Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant James Beauford Lamb, Jr. appealed the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance of his 2004 conviction for first-degree sexual abuse. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in entering a judgment based on an amended written jury verdict that differed from one taken from a direct poll of the jury after it had been discharged from its duty. Alabama case law held that once a jury had been discharged and "left the court's control, the jury could not properly be resummoned to correct or amend an insufficient verdict, and that the judgment entered on the amended verdict of that recalled jury must be reversed." Following precedent, the Supreme Court concluded that the amended verdict would constitute double jeopardy. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's affirmance of the amended verdict and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lamb v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Defendant T.D.M. was convicted on one count of first degree sexual abuse and one count of first degree sodomy. At the end of Defendant's trial, the jury first returned verdicts of guilty and not guilty, respectively. The jury was then discharged. The clerk of the court informed the trial judge that due to a clerical error, the 'not-guilty' verdict was entered incorrectly. The jury was recalled, and each juror polled stated that he/she had voted Defendant guilty on the sodomy charge. Ultimately the trial court entered a corrected judgment finding Defendant guilty on the sodomy charge, and passed sentence accordingly. Defendant unsuccessfully appealed the convictions. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant's constitutional rights against double jeopardy had been violated by the poll of the jury and change in Defendant's sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that under the circumstances of this case, Defendant's constitutional rights were violated. The Court reversed the sodomy conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "T. D. M. v. Alabama " on Justia Law

Defendant Mitzi Lawson appealed a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Harris Culinary Enterprises, LLC (HCE), John C. Harris III (Clinton), and John C. Harris, Jr. (John), (collectively "the Harrises"), on their fraud claims related to their purchase of a restaurant franchise. Mitzi was married to codefendant, Sims Lawson. Following his marriage to Mitzi, Sims formed SYM, Inc. for the purpose of operating a "Fox's Pizza Den" restaurant franchise in Killen. Sims purchased a building in which to operate the franchise; that building was titled solely in Mitzi's name. At some time before the events giving rise to their claims on appeal, John and Clinton formed HCE for the purpose of operating pizza-restaurant franchises. In March 2007, the Harrises entered into negotiations with Sims to purchase the Killen franchise. According to the Harrises, in an apparent attempt to secure a higher purchase price, Sims purportedly generated false financial reports evidencing higher gross sales and profits for the Killen franchise than were actually realized. The Harrises ultimately purchased the Killen franchise. As a condition of the sales agreement, the Harrises entered into a one-year lease agreement to continue operation of the Killen franchise in its then current location. The Harrisses initiated the underlying lawsuit alleging that as a result of the allegedly falsified financial reports, they were induced to purchase both the franchise and enter into the lease agreement. Mitzi moved to dismiss the claims against her, arguing that she made no actual representation to the Harrises. Plaintiffs won at trial, and Mitzi appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that there was no evidence presented at trial from which the court could have reasonably determined that Mitzi made any misrepresentation to the Harrises. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment against her. View "Lawson v. Harris Culinary Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants the Colbert County Board of Education ("the Board"); and the individual members of the Board and members of the Colbert County High School appealed a trial court's judgment that granted Plaintiff Felecia James's motion for a preliminary injunction. On or about May 21, 2010, an incident occurred at Colbert County High School (CCHS) involving J.H., Plaintiff's minor child, and another minor enrolled in CCHS. The details of the incident were disputed, but they led the assistant principal of the school to suspend both students for three days for allegedly fighting on school property during school hours. Plaintiff appeared before the Board to discuss the situation. The Board apparently took no action, and Plaintiff "individually and as mother and guardian of J.H." sued the Board and the individually named defendants asserting state-law and federal-law claims She also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Board members in their official capacities were immune from the state-law claims filed against them insofar as those claims sought monetary damages. As such, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over those state-law claims against the officials in their official capacities. However, the Board members were not immune from Plaintiff's state-law claims insofar as she sought injunctive relief based upon the Board members' alleged fraud, bad faith, or actions that were beyond the Board members' authority or that were taken under a mistaken interpretation of law. The Court noted that the Board and its members were not immune from the federal-law claims filed against them. Based on the foregoing, insofar as the Board appealed the preliminary injunction against it based upon the state-law claims filed by Plaintiff, the Supreme Court dismissed their appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the Court reversed the preliminary injunction, the Court declined to order the trial court to vacate the preliminary injunction entered against the Board insofar as it was based on those claims. View "Colbert Cty. Bd. of Edu. v. James" on Justia Law

