Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Denise Scott Ricks sought to admit a self-proving will to probate. After the will was admitted, Adam Dorough, Rufus Dorough, James Dorough, Patrick Dorough, and Robert Dorough brought a will contest at Circuit Court. The Circuit Court declared the will to be valid, and the Dorough brothers appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the Autauga Circuit Court. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court and reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. View "Dorough v. Ricks " on Justia Law

Defendants Dr. Gerald Hodge and Tombigbee Healthcare Authority d/b/a Bryan W. Whitfield Memorial Hospital separately petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the Marengo Circuit Court to dismiss the claims asserted against them by Gertha and David Tucker. In 2012, Gertha sued Dr. Hodge, Tombigbee, and others, alleging claims under the Alabama Medical Liability Act. Gertha alleged that Dr. Hodge performed a hysterectomy on her in 2005; that Dr. Hodge negligently failed to account for and to remove a surgical hemostat clamp from her abdomen; she did not discover the presence of the clamp until 2011 when she first started experiencing pain; and that as the proximate result of the negligent failure to remove the clamp she was made to suffer pain, life- threatening medical problems, including severe infections, and mental anguish. "Although the situation with which [the Supreme Court was] presented here [did] not involve the statute-of-limitations defense in the context of fictitious-party practice and the relation-back doctrine, the defendants . . . [were] faced with the extraordinary circumstance of having to further litigate this matter after having demonstrated from the face of the plaintiff's complaint a clear legal right to have the action against them dismissed based on the four-year period of repose found in 6-5-482(a). Having concluded that an appeal pursuant to Rule 5 or an appeal from a final judgment following further litigation is not an adequate remedy in this case, [the Court] conclude[d], based on the particular circumstances of this case, that mandamus is necessary in order to avoid the injustice that would result from the unavailability of any other adequate remedy."View "Tucker, Jr. v. Tombigbee Healthcare Authority " on Justia Law

Michelin North America, Inc. ("Michelin"), petitioned the Supreme Court for writs of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court: (1) to vacate its order allowing plaintiff Betty Brown to conduct an on-site inspection of Michelin's Ardmore, Oklahoma, tire-manufacturing facility (case no. 1121330); and (2) to vacate its order compelling Michelin to answer certain interrogatories and to comply with certain document requests propounded by Brown (case no. 1121341). Brown and her husband, George were traveling in Mobile when the tire mounted on the rear passenger side of their 1992 Ford Explorer sport-utility vehicle failed, causing an automobile accident in which George was killed and Brown was injured. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court granted Michelin's petition in case no. 1121330 and granted the petition in part in case no. 1121341. View "Brown v. Michelin North America, Inc." on Justia Law

Shelby Land Partners, LLC and Alabaster Land Company, LLC each own a 50% undivided interest in a parcel of undeveloped real property located within the municipal limits of the City of Alabaster. At the request of Shelby Land, the property was initially zoned as a "community business district," permitting only commercial uses. In 2009, Shelby Land petitioned the City to rezone the land to permit multifamily residential use in order to pursue the development of a low-income apartment complex for senior citizens on the property. The Alabaster City Council denied Shelby Land's rezoning application. Shelby Land and Alabaster Land then brought this action to appeal the denial of the rezoning request. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Shelby Land and Alabaster Land and ordered the City and the City Council to rezone the land to permit multifamily residential development. The City and the members of the City Council, who were sued in their official capacities, appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "The City of Alabaster v. Shelby Land Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Deborah Voltz, Jasmin Voltz, and Princess Turner appealed a circuit court order dismissing their action against Cameron Dyess. Plaintiffs filed their complaint against Dyess alleging Dyess had negligently and wantonly caused an automobile accident in which the plaintiffs were injured. Plaintiffs attempted service of process on Dyess by certified mail. This service of process was returned unclaimed. A few days later, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. A few months later, plaintiffs attempted to serve the amended complaint on Dyess, this time through personal service by the sheriff. A month after that, without giving notice to plaintiffs, the trial court entered an order dismissing the case for lack of service. On the same date, plaintiffs filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order of dismissal. After making their motion, the sheriff's summons was returned indicating nonservice. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to alter, and dismissed the case. Plaintiffs appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding the trial court erred when it dismissed the action without giving at least 14 days' notice to the plaintiffs that their case was subject to dismissal for failure to effect service. View "Voltz v. Dyess " on Justia Law

