North America, Inc. and Wayne Looney appealed a jury verdict in favor of Plaintinff Lawrence Nord. Plaintiff's claims arose from a personal injury he sustained at Lafarge's cement packhouse. Various forms of bagged cement are loaded onto flatbed trucks owned and operated by companies other than Lafarge, by Lafarge employees using forklifts. The drivers of the flatbed trucks drive their trucks into the loading zone of the packhouse. Plaintiff, a driver for Southern Tank, was injured in the loading zone of the packhouse when Lafarge employee Looney ran over Plaintiff's foot with a forklift, breaking several bones. In their postjudgment motion, Defendants argued that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings on his wantonness claim; that Plaintiff's negligence claim was barred because he had been contributorily negligent; that if the jury verdict stood, Defendants were "entitled to a setoff in the amount of the damages claimed by [Nord] which [had] already been recovered by ... Nord ..."; that the trial court had erred by instructing the jury on wantonness, punitive damages, and premises liability; and that the verdict form submitted to the jury was improper. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court found that the record was insufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Lafarge North America, Inc. v. Nord " on Justia Law

Getloaded Corporation, TransCore, and Roper Industries, Inc. (collectively, Getloaded), and American Timber & Steel Company, Inc. (ATSC), petitioned the Supreme Court for writs of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to dismiss them as defendants based on a lack of personal jurisdiction in actions filed by Plaintiffs Bishop Ivey, Carolyn Kelley, Joan Foye Wynn, Sonie Taylor, Annette Fenn, Kendra Bouier, and Jenny Simmons. The plaintiffs were representatives of the estates of passengers riding in an Alabama Department of Corrections van who died as a result of an October 2008 accident. A truck carrying lumber purchased by ATSC from Getloaded tried to pass another vehicle on the highway. The van hit the passing truck and caught fire, engulfing the van in flames killing all inside. The plaintiffs' respective complaints asserted claims against the purchasers of the lumber, the truck drivers and their trucking companies, and others who were otherwise involved in the loading and delivery of the lumber. ATSC filed an answer to the complaints in which, among other things, it pleaded lack of personal jurisdiction. In April 2009, the claims against ATSC were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. The plaintiffs then reached a settlement with one of the trucking companies and its driver. The circuit court found that the remaining Defendants had the sufficient "minimum contacts" with the state to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Defendants did not have sufficient contact with the state in order for the circuit court to exercise personal jurisdiction over them. The Supreme Court reversed the court's decision and remanded the case to dismiss Defendants from this action. View "In re: Ivey v. Lewis Trucking Co. " on Justia Law

Reginald Hayes appealed the circuit court's dismissal of his action against Jo Ann Henley both individually and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased husband Earl Hoyt Henley (Hoyt). Hayes sustained injuries when his automobile struck a horse on a highway. The horse rolled onto the roof of the automobile and the roof collapsed, breaking Hayes's neck and rendering him a quadriplegic. Hayes filed a multicount complaint against Mazda and against Henley, alleging that the horse he struck belonged to Hoyt and/or Henley and that Hoyt and/or Henley had allowed the horse to roam onto the highway thereby causing the accident. As to Mazda, Hayes alleged that the automobile was defectively designed and/or manufactured and that it was not crashworthy. The circuit court entered two orders in which it granted Henley's motions and dismissed the claims against Henley individually and as representative of the estate. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that "the circuit court's order disposing of Hayes's claims against Henley in her individual capacity is due to be affirmed. We cannot reach the same conclusion, however, as to the circuit court's disposition of all Hayes's claims against Henley in her capacity as personal representative of Hoyt's estate." The Court reversed the circuit court's ruling that the estate "knowingly and willfully" placed the horse upon the highway. View "Hayes v. Henley" on Justia Law

American Suzuki Motor Corporation petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant its motion to dismiss the claims filed against it by John Burns and Jill S. Hearn. Plaintiffs sued Defendants American Suzuki, several local dealerships and the dealerships' owner, alleging breach of contract based on Suzuki vehicle warranties, diminution in value of their vehicles, fraudulent misrepresentations, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs purported to bring the action on behalf of themselves and all members of a class composed of individuals who had purchased Suzuki vehicles from Defendants and had active warranties or service contracts on those vehicles. According to the complaint, new Suzuki vehicles carried a manufacturer's warranty, and that Defendants also sold purchasers of Suzuki vehicles extended warranties and maintenance agreements. In early March 2009, "the defendants closed dealerships … and [that] there are no other Suzuki dealerships closer than Nashville, Tennessee, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, or Birmingham, Alabama, to perform service work on the warranted vehicles." As a result of the dealerships being closed, Plaintiffs alleged they were "constructively barred from obtaining warranty work on their vehicles." The complaint did not allege that Plaintiffs needed or sought service under the warranties on their vehicles or that any of the Defendants refused to honor the warranties on vehicles. American Suzuki filed a motion to dismiss alleging that Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of American Suzuki's motion to dismiss, and remanded the case to the trial court to enter an order granting American Suzuki's motion. View "American Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Burns" on Justia Law

