Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Oak Grove Resources, LLC, and Cliffs North American Coal, LLC (Oak Grove) appealed a trial court's order in favor of class Plaintiffs finding that Oak Grove failed to satisfy the requirements of a settlement agreement between the parties, and ordered the continued monitoring of air near Plaintiffs' properties for the presence of coal dust for one year. Plaintiffs sued Oak Grove in 1997 alleging that it operated a preparation plant in a manner that caused coal dust to become airborne and to migrate to their properties, where it settled, causing them to suffer both personal injury and property damage. In October 2002, the parties entered into a settlement agreement the 2002 settlement agreement provided for certain injunctive relief and the payment of attorney fees and expenses. The injunctive relief required Oak Grove to complete 14 specific remedial measures within 24 months of the execution of the 2002 settlement agreement. Oak Grove implemented the remedial measures at the Concord plant following the trial court's approval of the 2002 settlement agreement. However, Plaintiffs continued to complain that the Concord plant emitted coal dust onto their properties and that the remedial measures had not satisfactorily solved the problem. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that no objection was raised by Plaintiffs to the site locations until two months after testing began in July 2009. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' expert did not visit the air-monitoring sites until January 2010. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs inexcusably delayed in asserting their rights under a 2008 supplement and that Oak Grove would be unduly prejudiced if Plaintiffs were allowed to assert those rights. The Court reversed the trial court's award of injunctive relief, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Oak Grove Resources, LLC v. White" on Justia Law

Betty Bradberry and Inez T. Jones, as the "personal representatives of the heirs-at-law and/or wrongful death beneficiaries of" the decedents, Roland E. Bradberry and George D. Jones, respectively (Plaintiffs), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Carrier Corporation and multiple other defendants in the their wrongful-death action based on their decedents' exposure to asbestos in their work environment. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were jointly and severally liable for the death of their decedents through the contamination of the decedents' work sites. During the pendency of the proceedings, some of the defendants filed for bankruptcy. When those insolvent defendants moved to sever themselves from case due to the stay provisions under the bankruptcy code (and ultimately be dismissed), Plaintiffs fought to keep the action against all defendants together, arguing that the asbestos claims were one single cause of action that could not be split. The solvent defendants moved for a summary judgement to dismiss the case, arguing there was insufficient evidence to indicate the decedents had been exposed to any asbestos-containing projects manufactured or supplied by each defendant. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment to all defendants, and Plaintiffs appealed. Upon careful review of the trial record and the applicable legal authorities, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to all defendants. View "Bradberry v. Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

Randy Fielding petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Walker Circuit Court to vacate its order denying his motion for summary judgment and to enter a summary judgment based on his claim to State immunity. In November 2004, Debra Jackson and Jerry Jackson sued Fielding, individually and in his capacity as a deputy sheriff, after he entered their property and shot their dog while on duty. The complaint alleged claims of negligence, wantonness, the tort of outrage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass to person, and trespass on property. The Jacksons sought "compensatory, actual, incidental, and punitive damages, plus attorney fees." Fielding moved for summary judgment, arguing that because he was acting within the line and scope of his employment as a sheriff's deputy at the time of the incident, he was entitled to State immunity from the Jacksons' suit. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Fielding established a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus. Therefore, the Court granted his petition and issue the writ. View " Jackson v. City of Cordova" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court addressed the validity of a circuit court order that granted Pamela and Robert Washington a new trial. In an earlier action, the Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus on petition of John Limerick, which directed the trial court to vacate its order that granted the Washngtons' motion for a new trial. The Court issued the writ on the basis that the Washington's motion was entered after the 90-day period referred to in Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., thus depriving the trial court of jurisdiction in the case. While the Supreme Court was considering the validity of the trial court's new-trial order in that earlier case, the Washingtons filed a motion for relief from judgment in the present case which related back to their motion in the earlier action. On January 7, 2011, upon release of our opinion in Limerick, the trial court entered an order vacating its order granting a new trial in accordance with our instructions but simultaneously setting the Washingtons' pending Rule 60(b) motion for a hearing. Approximately six months later, on July 1, 2011, the trial court once again ordered a new trial, purportedly based this time on Rule 60(b). Subsequently, Limerick petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its second new-trial order. Once again, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Washington v. Limerick" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate its order that granted a mandamus petition filed by Jeremy B. Jones, and that directed Mobile Circuit Judge Charles Graddick to recuse himself from presiding over Jones's postconviction proceedings. In October 2005, Judge Graddick presided over a trial in which Jones was convicted on four counts of capital murder and was sentenced to death. The jury was sequestered throughout the trial, which lasted several days. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, Jones filed a petition for postconviction relief. In that petition Jones alleged that juror "T.E." was unfit to serve on the jury on account of alcohol dependence and that T.E. had failed to answer truthfully certain questions on voir dire regarding his alcohol dependence. According to Jones, posttrial interviews revealed: (1) that T.E. had told Judge Graddick during Jones's trial that he was an alcoholic; (2) that T.E. had received permission from Judge Graddick to drink alcohol during sequestration; and (3) that Judge Graddick did not inform Jones's counsel that T.E. had requested such permission and that Judge Graddick had granted it. Jones's petition alleged juror misconduct, as well as juror incompetence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Judge Graddick would not be a material witness in Jones's postconviction proceedings, no "reasonable person knowing everything that the judge knows would have a 'reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality.'" Thus, the Court held Judge Graddick did not exceed his discretion in denying Jones's motion for his recusal, and the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that he did. The Court granted the State's petition for mandamus. View "Alabama vs. Jones" on Justia Law

