Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Alabama Educational Television Commission and Ferris W. Stephens, Rodney D. Herring, Les Barnett, J. Holland, Dannetta K. Thornton Owens, Bebe Williams, and Gregory O. Griffin, Sr. (collectively, "the Commissioners"), petitioned the Supreme Court for the writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss claims brought against them by Allan Pizzato and Pauline Howland and to strike Pizzato and Howland's second amended complaint. In 2012, Pizzato requested certain materials from the Commission pursuant to the Open Records Act. Pizzato sued the Commission and the Commissioners alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Pizzato also requested a judgment declaring that Stephens improperly held the office of assistant attorney general while he was serving as a commissioner. The Commissioners moved the circuit court to dismiss Pizzato's claims against them, arguing that Pizzato did not have standing to bring an Open Meetings Act claim, that the Open Meetings Act did not provide for the recovery of compensatory or punitive damages, and that the complaint failed to state a claim. Furthermore, the Commissioners argued that Pizzato's Open Records Act claim was moot because the requested documents had been produced. Because Pizzato and Howland did not establish standing to bring their action against the Commission and the Commissioners under the Open Meetings Act, the claims asserted in both the first amended and second amended complaints should have been dismissed. The Court therefore granted mandamus relief and issued the writ. View "Pizzato v. Alabama Educational Television Commission" on Justia Law

F.V.O., respondent in a dependency action, appealed a trial court's orders after a dispositional review hearing in a dependency case. A majority of the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the orders; the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Both arguments presented by the motherÐ-regarding the finding by the trial court as to the efforts made by DHR to reunite the mother and the children and the announcement of a new permanency plan--failed to adjudicate any rights of the mother from which an appeal would lie. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for that court to dismiss the mother's appeal and to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "F.V.O. v. Coffee County Department of Human Resources" on Justia Law

Foundation Bank petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the circuit court to vacate its order staying the Bank's attempted redemption in the probate court of certain property. The property at issue consisted of two parcels of contiguous property located in Autauga County, which included equipment for outdoor entertainment opportunities for the community. Emerald Falls, LLC, and its only member, Alice L. Smith owned the property originally. In 2010, Rob Riddle purchased the property at a tax sale as a result of Emerald Falls' failure to pay the ad valorem taxes on the property. Riddle assigned his interest in the property to CMC Properties, LLC. Riddle then sent notice to Working Capital No. 1, LLC, the mortgagee of the property, advising Working Capital that he had purchased the property. Riddle then filed a complaint against Emerald Falls alleging that Emerald Falls had abandoned the property and that Riddle was entitled to immediate possession. The circuit court entered a consent order, in which Emerald Falls and Riddle acknowledged that Riddle had purchased the property subject to the redemption rights of Emerald Falls, that Riddle had made improvements to the property, and that Riddle was entitled to be reimbursed for those improvements. Riddle sent written notification to the Bank, after discovering that Working Capital had assigned its mortgage on the property to the Bank as additional security for a line of credit held by the Bank. The Bank sent CMC written notice of its intent to redeem the property. CMC moved to stay the redemption, arguing that a resolution had not been reached between the parties with regard to the amount necessary to redeem the property. When the Bank attempted to redeem the property by depositing with the probate court the amount it believe to be owing, but the probate court denied the redemption. Finding that the Bank was within its right to redeem the property, the Supreme Court granted the Bank's petition and issued the writ. View "CMC Properties, LLC v. Emerald Falls, LLC" on Justia Law

George Mason petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment for him on the basis of State-agent immunity in an action filed against him by Kola Oyedepo, individually and as grandfather and next friend of Joshua Dosunmu. George Mason was a bus driver employed by the Macon County Board of Education. Joshua Dosunmu, a fifth-grade student in the Macon County school system, was a passenger on the school bus Mason was driving. After the bus had continued on its route, Dosunmu attempted to cross the highway. He was struck and injured by an automobile, driven by Janie Pearson Sellers. Oyedepo sued Mason and others alleging negligence and wantonness arising from Mason's alleged failure to properly supervise Dosunmu and/or his alleged failure to ensure that Dosunmu got off the bus at the appropriate school-bus stop. Mason moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to State-agent immunity because as a bus driver employed by the Macon County Board of Education at the time of the accident, he was exercising judgment in transporting and supervising students on the day of the incident. The Supreme Court concluded that Mason demonstrated that he was entitled to State-agent immunity as to the claims asserted against him in his individual capacity in Oyedepo's action. Therefore the Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Oyedepo v. Sellers" on Justia Law

