Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ryan Price-Williams sued Admiral Insurance Company and Gabriel Dean and Charles Baber in Circuit Court pursuant to Alabama's direct-action statute. Both Dean and Baber were alleged by Price-Williams to be covered under a commercial general-liability insurance policy Admiral had issued the national Kappa Sigma fraternity to which Dean and Baber belonged. Price-Williams alleged that Admiral was obligated to pay a judgment that had been entered in favor of Price-Williams and against Dean and Baber in a previous action. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Price-Williams and against Admiral, holding that the Admiral policy provided coverage to Dean and Baber for the negligent and/or wanton acts that formed the basis of the underlying action. Price-Williams sued Admiral after obtaining a judgment against Dean and Baber, who he alleged were insured by Admiral under a policy Admiral had issued to Kappa Sigma, by virtue of their positions as officers of the local chapter of Kappa Sigma. Following another bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Price-Williams, obligating Admiral to fulfill the judgment entered against Dean and Baber in the underlying action. Because the evidence presented at trial supported the trial court's conclusion that Admiral's policy with Kappa Sigma provided liability coverage to Dean and Baber with regard to the negligence and wantonness claims tried in the underlying action, the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. View "Admiral Insurance Company v. Price-Williams " on Justia Law

Carl Weaver appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint filed against him by Roger D. Firestone. In May 1995, Firestone, Charles T. Amberson, Jr., and Darrell Thomas were assaulted, battered, and burned. Amberson and Thomas died from their injuries; Firestone suffered extensive physical injuries and incurred over $1,000,000 in medical expenses. In August 2012, Charles Richard Tooley, L.C. Collins, Jr., and Mickie Wayne Collins pled guilty to attempted murder as to Firestone. On August 20, 2012, Firestone sued Weaver; Tooley; Collins, Jr.; Collins; and fictitiously named parties A-M. Recognizing that his causes of action were filed outside their respective limitations periods, Firestone noted in his complaint that the defendants then-recently led guilty, and it was not until recently that Firestone discovered the identity of the [individuals] who had attacked him "because of the fraudulent concealment of the conspiracy and the identity of the conspirators." After conducting a hearing on Weaver's motion to dismiss, the trial court denied Weaver's motion, concluding that the statutes of limitations had been tolled. The Supreme Court reversed: because Firestone did not satisfy the "reasonable-diligence" standard for equitable tolling and Firestone's causes of action were filed undisputedly after the expirations of the applicable limitations periods, his claims against Weaver were barred by the limitations periods. View "Weaver v. Firestone " on Justia Law

Miller Trucking, LLC, Ben Miller, and Miriam Miller ("the Miller plaintiffs) appeal a summary judgment in favor of APAC Mid-South, Inc. (APAC), Oldcastle Materials, Inc., and Steve Reynolds (defendants). The facts of this appeal were based on contracts between the Alabama Department of Transportation ("ADOT") and APAC and between APAC and Miller Trucking. ADOT hired APAC to provide aggregate materials for distribution to counties, and APAC, in turn, hired Miller Trucking to haul the aggregate materials to the counties purchasing the aggregate materials from the State. At issue in this appeal were adjustments to the compensation of APAC paid Miller Trucking based on the cost of fuel during the time of the contract. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of defendants and remanded the case for further proceedings. A genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a 2008 APAC-Miller Trucking contract and a 2009 hired-truck qualification agreement were modified to include fuel-price-adjustment agreements and, if so, what the terms of those agreements were. View "Miller Trucking, LLC, et al. v. APAC Mid-South, Inc., et al. " on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Southern Division certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "Under Alabama law, may a drug company be held liable for fraud or misrepresentation (by misstatement or omission), based on statements it made in connection with the manufacture or distribution of a brand-name drug, by a plaintiff claiming physical injury from a generic drug manufactured and distributed by a different company?" Plaintiffs Danny and Vicki Weeks filed this action against five current and former drug manufacturers for injuries that Mr. Weeks allegedly suffered as a result of his long-term use of the prescription drug product metoclopramide, the generic form of the brand-name drug "Reglan." The Weekses contended that the Wyeth defendants had a duty to warn Danny's physician about the risks associated with the long-term use of metoclopramide and that the Weekses, as third parties, have a right to enforce the alleged breach of that duty. The Supreme Court concluded: "[i]n the context of inadequate warnings by the brand-name manufacturer placed on a prescription drug manufactured by a generic-drug manufacturer, it is not fundamentally unfair to hold the brand-name manufacturer liable for warnings on a product it did not produce because the manufacturing process is irrelevant to misrepresentation theories based, not on manufacturing defects in the product itself, but on information and warning deficiencies, when those alleged misrepresentations were drafted by the brand-name manufacturer and merely repeated by the generic manufacturer." View "Wyeth, Inc., et al. v. Weeks " on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "Under Alabama law, is a 'Potentially Responsible Party' ('PRP') letter from the Environmental Protection Agency ('EPA'), in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act ('CERCLA') provisions, sufficient to satisfy the 'suit' requirement under a liability policy of insurance?" The plaintiff in the underlying action is Alabama Gas Corporation ("Alagasco"). Defendants St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Company, and St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company are all direct and indirect subsidiaries of defendant Travelers Casualty and Surety Company. Upon review of the applicable statutory and case law authority, the Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Travelers Casualty and Surety Company et al. v. Alabama Gas Corporation " on Justia Law

