Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Carol Rogers, the administratrix of the estate of Susan Bonner, deceased, filed a wrongful-death action against (1) the Cedar Bluff Volunteer Fire Department; (2) the Cherokee County Association of Volunteer Fire Departments, Inc.; and (3) Howard Guice, a former volunteer firefighter and emergency medical technician with the CBVFD. The incident from which this case arose happened in June 2017 when Bonner's car left the roadway and ended up submerged in a creek. Bonner ultimately died of anoxic encephalopathy, and the primary allegations in the suit was that the emergency response was negligently rendered. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Cedar Bluff and the Association. Although the trial court certified its judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that certification was improper, and this appeal was therefore dismissed. View "Rogers v. Cedar Bluff Volunteer Fire Department, et al." on Justia Law

In 2019, the Alabama Legislature passed -- and Governor Kay Ivey signed -- House Bill 380 ("H.B. 380"), which became Act No. 2019-393, Ala. Acts 2019. As enacted, H.B. 380 amended various Code provisions, including § 15-22-21(a), Ala. Code 1975, creating the position of director of the Alabama Bureau of Pardons and Paroles ("the Bureau"), and § 15-22-20(b), Ala. Code 1975, addressing the nomination and appointment processes for the members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the Board"). After H.B. 380 was enacted, Governor Ivey appointed Leigh Gwathney as chair of the Board pursuant to the new procedures set forth in § 15-22-20(b). In November 2020, the three-member Board convened and held a parole-consideration hearing for Angela Turner, an inmate who was serving a life sentence for murder. Following a review of Turner's file, the Board unanimously denied Turner's parole request. Around that same time, Governor Ivey appointed Cam Ward as the new director of the Bureau. In response to the Board's denial of parole, Turner filed suit against Governor Ivey, Ward, Gwathney, and the other members of the Parole Board, in which she sought a judgment declaring that Governor Ivey's appointment of Ward and Gwathney to their respective positions pursuant to the changes created by H.B. 380 violated the Alabama Constitution of 1901. She also, on behalf of the State of Alabama, petitioned for writs of quo warranto pursuant to § 6-6-591, Ala. Code 1975, alleging that Ward and Gwathney unlawfully held their respective positions. Finally, she alleged a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against all the defendants on the basis that she had been denied due process during her parole-consideration hearing. The circuit court dismissed Turner's claims with prejudice. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court's order, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Turner and the State of Alabama ex rel. Angela Turner v. Ivey, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a medical-malpractice wrongful-death action filed by Patricia West ("Mrs. West"), the personal representative of the estate of her husband, John West, Jr. ("Mr. West"), against Springhill Hospitals, Inc., d/b/a Springhill Memorial Hospital ("SMH"). In 2014, then 59-year-old Mr. West accidentally sliced most of the tip of his left thumb off when he was using a table saw in his shop. He went to the emergency room, at which he had surgery to suture the wound from the saw cut. Mr. West was given two pain medications for postsurgical care: Dilaudid, the brand name for hydromorphone, and Percocet, the brand name for the opioid oxycodone. Mr. West was admitted to the hospital following surgery for observation. He was given the prescribed pain medications while in the hospital. The hospital admitted prescribed doses of Dilaudid were administered to Mr. West, but Percoset was not. Mr. West was found unresponsive after the doses of Dilaudid, and no drugs to counteract opioid overdoses were given. Mrs. West's lawsuit alleged negligence against the hospital for failing to assess monitor her husband while in the hospital. A jury returned a verdict against SMH and awarded $35 million in punitive damages. The trial court thereafter entered judgment on the jury's verdict finding SMH liable. After a hearing concerning a remittitur of the punitive-damages award, the trial court reduced the amount of the award to $10 million. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed both the judgment entered on the jury's verdict finding SMH liable and the trial court's order reducing the punitive-damages award. View "Springhill Hospitals, Inc. v. West" on Justia Law

Dorothy Richey appealed a trial court judgment that set aside a deed conveying an interest in certain property to her on grounds that the grantor, Rodney Morris ("Rodney"), was incompetent at the time he purportedly executed the deed. Paul Morris, as guardian and conservator of the estate of his brother Rodney, an incapacitated person, initiated this action against Richey, seeking to set aside a deed in which Rodney had purported to convey his interest in the property to Richey. Morris alleged that Rodney had lacked the mental capacity to execute the deed in question and sought a judgment declaring the deed void and setting it aside. Morris also sought an accounting of any proceeds Richey had obtained from harvesting timber located on the property. The Alabama Supreme Court determined Richey's appeal was not from a final judgment, and therefore dismissed it. View "Richey v. Morris" on Justia Law

