Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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These consolidated appellate proceedings consisted of an appeal filed by Regina Daily ("Regina") and The Daily Catch, Inc., d/b/a Gulf Shores Seafood ("The Daily Catch") (case number SC-2022-0672); a cross-appeal by Greg Esser ("Greg") (case number SC-2022-0673); and a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Patrick Daily ("Patrick"), Regina, The Daily Catch, White Sands, Inc., d/b/a Remax of Orange Beach ("White Sands"), and Blue Palms, LLC (case number SC-2022-0992). The appeal, the cross-appeal, and the mandamus petition all involved the same underlying action filed by Greg -- in his individual capacity, in his capacity as the trustee of the Wallene R. Esser Living Trust ("the trust"), and in his capacity as an administrator ad litem of the estate of Wallene R. Esser ("the estate") -- against Patrick, Regina, The Daily Catch, White Sands, and Blue Palms. Following a bench trial, the circuit court entered a judgment awarding damages in favor of Greg and against Regina and The Daily Catch; the circuit court denied Greg's claims as to all the other defendants. Regina and The Daily Catch filed their appeal, and Greg filed his cross-appeal. Later, Patrick, Regina, The Daily Catch, White Sands, and Blue Palms petitioned for mandamus relief. Greg and Regina were Wallene's children and were beneficiaries to Wallene's estate. Generally, Greg alleged that "[t]he trust has been harmed and depleted by the acts and omissions of the defendants." Greg asserted claims of breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment, requesting money damages and declaratory relief. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment in case numbers SC-2022-0672 and SC-2022-0673, and granted the mandamus petition filed in case number SC-2022-0992. View "Daily, et al. v. Esser" on Justia Law