The Boys and Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc. ("BGCSA"), sought a writ of mandamus to order the Baldwin Circuit Court to dismiss a declaratory-judgment action filed against it and The Community Foundation of South Alabama by the attorney general of Alabama, Fairhope-Point Clear Rotary Youth Programs, Inc. ("Rotary Inc."), and Ruff Wilson Youth Organizations, Inc. ("Wilson Inc.") In 1996, B.R. Wilson, Jr., one of the incorporators and a principal benefactor of BGCSA, executed a deed transferring to BGCSA approximately 17 acres of real estate. Contemporaneously with the execution of the deed, Wilson gave a letter to BGCSA that stated Wilson's intentions and stipulations concerning his gift of the property. The letter stated that BGCSA was "'free to ultimately dispose of this property,'" but that it was Wilson's "'desire and understanding that [BGCSA] will use the proceeds from any such disposition for [BGCSA's] facilities and/or activities in the Fairhope–Point Clear area.'" Wilson died in 1997. In 2010, the Eastern Shore Clubs filed an action in the Baldwin Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against BGCSA. The Eastern Shore Clubs alleged that BGCSA "ha[d] used," or, perhaps, was "anticipat[ing] using," the proceeds from the sale of the property for its own operations, rather than for the benefit of the Eastern Shore Clubs. In 2012, the Baldwin Circuit Court entered a judgment concluding Wilson's intent was that the Wilson funds should be used for the "exclusive benefit of the Fairhope and Daphne Clubs." The Baldwin Circuit Court ordered the disbursal of the remainder of the Wilson funds. This case was the third action that has come before the Supreme Court arising out the dispute between BGCSA and the Eastern Shore Clubs over the Wilson funds. The Supreme Court concluded Section 6-5-440 compelled dismissal of this case because another action involving the same cause and the same parties ("the Mobile action") was filed first. Therefore, the Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate its most recent order in this case, and to enter an order dismissing this case. View "Alabama et al. v. Boys And Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law

A series of appeals before the Alabama Supreme Court involved a challenge to the disposition of the estate of A.V. Campbell, Sr., who died in 1977. He had at least four children: A.V. Campbell, Jr., William J. Campbell, Sr., Ethel C. Taylor, and Archie Paul Campbell. His will was admitted to probate in 1977; those proceedings languished in the probate court until 2005. During this time, A.V., Jr., and Archie Paul Campbell died. Ethel was ultimately named the executrix of the estate. In 2005, Gladys Campbell, one of Archie Paul Campbell's descendants, filed a petition to remove the probate proceedings to the Baldwin Circuit Court. She alleged, among other things, that Ethel, as the executrix, had failed to have the estate's property devised under the terms of the will. After several hearings, in 2006, the circuit court issued a judgment that, among other things, distributed property according to the testator's will. Specifically, certain property was awarded separately to (1) Ethel, (2) to Paula and Gladys, and (3) to "the heirs at law of William J. Campbell[, Sr.]." Jewel appealed that judgment, and the Supreme Court affirmed without issuing an opinion. In 2009, the underlying action was filed in the Baldwin Circuit Court: plaintiffs purported to be the heirs of William J. Campbell, Sr. Some plaintiffs participated in the 2005 circuit court action; others did not. This new action was described as a "complaint to set aside judicial decree" and was alleged to be filed "pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent action to set aside the 2006 judgment. The plaintiffs contended that, as the heirs of William J. Campbell, Sr., they were also heirs of A.V. Campbell, Sr., and were thus entitled to certain ownership interests in the property distributed in the 2005 circuit court action. Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged that they had not all been "named as parties" in the 2005 circuit court action at the time of the final adjudication," and "not subject to" and "not bound by" the 2006 judgment, and they asked that it be set aside. After various motions and after granting a motion by the defendants to strike certain affidavit testimony filed by plaintiffs, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Ethel. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment. Proceedings resumed in the trial court; Ethel and the remaining defendants moved for a summary judgment. In case no. 1110057, plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In case no. 1110104, Paula and Gladys cross-appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to strike. In case no. 1110057, Jewel Campbell, Acie A. Campbell, William J. Campbell, Jr., Roy J. Campbell, Eva Campbell, William C. Campbell, Kelly Calvert, and Amanda Givens appealed summary judgment in favor of Ethel C. Taylor, Paula Buettner, Gladys A. Campbell, Jason Bennett, and Mendi Bennett. In case no. 1110104, Paula Buettner and Gladys A. Campbell cross-appealed the denial of their motion to strike certain affidavits filed by plaintiffs in opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in case no. 1110057; its holding in case no. 1110057 rendered moot the cross-appeal in case no. 1110104. View "Campbell et al. v. Taylor et al. " on Justia Law

