Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Carson Sweeney petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order of May 26, 2011, insofar as the order granted Timmy Joe Holland's motion to strike Sweeney's demand for a trial by jury in Holland's trespass action against him. In 2010, Holland sued Sweeney, alleging that Sweeney had entered Holland's property and damaged it by, among other things, "remov[ing] trees, timber and other foliage, [and] soil"; "redirect[ing] water flow"; and "install[ing] drainage apparatuses." The complaint stated the following causes of action: "trespass - trespass to chattels," negligence, negligent supervision, and conversion. The circuit court ultimately entered an order that, among other things, granted in part and denied in part Holland's motion to strike Sweeney's answer and counter-complaint. In its order, the circuit court found that Sweeney's failure to file his answer and counter-complaint in a timely manner "was unreasonable and inherently prejudicial" to Holland and that "[g]ood cause has not been shown for said failure." Nonetheless, the circuit court denied Holland's motion insofar as it sought to strike Sweeney's answer and counter-complaint because, the circuit court said, "the interest of preserving a litigant's right of trial on the merits is paramount." However, the circuit court granted Holland's motion insofar as it sought to strike Sweeney's demand for a jury trial, concluding that Sweeney had "waived his right to demand a trial by jury." Sweeney filed a "motion for reconsideration, modification, new hearing, or in the alternative, motion to alter, amend or vacate" the order striking his jury-trial demand, which the circuit court denied. Sweeney then filed this petition for the writ of mandamus, seeking relief from the circuit court's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Sweeney demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief sought in his petition for the writ of mandamus. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Holland v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Rodgetta Colvin Jett n/k/a Octavia R. Cantelow-Jett ("Jett") appealed the grant of summary judgment entered against her in a legal-malpractice action against attorney James M. Wooten and his law firm, the Law Offices of James M. Wooten, P.C. ("Wooten P.C."). Jett was injured when she fell down the stairs while leaving a YMCA facility in Birmingham. Jett filed a legal-malpractice action against the Wooten defendants as a result of their failure to initiate legal actions on her behalf against the YMCA before the limitations period expired on those claims. The trial court thereafter entered a summary judgment in favor of the Wooten defendants, holding that Jett's claims against them were themselves barred by the two-year statute of limitations that applied to Alabama Legal Services Act (ALSA) claims because Jett did not initiate her action until December 30, 2010, more than two years after the two YMCA incidents. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ALSA tolled the statute of limitations and that the two-year period in which Jett could initiate an action against the Wooten defendants based on Wooten's failure to file actions against the YMCA did not begin to run until Jett discovered that Wooten had not filed the legal actions she alleged he told her he had filed. Accordingly, her lawsuit against the Wooten defendants was timely filed. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Jett v. Wooten" on Justia Law

Jennifer Ann Vest (Herron) petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision that denied her second petition for a writ of mandamus in a child-custody matter. The Supreme Court granted Jennifer's petition to examine the rationale applied by the Court of Civil Appeals, which appeared to be premised upon a perceived conflict between Ala. Code 1975, section 6-5-440 and Ala. Code 1975, section 30-3-5. Jennifer argued on appeal that the Court of Civil Appeals' rationale conflicted with the mandate of 6-5-440: it did not follow from the principle that venue in child-custody-modification proceedings could be waived and that a forum-shopping parent could "file a postdivorce proceeding in an improper venue and thereby bar the other former spouse from filing a postdivorce proceeding in the proper venue," because the respondent parent could always object in his or her first responsive pleading in the court in which venue is alleged to be improper. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded this case for further consideration of 6-5-440 and any other arguments that may have been pretermitted by the Court of Civil Appeals' analysis. View "Vest v. Vest " on Justia Law

