Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Consolidated appeals arose from of a commercial dispute between Southern Lift Trucks, LLC ("Southern"), and Hyundai Construction Equipment Americas, Inc. ("Hyundai Construction") -- an alleged subsidiary of Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. ("Hyundai Heavy Industries"). Southern was a heavy-equipment dealer for Hyundai Construction. Southern filed suit against Hyundai Construction and Hyundai Heavy Industries (collectively, as "Hyundai") asserting various claims, including claims under the Alabama Heavy Equipment Dealer Act ("the AHEDA"). Southern also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Hyundai: (1) from unlawfully terminating one of the dealer agreements at issue in these appeals; and (2) from unlawfully adding a second dealer in the territory that was covered under another dealer agreement at issue. In response, Hyundai moved to compel arbitration. The circuit court granted Southern's request for a preliminary injunction and denied Hyundai's motion to compel arbitration. In appeal no. SC-2022-0675, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order insofar as it granted Southern's motion for a preliminary injunction as to the forklift agreement. However, the Court reversed the trial court's order insofar as it issued a preliminary injunction related to the construction-equipment agreement, and remanded the case for the trial court to enter an order consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. In case no. SC-2022-0676, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order insofar as it denied Hyundai's motion to compel arbitration as to any provisions of Southern's declaratory-judgment claim relating to the "enforceability of any provision" of the dealer agreement. However, the Court reversed the trial court's order insofar as it denied Hyundai's motion to compel arbitration as to Southern's other claims, and that case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Hyundai Construction Equipment Americas, Inc., et al. v. Southern Lift Trucks, LLC" on Justia Law

Angelia Taylor, as personal representative of the Estate of Willie Latham, appealed the denial by operation of law of her Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion seeking to vacate an arbitration award entered in favor of Methodist Home for the Aging d/b/a Fair Haven and its administrator, Maria Ephraim (collectively, "Fair Haven"). While a resident, Latham fell and broke her hip. Latham was eventually transported to a hospital for surgery, and she died a few days later. In November 2019, Taylor, as the personal representative of Latham's estate, filed a wrongful-death action under the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987. In December 2019, Fair Haven moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement Latham had signed. The parties filed a joint stipulation to submit the case to arbitration, and in February 2020 the circuit court entered an order compelling arbitration. In November 2021, an arbitrator issued a final award in favor of Fair Haven. A month later, Taylor filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, she filed a motion to set aside or vacate the arbitration award. In response, Fair Haven filed a motion for the entry of a final judgment. On February 2, 2022, the circuit court entered an order noting that the purported postjudgment motions were not ripe, because the circuit clerk had not entered the arbitration award as a final judgment. On February 22, 2022, the circuit clerk entered the arbitration award as a final judgment. Taylor's motion to vacate was denied by operation of law 90 days later, on May 23, 2022. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded Taylor failed to demonstrate a recognized basis under 9 U.S.C. § 10 for vacating the arbitration award; the denial by operation of law of her Rule 59 motion to vacate the arbitration award was therefore affirmed. View "Taylor v. Methodist Home for the Aging d/b/a Fair Haven, et al." on Justia Law

Alabama Somerby, LLC, d/b/a Brookdale University Park IL/AL/MC; Brookdale Senior Living, Inc.; and Undrea Wright (collectively, Brookdale) appealed a circuit court's order denying their motion to compel arbitration of the claims asserted against them by plaintiff, L.D., as the next friend of her mother, E.D. Brookdale operated an assisted-living facility for seniors ("the nursing home") in Jefferson County, Alabama; Wright was the administrator of the nursing home. In March 2022, L.D. filed on E.D.'s behalf, a complaint against Brookdale and Wright and others, asserting various tort claims and seeking related damages premised on allegations that, following her admission to the nursing home, E.D. had been subjected to multiple sexual assaults both by other residents and by an employee of Brookdale. The Brookdale defendants jointly moved to compel arbitration of L.D.'s claims against them or, alternatively, to dismiss the action without prejudice to allow those claims to proceed via arbitration. Following a hearing, the trial court, denied the motion seeking to dismiss the action or to compel arbitration. The Brookdale defendants timely appealed, asserting that the trial court had erred by failing to order arbitration. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Brookdale defendants established that an agreement providing for arbitration existed and that the agreement affected interstate commerce. The trial court erred in denying the Brookdale defendants' request to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Alabama Somerby, LLC, et al. v. L.D." on Justia Law

