Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Smith's Sports Cycles, Inc. appealed the outcome of a nonjury trial that held in favor of American Suzuki Motor Corporation. Smith's claimed that Suzuki wrongfully terminated the parties' franchise agreement. The trial court conducted a 12-day bench trial. After hearing the evidence, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Suzuki on Smith's breach-of-contract claim, concluding that there was not substantial evidence that Suzuki had breached any provision of the franchise agreement. The trial court also entered a judgment in favor of Suzuki on Smith's claim that Suzuki had violated the Franchise Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "the judgment of the trial court terminating the parties' franchise relationship is due to be affirmed." View "Smith's Sports Cycles, Inc. v. American Suzuki Motor Corporation " on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division sent a certified question to the Supreme Court. While the Court initially accepted the certified question; however upon review, the Court declined to answer it. The Court noted that the certified question was framed in the abstract, with no reference to any specific language in the title-insurance policy at the heart of the case (i.e., as an evidentiary issue with broad application). "The parties, in their briefs to this Court, do not address the construction of the policy at issue and instead refer this Court to various authorities discussing how valuation may be determined in various title-insurance contexts. Additionally, it is not apparent from the materials before us that the district court has had the opportunity to address whether the specific language of the policy would control the determination of the value of the property. Therefore, we see no grounds under Rule 18 [of the Rules of Alabama Civil Procedure] that will allow this Court to answer the question." View "Stewart Title Guaranty Company v. Shelby Realty Holdings, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Boaz City Board of Education ("the Board") and its members Alan Perry, Fran Milwee, Roger Adams, Alan Davis, and Tony G. King (collectively "the Board members") petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order that denied their motion to dismiss claims filed against them by Lisa and Donnie Tarvin and to enter an order dismissing the claims with prejudice. According to the complaint, Leland Dishman, the superintendent for the Board, struck kindergarden teacher Lisa Tarvin with a paddle. Dishman read a statement at a press conference, denying that the incident occurred. The Tarvins sued the Board, the Board members in their official capacities, and Dishman in his individual capacity, alleging claims of assault and/or battery, defamation, libel, and slander and sought monetary damages. The Board and the Board members moved to dismiss the claims against them, arguing that they were immune from suit under the State immunity doctrine. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Board and its members demonstrated that under the Alabama Constitution, they had immunity from the claims asserted against them, and "a clear legal right to have the claims… dismissed with prejudice." The Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Tarvin v. Dishman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kenneth Jakeman appealed a trial court's dismissal of his claims against Defendants Alderwoods, Inc., Lawrence Group Management Company, LLC, Montgomery Memorial Cemetery, Inc. and Judy Jones. Plaintiff's father purchased a "family plot" in the cemetery in 1967 containing ten burial spaces. Pursuant to the terms of the purchase agreement for the family plot, burial was limited to members of the Jakeman family. The cemetery mistakenly conveyed two spaces in the Jakeman family plot to James Jones and his wife, Defendant Judy Jones. Mr. Jones died and was buried in one of the Jakeman spaces. Plaintiff learned of the mistake in 2006, and notified the the cemetery and Mrs. Jones. Mr. Jones was reinterred in another space, however, still within the Jakeman spaces. When Plaintiff's father died in 2008, Mr. Jones was still interred in one of the Jakeman spaces. Despite an offer to exchange burial spaces, and based on a purported refusal to again exhume Mr. Jones, Plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract, trespass, negligence, willfulness and/or wantonness, outrage and conversion. Mrs. Jones cross-claimed against Alderwoods, Lawrence and the cemetery based on their alleged error in conveying to her spaces already owned by the Jakemans. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case: "Despite representations in [Plaintiff's] notice of appeal that the underlying matter has been disposed of in its entirety, we hold that, because Judy's cross-claim remains pending below, this appeal is from a nonfinal judgment, and we do not have subject-matter jurisdiction." Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jakeman v. Lawrence Group Management Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Coosa Cable Company, Inc. (Coosa Cable), sued Sycamore Management Group, LLC (Sycamore), and DirecPath, LLC (DirecPath). Coosa Cable sought and obtained both a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction barring DirecPath from providing video-programming services to the tenants of an apartment building owned by Sycamore. As a condition of the TRO, Coosa Cable provided a security bond of $250. As a condition of the preliminary injunction, the trial court required Coosa Cable to provide a security bond of $100,000. After a hearing, the trial court entered a permanent injunction against Sycamore and DirecPath and discharged Coosa Cable's security bond. Sycamore and DirecPath appealed; the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order granting permanent injunctive relief to Coosa Cable. Sycamore and DirecPath then sought to recover costs, damages, and attorney fees caused by the wrongful injunction, but the trial court denied their motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the trial court's decision: "[the Court held] that after this Court held in [the first Sycamore case] that Sycamore and DirecPath had been wrongfully enjoined, they were entitled to seek an award from Coosa Cable of the damages caused by the wrongful injunction. Because the trial court erred in denying Sycamore and DirecPath damages for the wrongful injunction, we reverse the trial court's order denying their motion seeking those damages." View "Sycamore Management Group, LLC v. Coosa Cable Company, Inc. " on Justia Law

