Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC (Southeast), and Michael J. Smith petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Chambers Circuit Court to vacate its order that denied their motion to transfer the underlying action to Lee County on the ground of forum non conveniens. In 2011, a vehicle driven by Patricia Webster allegedly collided with timber that had come loose from a tractor-trailer rig owned by Southeast, driven by its employee Smith. She sued Southeast and Smith for negligence and wanton and reckless conduct. Southeast's principal office is located in Chambers County. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Southeast and Smith's motion for a change of venue based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The court granted their petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the circuit court to transfer the case to Lee Circuit Court. View "Webster v. Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC" on Justia Law

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, Southern Division certified a question to the Supreme Court: whether Ala. Code 11-81-3 (1975) required that an Alabama municipality refund or fund bond indebtedness as a condition of eligibility to proceed under Chapter 9 of Title 11 of the U.S. Code. Upon review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended to authorize every county, city, town and municipal authority to file for Chapter 9, and therefore, they are not required to have indebtedness prior to filing for Chapter 9 protection. View "City of Prichard v. Balzer" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were nine Alabama municipalities and the Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Appellees, sixteen online travel service companies and related entities (the "OTCs"). The issue was whether the OTCs were liable for paying the municipalities a lodgings tax under the local lodgings-tax ordinances of the respective municipal plaintiffs. After considering the record in this case, the briefs of the parties, and the trial court's order, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's reasoning in its summary judgment order, and therefore affirmed the judgment in favor of the OTCs. View "City of Birmingham v. Orbitz, LLC." on Justia Law

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a defendant in a civil case pending in the Escambia Circuit Court, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to dismiss the case on the ground that venue in Escambia County was improper or in the alternative, on the ground of forum non conveniens. This case arose from a in incident at Wal-Mart's Franklin, North Carolina store, wherein Escambia County resident Plaintiff Gloria Renee Wolfe was shopping with her sister. She was injured when a bolt of cloth fell from a display shelf and struck her upper body, including her neck and shoulder, exacerbating a preexisting condition in her cervical spine and also causing additional injuries. Upon returning home to Alabama, Gloria sought medical treatment from doctors in Mobile County, Escambia County, and Jacksonville, Florida. In 2010, Gloria and her husband sued Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and fictitiously named defendants. Gloria asserted claims of negligence and wantonness; her husband asserted a claim of loss of consortium. Wal-Mart resisted the complaint, arguing that it had been incorrectly named in the complaint and that it was filed in the wrong court. Wal-Mart East further asserted in its motion that because neither of its partners resided in Alabama and because Gloria's alleged injuries occurred in North Carolina, venue in Escambia County was improper. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., has not shown a clear legal right to the order to the trial court to dismiss the Wolfes' action on the ground that venue is improper in Escambia County and/or on the ground of forum non conveniens. View "Wolfe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Aziz and Karima Mohabbat sued Sanjay and Ramendra P. Singh in Circuit Court asserting claims of suppression and unjust enrichment. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered a $630,000 judgment in favor of the Mohabbats. The Singhs moved for a new trial; however, their motion was ultimately denied by operation of law. The Singhs appealed to the Supreme Court, and moved the trial court to enter a stay of execution of the $630,000 judgment pending the appeal even though, the Singhs alleged, they did not have the resources to execute a supersedeas bond in the amount required by Rule 8(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. The trial court granted the motion and accepted a supersedeas bond in the amount of $100,000, as opposed to the $787,500 presumably required by Rule 8(a)(1). The Mohabbats moved the trial court to reconsider its decision that same day; however, the trial court denied their motion. The Mohabbats petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to require the Singhs to execute a bond in the amount of $787,500 before a stay of execution of the judgment could be entered. The Court granted the Mohabbats' petition, and ordered the Singhs to file a response to that petition. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court had a duty to apply Rule 8(a)(1) and to require the Singhs to execute a bond in the amount of $787,500 before granting their motion for a stay of execution of the judgment entered against them. Because the trial court failed to do so, the Mohabbats had a clear legal right to the relief they sought, and their petition was granted. The trial court was directed to vacate its order granting the Singhs' motion to accept a supersedeas bond was directed not to accept any supersedeas bond in an amount less than $787,500 (as required by Rule 8(a)(1)). View "Mohabbat v. Singh " on Justia Law

