Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Alfa Life Insurance Corporation ("Alfa") and Brandon Morris, an agent for Alfa, appealed a judgment entered against them following a jury verdict for Kimberly Colza, the widow of Dante Colza. In 2010, Morris met with Dante to assist him in completing an application for a life-insurance policy. There was disputed evidence as to whether Morris asked Dante whether he had had a moving traffic violation, a driver's license suspended, or an accident in the prior three years, it was undisputed that Morris entered a checkmark in the "No" box by that question. The evidence indicated that Dante applied for the Preferred Tobacco premium rate. Dante named Kimberly as the beneficiary under the policy. At the close of the meeting, Kimberly wrote a check payable to Alfa for $103.70, the monthly Preferred Tobacco premium rate. Kimberly testified at trial that Morris informed them that Dante would be covered as soon as they gave Morris the check. Dante was later examined by the medical examiner. During the examination, Dante informed the examiner that his family had a history of heart disease and that he had had moving traffic violations within the past five years. The day after he had his medical examination, Dante was killed in an accident. Two days later, Alfa received the medical examiner's report, which indicated that Dante's family had a history of heart disease, that Dante's cholesterol was above 255, and that Dante had had moving traffic violations in the past five years. In light of the report, Alfa's underwriters determined that Dante was not eligible for the Preferred Tobacco rate for which he had applied; rather, the proper classification would have been the Standard Tobacco rate (which had a higher premium). Additionally, in light of the moving vehicle violations, Dante was a greater risk to insure and a "rate-up" of $2.50 per $1,000 worth of coverage was required. Alfa notified Kimberly by letter that no life-insurance coverage was available for Dante's death "because no policy was issued and the conditions of coverage under the conditional receipt were not met." Kimberly sued Alfa seeking to recover under the terms of the conditional receipt (an acknowledgment of the policy). She alleged, among other claims, that Alfa had breached the contract and had acted in bad faith when it refused to pay life-insurance benefits on Dante's death. Kimberly also sued Morris, alleging, among other claims, that he had negligently failed to procure insurance coverage for Dante. After a trial, the jury found that Alfa had breached the contract and had in bad faith refused to pay the insurance benefits due, and that Morris had negligently failed to procure insurance. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Alfa and Morris were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on those claims, and the trial court erred by submitting the claims to the jury for consideration. View "Alfa Life Insurance Corporation v. Colza " on Justia Law

