Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants R & G, LLC, George D. Copelan, Sr., Gilman Hackel, and Robert Yarbrough appealed a $1.3 million circuit court judgment entered against them and in favor of RCH IV-WB, LLC ("RCH"). In July 2005, Wolf Bay Partners, L.L.C., executed a promissory note with Wachovia Bank in the original principal amount of $2.5 million. That note was secured by a mortgage on two parcels of property in Baldwin County and guaranteed by each of the appellants, as well as by Defendants GDG Properties, LLC, David W. Mobley, and George D. Gordon. By written agreement of the parties, the amount of the indebtedness was subsequently increased to $2.9 million. Wachovia Bank thereafter assigned its interest in the note and mortgage to RCH Mortgage Fund IV, LLC. Wolf Bay Partners subsequently defaulted on its payment obligations under the terms of the promissory note, and RCH Mortgage Fund IV accordingly commenced foreclosure proceedings on the property secured by the mortgage. In early 2009, RCH, a newly created affiliate of RCH Mortgage Fund IV, purchased the property at a foreclosure sale for $2 million and RCH Mortgage Fund IV thereafter assigned RCH all of its rights under the loan. In June 2009, RCH sued the defendants, seeking to recover $1.1 million allegedly still due on the promissory note, plus interest after the proceeds of the foreclosure sale were applied to the debt. A bench trial was held, at which the defendants challenged the evidence put forth by RCH indicating that the foreclosed-upon mortgage had been properly assigned to RCH Mortgage Fund IV by Wachovia Bank. The defendants also argued that it was improper for RCH Mortgage Fund IV to sell the foreclosed property as a single unit instead of as two separate parcels and that RCH Mortgage Fund IV accepted an allegedly unconscionably low purchase price at the foreclosure sale. The trial court ultimately excluded the evidence put forth by RCH indicating that the mortgage had been assigned to RCH Mortgage Fund IV and set aside the foreclosure and sale because, for all that appeared, the wrong party had conducted the foreclosure and sale. The trial court made no ruling on the defendants' other arguments because it found that RCH Mortgage Fund IV was the wrong party to conduct the foreclosure and sale. RCH appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court, which held that RCH's evidence of mortgage assignment should have been considered by the trial court. On remand, RCH in light of the Supreme Court's reversal, all that was left for the trial court but to enter a final judgment in RCH's favor. RCH's brief was served on all defendants; however none filed a response. The trial court entered judgment in favor of RCH. Defendants Hackel and Yabrough moved the trial court to alter, amend or vacate its judgment in favor of RCH. Unsuccessful, they appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concurred with the trial court's new judgment in favor of RCH, and affirmed. View "R & G, LLC v. RCH IV-WB, LLC " on Justia Law

Derrick Ervin appealed a summary judgment in favor of the City of Birmingham seeking the return of $178,858. The money was taken pursuant to a search of a vehicle impounded by police in connection with suspected drug activity. During the search, officers found a black bag containing thirty-two bundles of cash, and a shoe box in the back seat containing six more bundles in U.S. currency. Officers also found assorted documents bearing Ervin's name inside the passenger compartment. Ervin did not contest those facts in federal district court. In this action, however, Ervin contended that the cash was initially seized by the Birmingham Police Department (BPD), not by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and that the cash was subsequently transferred by "unknown Birmingham police officers ... to the DEA to commence forfeiture or condemnation proceedings" in the federal court. The federal district court entered a final judgment forfeiting the $178,858 to the United States. Ervin did not appeal that judgment and did not seek any postjudgment relief from it in the federal court itself. Pursuant to "equitable sharing" of the seizure, the City received the majority of the cash for its role in the operation, and the DEA kept a small percentage. Ervin alleged that, because such forfeiture proceedings had never been instituted, he was entitled to the return of the subject property. "Even if all these contentions were correct, they amount only to an attack on the authority of the federal district court to exercise jurisdiction over the res in an in rem action, not an attack on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal court over a forfeiture action brought under federal law. As such, they come too late and are being advanced in the wrong court." The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the forfeiture. View "Ervin v. City of Birmingham " on Justia Law