The University of South Alabama Medical Center and the University of South Alabama Children's and Women's Hospital appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Mobile County. The County filed a complaint seeking a judgment to interpret Act 83-501. In its complaint, the County asserted that the Act was indefinite and unclear as to which hospitals qualify for reimbursements and the amount of those reimbursements. The County named several hospitals as defendants, including the University of Southern Alabama Children's and Women's Hospital. The Hospitals answered the complaint asserting that the Act is not indefinite, and that Mobile County previously provided reimbursement for providing indigent care and that it could continue to do so "based on established procedures and precedence and the plain meaning of the Act." In its review, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no justiciable controversy; Mobile County only sought an advisory opinion in its declaratory-judgment complaint. The trial court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. The Court vacated the trial court's order and dismissed the case. View "Univ. of So. Alabama Med. Ctr. v. Mobile Infirmary Association" on Justia Law

The Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut appealed a judgment in which it was ordered to pay $251,913.91 to Willie A. Miller. Smith House Movers, Inc. (Smith), was hired was hired to move houses located in the path of road construction to be performed. Miller entered into a contract with Smith to purchase one of the houses and to move it from Red Bay to Vina. The contract provided that Smith was to move the house, pour a foundation, and place the house on the new foundation. Smith cut the house into two pieces and delivered the first piece. However, the foundation was improperly poured and did not fit, and the house had been damaged in the move. Ultimately Miller had to hire another company to complete the move and repair the damage. Miller then sued Smith alleging breach of contract, negligence and wantonness. Smith did not answer or appear, and Miller moved to a default judgment against Smith. In an attempt to collect the amount of the default judgment, Miller sent a copy to Smith's general liability insurer, Travelers. As Miller tried to get Travelers to respond to its demand, Miller learned that Smith had declared bankruptcy. Two years following the default judgment, the bankruptcy trustee lifted its stay on Smith's affairs to allow him to collect on the default judgment to the extent that the insurance coverage would allow. Travelers subsequently denied the claim. Miller then sued Travelers for payment. Travelers moved for summary judgment to dismiss Miller's claim, arguing that the general liability policy did not provide coverage based on the terms in the policies. The trial court denied the motion, and eventually entered judgment against the company. Travelers then appealed to the Supreme Court. The issue before the Court was whether the notice of the original lawsuit was timely. The Court found that because Miller's knowledge of Smith's certificate of insurance from the underlying lawsuit put Miller on notice that he should have notified Travelers of the default judgment. As such, the Court concluded that Miller was barred from recovering under Smith's policies. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut v. Miller" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute between the Alabama Commercial Mobile Radio Services ("CMRS") Board (CMRS Board) and T-Mobile South, LLC and PowerTel Memphis, Inc. (collectively, T-Mobile) two providers of wireless telephone services, regarding emergency "911" service charges for purchasers of prepaid wireless service. From May 2003 through May 2005, T-Mobile paid the 911 service charge on behalf of its prepaid CMRS connections. In June 2005, T-Mobile ceased paying the 911 service charge for its prepaid connections. but resumed paying the service charge in 2007. T-Mobile never collected the service charge from any of its prepaid customers. T-Mobile requested a refund of CMRS service charges it had paid the CMRS Board from May 2003 through May 2005. The CMRS Board denied the request. T-Mobile then filed a declaratory judgment action against the CMRS Board and the members of the CMRS Board individually and in their official capacities, seeking a judgment declaring that the service charge did not apply to prepaid wireless service. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court subsequently denied. The trial court eventually entered an order denying T-Mobile's summary judgment motion and granting the Board's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the legislature's intent was to impose the service charge on all CMRS connections, including those provided by T-Mobile to its prepaid customers. And under Alabama law, T-Mobile was not excused from paying the service charges. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. Bonet" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Ronald Browning and Susan Browning, Bubba Beck and Debbie Beck, Allen Caprara and Pam Caprara, Bobby Fayet and Cindy Fayet, David Kennamer and Brad Kennamer, Steve Russell and Melinda Russell, and Gary Strickland and Jennifer Strickland sued Jeff Cornelius, among others, alleging various claims related to investments they made in corporations in which Cornelius was allegedly a principal. The trial court entered a default judgment against Cornelius based upon his purported failure to appear for his deposition, awarding the plaintiffs a total of $975,000 in damages. Cornelius moved the trial court pursuant to Ala. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b) to set aside the default judgment, arguing that he had not received notice that the motion for a default judgment had been filed. After a hearing, the trial court denied Cornelius's motion to set aside the default judgment, and Cornelius appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's judgment was inconsistent with due process and was therefore void. Cornelius was entitled to have the default judgment set aside, and accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cornelius v. Browning" on Justia Law

GE Capital Aviation Services, Inc., (now known as GE Capital Aviation Services, LLC), Pemco World Air Services, Inc., and Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc. have fiercely litigated a commercial-contract dispute since 2004 in which each party alleged breach-of-contract and fraud claims against the other. The parties entered an agreement for the conversion, maintenance and inspection of aircraft leased through GE Capital. GE Capital and Pemco each sought punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages. The litigation culminated in a jury trial that lasted approximately three weeks. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Pemco on all of its claims, awarded Pemco $2,147,129 in compensatory damages and $6,500,000 in punitive damages, and returned a verdict in favor of Pemco on all of GE Capital's counterclaims. GE Capital appealed the jury verdict and the trial court's order denying GE Capital's postjudgment motions. GE Capital did not appeal the judgment in favor of Pemco on its counterclaims. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order denying GE Capital's motion for a JML as to Pemco's fraud claims and its breach-of-an-implied-contract claim. The Court also reversed the trial court's order denying GE Capital's motion for a new trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "GE Capital Aviation Services, LLC v. Pemco World Air Services, Inc." on Justia Law