The City of Gadsden appealed an order of injunctive relief in favor of John Boman, a retired Gadsden police officer. Boman and 18 other active and retired Gadsden police officers sued Gadsden alleging, among other things, that they had "been deprived of Social Security and Medicare protection which other police officers have been provided" and that, after 20 years of service, they were being required to pay a higher pension charge or percentage of base pay than their counterparts who were hired after April 1, 1986. Boman filed a "motion for immediate relief for medical care." He alleged that when he was hired, Gadsden "provided police and firemen a 20 year retirement program whereby police and firemen would receive 50% retirement benefits after 20 years of service and lifetime medical care." He averred that Gadsden had "breached its contract with [him] to provide continuing medical insurance," and he requested "immediate relief by ordering [Gadsden] to pay for [his] medical care or in the alternative ordering [Gadsden] to pay for Medicare coverage for ... Boman so he will have continuing medical insurance as agreed by the Board filed a motion to dismiss the action as to it and the plan. As to it, the Board alleged that it was an agency of the State and, therefore, was entitled to absolute immunity from suit. Also, according to the Board, the plan is not a legal entity subject to suit, but "merely a program administered by the Board to provide insurance." It also averred that, "[e]ven if [the plan] were an entity subject to suit, it would be immune for the same reasons [the] Board is immune." Boman's response to the Board's motion failed to acknowledge or mention the immunity question. The trial court, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, entered an "order granting motion for emergency relief." It ultimately dismissed the claims against the Board and the plan. Gadsden appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed based on the failure to join the officials of the Board, in their official capacities, as necessary parties. On remand, the trial court was directed to entertain an amendment to the complaint adding claims against those officials of the Board who are charged with administering the plan, in their official capacities. View "City of Gadsden, Alabama v. Boman et al. " on Justia Law

Darren Woods and his half sister Joni Wood, appealed a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of Karrie Hayes and against Joni in the amount of $437,761.52 and against Darren in the amount of $86,540.49 for violating the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("AUFTA"). In 2004, Karrie Hayes, then age 14, was alone inside the house where she resided with her mother in Florence. Jason Earl Pruitt, at the request and under the direction of Stevie Woods, the father of Darren and Joni, released a large amount of propane gas into the residence and then ignited the gas, causing the residence to explode into flames. As a result of the explosion, Hayes sustained severe burns to over 70 percent of her body. Investigators quickly learned of Pruitt's involvement, and Pruitt thereafter implicated Stevie Woods. In 2006, Stevie Woods was arrested and charged with arson for the burning of the residence in which Hayes was living. Both Stevie Woods and Pruitt were convicted of arson in the first degree. Hayes, through her mother, filed a civil action against Stevie Woods and Pruitt seeking damages for the injuries she sustained as a result of the destruction of the residence. In amended complaints Hayes added claims alleging the fraudulent transfer of assets against Stevie Woods, Darren, Joni, and Flower Wood Development, LLC ("Flower Wood"), and conspiracy to engage in the fraudulent transfers and seeking injunctive relief to bar further transfers. With regard to these claims, Hayes specifically alleged that, with the knowledge of the existence of Hayes's claims against him, Stevie Woods fraudulently transferred real and personal property to various relatives, including Darren and Joni, as well as to Flower Wood. A jury awarded Hayes $5 million against Stevie Woods and Pruitt on her personal-injury claims. Stevie Woods did not appeal the verdict. The trial court determined that 11 deeds had been used to fraudulently transfer 9 parcels of real property from Stevie Woods to Darren, Joni, and Flower Wood, and the trial court set aside those deeds. The defendants did not challenge the order on appeal. Darren and Joni argued that the judgments based on the fraudulent transfers claims should be reversed on the ground that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence highly prejudicial photographs, medical records, and testimony concerning Hayes's injuries and photographs and testimony concerning the explosion. Upon review of this issue, the trial court's admission of evidence that was entirely irrelevant to Hayes's fraudulent-transfer claims and that was highly prejudicial to Darren and Joni. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that warranted reversal of the jury verdicts against Darren and Joni. Accordingly, the case was remanded for a new trial. View "Wood v. Hayes " on Justia Law

While represented by counsel, Defendant Stanford Earl Pritchett pled guilty to murder. Defendant then filed a pro se motion to set aside his guilty plea, asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied Defendant's motion without conducting a hearing and without making a determination that he had validly waived his right to counsel with respect to the motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's order denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari as to that decision, asserting that it conflicted with "Berry v. Alabama," (630 So. 2d 127, 129 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)). The Court granted the petition, and reversed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case. View "Pritchett v. Alabama " on Justia Law

