Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Dr. Ann M. Mottershaw and The Radiology Group, LLC, appealed a trial court's order granting a motion for a new trial filed by plaintiff Shannon Ledbetter, as administrator of the estate of Venoria Womack. These appeals primarily concerned whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in ordering a new trial based on the jury's exposure to certain evidence that the trial court had excluded by an order granting a motion in limine. After careful consideration of defendants' arguments and the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Mottershaw v. Ledbetter" on Justia Law

Ligon Capital, LLC, and its subsidiary HTI Hydraulic Technologies, LLC, sued CNH America, LLC, asserting breach-of-contract, fraudulent-misrepresentation, and fraudulent suppression claims stemming from CNH's decision to stop using HTI as a supplier of hydraulic cylinders. Following a two week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ligon and HTI on their fraudulent-suppression claims, awarding them $3.8 million in compensatory damages and $7.6 million in punitive damages. The trial court entered a judgment on that verdict, and CNH appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "CNH America, LLC v. Ligon Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

Two police officers and the City of Birmingham petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its judgment denying the petitioners' motion for a summary judgment and to enter a judgment in their favor based on State-agent immunity. Officers with the Birmingham Police Department (BPD) responded to a vehicle fire, as did James Higginbotham, a firefighter employed by the Birmingham Fire and Rescue Service (BFRS). The officers sustained injuries as a result of an accident between the first responders. The injured officers sued Higginbotham, the City, and several fictitiously named defendants, asserting claims of negligence and wantonness against Higginbotham and vicarious liability against the City. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the petitioners demonstrated a clear legal right to a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity. Therefore, the Court granted the petition and issue the writ directing the circuit court to enter a summary judgment for one of the officers and for the City as to its liability based on the claims against that officer. View "In re: Whatley v. Higginbotham" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions pertaining to Alabama law to the Alabama Supreme Court. The certified questions in this matter required the Court to determine the scope of certain provisions of the Act No. 2010-761, Ala. Acts 2010. The Supreme Court answered the first certified question in the affirmative and the second in the negative: (1) the "or otherwise" language in the Act is limited to the use of State mechanisms to make payments to organizations that use at least some portion of those payments for political activity; (2) the term "political activity" is not limited to electioneering activities, i.e., activities undertaken in support of candidates for elected offices. View "Alabama Superintendent of Education et al. v. Alabama Education Association" on Justia Law

Bruce L. Johnson, Michael L. King, and William Harrison sued Luke Edwards, the Apostolic Advancement Association, Heritage Real Investment, Inc., Alabama-Mississippi Farm, Inc., and several officers and board members of those organizations. Plaintiffs filed an application for the entry of a default judgment against Edwards pursuant to Rule 55, Ala. R. Civ. P., for his failure to plead or otherwise to defend the allegations in the complaint. The trial court held a hearing on plaintiffs' second application for a default judgment. The trial court thereafter entered a default judgment against the defendants and awarded damages. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendants' notice of appeal was untimely. Therefore the Court was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. View "Edwards v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The City of Bessemer and Bessemer City Councillors Jimmy Stephens, Dorothy Davidson, Sarah W. Belcher, and Albert Soles sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss a claim alleging bad-faith failure to pay legal bills and costs stemming from a complaint filed by former City Councillor Louise Alexander and the law firm of White, Arnold & Dowd, P.C. ("WAD"). The City councillors also sought to have a racial-discrimination claim dismissed. The plaintiffs alleged that in 2006 and 2007 Alexander received three donations from a Tuscaloosa real-estate developer, which were properly used for charitable projects in her district. In this same period (according to the complaint), Davidson and Belcher, received similar donations from the same individual for charitable projects in their respective districts. According to the complaint, beginning in the early spring of 2007, plaintiff Alexander opposed several projects the donor had proposed to the City and, the donor "vowed to retaliate." The complaint alleged that because of the donor's complaint to the Attorney General, a five-count indictment against Alexander was filed in August 2008 alleging violations of the Alabama Ethics Law. The complaint asserted that similar charges were not brought against Davidson and Belcher. WAD represented Alexander during her criminal proceedings. Alexander was ultimately acquitted. Alexander and WAD alleged that the City had a "policy and practice" of paying legal fees for city officials charged with crimes relating to their official duties if and when they were found not guilty. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus relief as it related to the bad-faith claim against the City. The Court denied the petition with regard to plaintiffs' claim against the City councillors regarding the racial discrimination claim: the councilors did not demonstrate entitlement to legislative immunity, and whether they were entitled to qualified immunity was a question requiring further consideration of facts outside of the pleadings. View "Alexander v. City of Bessemer" on Justia Law

Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation ("AMIC"), the defendant in an action pending at the Lamar Circuit Court filed by the City of Vernon on behalf of itself and other similarly situated entities, appealed the court's order that certified a class in that action. Vernon stated that it had reached an agreement with AMIC regarding individual claims and therefore no longer wished to pursue them. AMIC filed a response to Vernon's motion in which it argued that the Supreme Court should remand the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss it because now the case was missing its named representative, and therefore the requirements for a class action could not be met. Vernon argued it had the right to withdraw from the pending litigation, but because the trial court certified the class, the litigation remains viable. Vernon requested time in which to allow the class to name a new representative. The Supreme Court agreed with Vernon that the trial court should have the opportunity to determine whether a new named plaintiff should be certified. "The trial court is the proper entity to decide whether to allow the class members to amend their complaint to substitute a new named plaintiff and to determine whether that plaintiff meets the adequacy requirements in Rule 23(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., so as to represent the class." As such, AMIC's appeal was dismissed, and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation v. City of Vernon et al. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pavilion Development, L.L.C., sought to redeem certain foreclosed real property. In this appeal, it challenged the trial court's judgment assessing the "lawful charges" due the various parties holding a legal interest in the property. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in certifying its judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and thus proper for immediate appeal. As such, the Supreme Court dismissed this appeal. View "Pavilion Development, L.L.C. v. JBJ Partnership et al. " on Justia Law

George Patrick Stacey and Innovative Treasury Systems, Inc. ("I.T.S."), sued Anthony Lee Peed for breach of contract, account stated, and money lent. Peed denied he was indebted to Stacey and I.T.S., moved for dismissal and asserted various affirmative defenses. The trial court granted Peed's motion. Stacey and I.T.S. moved to alter, amend, or vacate that judgment, which was ultimately denied by operation of law. Stacey and I.T.S. then appealed the circuit court's judgment, arguing the circuit court received substantial evidence of the formation of a contract and of "open account [stated]" and because Peed had failed to present a counterargument regarding their claim for money lent. After careful review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed summary judgment with respect to Stacey and I.T.S.'s claim for open account stated and reversed as to Stacey and I.T.S.'s claims of breach of contract and money due on an open account and as to the determination that the money was a gift. View "Stacey v. Peed " on Justia Law

Safeway Insurance Company of Alabama, Inc. petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to grant its Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss a bad-faith claim against it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Richard Kimbrough alleged that a deer ran across the road causing a truck traveling in the opposite direction to swerve into the Kimbrough's lane. According to Kimbrough, the truck struck his vehicle and ran him off the road and into a creek bed. The driver of the truck allegedly fled. Kimbrough broke his right femur, right hand, and nose. Kimbrough sued Safeway, asserting claims of breach of contract and bad faith, alleging that Safeway, without justification, had intentionally refused to pay Kimbrough's claim. Safeway moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the claim for uninsured-motorist benefits was not ripe for adjudication until liability and damages were established. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as Safeway's subsequent motion to reconsider. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded Safeway did not clearly demonstrate this case was not ripe or that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, Safeway did not have a clear legal right to mandamus relief. View "Kimbrough v. Safeway Insurance Company of Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law