Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Clay Slagle appealed the Montgomery Circuit Court's dismissal of his action against the seven members of the Montgomery County Board of Education ("the Board") and the superintendent of the Montgomery County School System alleging that they violated the Alabama Open Meetings Act. The conflict arose from a June 2009 meeting in which the Board was scheduled to discuss and vote on the selection of a new superintendent. There was conflicting evidence as to the nature of the discussion that occurred at the meeting between the Board members who attended it. Slagle testified that, at a meeting of the Board held on July 1, 2009, one Board member made a comment about a previously held "secret meeting" of Board members, apparently referring to the June 2009 event at which four members of the Board were present. None of the Board members present at the June 2009 event confirmed that they deliberated about filling the superintendent position or other Board business at the event. At a July meeting, the Board voted to hire Barbara Thompson as superintendent of the Montgomery School System. In December 2009, Slagle filed this action against Board members Ross, Snowden, Sellers, Meadows, Dawkins, Briers, and Porterfield in their official capacities and against Thompson in her official capacity as superintendent, alleging that the Board members violated the Act in June 2009. The trial court concluded that, because a quorum was not physically present and discussing Board business at any given time at the June event, the Board did not hold a "meeting" as defined in the Act. Based on this finding, the trial court dismissed Slagle's claims against the Board members and Superintendent Thompson. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a plain reading of the Open Meetings Act showed that neither the presence of Board members at the June 2009 event constituted a "gathering" of a quorum of the Board itself. Therefore, the trial court's judgment in this case was affirmed. View "Slagle v. Ross" on Justia Law

David Bennett and Bennett & Bennett Construction, Inc. ("Bennett") appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration of the claims alleging fraud in the inducement and the tort of outrage brought against them by Barbara and Leotes Skinner. The Skinners entered into a construction-services contract with Bennett, pursuant to which Bennett was to renovate and remodel their residence located in Oxford. After disagreements developed between the parties, the Skinners sued Bennett, alleging claims of breach of contract; breach of warranty; fraud in the inducement; assault and battery; the tort of outrage; and negligence, wantonness and recklessness. Bennett moved to compel arbitration of all claims, arguing that, because each of the claims alleged by the Skinners arose from the construction-services contract or were related to the construction-services contract, the claims were subject to arbitration. Furthermore, Bennett argued that the tort-of-outrage claim arose out of a disagreement concerning the construction-services contract and that the Skinners should not be allowed to avoid arbitration because they cast their claim as a tort. The Skinners responded, arguing that their agreement to the arbitration clause in the contract was obtained fraudulently. The trial court denied Bennett's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Skinners' tort-of-outrage claim arose out of a disagreement concerning the construction-services contract and thus was a proper claim for arbitration. The Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bennett v. Skinner " on Justia Law

Northstar Battery Company, LLC ("Northstar"), petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Cullman Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Northstar's motion to dismiss the action filed against it by Apel Steel Corporation ("Apel") and to enter an order dismissing the action for lack of in personam jurisdiction. The case stemmed from a contract in which Apel Steel was working as a subcontractor for a battery manufacturing plant in Springfield, Missouri. Northstar Battery, owner of the plant, contracted with Walton Construction to serve as general contractor. Apel had further subcontracted a portion of its work to JS Nationwide, who erected structural steel at the plant. Sparks from welding started a fire which resulted in the destruction of property/equipment, and caused heat and smoke damage in the affected area of the plant. The contract between Apel and Walton contained a provision by which Apel allegedly waived all rights against JS Nationwide. Counts against Northstar alleged negligence, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, misrepresentation and conspiracy. Northstar moved to dismiss citing lack of personal jurisdiction. Finding that Apel failed to carry its jurisdictional burden, the Supreme Court held that the trial court "clearly" erred in denying Northstar's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court granted Northstar's petition and issued the writ. View "Apel Steel Corporation v. JS Nationwide Erectors, Inc." on Justia Law