Lawton Higgs, Sr., formerly a pastor and pastor emeritus at the Church of the Reconciler ("COR"), a United Methodist church, brought an action against Tom Bole, a lay member of COR, alleging defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. During the proceedings, Higgs filed a civil subpoena requesting the production of certain documents from Reverend Ron Schultz, the district supervisor of the South Central District of the North Alabama Conference of the United Methodist Church ("the Conference"). Reverend Schultz filed a verified objection to and a motion to quash the civil subpoena based on First Amendment concerns. Subsequently, Bole filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him, alleging that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the trial court denied Bole's motion. The trial court later entered an order in which it granted in part and denied in part Reverend Schultz's motion to quash. In case no. 1110868, Bole petitioned for a writ of mandamus requesting that this Court dismiss Higgs's claims against him. In case no. 1110892, Reverend Schultz petitioned for a writ of mandamus asking this Court to quash the subpoena in its entirety on the basis that the records subpoenaed by Higgs were privileged, ecclesiastical records of the United Methodist Church. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition in case no. 1110868 and dismissed the petition in case no. 1110892. View "Higgs, Sr. v. Bole" on Justia Law

One petition for the writ of mandamus and three appeals were brought before the Supreme Court to challenge a judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court awarding Hugh McInnish $196,625 in attorney fees and costs in his action against: (1) the Governor of the State of Alabama, (2) the State finance director, (3) the State comptroller, and (4) the State treasurer, all in their official capacities. The underlying case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the community-services grant-making process set forth in Ala. Code 1975, section 29-2-123. There, the Court held that "section 29-2-123, which authorizes a permanent joint legislative committee to award community-services grants, [as well as that portion of the annual education-appropriations act] by which those grants are funded," violated the separation-of-powers provisions of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, 925 So. 2d at 188, and the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case. Subsequently, McInnish filed a series of motions in the trial court, seeking "an award of attorney fees, reasonable expenses, and costs against the [State officials]." He also sought an order declaring that he was "a prevailing party, that this litigation provided a common benefit to all taxpayers of the state of Alabama, and that the amount that was prohibited from being disbursed illegally was in an amount of approximately $13.4 million." The State officials opposed McInnish's motions, arguing that "[t]he clear holding in Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro[, 950 So. 2d 1203 (Ala. 2006),] is that section 14 of the Alabama Constitution prohibits the awarding of attorney fees and expenses in any state court action against the State of Alabama or against state officials in their official capacities." The trial court entered a judgment awarding "counsel for Plaintiff McInnish a judgment for attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $196,625.00 to be paid by the [State officials]." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that section 14 bars an award of attorney fees and costs even if a plaintiff has prevailed on a claim against State officials in their official capacities for a violation of the State constitution that results in preservation of significant funds in the State treasury. The trial court lacked authority to award such attorney fees and costs. Consequently, the judgment was reversed. View "McInnish v. Bentley " on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Eastern Division certified two questions of first impression to the Alabama Supreme Court: whether a coverage exclusion clause in an automobile insurance policy applied to the use of the vehicle used for transporting people or delivering newspapers (as part of the insured's job) was enforceable. A secondary issue was whether that exclusion applied when an accident takes place after the delivery of the last paper, "but while the insured is driving back to his point of origin or some other location." Scott and Lori Touart Thomas were injured as the result of an automobile accident; Lori had been driving. The Thomases recovered a judgment in state court against defendant Kenneth Gooden, Jr., the driver of the other vehicle. The dispute involved whether the Thomases were entitled to recover from Nationwide under the provisions of a Nationwide automobile liability insurance policy naming Gooden as an insured. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the answer to the first certified question is "yes:" a clause in an automobile liability-insurance policy excluding coverage for the "use of any motor vehicle to carry persons or property for a fee" could be enforced as to an insured if the finder of fact concludes that the insured delivers newspapers for a fee and that the insured was using the covered vehicle for that purpose at the time of the accident. With regard to the second question, the Court concluded that the answer to the second certified question is "no:" a clause in an automobile liability-insurance policy excluding coverage for the "use of any motor vehicle to carry persons or property for a fee" cannot be enforced as to an insured after the delivery of the "property," i.e., newspapers in this case, is complete. View "Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 64, and three employees of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Personnel Board of Jefferson County, and Jefferson County Sheriff Mike Hale in the employees' action regarding the suspension of merit pay raises for classified employees of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. View "Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 64 v. Personnel Board of Jefferson Cty." on Justia Law