Daniel Barefoot, as a personal representative and legatee of the estate of Danny Bryant Barefoot, appealed a probate court order that determined the estate of Donna Viola Barefoot was entitled to a share of Danny's estate on the basis that Donna was an omitted spouse under § 43-8-90, Ala. Code 1975. Danny executed a will in August 2012, while married to Merita Hall Barefoot. In the will, other than a specific bequest to his and Merita's son, Daniel, Danny devised his residuary estate to Merita. Danny specified that, if Merita predeceased him, his estate would be shared jointly in equal shares by Daniel and Marcie Jenkins, whom he identified in the will as his stepdaughter. Danny also named Daniel and Marcie as corepresentatives of his estate. Merita died on September 6, 2014. On January 21, 2018, Danny married Donna. Danny and Donna did not execute a prenuptial agreement, and Danny did not execute a new will or a codicil to his previous will to include any testamentary dispositions to Donna. Danny died on September 5, 2021. Twelve days later, on September 17, 2021, Donna died. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the appeal was from a nonfinal order and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Barefoot v. Cole" on Justia Law

This appeal related to "electronic-bingo" operations conducted by the Department of Alabama Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States ("the VFW") at some of its Alabama posts. Travis Whaley and Randall Lovvorn contracted with the VFW to superintend and promote its electronic-bingo operations. Between 1997 and 2013, Whaley served the VFW as adjutant, commander, and quartermaster at different times. For his part, Lovvorn served as the VFW's accountant. The VFW contracted with G2 Operations, Inc. ("G2"), to conduct its electronic-bingo operations. Under contract, G2 agreed to conduct electronic-bingo operations at VFW posts throughout Alabama, and the VFW would receive 10% of the gross revenue. All the proceeds from electronic bingo were deposited into a VFW bank account. The VFW also entered into contracts with Whaley and Lovvorn, assigning them specific roles in its electronic-bingo operations. Several years later, after being notified of a tax penalty from the IRS, the VFW discovered a shortfall of $1,782,368.88 from what it should have received under its contracts with G2. The VFW filed a complaint asserting claims against G2 as well as additional claims against other parties, which were eventually whittled down throughout litigation until only claims against Whaley and Lovvorn remained. A jury reached a verdict against Whaley and Lovvorn on VFW's claims of breach of contract, fraudulent suppression, and conversion, awarding $1,782,368.88 in compensatory damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages. Because the VFW's claims rely upon its own involvement in illegal transactions, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Whaley and Lovvorn. View "Whaley, et al. v. Dept. of Alabama Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States" on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals concerned the division of certain assets in the estate of R.E. Ivey ("R.E."). At the time of his death, R.E. was survived by his wife, Edwyna Ivey ("Edwyna"), and his four children from a previous marriage -- Sharyl Eddins ("Sharyl"), William Ivey ("Robbie"), Dell Ivey Moody ("Dell"), and Ty Ivey ("Ty"). In appeal no. SC-2022-0533, Mary Jo Fletcher, as the personal representative of Edwyna's estate, appealed the circuit court's determination that Edwyna's claims for certain statutory allowances were totally offset by the value of certain assets that Edwyna had retained from R.E.'s estate. She also appealed the circuit court's determination that three of Edwyna's stepchildren, Sharyl, Robbie, and Dell, were entitled to recover on their claims of conversion and breach of trust against Edwyna. In appeal no. SC-2022-0640, Sharyl, individually and as the executrix of R.E.'s estate, Dell, and Robbie filed a cross-appeal challenging the circuit court's determination that Edwyna was entitled to funds contained in an account known by the parties as the "farm account." In appeal no. SC-2022-0533, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order insofar as it denied Edwyna's claims for homestead, exempt-property, and family allowances pursuant to §§ 43-8-110 through -113 on the basis that those claims were completely offset by the value of the pickup truck. However, the Court reversed the circuit court's order insofar as it determined that Sharyl, Robbie, and Dell were entitled to recover the funds held in the POD accounts, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. In appeal no. SC-2022-0640, the Court affirmed the circuit court's determination that Edwyna, as R.E.'s surviving spouse, was entitled to the funds that Dell withdrew from the farm account. View "Fletcher v. Eddins, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners Insurance Express, LLC ("Insurance Express"), Wayne Taylor, and Julie Singley sought a writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to vacate an order staying the underlying action against defendants Lynne Ernest Insurance, LLC ("LEI"), Lynne Ernest, Chynna Ernest, and Deadra Stokley. According to the complaint, Lynne and Stokley were longtime employees of Insurance Express. It alleged that they, while still employed by Insurance Express, entered Insurance Express's office after business hours and, without authorization, made