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Dr. William Morgan, Dr. Carol Zippert, Morris Hardy, Leo Branch, Sr., and Carrie Dancy, each of whom is or was a member of the Greene County Board of Education ("the Board"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Greene Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on the individual-capacity claims asserted against them by Dr. Rhinnie B. Scott. Scott had been an employee of the Board for over two decades. For most of that time, she served as "Vocational Director." During the 2007-2008 school year, Scott was asked by the president of the Board at that time, Elzora Fluker, to serve as "Acting Principal" at Greene County High School ("GCHS"). During a search for a school principal in the 2010-2011 school year, Scott was tapped to serve as "Instructional Leader" for GCHS in addition to her regular function of Vocational Director. The purpose of such designation was for Dr. Scott to serve as the leader of the school until a principal was selected. At the time of that decision, the period of time of the designation was thought to be only a few weeks at most. Problems arose, however, with the selection, and Dr. Scott ended up having to serve in the position for the entire 2010-2011 school year. Scott filed a grievance with the Board in 2014 concerning her claim that she had not been compensated for her service as "Instructional Leader," which she deemed to be service as the de facto acting principal, at GCHS during the 2010-2011 school year. Additionally, Scott presented a claim that she had been "underpaid by approximately $1,664.00" each year since 2007 because, she asserted, the Board had "inadvertently reduc[ed] the annual pay for the Vocational Director." The Board denied Scott's grievance claims. Because Scott conceded that no genuine issues of material fact remained to be decided with respect to her individual-capacity claims against the Board members, the Board members were entitled to summary judgment concerning those remaining claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the Board members' petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Ex parte Morgan, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-counterclaim defendant Janice Morrison appealed a circuit court's judgment entered in favor of defendants-counterclaim plaintiffs Torry May, Sr., and Angela May. This case involved two parcels of property in Mobile, Lots 24 and 25. In 2008, the Morrison's parents, the Reddicks, executed a mortgage on Lot 25 in favor of GMAC Mortgage, LLC, f/k/a GMAC Mortgage Corporation ("GMAC"). Yolanda Reddick died in 2009. Shortly after Yolanda's death, Joseph Reddick moved out of state and died shortly later. Lot 24 was sold at a tax sale; GMAC foreclosed on Lot 25, and Fannie Mae purchased Lot 25 at the foreclosure sale in 2012. In early 2013, the Mays purchased Lot 25 from Fannie Mae, and Morrison purchased Lot 24 from the State. The Mays testified they waited until the redemption period ended before they started making improvements to the house. Torry testified he had not expanded the part of the house that sat on Lot 24. Morrison testified that, at the time she purchased Lot 24, she did not know that parts of the house, the driveway, and the storage shed were located on Lot 24 and that she did not discover that information until sometime later. At some point in 2018, Morrison walked up the driveway on Lot 24, and Torry told her to get off his property. She told Torry that it was not his property, the police were called, ultimately leading to this litigation. In its judgment, the trial court found that the Mays were entitled to redeem Lot 24 pursuant to § 40-10-82 because they were in possession of that property Morrison had not adversely possessed Lot 24 for a period of three years. The Alabama Supreme Court found the undisputed evidence established the Mays had never been owners of Lot 24 and never ever held title that property. Thus, the exception in § 40-10-82 did not apply. Because the Mays filed their counterclaim to redeem Lot 24 after the expiration of the time to redeem, the trial court erred when entered its August 11, 2022 judgment determining that the Mays had properly exercised the right to redeem Lot 24, and when it subsequently entered its November 3, 2022, order quieting title to Lot 24 in favor of the Mays. View "Morrison v. May" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Karen Watters and Cheryl Yarbrough appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Birmingham Hematology and Oncology Associates, LLC, d/b/a Alabama Oncology ("Alabama Oncology"), and Brian Adler on their claims alleging defamation and wantonness. Plaintiffs were formerly employed by Alabama Oncology. In August 2019, an anonymous letter was delivered to various physicians at several Alabama Oncology locations. The letter alleged that there had been illegal and unethical behavior by four staff members, two of whom were plaintiffs, and that there was "a massive lawsuit brewing." The letter also warned that an attorney would be contacting Alabama Oncology regarding a class-action lawsuit. In response to the letter, Alabama Oncology's executive director, Chris Barnes, contacted Alabama Oncology's outside legal counsel, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP ("Bradley Arant") for advice on responding to the letter and preparing for the threatened litigation. Bradley Arant began conducting an internal investigation regarding the allegations in the anonymous letter. Ultimately, after the conclusion of the internal investigation, Alabama Oncology terminated plaintiffs' employment. Plaintiffs sued Alabama Oncology, and certain executive staff, alleging that their employment had been wrongfully terminated based on the executives' conspiracy to defame the plaintiffs and the results of what they alleged was a "sham investigation." The Alabama Supreme Court found that plaintiffs' "bare assertion that they satisfied their burden to defeat the summary-judgment motion" was insufficient to warrant reversal; the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Watters, et al. v. Birmingham Hematology and Oncology Associates, LLC, d/b/a Alabama Oncology, et al." on Justia Law

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In a defamation action, M.E.J. filed a motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The circuit court denied M.E.J.'s motion. She then petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct that court to vacate its order and to enter an order dismissing the action. Because M.E.J. lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Alabama and maintenance of this action would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte M.E.J." on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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MSE Building Company, Inc. ("MSE") appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of The Stewart/Perry Company ("Stewart/Perry"); Buc-ee's, Ltd., and Buc-ee's Alabama II, LLC (referred to collectively as "Buc-ee's"); and Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company ("Philadelphia"). Among other things, the trial court found MSE's claims against the defendants were unenforceable because MSE had violated § 34-8-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, which regulated contractors, by utilizing unlicensed sub-subcontractors in connection with a construction project. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed summary judgment insofar as it determined that MSE's claims were barred as a matter of law under § 34-8-1 because there were material issues of disputed fact regarding whether the labor brokers utilized by MSE were required to obtain a general contractor's license under § 34-8-1. Accordingly, the summary judgment on MSE's lien claim and prompt-payment claim was also reversed. The summary judgment on MSE's negligence claim against Buc-ee's was affirmed. In addition, the summary judgment was affirmed insofar as it was entered in favor of Stewart/Perry on MSE's claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, because MSE did not challenge the judgment on those claims in its appellate brief. View "MSE Building Company, Inc v. The Stewart/Perry Company, et al." on Justia Law