Defendants Del Marsh, Gerald Dial, Jay Love, and Chad Fincher were members of the Alabama Legislature during its 2013 Regular Session. Defendants sought a writ of mandamus to order the Circuit Court to set aside its order denying their motion to dismiss an action against them filed by Lynn Pettway and to enter an order granting the motion. Pettway sued the defendants seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Pettway alleged that HB 84 was passed in violation of Rule 21 and Alabama's Open Meetings Act. In a second complaint, Pettway alleged that because defendants constituted a majority of the conference committee, the private meeting at which HB 84 was revised was a de facto meeting of the conference committee. Therefore, alleged Pettway, that meeting was an "unannounced executive session" and violated both the Open Meetings Act and Rule 21. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and to quash service. The circuit court denied the defendants' motion but issued a stay of the proceedings and certified the matter for the Supreme Court's review. Defendants responded with a petition for permissive appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. Civ. P., or in the alternative, a writ of mandamus. After careful review, the Supreme Court concluded defendants were entitled to a writ of mandamus to order the circuit court to grant their motion to dismiss Pettway's second complaint on related grounds that legislators are immune from suit regarding acts undertaken within the scope of legitimate legislative activity and because the substance of Pettway's new complaint involved nonjusticiable claims. View "Pettway v. Marsh et al." on Justia Law

Two petitions for a writ of mandamus came before the Supreme Court. Both sought review of orders that found plaintiffs lacked of standing and, in turn, found the trial courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In case no. 1111567, U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank"), sought a writ to require the Walker Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Walker County. In case no. 1111370, MERSCORP, Inc. ("MERSCORP"), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") sought a writ to require the Barbour Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Barbour Probate Judge Nancy Robertson. Upon careful consideration of the underlying trial court cases, the Supreme Court concluded that these cases did not fall within the subject-matter-jurisdiction exception to the general rule that the Supreme Court would not engage in mandamus review of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss. The Court therefore denied the request for mandamus relief in both of the cases. View "Robertson v. MERSCORP, Inc." on Justia Law

Hubert Norris appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the Fayette County Commission and the dismissal of his petition for a writ of mandamus. Because the trial court correctly held that, as a matter of law, Norris did not meet the statutory requirements to be appointed a supernumerary sheriff, Norris was not entitled to the mandamus relief he requested. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded trial court did not err in entering a summary judgment in favor of the Commission and in dismissing Norris's petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Norris v. Fayette County Commission " on Justia Law

Jamie Gaddy appealed a circuit court judgment that dismissed with prejudice Gaddy's medical-malpractice action against certified nurse anesthetist Lisa Brascho. According to Gaddy, the reason she requested the dismissal of her trial court case against Brascho was to seek appellate review of the trial court's decision granting Brascho's motion in limine. However, the Supreme Court has previously stated that "where the plaintiff knowingly and willingly agrees to a stipulation of dismissal, he has no standing to appeal." Therefore, based on Gaddy's failure to demonstrate to the Supreme Court that it had jurisdiction over Gaddy's appeal, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Gaddy v. Brascho " on Justia Law

John Lanier appealed the denial of his motion to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment, and for relief from the judgment. Lanier's motion was filed after plaintiff McMath Construction, Inc. filed a "Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment" pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("the UEFJA"). After careful consideration, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that under Louisiana law (the foreign jurisdiction), McMath did not properly serve Lanier. Therefore, a preliminary default judgment and the Louisiana judgment were void. Because the Louisiana judgment was void, the trial court erred when it denied Lanier's motion for relief from judgment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Lanier v. McMath Construction, Inc. " on Justia Law

Owners Insurance Company appealed a circuit court judgment declaring Owners was obligated to pay an arbitration award entered against Jim Carr Homebuilder, LLC ("JCH"), under the terms of a commercial general-liability insurance policy Owners had issued. Owners initiated a declaratory-judgment action against JCH seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to indemnify JCH for any judgment entered against JCH arising from a dispute that a house JCH constructed was poorly built. After the homeowners prevailed in their action against JCH, the trial court in the declaratory-judgment action entered a summary judgment holding that Owners was required to pay pursuant to the terms of the Owners policy. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because JCH's faulty workmanship was not an "occurrence," the trial court's judgment was in error, and it was hereby reversed. View "Owners Insurance Company v. Jim Carr Homebuilder, LLC et al. " on Justia Law