Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Bay Area Physicians for Women ("BAPW") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate an order entered by that court on November 8, 2012, which reinstated a medical-malpractice case filed against BAPW and transferred the case to the Mobile Circuit Court. The Supreme Court concluded BAPW did not include a statement of circumstances constituting good cause for the Supreme Court to consider vacating the November 8, 2012 order, notwithstanding that it was filed more than seven months after the Baldwin Circuit Court entered it. Accordingly, insofar as BAPW's petition for a writ of mandamus sought vacatur of the Baldwin Circuit Court's order, the Court dismissed the petition as untimely. View "White v. Bay Area Physicians for Women" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in this case to the extent that it concluded Parker Towing was not entitled to indemnity for $25,000 it paid landowners in settlement of landowners' claims against it. The landowners sued Parker Towing and Triangle Aggregates, Inc. stemming from their claims of breach of contract pertaining to properties they originally leased to Parker, which were subsequently purchased by Triangle. Parker argued it was not liable for the landowners' claims following its sale of the properties to Triangle. However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment with respect to its conclusion that Triangle was not required to indemnify Parker Towing for its attorney fees and other litigation expenses incurred to defend against the claims asserted against Parker Towing for breaches of the agreements with the landowners. The fees and expenses incurred by Parker Towing as a result of those breaches were covered by the indemnification agreement between Parker Towing and Triangle. View "Parker Towing Company, Inc. v. Triangle Aggregates, Inc. " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted father Adam Terry's petition for certiorari to consider whether the appellate court erred by reversing the trial court's judgment enjoining Emily Terry (mother) from relocating from Lawrence County to Charleston, South Carolina, with their son. The Court of Civil Appeals' held that the trial court erred in concluding that the mother did not meet her burden of rebutting the section 30–3–169.4 presumption that the move to South Carolina was not in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment to that end. However, insofar as the judgment directed the trial court to enter a judgment in favor of the mother on remand, that portion was reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Terry v. Terry" on Justia Law

Gambro Renal Products, Inc. hired The Facility Group, Inc. ("TFG"), as the general contractor for the construction of a facility designed to produce kidney dialysis filters in Opelika. TFG contracted with the Hardy Corporation for specialized piping work on the project. Absolute Welding Services, Inc. ("AWS"), is a subsidiary of Rayco Industrial, Inc., a subsubcontractor hired by Hardy. Although the negotiations on the subcontract at issue in these appeals were between AWS and Hardy, the subcontract was executed by Rayco and Hardy. A dispute arose over whether the exclusion of "passivation" and the installation of piping in Rayco's offer was incorporated into its subcontract. Rayco filed a complaint against Hardy, Gambro and 15 fictitiously named parties, seeking an accounting, a declaratory judgment, a reformation of the contract, and perfection of a lien. Rayco asserted claims for damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment/quantum meruit, and "work and labor done." Both parties unhappy with the eventual trial court order resolving the dispute, appealed the order. After careful consideration of the contracts and the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part. The case was remanded with instructions for further proceedings. View "Hardy Corporation v. Rayco Industrial, Inc. " on Justia Law

Safeway Insurance Company of Alabama, Inc. petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to grant its Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss a bad-faith claim against it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Richard Kimbrough submitted a claim to Safeway for uninsured-motorist coverage when he was injured in an accident. A deer ran across the road, causing a truck in the southbound lane to swerve into the northbound lane, where Kimbrough was driving. According to Kimbrough, the truck struck his vehicle and ran him off the road and into a creek bed. The driver of the truck allegedly fled and was unknown. Kimbrough contended the driver of a "phantom vehicle" was an uninsured motorist. He sought the full policy limit of $50,000 because his expenses exceeded his coverage. The parties disputed whether Safeway denied the claim. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court disagreed with Safeway's argument that the Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. As such, Safeway did not demonstrate a clear legal right to the writ of mandamus. The Court therefore denied the petition. View "Kimbrough v. Safeway Insurance Company of Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law