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This appeal involved a boundary-line dispute between neighbors: Kathleen LaFlore sued her neighbors, Robert and Katherine Huggins, seeking to have the court establish the true boundary line between her property and the Hugginses' property. LaFlore alleged she had acquired legal title to the disputed property -- which consisted of a ravine ("the gully") and an adjoining strip of land -- through adverse possession. The trial court rejected LaFlore's claim and declared the true boundary to be the western survey line that existed when her family originally purchased their home in 1962. LaFlore filed a timely postjudgment motion, which the trial court denied. LaFlore appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "LaFlore v. Huggins" on Justia Law

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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") appealed a judgment entered against it on a jury verdict in an automobile-accident case. Brian Wood ("Brian") was driving through an intersection in Auburn when his vehicle was T-boned by a vehicle being driven by Mark Stafford. Brian and his wife Jennifer sued Stafford, an uninsured motorist, alleging claims of negligence, wantonness, and loss of consortium. Because Stafford was uninsured, the Woods also sued State Farm, their automobile-insurance company, seeking uninsured-motorist benefits under their policy. The jury returned a verdict in the Woods' favor, awarding them $700,000 in compensatory damages, and the trial court entered a judgment on that verdict. The jury did not award any punitive damages. State Farm filed a postjudgment motion challenging the judgment on various grounds, including whether the wantonness claim should have gone to the jury. The postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law, and State Farm appealed. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded State Farm failed to establish the trial court erred by not setting aside its judgment entered on the jury's verdict, therefore the judgment was affirmed. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Wood" on Justia Law

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Dolgencorp, LLC, appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Deborah Gilliam. In March 2016, Daisy Pearl White Freeman was operating her vehicle in the parking lot of the Northwood Shopping Center. Freeman lost control of the vehicle, ran over a six-inch curb, crossed a sidewalk, and crashed through the storefront of a Dollar General store, striking Gilliam -- a customer of the store. Gilliam sustained serious and permanent injuries. According to an Alabama Uniform Traffic Crash Report, Freeman reported that, immediately before the accident, she had been traveling across the shopping center parking lot when the vehicle's steering wheel began to shake, the vehicle jerked to the left, and the vehicle's brakes failed. The traffic report also indicated that witnesses had observed Freeman's vehicle traveling across the parking lot at a "high rate of speed." The traffic report listed the speed limit in the parking lot at 15 miles per hour; it was estimated that Freeman's vehicle had been traveling approximately 33-34 miles per hour when it collided with the storefront. Gilliam filed suit against, among others, Dolgencorp, which owned the Dollar General store, alleging that Dolgencorp had been negligent and wanton in failing to erect barriers such as bollards outside the store's entrance, which, she claimed, could have prevented Freeman's vehicle from crashing into the storefront and injuring her. Dolgencorp moved for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that Gilliam's claims were precluded as a matter of law. The Alabama Supreme Court concurred with the company, finding Gilliam's negligence claim failed as a matter of law. It therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Dolgencorp. View "Dolgencorp, LLC v. Gilliam" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Steven Dixon appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants the City of Auburn ("the City"); Ron Anders, in his official capacity as the mayor of the City; and Beth Witten, in her official capacity as an Auburn City Council member who served as mayor pro tempore of the City. The underlying action arose from a dispute between Dixon and defendants over Ordinance No. 3288, which amended the City's zoning ordinance to expressly regulate short-term rentals of residential property within the City's geographical limits. Dixon claimed that the adoption and enforcement of the short-term-rental ordinance violated his right to due process and also violated his right to equal protection as guaranteed by the Alabama Constitution. Finding that the trial court properly entered summary judgment in defendants' favor, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dixon v. City of Auburn, et al." on Justia Law