Stenum Hospital, Sue Hart, James Rider, Malte Peterson, Dr. Jens Dannenberg, Dr. Karl Ritter-Lang, Dr. Heiner Beese, and Dr. Hans-Georg Zechel, third-party defendants in an action pending in the Madison Circuit Court (collectively "the hospital parties"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its order that denied their motion to dismiss the third-party complaint filed against them by Madison Square Associates, Ltd. (Madison Square), ERMC II, L.P., CBL & Associates Properties, Inc., and CBL & Associates Management, Inc. (collectively "the mall parties"), and to enter an order dismissing the third-party complaint. In 2007, Elizabeth Duncan slipped and fell on a wet tile floor at Madison Square Mall. According to her second amended complaint, Ms. Duncan sustained a fracture to her left patella and "aggravated and/or sustained injuries to her spine, including her neck and back." She became partially paralyzed after she underwent disk-replacement surgery at Stenum, which is located in Germany. Ms. Duncan and her husband, John, subsequently sued the mall parties. Ms. Duncan alleged claims of negligence and wantonness resulting in the injuries she suffered when she fell; her husband alleged a claim of loss of consortium. The hospital parties argued that the dispositive issue presented by their petition for the writ of mandamus was whether the mall parties had standing to assert the claims made in the third-party complaint. The hospital parties maintained that the mall parties do not have standing; therefore, the hospital parties argued, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition, and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the hospital parties' motion to dismiss the complaint. The Court concluded the mall parties lacked standing to assert the claims they asserted against the hospital parties in the third-party complaint. View "Duncan v. Madison Square Associates, Ltd." on Justia Law

Ashley Rich, district attorney of Mobile County, and the State filed separate petitions for a writ of mandamus directed to the Montgomery Circuit Court in an inverse-condemnation action filed by Jesse Griffin and others. Griffin filed the Montgomery action seeking compensation for property, namely electronic "bingo" machines and related equipment and money, previously confiscated by the State from Griffin's facility in Mobile County. Rich and the State each argued that the Montgomery Circuit Court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to interfere with the executive branch's enforcement of the criminal law, and without jurisdiction based on principles of sovereign immunity. In 2010, Griffin opened and operated a facility in containing 25 electronic devices Griffin promoted as lawful charitable bingo machines. That same day, members of the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Gambling seized the 25 machines, as well as other items, from the facility. The machines were transported to a state warehouse in Montgomery County to be stored temporarily. Upon review, the Supreme Court consolidated the petitions for the purpose of writing one Opinion, and granted them, issuing the writs. The Court concluded that neither the fact that the electronic-bingo machines were brought to Montgomery County to be temporarily stored nor the fact that Griffin filed the Montgomery action before the Mobile County district attorney filed the Mobile action erased the fact that the events in this case arose from a criminal action initiated by the investigation of the facility and the resulting seizure of the machines and other evidence, "[t]hus, Griffin's reliance on the duel-litigation statute and the compulsory-counterclaim rule is misplaced." The Court issued the writs and directed the circuit court to vacate its order in favor of Griffin. View "Griffin v. Bentley" on Justia Law

Dallas County Sheriff Harris Huffman, Jr., and Deputy Sheriff Ernest Larry Donaldson petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss a complaint filed by Plaintiff Marie Jemison alleging multiple claims against them in their individual capacities. Plaintiff alleged that on August 23, 2008, she was traveling in Selma while, at the same time, Deputy Donaldson "was operating a motor vehicle in the line and scope of his agency and/or employment with the Dallas County Sheriff's Department." According to Plaintiff, as she entered the intersection of Lauderdale Avenue and Dallas Avenue, she was struck by Deputy Donaldson's vehicle and, as a result, sustained serious personal injuries. Jemison sued Deputy Donaldson, Donaldson's supervisor Sheriff Huffman, the Dallas County Sheriff's Department, and the Dallas County Commission. Among other claims, Plaintiff alleged negligence and wantonness against Deputy Donaldson for the manner in which he operated his vehicle, negligent entrustment and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention against Sheriff Huffman, and vicarious liability against the Dallas County Sheriff's Department and the Dallas County Commission. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims, asserting a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that under the circumstances of this case, Deputy Donaldson was acting in the line and scope of his employment and was entitled to State immunity. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to dismiss all claims against Deputy Donaldson and Sheriff Huffman. View "Jemison v. Donaldson" on Justia Law