Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pamela Ruttenberg, Harold Ruttenberg's widow, and two of the Ruttenberg's three children, Warren Ruttenberg and Jodi Ruttenberg Benck appealed a final judgment of the probate court that granted the petition of Karl B. Friedman and Daniel H. Markstein III, the coexecutors of Harold's estate, for final settlement of the estate. Ruttenberg's third child, Don-Allen Ruttenberg, who had worked with his father in the family business, Just For Feet, Inc., and who was involved in civil litigation and criminal prosecution surrounding Just For Feet, did not object to the coexecutors' administration and settlement of his father's estate. Upon review of the record of the nine-day trial and the considerable documentary evidence, the Supreme Court held that there was substantial evidence to support the probate court's decision. The Court concluded that the probate court did not exceed its discretion. Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the probate court was affirmed. View "Ruttenberg v. Friedman" on Justia Law

The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, appointed the Trust Company of Virginia (TCVA) as conservator of property owned by Amy Falcon Morris when that court declared Ms. Morris to be incapacitated in 2008. Ms. Morris died in 2011 in Alabama, and her will was admitted to probate in the Montgomery County Probate Court. The probate court entered orders compelling TCVA to turn over funds in the conservancy estate to the estate opened in the probate court and enjoining TCVA from expending funds without prior approval. TCVA moved to vacate those orders, and the probate court denied the motion. TCVA then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ to direct the probate court to vacate those orders on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to enter those orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that in this case a writ of mandamus was the appropriate remedy by which to order a vacatur of the probate court's orders. Furthermore, because TCVA was not properly served with process or provided adequate notice of the proceeding before the probate court, the Supreme Court directed the probate court to vacate the contested orders concerning the assets to which TCVA was conservator. View "In re: Estate of Amy F. Morris" on Justia Law

Three appellate proceedings were consolidated for a single Supreme Court opinion. All three cases appealed the dismissal of their respective cases from the Etowah Circuit Court. The Appellants all sued Donald Stewart individually and as the trustee of the Abernathy Trust and the Abernathy Trust Foundation, in a line of cases arising out of a toxic tort action against Monsanto Company, its parent corporation and a spin-off. The Monsanto Corporations manufactured and disposed of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). A jury found the corporations liable on claims of wantonness, outrage, "suppression of the truth," negligence and public nuisance. After 500 trials on damages, the parties reached a settlement in 2003. $21 million was placed into a trust (the Abernathy Trust) established to pay health and education benefits for those Plaintiffs who qualified for assistance. Each plaintiff signed a retainer agreement and received and cashed his or her settlement check. Plaintiffs in this case challenged the settlement agreement and the award of attorneys fees. Further, they asked for a trust accounting regarding the use of the settlement funds. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the cases that asked for an accounting of the use of the trust's funds; one case was dismissed as moot; in the third case, the Court granted a writ of mandamus as to all portions of a circuit court order that sought review of the Abernathy trust document as compared to the terms of the settlement agreement. The circuit court was directed to lift any freeze of distributions from the trust. View "Bates v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The Fort Morgan Civic Association, Inc. and Charles Browdy, a resident of the unincorporated Fort Morgan area of Baldwin County and a member of the Association (collectively "the FMCA"), sued the City of Gulf Shores and its mayor and city council seeking a court order declaring the City's annexation of a 19.3-mile segment of the land on which Fort Morgan Road is located and the adjacent land to be invalid.1 Following a nonjury trial, the trial court held that the FMCA had failed to establish that the Fort Morgan annexation was invalid; it accordingly entered a judgment in favor of the City. The FMCA appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "because the FMCA submitted evidence at that trial indicating that two parcels of property included in the Fort Morgan annexation were owned by private individuals and because the City failed to submit any evidence indicating that those same parcels were owned by the State, the trial court exceeded its discretion in upholding the annexation." View "Fort Morgan Civic Association, Inc. v. City of Gulf Shores" on Justia Law

Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC (Southeast), and Michael J. Smith petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Chambers Circuit Court to vacate its order that denied their motion to transfer the underlying action to Lee County on the ground of forum non conveniens. In 2011, a vehicle driven by Patricia Webster allegedly collided with timber that had come loose from a tractor-trailer rig owned by Southeast, driven by its employee Smith. She sued Southeast and Smith for negligence and wanton and reckless conduct. Southeast's principal office is located in Chambers County. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Southeast and Smith's motion for a change of venue based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The court granted their petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the circuit court to transfer the case to Lee Circuit Court. View "Webster v. Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC" on Justia Law