Turquoise Properties Gulf, Inc. (Turquoise) appealed a circuit court judgment that denied its motion to alter, amend or vacate an arbitration award in an action filed by Clark A. Cooper, David L. Faulkner, Jr., and Hugh and Adrienne Overmyer (collectively, Claimants). Claimants signed purchase and escrow agreements to purchase condominiums to be built as part of "phase I" of a complex Turquoise was developing in Orange Beach. In conjunction with the purchase, they each posted a letter of credit for 20% of the purchase price. When construction neared substantial completion, the Claimants declined to "close" on the purchases on their respective units, allegedly because Turquoise had failed to build an outdoor pool and sundeck area or to provide individual storage units and private cabanas which it had agreed to build and to provide. The purchase and escrow agreements contained an arbitration provision. Claimants' initial demands contained claims of breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. The arbitrator entered a lengthy arbitration award containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, ultimately in favor of the Claimants. Turquoise filed a motion to modify the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator had made a computational error in his calculation of damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the arbitrator did mistakenly calculate damages owed to the claimants. The Court vacated the arbitrator's award and remanded the case for recalculation of damages. View "Turquoise Properties Gulf, Inc. v. Overmyer" on Justia Law

Students and former students of the University of Alabama, Auburn University, and the University of Alabama at Birmingham, filed three separate class-action lawsuits in the Jefferson Circuit Court challenging the legality of so-called "dining-dollars" programs implemented by the universities and pursuant to which all undergraduate students were required to pay a mandatory dining fee each semester, which was then credited back to the students in the form of "dining dollars" that could be spent only at on-campus dining outlets controlled exclusively by the food-service vendors for the universities - Aramark Educational Services, Inc., at UA; Compass Group, USA, Inc. (Chartwells) at Auburn; and Sodexo, Inc., at UAB. The trial court dismissed the three actions, and the students appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion and affirmed all three. The students sued the boards of trustees governing the universities and the food-service vendors, alleging that the dining-dollars programs violated: (1) state antitrust laws; (2) the Alabama Constitution inasmuch as it forbids the State from having an interest in a private enterprise; (3) the rule in 16-1-32(d) barring universities from charging excessive transaction fees to merchants that accept university-issued debit cards; and (4) the common-law prohibition on conversion. Because the boards of trustees are entitled to state immunity pursuant to section 14 of the Alabama Constitution, all claims against them were properly dismissed. The university administrators and foodservice vendors were entitled to immunity on the asserted antitrust claims as well, albeit state-action immunity as opposed to state immunity. Moreover, because the students lacked standing to pursue a cause of action for a violation of 16-1-32(d), and because the students did not and could not allege the necessary elements of a conversion claim, the trial court also properly dismissed the students' other claims. View "Vandenberg v. Aramark Educational Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Melvin Jarrett petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum affirming the circuit court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Jarrett challenged his 2006 guilty-plea conviction for one count of failing to comply with the requirement of the Community Notification Act (CNA) that he provide notice of his intent to move his legal residence. Jarrett alleged, as he did before the Court of Criminal Appeals, that his 15-year sentence imposed following his conviction for violating the CNA was illegal. Specifically, Jarrett contended that his offense was complete before October 1, 2005, the effective date of the amendment to the CNA which changed the violation from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class C felony. Jarrett argued that the offense to which he pleaded guilty was, at the time he committed it was only a misdemeanor, not a Class C felony, thus, his 15-year sentence was not authorized by law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Jarrett and reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' sentence. View "Jarrett v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Defendant Jo Ann Hood appealed a trial court's order that granted a motion for a new trial filed by Plaintiff Elizabeth McElroy as personal representative of the estate of Austin Taylor Terry (the estate). The mother of Austin Taylor Terry, who was then 12 months old, admitted him to the Children's Hospital of Alabama. A social worker at the hospital notified the county Department of Human Resources (DHR) that Terry had suffered "suspicious non-accidental injuries." Terry's father, who was divorced from Terry's mother, also contacted DHR after he learned of his son's hospitalization. He spoke with an after-hours on-call DHR service worker learned that Chris Wesson, the mother's boyfriend, had been in the house with Terry. The service worker recommended that Terry not be allowed to return home when he was discharged. A DHR supervisor who had not seen the report, assigned Defendant to investigate Terry's suspected abuse and informed the Hospital that Terry could go home with his mother when he was discharged. Based on her investigation, Defendant determined that it was safe to leave Terry in his mother's care. Subsequently, Terry died from brain injuries caused by Wesson. Terry's parents filed separate wrongful-death actions naming Wesson, Children's Hospital, Hood, and other DHR social workers as defendants. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the estate and awarded $25,000 in damages against Wesson and Hood. The estate filed a motion for a new trial, arguing among other things, that a juror's failure to respond to a voir dire question prevented the estate from using its jury strikes effectively because it would have used one to remove the juror had the juror answered the question. After Hood filed her opposition to the estate's postjudgment motion, the court granted the motion on the ground that the estate was probably prejudiced in its right to a fair and impartial trial as a result of the juror's failure to respond to the voir dire question. Upon review, the Supreme Court could not conclude that "[the juror's] failure to reveal, in response to the particular questions asked, [provided] adequate support for a finding ... so as to warrant retrying this case." The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hood v. McElroy" on Justia Law

Capmark Bank appealed a preliminary injunction entered in favor of RGR, LLC; MB Park, LLC; TTM MB Park, LLC; Robert G. Randall; and T. Todd Martin III (referred to collectively as "RGR") which enjoined Capmark from foreclosing on certain real property that served as the primary collateral for a loan from Capmark to RGR, LCC, MB Park, LLC, and TTM MB Park, LLC. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded RGR failed to establish the requisite elements entitling it to a preliminary injunction. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment issuing the injunction. View "Capmark Bank v. RGR, LLC " on Justia Law