Larry Webber petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate his order denying his motion to dismiss an action filed against him by Donald Sherrod, Helen Sherrod, and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm"). The Sherrods hired Webber to paint inside their house. The Sherrods and State Farm alleged that Webber and his employees did not cover objects in the house before painting and that overspraying damaged the walls, floors, countertops, fixtures, appliances, and a number of items of personal property in the house. Donald Sherrod sued Webber in the small-claims court. Helen was not a party to the small-claims-court action. Sherrod won, and Webber paid the judgment. The Sherrods sued Webbr again, this time in Circuit Court - the only difference this time was that Helen was added as a party. In her affidavit filed for the circuit court action, Helen Sherrod stated that State Farm paid them "for damage[] to the flooring, walls and interior of the home. State Farm did not pay us for the damage[] to any of the personal property because the damage[] to the personal property [was] not covered by our policy." In response to the circuit court action, Webber moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and the prohibition against double recovery. The circuit court denied Webber's motion to dismiss without explaining its reasons. The Supreme Court concluded that res judicata barred the Sherrods and State Farm from bringing the circuit-court action. Accordingly, the circuit court should have granted Webber's motion for a summary judgment on all the claims against him. View "In re: Sherrod et al. v. Webber" on Justia Law

International Refining & Manufacturing Co. d/b/a IRMCO, among others, and GE Betz, Inc., among others, separately sought mandamus relief from the trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss. Bell Carr, Jr., and approximately 320 other former employees at a manufacturing plant operated by Arvin Industries d/b/a Arvin–Meritor, Inc. sued Arvin–Meritor and six individual defendants, also former employees at the plant, where automotive mufflers were manufactured. The complaint alleged that up until the closing of the plant in May 2002, the employees suffered harm from "exposure to toxic and dangerous chemicals" that were flushed from the manufacturing machines and eventually circulated into a large pit, which the employees were responsible for draining and cleaning. In addition to these seven defendants, the original complaint fictitiously named 40 other defendants in the caption and in the body of the complaint. Defendants argued that mandamus was appropriate because certain claims of wantonness were governed by a two-year statute of limitations and were time-barred because those claims did not relate-back to the date of filing of the original complaint. Although a two-year statute of limitations on wantonness claims may have been in place at the time the employees' claims arose, the six-year statute of limitations adopted in "McKenzie v. Killian" (887 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 2004)) was in place at the time the former employees asserted those claims against the defendants in the first amended complaint. Defendants did not demonstrate that the trial court failed to comply with any prior mandate of the Supreme Court, nor have they demonstrated a clear legal right to the dismissal of the wantonness claims against them by way of a summary judgment. View "Carr v. Arvin Industries" on Justia Law

O.S. and J.A.S. petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' decision affirming the judgment of the circuit court in favor of E.S. setting aside a final judgment of adoption by the Probate Court of Walker County The Court granted certiorari review solely to determine whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider E.S.'s independent action seeking to set aside the probate court's judgment of adoption. Concluding that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re: O.S. and J.A.S. v. E.S." on Justia Law