Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Carolyn Christopher petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the a Court of Appeals judgment that affirmed an order requiring her to pay postminority educational support on behalf of her child, C.C. In "Ex parte Bayliss," (550 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1989)), the Court interpreted 30-3-1, Ala. Code 1975, as authorizing a trial court to require a noncustodial parent to pay college expenses for children past the age of majority. The Court granted Carolyn's petition to consider whether Bayliss was correctly decided, and reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court concluded the Bayliss Court failed to recognize the ordinary and common-law definitions of "child" as a minor, did not defer to the legislature's designation of the age of majority, and failed to observe the canon of construction that courts cannot supply what a statute omits. Accordingly, the Court expressly overruled Bayliss. Because the child-custody statute did not authorize a court in a divorce action to require a noncustodial parent to pay educational support for children over the age of 19, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals n this case and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Christopher v. Christopher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it affirmed Derek Baker's conviction for trafficking in marijuana. Baker was entitled to production of the seized substance in his case for the purpose of having it independently tested. The denial of the motion for production resulted in prejudice to Baker and violated his right to due process. Additionally, because the record did not indicate that Baker ever requested funds for an expert to conduct the independent testing, he was not required to demonstrate that there was a particularized need for such testing. Accordingly, the trial court exceeded its discretion when it denied Baker's motions seeking independent testing and evaluation of the substance purported to be marijuana. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Baker v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Sandra Chavers sued the City of Mobile seeking damages based on claims of negligent maintenance, continuing trespass, continuing nuisance, and inverse condemnation, all related to that part of the City's storm water-drainage system that abutted her property. After the Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the City, Chavers appealed. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Chavers repeatedly notified the City of damage to her property, and an inspector came to her home after she complained. After that visit, the inspector recommended that repairs be made to certain aspects of the City's drainage system, including an open concrete-lined ditch. The record indicated that those repairs were not made until well after Chavers had filed a notice of claim and had sued the City. The Court concluded the evidence in the Circuit Court record was sufficient to withstand a motion for a summary judgment based on the City's allegation that there was no evidence to support a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment as to the inverse-condemnation claim and as to the negligent-maintenance, nuisance, and trespass claims insofar as Chavers requested damages based on the cracking and uneven settling of her house. The Court reversed the summary judgment as to the negligent- maintenance, nuisance, and trespass claims insofar as Chavers requested damages for sinkholes allegedly caused by the City's negligent maintenance of the open concrete-lined ditch. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Chavers v. City of Mobile " on Justia Law

Tammie Boyles, as mother and next friend of Colton Elijah Powell Boyles ("Eli"), filed a lawsuit on behalf of her son for injuries he allegedly sustained from an arterial stick while he was hospitalized at University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital. Eli's treating physician ordered a blood culture, which was taken by registered nurse Denise Dougherty from Eli's right arm. Later that day, Eli's mother, who is also a nurse, noticed that Eli's fingertips on his right hand were blue or "dusky." Dougherty applied a warm compress to Eli's right hand. The discoloration in Eli's fingertips moved upward from his right hand toward his shoulder. Later Eli was transferred to Children's Hospital of Alabama for treatment of a bowel perforation. While at Children's Hospital, the fingertips of Eli's right hand auto-amputated or fell off. Boyles then filed suit against the nurse. Dougherty filed an answer denying that she was guilty of negligence and denying that there was a causal relationship between her and the injury alleged in the complaint. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Dougherty. The trial court concluded that a summary judgment in favor of Dougherty was proper because "[Boyles] lacked an expert capable of testifying as to causation [and] there has been no evidence presented to the [trial court] that [Eli]'s injuries were probably a result of a breach of the standard of care by Dougherty." Boyles appealed. Upon careful review, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence in this case was sufficient to warrant the child's injuries occurred as alleged. Therefore, the Court reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of Dougherty, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Boyles v. Dougherty" on Justia Law