Tommy Wiley appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Bohannon Services, Inc. As a Bohannon employee, Wiley suffered a shoulder injury as a result of a work-related accident. Wiley filed a complaint requesting that the trial court set the issue of his right to receive total-disability benefits for an immediate hearing, order Bohannon to pay a 15% penalty and award any other benefits to which Wiley may be entitled. At a hearing, counsel for both parties informed the trial court that a settlement had been reached, and the terms of the settlement agreement were read into the record. Both parties were to separately file a proposed settlement agreement and obtain approval from the trial court. According to Bohannon, Wiley had failed to file a proposed settlement agreement as required by the trial court and had refused to sign the proposed settlement agreement submitted to the trial court by Bohannon. Wiley filed a response to Bohannon's motion in which he averred that he did not agree with certain provisions of the proposed settlement agreement that was submitted to the trial court by Bohannon, and he requested that the trial court set the matter for a hearing. The trial court entered an order purporting to grant Wiley's postjudgment motion to set aside the settlement agreement, provided that Wiley reimburse Bohannon for any settlement proceeds that Wiley had received and all costs and attorney fees that Bohannon had incurred during the course of this action. Subsequently, Wiley filed a motion requesting relief from the court's prior order and for leave to amend his original complaint. After a hearing, the trial court found that Wiley had failed to comply with the requirements of the set-aside order and therefore denied Wiley's requests for relief and enforced the previously entered settlement agreement. Wiley filed a motion styled as a "motion for new trial or in the alternative motion for relief from judgment or order and motion to alter, vacate or amend pursuant to Rule[s] 59 and 60," but that too was denied. Wiley then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Wiley did not timely file a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wiley v. Bohannon Services, Inc. " on Justia Law

J.D.A. ("the husband") appealed a circuit court judgment that, among other things, divorced him from A.B.A. ("the wife"); divided the marital assets; awarded the wife periodic alimony; required the husband to pay child support for the parties' two minor children and postminority educational support for all three of the parties' children; and awarded the wife an attorney fee. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it ordered the husband to pay the postminority educational expenses of the two minor children; required the husband to pay the expenses associated with the daughters' automobiles; awarded the wife $10,000 per month in periodic alimony; and awarded the wife an attorney fee. Because the division of marital assets is considered in conjunction with an award of periodic alimony, the Court also reversed the trial court's property-division awards so that the circuit court could reconsider the alimony and marital-property awards together. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "J.D.A. v. A.B.A. " on Justia Law

Harold Keith Hunt, the surviving son of Harold Guy Hunt, who died testate in 2009, appealed a November 2011 circuit court order among other things, refused to issue him a deed to the real property devised to him in his father's will until all debts, claims, and costs of administration of the estate had been paid. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as having been taken from a nonfinal judgment. View "Hunt v. Estate of Harold Guy Hunt" on Justia Law

Alamo Title Company ("Alamo"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order that denied Alamo's motion to dismiss an action filed against it by P.B. Surf, Ltd., and to enter an order dismissing the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. This dispute concerned the disbursement of proceeds from the sale of the an apartment complex in Houston, Texas. According to P.B. Surf, at the time the sale was scheduled to close in late 2011, a dispute arose over who was entitled to the net proceeds of the sale and where the net proceeds were to be deposited after the closing. After the closing, Alamo wired a portion of the net proceeds from the sale to a Birmingham Wells Fargo bank account pursuant to instructions from several of the sellers. P.B. Surf sued Alamo and several other defendants, alleging, among other things, conspiracy. Alamo moved the trial court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., to dismiss P.B. Surf's claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. In an amended complaint, P.B. Surf alleged that Alamo was partially responsible for what it alleged was the improper distribution of the proceeds among Defendants Guy Savage and Willem Noltes, and P.B. Surf. When the trial court denied its motion to dismiss, Alamo moved to reconsider which was also denied. Considering the minimum-contacts analysis in the context of specific personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court concluded that the requisite minimum contacts for the trial court's exercise of specific jurisdiction over Alamo did not exist. Furthermore, the Court found that Alamo's contacts with Alabama were not continuous and systematic so as to support the trial court's exercise of general personal jurisdiction over Alamo. Therefore, the petition for a writ of mandamus established clear legal right to dismissal of P.B. Surf's complaint. View "In re: P. B. Surf, Ltd. v. Savage" on Justia Law