Lambert Law Firm, LLC ("Lambert"), petitions the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to set aside an order awarding respondent Shawn Brechbill a portion of certain funds filed with the Circuit Court clerk. Brechbill, was represented by the law firm of Morris, Conchin & King. He sued State Farm Fire and Casualty Company seeking damages for breach of contract and bad-faith failure to pay an insurance claim. The law firm filed the initial complaint, prepared various pleadings, conducted discovery, engaged experts, and filed a response to a motion for a summary judgment filed by State Farm. Later, the law firm withdrew its representation of Brechbill. The trial court held a hearing and issued an order stating that the law firm would have a lien against any settlement or judgment that became payable to Brechbill arising from his claims against State Farm. Ultimately, the law firm's interest in the lien was assigned to Gary Conchin, a partner in the law firm. Brechbill hired Lambert to continue the litigation. Brechbill ultimately received a judgment against State Farm on his breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims. At some point after the judgment was entered, Lambert withdrew from further representation of Brechbill, and the trial court entered an order granting Lambert a lien on any recovery Brechbill might be awarded. State Farm elected to appeal the verdict on the bad-faith claim, but paid one-half of the amount of the verdict in satisfaction of the verdict on the breach-of-contract claim to the circuit court clerk. While State Farm's appeal was pending, both Conchin and Lambert moved to "condemn" the funds held by the circuit clerk. Brechbill also moved the trial court to release the funds to him. Upon review of the competing claims for the money, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court clearly acted within its discretion in refusing, at the time of the hearing, to determine the amount of the liens at issue. "However, given the mandatory nature of section 34-3-61, the priority of the two liens in this case, and the limited funds to which the liens attached, the trial court must first determine the amount of the fees owed to ensure that any preliminary disbursement would not divest the fund of money in which, by law, another party would have a priority in interest." The Court held that Lambert demonstrated a clear legal right to relief, and therefore directed the trial court to vacate its May 30, 2013, order and to hold further proceedings. View "Brechbill v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The City of Birmingham appealed a Court of Civil Appeals affirmance of a summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Ernest Alexander in light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Ervin v. City of Birmingham." Upon execution of a search warrant of Alexander's home, federal drug enforcement agents and Birmingham police found marijuana, $38,675 in cash, cocaine, a firearm, and digital scales. In October 2009, a complaint for the civil forfeiture of the $38,675 was filed in the federal district court. Alexander failed to respond to the complaint or to take any action to reclaim the money. The federal court entered a default judgment of forfeiture as to the money on August 10, 2010. On March 16, 2011, Alexander filed a complaint in the Circuit Court seeking the return of the $38,675. He argued that the money had been seized but that no state forfeiture or condemnation proceeding had been filed as required by statute. The City filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment, arguing, in part, that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over this matter. Based on the intervening change of law set forth in "Ervin," the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in the previous Alexander case ("Alexander I") was "clearly erroneous." Therefore, the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it relied on the law-of-the-case doctrine and on its prior decision in determining that its decision in Alexander I was not subject to appellate review and that the City was not entitled to relief based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Ervin. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "City of Birmingham v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Don Davis, in his capacity as the Judge of Probate for Mobile County, appealed a Circuit Court's final judgment in favor of then Secretary of State Beth Chapman and the three members of the Mobile County Board of Registrars: Pat Tyrrell, Shirley Short, and Virginia Delchamps. The matter before the Supreme Court concerned a regulation promulgated by the Secretary in an effort to comply with certain federal election laws and an asserted conflict between that regulation and the residency requirement prescribed by three Alabama election statutes. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court: "Alabama statutory law continues to require, as it long has, that voters who have moved cast ballots at the polling place designated for their new address. Further, Ala. Admin 20 Code (Secretary of State), Reg. 820-2-2-.13(1), was not and is not required by NVRA or HAVA. Because Reg. 820-2-2-.13(1) expressly contradicts Alabama statutory law, it is void." View "Davis v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Larry Dunaway filed a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P. petition challenging his 1997 convictions for the capital murder of his girlfriend Tressa Patterson and her 22-month-old son James. The Rule 32 court entered an order denying Dunaway's petition, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Dunaway petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in "Dunaway II." The Court granted the writ to consider: (1) Dunaway's claims of misconduct by four jurors who allegedly failed to disclose pertinent information during voir dire; (2) Dunaway's claim that the Rule 32 court erred by denying his "Brady v. Maryland" (373 U.S. 83 (1963)) claims that he was denied due process as a result of the District Attorney's failure to disclose alleged relationships between him and certain jurors; and (3) Dunaway's claim that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial. Because the Supreme Court concluded that Dunaway was entitled to a new trial based on his juror-misconduct claim, the Court declined to address the nondisclosure claim as to the DA and the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. View "Dunaway v. Alabama " on Justia Law

Sarah Hicks petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment affirming her conviction, following a guilty plea, for chemical endangerment of a child for exposing her unborn child to a controlled substance. In affirming the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Supreme Court held that use of the word "child" in the chemical-endangerment statute included all children, born and unborn, and furthered Alabama's policy of protecting life from the earliest stages of development. View "Hicks v. Alabama " on Justia Law

Defendants Hector Laurel, M.D., Crissey Watkins, and Comprehensive Anesthesia Services, P.C. ("CAS"), sought a permissive appeal to challenge the circuit court's order denying their motions for a summary judgment. Plaintiff Tiffany Prince underwent a laparoscopic cholecystectomy at The Madison Surgery Center. During the anesthetic induction, Watkins administered what she believed to be 4 milligrams of Zofran from a syringe that had a white label with a handwritten letter "Z" on the label. Watkins testified that that medication had been drawn into the syringe by Dr. Laurel, an anesthesiologist. After the medication was administered, and while Prince was moving from the preoperative stretcher to the operating-room stretcher, Prince became weak and was having trouble breathing. Watkins called for an anesthesiologist and assisted Prince with a bag mask. Subsequently, Dr. Hoger, another anesthesiologist, came in and administered anesthesia medication to Prince. Watkins testified that Dr. Laurel came into the room sometime during the induction of Prince. When talking to Dr. Laurel, Watkins learned that the syringe with the white label actually contained Zemuron, a paralytic, and that the syringe had been used on a previous patient ("Patient A"). Watkins testified that, during Patient A's induction, she had disposed of a syringe of Zemuron because she had touched the cap. Subsequently, she said, Dr. Laurel had drawn another syringe of Zemuron for Patient A. Watkins testified that she subsequently checked Patient A's medical records and that Patient A's medical history was negative for a history of HIV and hepatitis C. During the year following her surgery, Prince underwent routine testing for HIV and hepatitis C, and all of Prince's tests were negative. Prince did not pay for any of the testing. Prince later sued Dr. Laurel, Watkins, and CAS, alleging medical malpractice. The trial court entered orders denying the defendants' motions for a summary judgment. Defendants subsequently filed a "Motion to Reconsider or, Alternatively, Motion for Certification of Order for Appeal," which the trial court also denied. The defendants then filed a petition for a permissive appeal to the Supreme Court, which was granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that undisputed expert testimony established that there was no medical basis for concluding that Prince had a risk of developing any disease based on the use of the contaminated syringe, and her test results had all been negative. The trial court should have granted the defendants' motions for a summary judgment on that basis. View "Laurel v. Prince " on Justia Law