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Belleview Properties Corporation, IPF/Belleview Limited Partnership ("IPF"), HR/Belleview, L.P., and Infinity Property Management Corporation ("the defendants"). In August 1991, Wallace leased office space in the Belleview Shopping Center to use for his dental practice. Around 1996, the defendants purchased the shopping center and renewed Wallace's lease. The lease was renewed a second time in 2003 for a term of five years. In 2005, Wallace sued the defendants,1 alleging fraud and suppression; negligence; wantonness; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; and negligent training, supervision, and retention. Wallace alleged that, during the term of the lease, he reported various maintenance problems to the defendants. He also alleged that, although the defendants assured him that the problems would be taken care of, but that they were not. Wallace asserted that, as a result of reported water leaks that were left unrepaired, the office was infested with toxic mold. Therefore, he had to close his practice to avoid exposing his employees and his patients to the toxic mold. The defendants successfully filed a motion for a summary judgment as to Wallace's claims against them. In 2010, Wallace filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that Wallace did not timely file his notice of appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wallace v. Belleview Properties Corp." on Justia Law

Anne Bates Gibbons appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town of Vincent ("the Town"), the town's planning commission, and White Rock Quarries, LLC ("White Rock") (collectively, "appellees"). This matter stemmed from a zoning change impacting 86 acres of undeveloped land owned by White Rock that were annexed into the Town. Gibbons's complaint challenged the Town's rezoning of the land based on a rezoning application submitted by White Rock and its annexation of the 86 acres. White Rock sought the rezoning and annexation so that it could construct and operate a rock quarry on the property. Gibbons alleged that the Town did not satisfy the notice requirements of the applicable statutes that give municipal corporations in Alabama the power to enact zoning ordinances and that set out the requirements for enacting such ordinances in adopting a 2009 amendment. In the alternative, assuming that the 2009 amendment was validly adopted, Gibbons sought a declaration that White Rock's proposed use of the land was covered under section 5.5, not section 5.14.5, of the Town's zoning code. The circuit court ultimately granted appellees' motion for summary judgment, and Gibbons appealed. Finding that the Town complied with the applicable statutes in its annexation of the 86 acres, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the appellees. View "Gibbons v. Town of Vincent" on Justia Law

