Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The parties in this dispute entered into a common-law marriage in 2006. They lived together as husband and wife in Alabama with their minor children, L.F. and M.F, until 2009. Siderius moved with L.F. and M.F. to Oregon to begin her new job. Fordham thereafter joined the family in Portland. The family lived in Oregon until March 2010. Siderius sought a transfer her company's Spokane, Washington office; following the transfer, the entire family moved to Washington. In May 2011, the parties retained a court-approved mediator to assist with the dissolution of their marriage and custody of the minor children. With the mediator's assistance, the parties developed parenting plans and a visitation schedule. Fordham did not dispute that the parties agreed that the children would be in Alabama for the summer of 2011, and would then return to Washington. Siderius purchased a plane ticket for the children's return to Washington at the end of summer, but Fordham transferred the school registration of both children, who had remained in Alabama, from Spokane to schools in Mobile. Fordham then filed a child-custody petition and complaint for divorce in Alabama. He also filed an emergency motion seeking immediate custody of the children. The Alabama court signed an order granting Fordham's emergency motion and awarding him custody of the children pendente lite. Siderius filed a petition in Washington seeking dissolution of the marriage and custody of the minor children. The Washington court issued an ex parte restraining order ordering Fordham to return the minor children to Washington. The Washington court also scheduled initial divorce, custody, contempt hearings, and a telephone conference with the Alabama court pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The Alabama court issued an order finding that it had jurisdiction over Siderius on the basis of her minimum contacts with Alabama. The court did not rule on the applicability of the UCCJEA to the proceeding. Siderius thereafter filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals denied Siderius's petition without an opinion. In early 2012, the Washington court issued an order awarding custody of the children to Siderius and finding, among other things, that Washington had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. The Washington court also found Fordham in contempt for failing to return the children to Washington as the court had ordered in its restraining order. Siderius registered the Washington court's custody determination and a motion for enforcement with the Alabama court. When the Alabama court denied her motion, Siderius petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for mandamus relief. Upon review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Alabama trial court erred in denying Siderius's motion to dismiss based on the irrelevant fact that Siderius had sufficient minimum contacts with Alabama to subject her to personal jurisdiction. Siderius's petition for a writ of mandamus was granted and the Alabama trial court was directed to dismiss Fordham's child custody proceeding. View "Fordham v. Siderius" on Justia Law

Wausau Development Corporation ("WDC") appeals a circuit court judgment in favor of Natural Gas & Oil, Inc. ("NGO"). NGO filed a complaint seeking a judgment determining the validity of certain oil and gas leases held by WDC to particular wells located in Lamar County. NGO alleged: WDC was a Mississippi corporation with a principal office located in Mississippi and that WDC was not authorized to conduct business in Alabama because WDC was not registered as a foreign entity; that WDC had obtained leases to the wells but that, by their terms, WDC's leases had expired and had not been held open by production; and it had obtained new and current leases on the wells. WDC argued on appeal that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by granting NGO's motion for a judgment on the pleadings because, it said, the undisputed facts in the pleadings did not support the circuit court's judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the circuit court's judgment. View "Wausau Development Corporation v. Natural Gas & Oil, Inc. " on Justia Law

Robert and Tracy Barrett appealed the grant of two summary judgments in favor of Carlos Roman d/b/a Carlos Roman Roofing ("Roman") and Bobby Beach d/b/a Just Brick Masonry ("Beach") on all of the Barretts' claims against Roman and Beach. The issues before the Supreme Court in this appeal required resolution of the same issues that were in claims pending in the circuit court against a third party. A November 2012 judgment disposed of all of the Barretts' claims against Beach and Roman, but it did not dispose of the Barretts' claims against the third party. Thus, the Court's consideration of the circuit court's summary judgments in favor of Beach and Roman as final would mean that the intertwined claims against the subcontractors named as defendants in this action would have been litigated in piecemeal fashion. "The piecemeal adjudication of the claims against the subcontractors pose[d] an unreasonable risk of inconsistent results. Therefore, we must conclude that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the summary judgments in favor of Beach and Roman as final." Accordingly, the Court dismissed the Barretts' appeal. View "Barrett v. Roman" on Justia Law