Regions Bank, in its fiduciary capacity as trustee or cotrustee of various trusts, Delores Ancell, and David Puckett filed two permissive appeals, pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., to challenge the Jefferson Circuit Court's orders denying the trustees' motions to dismiss in part Ernest Kramer's and Kenyon R. Kirkland's complaints filed against the trustees. In his complaint, Kramer alleged that the trustees' management of the assets held by the Kramer revocable trust constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, wantonness, breach of contract, fraud, reckless misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, suppression, violation of the Alabama Securities Act. Finding that the trustees failed to support their argument with relevant legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's orders. View "Regions Bank v. Ernest Kramer " on Justia Law

Monte Sano Research Corporation (MSRC), Steven L. Thornton, and Steven B. Teague appealed a preliminary injunction entered against them in an action brought by Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc., a California-based aerospace and defense contractor, Digital Fusion, Inc. (DFI), an Alabama-based holding company, and Digital Fusion Solutions, Inc. (DFSI), a Florida corporation and a subsidiary of DFI (referred to collectively as Kratos), alleging breach of the duty of loyalty, breach of contract, tortious interference with business and contractual relationships, and civil conspiracy. Additionally, Kratos sought injunctive relief. MSRC was formed in 2009 to procure government subcontract work at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville. Thornton and Teague were employees of DFI, which also engaged in government subcontract work; they became employees of Kratos when Kratos Defense merged with DFI in 2008. Kratos terminated Teagues employment on June 23, 2011. Thornton resigned from Kratos four days later. A dispute arose between the parties which implicated the employment contracts for Thornton and Teague when they sought subsequent work. Upon review of this case, the Supreme Court found that because the provisions of Rule 65(d)(2) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure were not complied with and because there was no evidence of an irreparable injury or the lack of an adequate remedy at law, the trial court erred in issuing the preliminary injunction. The Court reversed the trial courts order entering the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the trial court with directions that it dissolve the injunction it issued September 10, 2011. View "Monte Sano Research Corp. v. Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Mary Ann Wilkinson was employed by the Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama for several years, until the Board terminated her employment in December 2009. In July 2010, Wilkinson sued the Board, seeking compensation she alleged was due her pursuant to her employment contracts. The Board filed a motion to dismiss Wilkinsons complaint, in which it alleged that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., on the ground that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Board, as a State agency, is immune from suit under Ala. Const. 1901, Art. I, sec. 14; that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., because it failed to state a claim; and that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., for improper venue. In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the Board argued this case presented an issue of first impression regarding whether the Board is a State agency that is entitled to section 14 immunity and whether the Board was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Board of Adjustment. The Board argues that the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it concluded that the Board was not a State agency entitled immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Board was a State agency and therefore entitled to immunity pursuant to section 14, the courts of this State were without jurisdiction in this case, and the Board of Adjustment would have jurisdiction over Wilkinsons claims. For these reasons, the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it reversed the trial courts judgment dismissing Wilkinsons complaint against the Board and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wilkinson v. Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted T.C.s writ of certiorari to review an issue of first impression: interpretation of 12-15-601, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the 2008 Alabama Juvenile Justice Act, which became effective January 1, 2009 (the 2008 AJJA). Specifically, the question was whether the 2008 AJJA provided for an appeal from an interlocutory order. On March 11, 2010, the juvenile court issued an order awarding the maternal grandparents pendente lite custody of the child and ordering the Department of Human Resources to complete home studies on both the parents and the maternal grandparents. The mother was allowed supervised visitation, and an attorney was appointed to represent her. The juvenile court entered another more detailed order continuing the award of pendente lite custody of the child to the maternal grandparents and awarding the mother and the father supervised visitation pending a hearing on dependency. An attorney was appointed to represent the father. The juvenile court entered another pendente lite order continuing custody of the child with the maternal grandparents and denying the fathers motion to modify that aspect of the order awarding supervised visitation. Subsequently, the trial court found the child dependent based on the fathers prescription drug abuse, and a suggestion that the mother had died. The father then appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that had the legislature intended to provide for appeals from an order finding a child dependent, it could have easily done so without the unintended consequences of allowing all nonfinal orders in juvenile cases to be appealable. Accordingly, the Court did not interpret the omission of the word final from 12-15-601 as indicating an intent on the part of the legislature to allow every interlocutory juvenile court order to be appealable. Therefore, when the legislature enacted the 2008 AJJA (revising, reorganizing, and repealing parts of the former AJJA) it may not have referred to the right to appeal from a final judgment or order, but merely referred to the right to appeal a judgment or order. That language choice, however, does not reflect the legislatures intent to make all orders in juvenile proceedings appealable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment dismissing the fathers appeal as being a nonfinal judgment. View "In re: T.C." on Justia Law