Target Media Partners Operating Company, LLC ("Target Media"), and Specialty Marketing Corporation d/b/a Truck Market News ("Specialty Marketing"), both publishers of magazines directed to long-haul truck drivers and to the truck-driving industry, have been in a commercial-contract dispute since 2007 in which each party alleged breach-of-contract claims against the other. Specialty Marketing also alleged fraudulent-misrepresentation and promissory-fraud claims against Target Media and Ed Leader, Target Media's vice president of trucking, and sought punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Specialty Marketing on its breach-of-contract and promissory-fraud claims against Target Media, in favor of Leader on the promissory-fraud claim against him, in favor of Specialty Marketing on its fraudulent-misrepresentation claim against Target Media and Leader, and in favor of Target Media on its breach-of-contract counterclaim against Specialty Marketing. Target Media and Leader appealed that aspect of the judgment entered on the jury verdict in favor of Specialty Marketing on its claims against Target Media and Leader. Specialty Marketing did not appeal the judgment insofar as it found in favor of Target Media on Target Media's counterclaim. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order denying Target Media's motion for a judgment as a matter of law (JML)and/or a new trial as to Specialty Marketing's breach-of-contract claim. The Court reversed the trial court's order denying Target Media and Leader's motion for a JML as to Specialty Marketing's fraudulent-misrepresentation and promissory-fraud claims. The case was remanded back to the trial court for entry of a JML in favor of Target Media and Leader as to Specialty Marketing's fraudulent-misrepresentation claim and to enter a JML in favor of Target Media as to Specialty Marketing's promissory-fraud claim. Because the Court concluded that the trial court should have granted a JML as to Specialty Marketing's fraudulent-misrepresentation and promissory-fraud claims, the Court pretermitted consideration of the other arguments made by the parties regarding those claims. View "Target Media Partners Operating Company, LLC v. Specialty Marketing Corp." on Justia Law

In case no. 1110439, the Town of Gurley ("the Town") appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of M & N Materials, Inc. ("M & N"), on M & N's inverse-condemnation claim against the Town. In case no. 1110507, M & N cross-appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the Town and Stan Simpson on other claims. Based on the Supreme Court's review of the matter, the Court found that the applicable statute upon which M&N maintained did not support its claim of a regulatory taking. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of M & N on its inverse-condemnation claim and rendered a judgment in favor of the Town. The Court's conclusion pretermitted the other issues raised by the Town in case no. 1110439. In case no. 1110507, the Court found no error in the trial court's judgment and affirmed its decision. View "Town of Gurley v. M & N Materials, Inc. " on Justia Law

MTA, Inc. appealed a circuit court order which held that its claims against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. were subject to an arbitration agreement and compelling MTA to arbitrate those claims. MTA entered into a deferred compensation agreement ("the DCA") with its employee, Yvonne Sanders. Pursuant to the terms of the DCA, MTA was obligated to pay Yvonne $270,000 in 120 equal monthly installments beginning the month following her 50th birthday or, in the event Yvonne died before reaching her 50th birthday, to pay her children, Tiffany Sanders and Roderick Dedrick, a total of $750,000 in 120 equal monthly installments beginning the month after her death. MTA thereafter obtained a $1,000,000 life insurance policy on Yvonne to fund the death benefit provided in the DCA in the event it became payable. On October 22, 1999, Yvonne died at the age of 43. MTA thereafter received the $1,000,000 it was owed under the life-insurance policy. However, MTA did not begin making payments to Tiffany and Roderick as called for by the DCA. Instead, Tiffany and Robert asked MTA to establish a rabbi trust to handle the payments, presumably to allow for more favorable tax treatment for Tiffany and Roderick. MTA executed a trust agreement with Thomas W. Dedrick, Sr., Tiffany and Roderick's uncle and a licensed broker employed by Merrill Lynch, establishing the trust and depositing into it an initial sum of $506,450. The trust agreement also provided that Thomas would act as trustee of the trust. Subsequent to the creation of the trust some intermittent payments were made from the trust to Tiffany and Roderick before payments ceased in late 2009. The sum total of the payments made did not equal $750,000. In 2011, Tiffany and Roderick filed an action against MTA asserting breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims and seeking $213,777, the amount they allege was still due them pursuant to the DCA. Merrill Lynch moved to compel arbitration of MTA's claims against it pursuant to the arbitration provisions in the account-authorization form. MTA opposed that motion, arguing that it was not a party to those contracts, and, following a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted Merrill Lynch's motion to compel arbitration and dismissed MTA's third-party claims against Merrill Lynch. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed that order, holding that MTA was not a signatory to those contracts and that the scope of the arbitration provisions in those contracts was too narrow to encompass disputes between Merrill Lynch and other entities not a party to those contracts. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MTA, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc." on Justia Law