In 2010, the State of Kentucky entered an order finding that 74-year-old Shirley Day was in need of a guardian and conservator. The Kentucky court appointed her adult daughter, Rhonda Sears, to serve in both capacities. Subsequently, Sears applied to the Kentucky court to transfer the guardianship and conservatorship to Alabama, where she and Day resided. In early 2012, the Kentucky court issued a provisional order granting the request. Sears then applied to the Montgomery Probate Court for a provisional order accepting the transfer from Kentucky. That same day, the probate judge appointed Valerie Cain as a guardian ad litem to represent Day in the transfer proceeding. Cain later submitted a report to the probate court questioning expenditures from Day's estate and requesting a guardian ad litem fee. Although nothing in the report indicated any inappropriate actions regarding Sears's actions in caring for Day, Cain recommended that both the conservatorship and the guardianship be transferred but that, rather than Sears, "the [Montgomery] county guardian and conservator be appointed." The probate court granted the petition to transfer and appointed James Hampton as guardian of Day and conservator of Day's estate. Day was removed from Sears's home and placed in an apartment home. The probate court also approved Cain's guardian ad litem fee to be paid from Day's estate. Sears appealed the probate court's order on the ground that the probate court's order violated Alabama law. Ultimately, the court denied Sears's requested relief and set the matter for further proceedings. Sears then filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that one of Day's other adult daughters disagreed with Sears's expenditures from Day's estate, and could have objected and the probate court could then have held a hearing to determine whether the transfer to Alabama of Sears's Kentucky guardianship and conservatorship would be in Day's best interests. Here, the probate court would have erred by appointing any new guardian and conservator, most especially a different guardian and conservator than the one previously appointed by the transferring court, when the only matter properly before the court was the issue whether a provisional order of transfer would be approved. "This was clearly beyond the scope of the statute, and the probate court acted without authority in doing so." As a result of the erroneous appointment of the Montgomery County guardian and conservator, Day was subjected to removal from Sears's home and Day's estate was subjected to unnecessary fees in this jurisdiction when the Alabama law safeguards the protected person and his or her resources from the transfer of an inappropriate guardianship or conservatorship when it is not in the best interests of the protected person. Because the Court could not ascertain whether the probate court's grant of the transfer petition was dependent upon its erroneous appointment of a new guardian and conservator, the Court felt compelled to reverse both aspects of the court's order. View "Sears v. Hampton" on Justia Law

Jeffery and Allison Rhodes petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss the ejectment action filed against them by the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"). The Supreme Court found that the defect in the foreclosure process alleged by the Rhodeses did not implicate Fannie Mae's standing to bring the ejectment action against the Rhodeses or, in turn, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain that claim. The only basis upon which the Rhodeses sought interlocutory mandamus relief from the order of the trial court denying their motion to dismiss the complaint against them was an alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial court as a result of the alleged lack of standing. Because the problem alleged by the Rhodeses did not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court had no basis on which to consider this petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Federal National Mortgage Association v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

Defendants Del Marsh, Gerald Dial, Jay Love, and Chad Fincher were members of the Alabama Legislature during its 2013 Regular Session. They sought a writ of mandamus to order the Circuit Court to set aside its order denying their motion to dismiss an action against them filed by Lynn Pettway and to enter an order granting the motion. The Alabama House of Representatives approved House Bill 84 ("HB 84"), and the bill was sent to the Senate, where the Senate Education Committee gave it a favorable report. During the third reading of HB 84 on the floor of the Senate, an amendment was proposed and approved, and HB 84 was passed by the Senate. The amended version of HB 84 was then sent to the House, but the House voted to "non concur," and HB 84 was sent to a conference committee. Pettway sued the defendants in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Pettway alleged that HB 84 was passed in violation of Rule 21 and Alabama's Open Meetings Act. The circuit court issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") prohibiting the clerk of the House of Representatives from sending HB 84 to the governor for his signature, and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court issued an order vacating the TRO, dismissing the underlying action, and dismissing the appeal on the ground that the dispute was not ripe for adjudication because HB 84 had not been signed into law or even taken on the color of law. The Supreme Court found that the defendants were entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the circuit court to grant their motion to dismiss Pettway's new complaint on the related grounds that legislators are immune from suit regarding acts undertaken within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity and because the substance of Pettway's new complaint involves nonjusticiable claims that would lead to "judicial second-guessing" of the legislature's internal actions, motivations, and procedural decisions regarding its actions. View "Pettway v. Del Marsh" on Justia Law