John and Judith Valloze and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company; State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company; Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation; Freightliner, Allison Transmission, Inc. ("Allison Transmission"); and Cummins Atlantic, LLC, separately petitioned the Supreme Court for writs of mandamus to direct the Franklin Circuit Court to dismiss the declaratory-judgment actions filed against them by Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc. Tiffin manufactured and sold custom-made motor homes. In its complaint in the Valloze action, Tiffin alleged that the Vallozes, who reside in Florida, purchased a Tiffin "Allegro Red" motor home that was manufactured by Tiffin in Red Bay, Florida. In 2011, the Vallozes' motor home caught fire somewhere in South Carolina and was declared a total loss. Nationwide insured the motor home, and it paid the Vallozes for their loss. Tiffin subsequently filed a complaint against the Vallozes, Nationwide, Freightliner, Allison Transmission, and Cummins in Alabama, describing Allison Transmission and Cummins as manufacturers of component parts for Tiffin that Tiffin alleged were the source of the fire. The Vallozes, Nationwide, Allison Transmission, Freightliner and Cummins filed motions to dismiss which were ultimately denied. The trial court did not provide reasons for its rulings. All parties appealed. In the Katnich action, Tiffin alleged that Karen Katnich purchased a Tiffin "Phaeton" motor home in Virginia, and somewhere in North Carolina, the motor home caught fire and suffered a total loss. Tiffin sued State Farm, Custom Automated Services, Inc., Waterway, Inc., Maxzone Auto Parts Corporation and Freightliner, alleging each manufactured parts for Tiffin that were the source of the fire. In both cases, Tiffin asserted that a real, present justiciable controversy existed between the parties as to the cause and origins of the motor home fires. Again the trial court denied motions to dismiss, and provided no reasons for its ruling. After its review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded with the conclusion of the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions that declaratory-judgment actions were not intended to be a vehicle for potential tort defendants to obtain a declaration of nonliability. Because a bona fide justiciable controversy did not exist either action, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the petitioners' motions to dismiss Tiffin's complaints. View "Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc. v. Valloze " on Justia Law

Terminix International Company, L.P., and Terminix International, Inc. appealed a trial court's order denying Terminix's motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award entered in favor of Walter Scott III and his wife, Paige. Terminix also appealed the trial court's order referring the Scotts' motion for sanctions to arbitration. In 2001, the Scotts entered into a termite-control-services contract with Terminix for a service known as the Termite Baiting System Protection Plan. Pursuant to the baiting plan, Terminix agreed, among other things, to install the baiting system, to monitor it, and to add or remove termite bait from the system as needed. In 2004 or 2005, Terminix lost the licensing rights to service or sell the termite-baiting-system plan. As a result, Terminix was no longer allowed to monitor or service the baiting system it had installed at the Scotts' house. The Scotts were not informed of this development until 2007, when they received a letter from Terminix which encouraged the Scotts to "update" their baiting system with another Terminix service or to convert their baiting system to the Terminix Liquid Defend System. The Scotts then entered into a new termite-service contract with Terminix for the new system. No live termite infestation was found in the Scotts' house since Terminix began servicing the house in 2001. However, in February 2010, a Terminix employee discovered extensive termite damage throughout the Scotts' house. Terminix agreed to repair the damage. Terminix stated it expended approximately $52,645 in repairs when a dispute arose with the Scotts over the scope of repairs to be made in a bathroom. Later that year, the Scotts petitioned the trial court, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("the FAA"), to arbitrate certain fraud claims arising from their dispute with Terminix. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed with Terminix to the extent that it argued the trial court erred in denying its postjudgment motion to vacate the ultimate arbitration award without first conducting a hearing on the motion as to the issue of arbitrator bias, and that was not harmless error. However, the Court found that the trial court did not err in denying the postjudgment motion to vacate the arbitration award without first conducting a hearing on the motion as to the issue whether the arbitrator had exceeded his authority under the termite-service contract. Furthermore, the trial court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate in any respect the Scotts' ALAA claim because that claim did not survive the trial court's failure to reserve jurisdiction to hear the claim. View "Terminix International Company, L.P. v. Scott " on Justia Law