Regions Bank, as sole trustee of the J.F.B. Lowrey Trust, appealed a circuit court order that awarded Regions $312,257.36 from the Lowrey Trust as reimbursement for attorney fees and expenses Regions incurred as trustee during the successful defense of an action brought against Regions by Sam G. Lowrey, Jr., and Shelby Jones, two of the beneficiaries of the Trust. The beneficiaries sued Regions, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, claiming Regions failed to protect and preserve the assets of the Lowrey Trust, which consisted primarily of approximately 20,000 acres of timberland located in Monroe and Conecuh Counties and which have been the subject of much intra-family litigation. Hurricane Ivan made landfall and moved over Monroe and Conecuh Counties, causing severe wind damage and destruction of much of the standing timber owned by the Lowrey Trust. In their complaint, the beneficiaries asserted that Regions should have purchased casualty-loss insurance on the timber, should have sold most of the timberland before Hurricane Ivan in order to diversify the investments of the trust estate, should have cut the timber more rapidly, or should have pursued some combination of these tactics in order to preserve the corpus of the Trust. The trial court entered a detailed order in favor of Regions, rejecting the beneficiaries' claims of mismanagement of the trust assets and taxing costs against the beneficiaries. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Regions was entitled to reimbursement of fees and expenses and costs arising out of the litigation. The trial court exceeded its discretion by reducing Regions' reimbursement by both a line-by-line reduction and a percentage reduction. The trial court's January 8, 2013 was reversed in its entirety and remanded for consideration of the reasonableness of each aspect of Regions' reimbursement request. View "Regions Bank v. Lowrey" on Justia Law

Guardian Builders, LLC, and E. Wayne Tackett appealed a Circuit Court order denying their motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award entered in favor of Randy Uselton and his wife Melissa. In 2010, the Useltons sued Guardian alleging several claims arising from Guardian's construction of a house for the Useltons. Guardian subsequently filed a motion to compel arbitration, and the circuit court granted that motion. In late 2011, the arbitrator entered a final award in favor of the Useltons. Guardian subsequently filed a motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award to the circuit court, to which it attached a copy of the arbitration award. The Useltons filed a 'motion to confirm' the arbitration award. The circuit court entered an order purporting to deny Guardian's motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award, purporting to grant the Useltons' motion to confirm the arbitration award, and purporting to order Guardian to pay $1,421.75 in Better Business Bureau fees and facility costs related to the arbitration. Guardian objected only to a subset of the damages that were awarded the Useltons that were not directly related to the poorly constructed house, specifically, attorney fees and arbitration fees (including both the arbitrator fee and the forum fee charged by the Better Business Bureau of North Alabama ("the BBB"), which administered the arbitration). Furthermore, Guardian argued the arbitrator lacked the authority to award the Useltons attorney fees and arbitration fees. The Supreme Court agreed that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding those remedies. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to enter a modified judgment subtracting attorney fees and arbitration fees from the award made to the Useltons. View "Guardian Builders, LLC v. Uselton " on Justia Law

The Shelby County Board of Equalization petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, or, in the alternative, a writ of prohibition, to direct the Shelby Circuit Court to dismiss as untimely an appeal filed by Central Shelby LTD. challenging a final ad valorem tax assessment issued by the Board. In response to Central Shelby's objection to the Board's 2013 assessed value of real property owned by Central Shelby, the Board entered a final ad valorem assessment. The clerk of the Shelby Circuit Court mailed a copy of the notice of appeal to the Board, which received the notice on July 8, 2013. Thereafter, the Board moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Central Shelby had not filed with the secretary of the Board its notice of appeal within 30 days of the final assessment as, the Board contended, section 40-3-25 requires. The trial court, without stating the findings on which its decision was based, denied the Board's motion. In response, the Board filed this petition alleging that, as a result of the alleged untimely notice to it of Central Shelby's appeal, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying appeal. Central Shelby faulted the circuit clerk for her alleged untimely mailing of the notice of appeal to the secretary of the Board. The Supreme Court concluded the appealing taxpayer is charged with the responsibility of filing the notice of appeal with the secretary of the Board. As a result of Central Shelby's failure to comply with the provisions of 40-3-25, its appeal was not perfected and the trial court's jurisdiction was never invoked. The Supreme Court therefore granted the Board's petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the Board's motion to dismiss and to dismiss Central Shelby's appeal as untimely. View "Central Shelby LTD. v. Shelby County Board of Equalization" on Justia Law