Roy Harbin started working as a police officer for the City in 1972. At that time, he started mandatory participation in the Policemen's and Firemen's Retirement Fund of the City of Gadsden ("the PFRF"). In 1975, the PFRF was modified by the Legislature, and a "sliding scale provision" was eliminated. The PFRF was modified again in 1980. In 2002, all PFRF funds were transferred to the Employees Retirement System of Alabama ("the ERS"), which then administered the retirement program for the City's police officers. Harbin retired in 2012 and received pension payments under the ERS. In 2007, Harbin sued the City, alleging breach of contract under the 1972 PFRF. He amended his complaint five time, with the last amendment in 2011. He eventually won on his breach of contract claim against the City. The City appealed the circuit court's denial of its motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Harbin had no presented sufficient evidence to establish that Harbin had a contract with the city. The Court therefore concluded the City was entitled to summary judgment. View "City of Gadsden v. Harbin " on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc., d/b/a Bob Tyler Toyota ("BTT"), one of two named defendants, appealed in case no. 1110840 a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs Daphne Automotive, LLC, d/b/a Eastern Shore Toyota ("EST"), and Shawn Esfahani, on plaintiffs' claims seeking damages for slander. In case no. 1110857, Fred Keener, an employee of BTT and a codefendant, similarly appealed the judgment against him and in favor of EST and Esfahani. Esfahani ultimately learned of slanderous statements made about him and/or EST by employees of BTT, including, in an apparent effort to discourage potential customers from purchasing from EST, BTT's agents' purportedly informing customers that Esfahani and/or EST "are engaged in illegal activity, are terrorists, or otherwise support terrorist organizations." More specifically, BTT and its employees purportedly referred to EST as "Middle Eastern Shore [Toyota]" or "Taliban Toyota." At the conclusion of the four-day trial, the jury found for Esfahani and EST against both BTT and Keener on the remaining slander claims. Specifically, as to his slander per se charge against both BTT and Keener, the jury awarded Esfahani $1,250,000 in compensatory damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages; as to the slander per se and slander per quod claims of EST against both BTT and Keener, the jury awarded EST $1,250,000 in compensatory damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages. The trial court entered judgment accordingly. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc. v. Daphne Automotive, LLC " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Patricia Working, Rick Erdemir, and Floyd McGinnis appealed a circuit court judgment that held that the Jefferson County Election Commission ("the JCEC"), Probate Judge Alan King, Circuit Clerk Anne-Marie Adams, and Jefferson County Sheriff Mike Hale were immune from liability as to the plaintiffs' attorney fees. In "Working I," the Supreme Court held that a February special election was invalid on state-law grounds, and that the Governor's appointment of George Bowman to fill a vacancy on the Election Commission was lawful. On remand to the circuit court, as the "prevailing parties," plaintiffs moved for attorney fees. The trial court denied their motion, and plaintiffs appealed. In "Working II," the Supreme Court addressed plaintiffs' that the trial court erred in denying their motion for mediation, and vacated the trial court's order denying the motion for an award of attorney fees and remanded the case. On remand, the trial court concluded that the JCEC defendants had not waived their immunity defense and that plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees against defendants was precluded by the Alabama Constitution as to plaintiffs' state-law claims. Plaintiffs then filed this third, appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded the case once again to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the issue of immunity and state-law claims, but remanded remand the case with instructions on the issue concerning section 6–6–20 and the federal-law claims. View "Working v. Jefferson County Election Commission" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, defendants the Alabama Department of Corrections, various department officials, and Governor Robert Bentley, appealed in case no. 1111588, the trial court's determination limiting certain deductions from work-release earnings for inmates. In case no. 1120264, Jerry Mack Merritt (as sole representative of the plaintiff class) cross-appealed, raising numerous challenges to the trial court's final judgment. After its review, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in case no. 1120264 as untimely filed; in case no. 1111588, the Court reversed and remanded. The Court found that the department's interpretation of section 14-8-6 as permitting its collection of charges, which were not incident to the inmate's confinement, in excess of a 40% withholding cap established by that statute was both reasonable and consistent with the statutory language. View "Thomas v. Merritt" on Justia Law

The Alabama Department of Transportation ("ALDOT") and its director, John Cooper, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss all claims filed against them by Asphalt Contractors, Inc. ("ACI"). Trichloroethylene ('TCE') and other chemicals were used by ALDOT since the early 1970s. TCE was used extensively by ALDOT as a degreaser and/or cleaning agent and/or as a solvent. TCE is now contained in shallow groundwater in North Montgomery. Since at least April 2009, ALDOT has pumped groundwater into a Dewatering Pond and from there onto a Transfer Pond and then to the South Pond. A portion of the South Pond and wetland area used in ALDOT's remedial efforts is being discharged onto ACI's property. In 2010, ACI demanded that ALDOT immediately cease all dumping of contaminated water on ACI's property. However, the dumping of TCE-laden water onto ACI's property continued to the date of ACI filing its lawsuit. The complaint asserted trespass to realty and inverse condemnation and made claims for injunctive relief. ACI requested damages for the full fair-market value of its property, consequential and incidental damages, compensatory damages, punitive and exemplary damages, expenses, costs, interest, and attorney fees. ALDOT and Cooper filed a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing qualified immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss ALDOT as a party to this action. Conversely, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss as to ACI's inverse-condemnation claim against Cooper in his official capacity. Further, the trial court properly refused to dismiss ACI's claim for injunctive relief against Cooper. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus in part and denied it in part. View "Asphalt Contractors, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Transportation " on Justia Law