The State petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to reverse Sean Travis Howard's criminal conviction based on the trial court's failure to charge the jury on manslaughter as a lesser offense to capital murder, the offense with which Howard was charged. The Court granted review to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflicted with its decision in "Fox v. State." The Court concluded that it did, and reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment: "Reckless murder and reckless manslaughter do not involve the same degree of recklessness. … [t]he difference between the circumstances which will support a murder conviction and the degree of risk contemplated by the manslaughter statute is one of degree, not kind. ... [T]he degree of recklessness which will support a manslaughter conviction involves a circumstance which is a 'gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation,' but is not so high that it cannot be 'fairly distinguished from' the mental state required in intentional homicides." Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Howard v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Aurora Healthcare, Inc., Aurora Cares, LLC, (d/b/a Tara Cares) and Birmingham Nursing and Rehabilitation Center East, LLC appealed a circuit court order that denied their motion to compel arbitration. Mary Pettway, then 75 years old, was discharged from the hospital at the University of Alabama at Birmingham and admitted to a nursing home in Birmingham owned and operated by the defendants. She was returned to the hospital and then readmitted to the nursing home twice in the weeks following her initial discharge. Upon Pettway's first readmission, an arbitration agreement was executed, along with the other admission documents, on her behalf. Pettway was finally returned to the hospital, where she died on December 10, 2003. Sharon Ramsey, in her capacity as administratrix of Pettway's estate, filed a complaint against the defendants. The complaint asserted a variety of statutory and common-law claims allegedly arising from Pettway's death, including a wrongful-death claim. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for a change of venue. The parties litigated the issue of venue vigorously until the Wilcox Circuit Court entered an order transferring the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court. The "Aurora" defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they did not own the nursing home at which Pettway resided during the relevant period. Because the Supreme Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support a determination that Ramsey was substantially prejudiced by defendants' belated assertion of their right to arbitration, "the order of the circuit court denying the defendants' motion to compel arbitration must be reversed. We are unable to determine, however, whether this case is due to be arbitrated." Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court's order denying the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The Court remanded the case for that court to consider the motion to compel arbitration in light of the issues associated with the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement proffered by the defendants. View "Aurora Healthcare, Inc. v. Ramsey" on Justia Law

Town & Country Property, L.L.C., and Town & Country Ford, L.L.C. (T&C), sued Amerisure Insurance Company and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company (Amerisure) and its insured, Jones-Williams Construction Company, Inc., alleging that Amerisure was obligated to pay a $650,100 judgment entered in favor of T&C and against Jones-Williams in a separate action pursuant to a commercial general-liability insurance policy Amerisure had issued Jones-Williams. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Amerisure, and T&C appealed. Specifically, the trial court held that Amerisure was not required to indemnify Jones-Williams because there had been no occurrence invoking coverage under the policy. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment to the extent the awarded damages represented the costs of repairing or replacing faulty work covered under the liability policy. The Court remanded the case to the trial court so that it could consider arguments from the parties to determine if any of the damages awarded represented compensation for damaged property. View "Town & Country Property, L.L.C.v. Amerisure Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In May 2008, seven-year-old Jordan Alexander Robertson was placed in foster care at the home of Verlin Spurgeon and Carol Spurgeon. In June 2008, Jordan drowned in the Spurgeons' swimming pool. James Brakefield, as administrator of Jordan's estate, sued the Spurgeons, among others, in circuit court alleging that they had negligently and/or wantonly caused Jordan's death. The Spurgeons moved the circuit court for a summary judgment, alleging, among other things, that the claims were barred by the doctrines of parental, State, and State-agent immunity. The circuit court denied the motion. The Spurgeons petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against them. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted their petition in part and issued the writ to direct the circuit court to dismiss the negligence claims against the Spurgeons. In all other respects, the Court denied the petition. View "Brakefield v. Alabama Dept. of Human Resources" on Justia Law

McNeese Title, LLC, a Florida limited liability company owned and operated by Richard McNeese, and Richard McNeese and Peggy Owens petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order denying their motions to dismiss the action filed against them by James Atchison, and to enter an order dismissing the action for lack of in personam jurisdiction. This dispute arose out of Atchison's purchase of two residential lots in the Villa Lago subdivision, which was originally a 14-acre tract of land in the Golf and Beach Resort of Sandestin, Florida. According to Atchison, purchase agreements were sent to him by the "developers," who, he says, "developed, marketed and sold the lots" in the subdivision. Mr. Atchison signed a "compliance agreement limited power of attorney," designating Richard McNeese or Ms. Owens as Atchison's "attorney in fact for [his] use and benefit, ... for the purpose of ... signing or initialing on [his] behalf, any and all documents affecting the closing or refinance of the [lots]." The closing was held in 2005, however, many of the other lots in the subdivision had not closed, contrary to the purchase agreements. Eventually, Atchison sued a number of individuals and entities, including C-D Jones, 331 Partners, McNeese, and Owens, alleging that he had suffered damage as a result of activities conducted by C-D Jones and 331 Partners after the closing. McNeese and Owens unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the McNeeses and Ms. Owens. Accordingly, the Court granted their petition and issued the writ. View "Atchison v. IPC Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Smith's Sports Cycles, Inc. appealed the outcome of a nonjury trial that held in favor of American Suzuki Motor Corporation. Smith's claimed that Suzuki wrongfully terminated the parties' franchise agreement. The trial court conducted a 12-day bench trial. After hearing the evidence, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Suzuki on Smith's breach-of-contract claim, concluding that there was not substantial evidence that Suzuki had breached any provision of the franchise agreement. The trial court also entered a judgment in favor of Suzuki on Smith's claim that Suzuki had violated the Franchise Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "the judgment of the trial court terminating the parties' franchise relationship is due to be affirmed." View "Smith's Sports Cycles, Inc. v. American Suzuki Motor Corporation " on Justia Law