electronic copies of various business records related to Insurance Express's clients and insurance policies. Lynne and Stokley resigned soon after and began employment with LEI, which purportedly had been formed by Lynne and Chynna and was a direct competitor of Insurance Express. Lynne and Stokley, it is alleged, then induced some Insurance Express clients to transfer their policies to LEI. Insurance Express sought injunctive relief to, among other things, prevent defendants from communicating with past or current customers of Insurance Express and to require defendants to return any customer information taken by them. It further sought damages for breach of contract, conversion, intentional interference with business relations, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found petitioners established they had a clear legal right to the relief they sought. The Court granted their petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order granting a stay. View "Ex parte Insurance Express, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Baldwin County Bridge Company, LLC ("BCBC"), filed suit against John Cooper in his official capacity as Director of the Alabama Department of Transportation ("ALDOT"), seeking to halt construction of a bridge that ALDOT had hired Scott Bridge Company, Inc. ("Scott Bridge"), to build over the Intracoastal Waterway in Baldwin County. That lawsuit spawned three matters before the Alabama Supreme Court. In the first, Cooper sought mandamus relief because the trial court entered an order compelling him to respond to certain discovery requests made by BCBC; he argued the information sought was protected from disclosure by the executive-privilege doctrine. On Cooper's motion, the Supreme Court stayed enforcement of the trial court's discovery order to allow the Court to consider Cooper's privilege argument. Meanwhile, the trial-court proceedings continued and, before the Supreme Court was able to rule on Cooper's mandamus petition, the trial court granted BCBC's motion for a preliminary injunction to halt construction of the bridge. Cooper appealed that injunction, arguing that it was unwarranted and that the $100,000 preliminary-injunction bond put up by BCBC was insufficient. Scott Bridge filed its own appeal challenging the preliminary injunction, while also arguing that the trial court erred by dismissing it from the case and by stating that it was not entitled to the protection of an injunction bond. After reviewing the briefs submitted by the parties in all three of these matters, the Supreme Court concluded BCBC's claim on which the preliminary injunction was based was barred by State immunity. Accordingly, the trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim and the preliminary injunction had to be reversed. Although the Court ruled in favor of Cooper on this point, it nevertheless rejected his companion argument that the trial court should have been directed to increase the $100,000 preliminary-injunction bond on remand. The Court also rejected Scott Bridge's argument that that it was entitled to recover on the preliminary-injunction bond. Finally, because the discovery that Cooper sought to withhold based on executive privilege was being sought in conjunction with the claim that is barred by State immunity, the trial court's order compelling Cooper to produce that information was moot, as was Cooper's petition challenging that order. View "Ex parte Alabama Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Cody Durham filed suit against Jacob Cooper, alleging breach of a purchase agreement between them involving the sale of Cooper's residence. In August 2020, Durham saw a listing on the Facebook Marketplace social-media website advertising for sale Cooper's house and the two acres of real property on which the house was situated. Over text messages between Durham and Cooper, they agreed to a purchase price and closing date, with Cooper paying the closing costs. Durham testified that he did not engage any realtor or lawyer to help him with drafting the purchase agreement. Instead, he just Google-searched for "residential purchase agreement" and used the first fillable form generated by that search. One of the conditions of Durham's FHA loan was that the loan would not be approved unless the subject property's appraised value was confirmed by a certified appraiser. A certified appraiser appraised the property's value, but that value was subject to the condition that a storage shed in Cooper's backyard needed to be fixed or torn down. Cooper told Durham he "don't have the money" to fix or tear down the storage shed, so it would be up to Durham to take care of it. Cooper then sent Durham a text stating he was backing out of the deal because the closing date had passed, and the issue of the shed had not been resolved. Durham sought specific performance of the purchase agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded Durham $79,000 in damages. Cooper appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court misapplied the law to the facts by measuring Durham's damages based on the difference between the contract price and the subject property's assessed market value in a new appraisal because the proper legal standard for measuring damages for the breach of a contract involving the sale of real property was the difference between the contract price and the subject property's market value at the time of the breach. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a recalculation of damages. View "Cooper v. Durham" on Justia Law