First Commercial Bank of Huntsville appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of various defendants on claims alleged by the Bank against those defendants. Because the summary judgment did not resolve all claims against all parties and because no part of the summary judgment was certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment. View "First Commercial Bank of Huntsville v. Nowlin, III." on Justia Law

Cocina Superior, LLC owned a restaurant in Birmingham that sold alcoholic beverages to the public. Cocina appealed two final assessments of the Jefferson County Department of Revenue. The assessments reflected that, for the years 2008-2010, Cocina owed money pursuant to the "Alabama Liquor Tax." The parties filed cross-motions for a summary judgment at the circuit court, agreeing that there were no disputed issues of fact and that the issue to be resolved was a question of law. Cocina argued that the applicable legislation called for the imposition of a tax on the gross receipts derived from the sale of "alcoholic beverages," but, it said, the Department's assessments were erroneously based upon the taxpayer's gross sales of mixed drinks that were composed of both alcoholic beverages and nonalcoholic mixing agents such as colas, sodas, and juices. Cocina asserted that its internal policy and procedure dictated that each mixed drink contain 1.25 ounces of alcohol, and, it maintained, the taxes were due only on the alcohol portion of the mixed drinks, exclusive of any nonalcoholic mixing agent. Cocina also argued that the Department's assessments denied it due process and equal protection of the law because its restaurant was a more upscale establishment with higher overhead expenses than many other facilities that sell alcoholic beverages and was therefore required to charge higher prices and, consequently, pay more taxes for the mixed drinks it sold. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court correctly held that the plain meaning of "alcoholic beverage" was a beverage containing alcohol, and that the Department's assessments did not violate the restaurant's right to due process or equal protection of the law. View "Cocina Superior, LLC v. Jefferson County Dept. of Revenue " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Nandean Sanders appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Defendants E.I. Campbell, Averline Campbell and Jerry Lawrence. The parties owned adjoining properties in Dallas County. Sanders sought declarative and injunctive relief regarding a disputed strip of property that the the parties all claimed to own. Defendants counterclaimed to ask the court to establish a boundary line between Sanders and their property and to enjoin Sanders' "encroachment." Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's judgment was nonfinal, and therefore the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction for further consideration. The appeal was dismissed. View "Sanders v. E. I. Campbell et al. " on Justia Law

Defendants Jim Cody Beddingfield and his parents, Jimmy Larry and Rebecca M. Beddingfield appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff Trace Rex Linam, and appealed the trial court's order denying their postjudgment motion for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") or for a new trial. The Beddingfields attended a 2004 family reunion and Fourth of July celebration at their house on Lake Guntersville. The boys (all cousins), including Cody Beddingfield, ventured off from their parents to a dock on the lake with bottle rockets and M-80s where they began lighting the fireworks and throwing them toward the water. One of the boys was hit in the eye by an errant bottle rocket. He would later lose sight in that eye. The injured boy sued his cousins and their parents for negligence, wantonness, assault, negligent and wanton supervision and negligent and wanton entrustment. In their challenge of the trial court's denial of JML, defendants argued the injured boy failed to present evidence sufficient to support many of his claims, particularly "negligent entrustment." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that no evidence was presented to support the negligent entrustment claim, and reversed the trial court with respect to only that claim. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Beddingfield v. Linam " on Justia Law