Several Citites and their employees, police officers J.J. Oglesby, J.M. Stewart, A.T. Caffey, Q.O. Commander, and N.W. McMahon petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Plaintiffs Dashad Berry, Kamessa Williams, and Miguel Johnson. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from a traffic stops conducted by the City officers. Each of plaintiffs suffer from a type of paralysis that inhibited their abilities to respond quickly and directly to officers' orders incident to the officers' initial investigations. Plaintiffs sued the City and the individual officers alleging assault and battery, wantonness, negligence, negligent hiring, negligent training and negligent supervision. A trial court entered an order denying the City and officers' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the City and officers argued they were immune to Plaintiffs' claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Officers Oglesby and McMahon showed a clear legal right to the relief sought, and, as to them, their petition was granted and the trial court was directed to enter a summary judgment in their favor. Officers Stewart, Commander, and Caffey failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief they sought, and, as to them, their petition was denied. However, the City has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought as to the claims against it based on the acts of Officers Stewart, Commander, and Caffey, and its petition was denied as to those claims. Finally, the City has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought based on the claims alleging negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and its petition was denied as to those claims. View "Berry et al. v. City of Montgomery et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Wade Tucker, the Wendell H. Cook, Sr. Testamentary Trust, and HealthSouth Corporation appealed a circuit court's partial summary judgment in favor of the Richard M. Scrushy Charitable Foundation. In 2009, the court entered a judgment against the Scrushy Foundation in favor of Plaintiffs for approximately $2.7 billion. As part of their efforts to collect on the judgment, Plaintiffs issued a process of garnishment to the Foundation. The Foundation responded to the garnishment by denying that it had possession or control of any belongings to Mr. Scrushy. Plaintiffs then contested the Foundation's response alleging, among other things, that Mr. Scrushy "dominated and controlled" the Foundation such that it was his alter ego. The Foundation did not respond to Plaintiffs' garnishment contest, but moved for summary judgment a few months later on all of Plaintiffs' claims. The Foundation maintained that Plaintiffs' actions were time barred. The Foundation’s motion did not address Plaintiffs' garnishment contest. Ultimately, the circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of the Foundation concerning Plaintiffs’ clams brought under the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (AUFTA), finding that Plaintiffs' claims under the statute were time-barred. With regard to the garnishment contest, the court entered summary judgment again, holding that Plaintiffs' claims arose from transfers Mr. Scrushy made to the Foundation rather than upon the Judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court exceeded its discretion by conducting a hearing on the Foundation's request for a summary judgment in Plaintiffs' garnishment contest on less than ten days' notice in violation of the rules of procedure and over Plaintiffs' objections. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Circuit Court's summary judgment "insofar as it considered the Plaintiffs' garnishment contest," and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tucker v. Richard M. Scrushy Charitable Foundation, Inc " on Justia Law

Fred and Nancy Eagerton appealed a summary judgment granted in favor of Vision Bank in the bank's action seeking to enforce the Eagertons' obligations under certain guaranty contracts. "Dotson 10s, LLC" was organized to operate a tennis club in Fairhope. Dotson 10s executed a note and security agreement with Vision Bank, and the bank obtained in exchange, unlimited personal guarantees from John and Elizabeth Dotson, and limited guarantees from the Eagertons. The Dotsons executed a second loan to which the Eagertons were not a party. The Dotsons defaulted on both loans, and the bank sued the Dotsons as the primary obligors, and the Eagertons as personal guarantors. Dotson 10s then filed for bankruptcy protection. Part of the reorganization plan provided in part that the two loans would be combined and paid in full. Dotson 10s subsequently defaulted on the bankruptcy plan. The properties were foreclosed and sold, with the proceeds applied to the consolidated loan. The circuit court then entered a partial summary judgment in favor of the bank against Dotson 10s, but denied the motion as to the Eagertons. The bank argued that the Eagertons were still responsible under their guaranty contracts for the deficiency remaining on the consolidated loan. The Eagertons argued that the creation of the consolidated loan without their knowledge or consent, operated to discharge them from any further obligations under their guaranty contracts. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, and reversed the circuit court's judgment in favor of the bank, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Eagerton v. Vision Bank " on Justia Law

The State Director of Finance Marquita Davis and the State Comptroller Thomas L. White, Jr. appealed a preliminary injunction entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court in response to a declaratory-judgment action brought by the Alabama Education Association (AEA); Alabama Voice of Teachers for Education (a political-action committee affiliated with the AEA (A-VOTE)); the Alabama State Employees Association (ASEA); and the State Employees Association Political Action Committee (a political-action committee affiliated with the ASEA (SEA-PAC). In 2010, the comptroller implemented a new policy regarding salary deductions. Under this new policy, the comptroller stopped executing salary deductions designated for contributions to SEA-PAC; the comptroller continued making deductions designated for the payment of dues to the ASEA. Likewise, the comptroller stopped executing salary deductions to a political-action committee affiliated with the Alabama State Troopers Association. Portions of an employee's salary no longer deducted as a result of this policy change were included in the employee's paychecks. The AEA and A-VOTE filed a complaint against the finance director and the comptroller in circuit court seeking a judgment declaring that deductions designated for the AEA that benefited A-VOTE were not prohibited by law and seeking a permanent injunction to force the comptroller to resume the previous practice of executing salary deductions designated for the AEA. The ASEA and SEA-PAC filed a motion to intervene as plaintiffs in the action. The circuit court ruled that, without the preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm through the actions of the finance director and the comptroller. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the injunction and ordered the circuit court dismiss the complaint: the action before the Court was one that challenged the practices adopted by the finance director and the comptroller based on their interpretation of Alabama statutory law as it existed before the the statutory authority under which they acted became effective. The Court concluded the injunction was moot. View "Davis v. Alabama Education Ass'n" on Justia Law

DuBose Construction Company, L.L.C., petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Civil Appeals to vacate its order reversing a Montgomery Circuit Court ruling in the case. On February 14, 2005, James Simmons, an employee of DuBose Construction, sustained a medial meniscus tear in his right knee when he slipped and fell in a hole while working at a construction site. Simmons ultimately sued DuBose Construction in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking workers' compensation benefits for his knee injury. The trial court entered a judgment in 2007, finding that Simmons had suffered a permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and a 15% permanent partial loss of his ability to earn and awarding benefits accordingly. However, the trial court dismissed Simmons' case, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. DuBose Construction subsequently appealed that judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals, arguing that the trial court had erred in awarding Simmons benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court found DuBose Construction failed to establish that it had a clear legal right to the writ because the trial court's order dismissing Simmons's case was void as being outside the scope of the Court of Civil Appeals' remand order, and Simmons was accordingly entitled to a writ directing the trial court to enter a proper judgment in the case. View "Simmons v. DuBose Construction Company, L.L.C. " on Justia Law