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company appealed an adverse judgment entered on a jury verdict in in favor of homeowner and policyholder Shawn Brechbill on his claim of "abnormal" bad-faith failure to investigate an insurance claim. "A bad-faith-refusal-to-investigate claim cannot survive where the trial court has expressly found as a matter of law that the insurer had a reasonably legitimate or arguable reason for refusing to pay the claim at the time the claim was denied. Because State Farm repeatedly reviewed and reevaluated its own investigative facts as well as those provided by Brechbill, it is not liable for a tortious failure to investigate." The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Brechbill " on Justia Law

The State petitioned the Supreme Court for review of a Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to reverse Curtis Maurice Sanders's conviction for third-degree burglary. Sanders entered a guilty plea. As a matter of first impression, the issue in this case before the Court was whether an unoccupied house that was scheduled for demolition constituted a "building" as defined in 13A-7-1(2), Ala. Code 1975, for purposes of 13A-7-7(a), Ala. Code 1975. "If the legislature had intended to exclude an abandoned building awaiting demolition from the purview of the statute, it could have included express language to that effect in the statute. However, it did not do so, and this Court will not read such language into the statute." Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sanders v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc. sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order compelling discovery of a post-accident investigation report related to an accident that occurred at the Birmingham facility of Schnitzer Southeast, LLC (a subsidiary). In 2008, Jason Jackson had part of his leg amputated as a result of a workplace accident that occurred at Schnitzer Southeast's metal-recycling facility in Birmingham. After the accident, Schnitzer Steel instigated a post-accident investigation. Josephine Cetta, who was a safety director at Schnitzer Steel at the time of Jackson's accident, conducted the investigation. Cetta testified in her deposition that in-house counsel at Schnitzer Steel reviewed and edited the report. She also testified that in-house counsel marked the report as privileged. Sometime after the accident but before Cetta's report was created, Jackson filed a worker's compensation claim with Schnitzer Southeast. In September 2010, Jackson and his wife, Latonya Jackson, filed a separate action against Schnitzer Steel and certain of its employees, seeking additional recovery for the injuries Jackson suffered. The trial court ordered Schnitzer Steel to produce, among other things, "reports of safety inspections." Here, the evidence before the Supreme Court indicated that, although anticipation of litigation may not have been the sole factor for preparing the report, it was "a significant factor" in the company's decision to have the report prepared. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion by ordering Schnitzer Steel to produce the report, which was prepared in reasonable anticipation of litigation. Therefore, the Court granted Schnitzer Steel's petition and issued the writ. View "Jackson v. Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Deidre W. Lee and Samuel G. McKerall appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Town of Magnolia Springs Mayor Charles Houser and Town Councilman Robert C. Holk. The Town of Magnolia Springs and the Magnolia Springs Planning Commission (the remaining defendants in the underlying action), appealed a judgment entered on a jury award to Lee and McKerall. In 2005, Lee purchased 47 acres of property in Baldwin County. In 2006, she submitted an application for preliminary subdivision-plat approval detailing a 124-lot residential subdivision to the Baldwin County Planning Commission. The Town of Magnolia Springs incorporated in June 2006, six months before Lee submitted her plat application to the Baldwin County Planning Commission. The first mayor and council for the Town of Magnolia Springs were sworn in 13 days before Lee submitted her application to the Baldwin County Planning Commission. When Lee submitted her application, the Town of Magnolia Springs had no jurisdiction over Lee's property, and only the Baldwin County Planning Commission had the authority to consider Lee's application because her property was outside the town limits. The Baldwin County Planning Commission tabled Lee's application. The Town of Magnolia Springs' mayor informed the Baldwin County Planning Commission that the jurisdiction of Magnolia Springs would extend to include Lee's property and that Magnolia Springs intended to pass a moratorium on subdivision approvals because "a couple of [the town's] council members ... have been involved in ... trying to get [Lee's plat application] delayed." He also acknowledged that Magnolia Springs had "no rules and regulations" regarding applications for preliminary subdivision-plat approvals. Lee sued when the plan was ultimately denied. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of Lee against the Town of Magnolia Springs and its planning commission, as well as the summary judgment in favor of Houser and Holk, and pretermitted any remaining issues. The Court held that McKerall's claims against the Town of Magnolia Springs and its planning commission were barred by his failure to timely file a notice of claim, and reversed the judgment in his favor. View "Lee v. Houser" on Justia Law