Afassco, Inc., a Nevada-based corporation, appealed a circuit court judgment that held a judgment Afassco obtained in a Nevada state court against former Afassco employee and Alabama resident Comer Ladon Sanders was void because the Nevada court lacked personal jurisdiction over Sanders. Afassco sued Sanders in a Nevada court. After Afassco domesticated the judgment in Alabama in an attempt to collect on it, Sanders moved an Alabama court for relief from the judgment, arguing that the Nevada court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Alabama court agreed and entered a judgment granting Sanders's motion. However, because Sanders filed a motion in the Nevada court asking it to dismiss Afassco's action based on the alleged lack of personal jurisdiction, he consented to the court's determination of that issue. He waived any right to subsequently litigate that issue in another forum. Because of that waiver, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded it was unnecessary to consider the substance of Sanders's argument that the Nevada court lacked personal jurisdiction over him, and we accordingly pretermitted all consideration of that issue. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Afassco, Inc. v. Sanders " on Justia Law

The Bessemer City Board of Education and Davis Middle School petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the petitioners' motion to dismiss the claim filed against them by John Doe, a minor, by and through his next friend, W.A. ("Doe"), and to enter an order dismissing with prejudice the claim against petitioners. The matter stemmed from a claim of negligence Doe raised against the school; Doe claimed he had been sexually abused by an unidentified person as a result of the negligence of petitioners. The Circuit Court denied petitioners motion based on qualified immunity grounds. After review, the Supreme Court found that petitioners demonstrated they were entitled to absolute immunity from Doe's action against them. Therefore the Court granted their petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Bessemer City Board of Education" on Justia Law

The City of Gadsden and certain members of the State Employees' Insurance Board appealed two circuit court orders that granted injunctive relief to John Boman. Boman worked as a Gadsden police officer from 1965 until he retired in 1991. In 2000, Gadsden elected to join the 'Local Government Health Insurance Plan,' a health benefit plan administered by the Board. When Boman turned 65 in 2011, he was receiving medical care for congestive heart failure and other ailments. After his 65th birthday, Blue Cross began denying his claims for medical treatment based on the failure to provide Blue Cross with a 'record of the Medicare payment.' However, Boman had no Medicare credits. When the dispute over coverage arose, Boman sought review by the Board. The Board denied Boman's request for an appeal. Boman and 18 other active and retired Gadsden police officers sued Gadsden, alleging, among other things, that they had 'been deprived of Social Security and Medicare protection which other police officers have been provided' and that, after 20 years of service, they were being required to pay a higher pension charge or percentage of base pay than their counterparts who were hired after April 1, 1986. In 2011, Boman filed a 'motion for immediate relief for medical care.' The Supreme Court found that the circuit court issued preliminary injunctive relief against Gadsden without requiring Boman to give security and without making any specific findings. As such, the Supreme Court had "no alternative but to reverse" the preliminary injunction issued against Gadsden and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Gadsden v. Boman " on Justia Law

In 2005, James Wiese attended an auction held by Alabama Powersport Auction, LLC (APA) and purchased a "Yerf Dog Go-Cart," for his two minor sons. The go-cart was on consignment to APA from FF Acquisition; however, Wiese was not aware that FF Acquisition had manufactured the go-cart. Soon after purchasing the go-cart, Wiese discovered that the engine would not operate for more than a few minutes at a time. After several failed attempts to repair the go-cart, Wiese stored the go-cart in his garage for almost two years. In 2007, Wiese repaired the go-cart. Matthew Wiese was riding the go-cart and had an accident in which he hit his head on the ground causing a brain injury that resulted in his death in 2010. The elder Wiese brought contract claims against APA stemming from his purchase of the go-cart and for his son's death. APA appealed the circuit court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that based on the common-law principles of agency, an auctioneer selling consigned goods on behalf of an undisclosed principal may be held liable as a merchant-seller for a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under 7-2-314, Ala. Code 1975. As a result,the Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment denying APA's summary-judgment motion as to Wiese's breach-of-the-implied-warranty-of-merchantability claim. View "Alabama Powersport Auction, LLC v. Wiese" on Justia Law