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, Southern Division certified a question to the Supreme Court: whether Ala. Code 11-81-3 (1975) required that an Alabama municipality refund or fund bond indebtedness as a condition of eligibility to proceed under Chapter 9 of Title 11 of the U.S. Code. Upon review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended to authorize every county, city, town and municipal authority to file for Chapter 9, and therefore, they are not required to have indebtedness prior to filing for Chapter 9 protection. View "City of Prichard v. Balzer" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were nine Alabama municipalities and the Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Appellees, sixteen online travel service companies and related entities (the "OTCs"). The issue was whether the OTCs were liable for paying the municipalities a lodgings tax under the local lodgings-tax ordinances of the respective municipal plaintiffs. After considering the record in this case, the briefs of the parties, and the trial court's order, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's reasoning in its summary judgment order, and therefore affirmed the judgment in favor of the OTCs. View "City of Birmingham v. Orbitz, LLC." on Justia Law

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a defendant in a civil case pending in the Escambia Circuit Court, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to dismiss the case on the ground that venue in Escambia County was improper or in the alternative, on the ground of forum non conveniens. This case arose from a in incident at Wal-Mart's Franklin, North Carolina store, wherein Escambia County resident Plaintiff Gloria Renee Wolfe was shopping with her sister. She was injured when a bolt of cloth fell from a display shelf and struck her upper body, including her neck and shoulder, exacerbating a preexisting condition in her cervical spine and also causing additional injuries. Upon returning home to Alabama, Gloria sought medical treatment from doctors in Mobile County, Escambia County, and Jacksonville, Florida. In 2010, Gloria and her husband sued Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and fictitiously named defendants. Gloria asserted claims of negligence and wantonness; her husband asserted a claim of loss of consortium. Wal-Mart resisted the complaint, arguing that it had been incorrectly named in the complaint and that it was filed in the wrong court. Wal-Mart East further asserted in its motion that because neither of its partners resided in Alabama and because Gloria's alleged injuries occurred in North Carolina, venue in Escambia County was improper. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., has not shown a clear legal right to the order to the trial court to dismiss the Wolfes' action on the ground that venue is improper in Escambia County and/or on the ground of forum non conveniens. View "Wolfe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Aziz and Karima Mohabbat sued Sanjay and Ramendra P. Singh in Circuit Court asserting claims of suppression and unjust enrichment. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered a $630,000 judgment in favor of the Mohabbats. The Singhs moved for a new trial; however, their motion was ultimately denied by operation of law. The Singhs appealed to the Supreme Court, and moved the trial court to enter a stay of execution of the $630,000 judgment pending the appeal even though, the Singhs alleged, they did not have the resources to execute a supersedeas bond in the amount required by Rule 8(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. The trial court granted the motion and accepted a supersedeas bond in the amount of $100,000, as opposed to the $787,500 presumably required by Rule 8(a)(1). The Mohabbats moved the trial court to reconsider its decision that same day; however, the trial court denied their motion. The Mohabbats petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to require the Singhs to execute a bond in the amount of $787,500 before a stay of execution of the judgment could be entered. The Court granted the Mohabbats' petition, and ordered the Singhs to file a response to that petition. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court had a duty to apply Rule 8(a)(1) and to require the Singhs to execute a bond in the amount of $787,500 before granting their motion for a stay of execution of the judgment entered against them. Because the trial court failed to do so, the Mohabbats had a clear legal right to the relief they sought, and their petition was granted. The trial court was directed to vacate its order granting the Singhs' motion to accept a supersedeas bond was directed not to accept any supersedeas bond in an amount less than $787,500 (as required by Rule 8(a)(1)). View "Mohabbat v. Singh " on Justia Law

Several Citites and their employees, police officers J.J. Oglesby, J.M. Stewart, A.T. Caffey, Q.O. Commander, and N.W. McMahon petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Plaintiffs Dashad Berry, Kamessa Williams, and Miguel Johnson. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from a traffic stops conducted by the City officers. Each of plaintiffs suffer from a type of paralysis that inhibited their abilities to respond quickly and directly to officers' orders incident to the officers' initial investigations. Plaintiffs sued the City and the individual officers alleging assault and battery, wantonness, negligence, negligent hiring, negligent training and negligent supervision. A trial court entered an order denying the City and officers' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the City and officers argued they were immune to Plaintiffs' claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Officers Oglesby and McMahon showed a clear legal right to the relief sought, and, as to them, their petition was granted and the trial court was directed to enter a summary judgment in their favor. Officers Stewart, Commander, and Caffey failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief they sought, and, as to them, their petition was denied. However, the City has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought as to the claims against it based on the acts of Officers Stewart, Commander, and Caffey, and its petition was denied as to those claims. Finally, the City has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought based on the claims alleging negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and its petition was denied as to those claims. View "Berry et al. v. City of Montgomery et al." on Justia Law