Marcus Lydell Walker, an employee of the Macon County Sheriffs Department, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to enter an order holding him immune from suit based on Art. I, sec. 14, Ala. Const. 1901. He further asked the Court to direct the Macon Circuit Court to dismiss the claims asserted against him by Miguel Harris. While acting within the scope of his duty for the Sherriffs Department, Walker and Harris were in a vehicle accident in which Harris was injured. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Walker demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief he sought. Therefore, the Court granted his petition and directed the circuit court to dismiss the claims asserted against Walker. View "Harris v. Walker" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a workplace accident in which Lee Calhoun, Jr., Plaintiff Lula Calhoun's husband, was fatally injured. Mrs. Calhoun filed a complaint against her husband's employer seeking worker's compensation death benefits. The circuit court eventually entered an order awarding Mrs. Calhoun 375 weeks in death benefits. The order also released one party, Linden, Inc., from further liability. The court did not certify this order as final. In the meantime, litigation involving a host of other parties proceeded. The parties exchanged correspondence regarding settlement of Mrs. Calhoun's claims. While the back-and-forth continued on settlement, Mrs. Calhoun filed suit against three parties, including Linden, alleging the torts of outrage, fraud and conspiracy. In this suit, she alleged that while attempting to negotiate settlement with Linden, a dispute arose over the terms of Linden's waiver, ending with Linden halting the workers' compensation death benefit payments. Linden and its two co-defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss Mrs. Calhoun's last suit. The case was tried solely on outrage, ending with a jury awarding Mrs. Calhoun over $3.6 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Attenta, Inc., one of Linden's co-defendants, appealed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Attenta argued that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the outrage claim, contending that the controlling issue was at the center of the dispute in the wrongful death action. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, vacated the circuit court's judgment, and dismissed the case and appeal. View "Attenta, Inc. v. Calhoun " on Justia Law

Dr. Zenko J. Hrynkiw and Zenko J. Hrynkiw, M.D., P.C., appealed a judgment entered in favor of Thomas and Barbara Trammell in their medical-malpractice action. In 2005, Dr. Hrynkiw, a neurosurgeon, performed fusion surgery on Thomas's spine to relieve pain in his lower back and pain and numbness in his right leg and foot caused by a herniated disk that was creating pressure on a nerve. Immediately following the surgery, Thomas experienced weakness, numbness, and pain in his lower extremities. A second surgery provided Thomas no relief, and he was permanently partially disabled. In 2007, Thomas and his wife Barbara sued Dr. Hrynkiw, alleging negligent diagnosis, treatment and postoperative care. Barbara asserted a claim of loss of consortium. Dr. Hrynkiw raised two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not granting Hrynkiw's judgment as a matter of law on the Trammells' claim relating to Dr. Hrynkiw's postoperative care because the Trammells failed to present substantial evidence that any of Thomas's injuries were probably caused by Dr. Hrynkiw's postoperative care; and (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony under the learned-treatise exception when, Hrynkiw says, the foundational requirements of Rule 803(18), Ala. R. Evid., were not met. Finding sufficient evidence to support the judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Hrynkiw v. Trammell" on Justia Law