Victor Chin, M.D., and Sportsmed Orthopedic Specialists, P.C. (collectively "the Sportsmed defendants"), were defendants in an action brought by their patient, Malik Woodard. Woodard alleged that, against his wishes, Dr. Chin obtained records of Woodard's prior psychological treatment. The Sportsmed defendants sought mandamus relief from: (1) the circuit court's order denying their motion to change venue based on the Alabama Medical Liability Act and the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987 (collectively "AMLA"); and (2) the court's order prohibiting them from using the psychological records (and certain related documents) in the case and requiring them to return or destroy those records and documents ("the protective order"). As to the venue order, the Alabama Supreme Court denied the petition because the Sportsmed defendants did not argue that the complaint did not support an inference that Dr. Chin had no medical reason for obtaining the psychological records. As to the protective order, the Supreme Court denied the petition because the Sportsmed defendants did not demonstrate that the order was subject to mandamus review. View "Ex parte Victor Chin, M.D., and Sportsmed Orthopedic Specialists, P.C." on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals arose from a dispute between Richard Bentley and his brother, James Randall Bentley ("Randy"), and from a dispute between Richard and his ex-wife, Leslie Bentley. In case no. CV-19-7, an action concerning the administration of the estate of Richard and Randy's father, Dedrick William Bentley ("the estate action"), Richard, as coexecutor of Dedrick's estate, asserted cross-claims against Randy, as the other coexecutor of the estate. Richard sought, among other things, the return of certain real property previously owned by their parents to Dedrick's estate and sought to eject Randy from that property. Randy moved for summary judgment on those cross-claims, which was granted by the circuit court. Although the circuit court certified its partial summary judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., that certification was improper, and therefore Richard's appeal of the partial summary judgment (appeal no. SC- 2022-0522) should have been dismissed. In case no. CV-20-900058 ("the fraudulent-transfer action"), Leslie sued Richard seeking to set aside, pursuant to the Alabama Fraudulent Transfer Act ("the AFTA") the allegedly fraudulent transfer of assets that Richard had obtained or inherited from Dedrick's estate to a trust that Richard had created. Leslie moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the circuit court, and Richard appealed (appeal no. SC-2022- 0526). Finding no error in that judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bentley v. Bentley" on Justia Law

Birmingham attorney Daniel Flickinger posted a message on his personal Facebook social-media page in which he appeared to reference the death George Floyd, which occurred while Floyd was being arrested and was recorded. The social-media post, along with an allegedly "counterfeit" social-media "profile," was later shared with Flickinger's supervising attorney at his law firm by Lawrence Tracy King, an attorney with the Birmingham law firm of King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. Shortly thereafter, Flickinger was forced to resign. Flickinger's post was also shared by members of a "private" Facebook group, who then posted a series of offensive comments about him both personally and professionally. Flickinger sued King and the King law firm asserting claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship. The King defendants filed a motion to dismiss Flickinger's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., and the circuit court granted the motion. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it dismissed Flickinger's defamation and invasion-of-privacy claims. However, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it dismissed Flickinger's tortious-interference claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Flickinger v. King" on Justia Law

Unhappy with the result in the underlying litigation, two family members -- Mary Beasley Schaeffer ("Mary") and Ellis Beasley Long ("Ellis"), as the personal representative of the estate of Emma Glass Beasley -- sued their attorney, Jan Garrison Thompson, claiming that he committed malpractice when he represented them. Thompson moved for summary judgment and presented evidence that he did not commit malpractice. In response, Mary and Ellis submitted expert testimony stating that Thompson violated the standard of care owed by attorneys. The trial court ruled for Thompson and entered summary judgment in his favor. Mary and Ellis appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schaeffer et al. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In this case, a purchase agreement provided provided that the parties were obligated to close a real-estate sale unless the buyer -- Lafayette Land Acquisitions II, LLC ("Lafayette Land") -- rejected the deal in writing before the end of the due-diligence period. Although the parties disputed when that period began, and how long it lasted, it was undisputed that Lafayette Land never rejected the deal. Therefore, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the parties were obligated to close. Because the Circuit Court held otherwise, judgment was reversed and remanded. View "Lafayette Land Acquisitions II, LLC v. Walls" on Justia Law

Sheryl Lyne, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Robert L. Kawzinski, filed suit against Debra Ann Kawzinski ("Debra Ann") to quiet title to a piece of real property to which Lyne and Debra Ann both claimed an ownership interest. Lyne further requested that the circuit court require the property to be sold and the proceeds divided among the rightful owners of the property. The circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of Lyne. Debra Ann appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed Debra Ann's appeal as untimely filed. View "Kawzinski v. Lyne" on Justia Law

Michael Upchurch, his brother David Upchurch, and his nephew Jason Upchurch owned several pieces of real property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. They signed a contract to sell the properties to third parties. However, before closing, Michael died. In this declaratory-judgment action, Michael's widow Carol Upchurch, individually and as the executor of Michael's estate, asserted, among other things, a claim to one-third of the proceeds from that sale. David and Jason filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. The Alabama Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, Michael, David, and Jason's decision to enter into a contract to sell the properties severed their joint tenancy and that, as a result, Michael's estate was entitled to one-third of the proceeds from the sale of properties. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and remand the case for the entry of a judgment in favor of the estate. View "Upchurch v. Upchurch" on Justia Law