Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondents Reed Collar and Bonnie Collar, as the parents of Gilbert Collar, sued the University of South Alabama in connection with Gilbert's death. In October 2012, Gilbert was a student at the University. At some point while he and a few other students were talking, Gilbert was given a substance that was believed to have included illegal drugs. Gilbert had a sudden and immediate reaction to the substance: the reaction caused him either to become extremely hot or to believe that he was very hot. Gilbert lost the ability to fully understand his actions and to reason. As a result, Gilbert took off his clothes and began running into and out of traffic on the campus of the University. At some point during his reaction, Gilbert went to the University's police station and began hitting the windows. Gilbert started to walk away from the building but came back and started hitting the door of the station. An officer came out of the station through the door with his weapon drawn. After the officer called to Gilbert, Gilbert started to advance toward the police station and "immediately began acting in an erratic manner." When Gilbert was a few feet from the officer ("and for unexplainable reasons"), the officer shot Gilbert. The trial court entered an order denying the Chief of University Police's motion to dismiss. The Chief filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to reverse the trial court. The Supreme Court found that the Chief had a clear legal right to the dismissal of counts one and three of the complaint against him. Therefore, the Court granted his petition. View "Collar v. University of South Alabama" on Justia Law

In late 2005 or early 2006, Corey Culverhouse began constructing a house for himself on a five-acre lot in Hartford. He obtained a policy from Alfa Mutual Insurance Company to insure the house during the remainder of the construction process and after construction was completed. In 2009, a minor fire damaged the kitchen of the house. Culverhouse submitted a claim to Alfa, which paid for a remediation company to clean and repair the smoke damage caused by the fire. During this process, Culverhouse moved out of the house and into a barn on his property. After about two weeks of living in the barn, Culverhouse moved into a house he was constructing for eventual sale across the road from his house. Later that year, another fire damaged the house. This time, the fire could not be extinguished, and the house, its contents, and an adjacent swimming pool were completely destroyed. Culverhouse promptly informed Alfa. Alfa immediately questioned the Culverhouse's claim because he had not submitted with his claim an inventory of the contents of the house and supporting documentation, and he had not submitted any evidence supporting the large claim he had submitted for loss of use in the two-month period prior to the second fire. Culverhouse ultimately sued Alfa for payment of the claim. A hearing on the summary-judgment motion was held on in 2013, and the trial court granted Alfa's motion and dismissed each of Culverhouse's claims; the trial court also dismissed an Alfa counterclaim as moot. Culverhouse thereafter retained a new attorney and, on moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its order. The trial court granted Culverhouse's motion in part and amended its summary-judgment order so as to exclude Culverhouse's breach-of-contract claim from the judgment, leaving it as the only remaining claim in the case. Alfa's argument on appeal did not relate to the merits of Culverhouse's breach-of-contract claim. Rather, it concerned only whether the trial court acted properly by amending its summary-judgment order to resurrect that claim in response to Culverhouse's motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "ALFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Culverhouse " on Justia Law

Frank Gillis, M.D. appealed a $5,000,000 judgment entered on a jury verdict against him in favor of Joey Frazier, as executor of the estate of his mother, Florine Bryant, in a wrongful-death/medical-malpractice case. Bryant died in 2005. The case against Dr. Gillis was first tried in October 2010. At the close of Frazier's case, Dr. Gillis moved for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML"), arguing that his alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of Bryant's death. The trial court entered a JML in Dr. Gillis's favor. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial. The case was retried in June 2012. At the conclusion of the retrial of the case, the jury awarded Frazier $5,000,000 in damages for the wrongful death of his mother. Dr. Gillis filed a motion seeking, alternatively, a JML, a new trial, or a remittitur of the damages award. The parties engaged in posttrial discovery. Frazier sought the production of evidence related to a potential bad-faith claim by Dr. Gillis against his liability-insurance carrier, ProAssurance Indemnity Company, Inc. ProAssurance produced certain documents from its claim file for in camera review by the trial court. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and subsequently denied Dr. Gillis's postjudgment motions. Dr. Gillis appealed. After Dr. Gillis filed his appeal from the trial court's denial of his postjudgment motions, Dr. Gillis asked the Supreme Court for permission to file a motion with the trial court for relief from the trial court's judgment under Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Frazier opposed Dr. Gillis's motion. The Supreme Court entered an order staying the appeal and allowing Dr. Gillis to file a Rule 60(b) motion, and remanded the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a "Hammond/Green Oil" hearing concerning the jury's punitive-damages award. The trial court denied Dr. Gillis's Rule 60(b) motion as time-barred. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment denying Dr. Gillis relief under Rule 60(b). The Court also reversed the trial court insofar as it considered the potential bad-faith and/or negligent-failure-to-settle claim against Dr. Gillis's liability-insurance carrier. On remand, the trial court was ordered to conduct a Hammond/Green Oil hearing without consideration of the potential bad-faith claim and without consideration of Dr. Gillis's wife's portion of jointly owned assets. View "Gillis v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Tiffin Motorhomes, Inc. sued Edgetech I.G.,Inc., n/k/a Quanex I.G. Systems, Inc.; Quanex Building Products Corporation; Thompson I.G., LLC, and RDM Consulting, LLC; and Wynne Enterprises, Inc. Edgetech filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction; the trial court denied the motion. Edgetech then filed this petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that the Supreme Court direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to dismiss and to enter an order granting the motion and dismissing the case against it. Finding that the trial court erred in denying Edgetech's motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court granted Edgetech's petition and issued the writ. View "Tiffin Motorhomes, Inc. v. Thompson I.G., LLC et al. " on Justia Law

U.S. Bank National Association and U.S. Bancorp sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Jefferson Circuit Court to dismiss the malicious-prosecution case filed against them by Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc. that arose out of a lawsuit prosecuted by U.S. Bank entirely in the State of Washington. The principle of "lex loci delicti" requires that the law of the state in which the antecedent lawsuit was terminated in favor of the complaining party governs a malicious-prosecution claim. Thus, Washington law governed Sterne Agee's claim of malicious prosecution. Accordingly, U.S. Bank's petition for writ for mandamus was granted, and the circuit court was ordered to dismiss Sterne Agee's malicious-prosecution case.View "Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc. v. U.S. Bank National Association" on Justia Law

Denise Scott Ricks sought to admit a self-proving will to probate. After the will was admitted, Adam Dorough, Rufus Dorough, James Dorough, Patrick Dorough, and Robert Dorough brought a will contest at Circuit Court. The Circuit Court declared the will to be valid, and the Dorough brothers appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the Autauga Circuit Court. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court and reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. View "Dorough v. Ricks " on Justia Law

Defendants Dr. Gerald Hodge and Tombigbee Healthcare Authority d/b/a Bryan W. Whitfield Memorial Hospital separately petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the Marengo Circuit Court to dismiss the claims asserted against them by Gertha and David Tucker. In 2012, Gertha sued Dr. Hodge, Tombigbee, and others, alleging claims under the Alabama Medical Liability Act. Gertha alleged that Dr. Hodge performed a hysterectomy on her in 2005; that Dr. Hodge negligently failed to account for and to remove a surgical hemostat clamp from her abdomen; she did not discover the presence of the clamp until 2011 when she first started experiencing pain; and that as the proximate result of the negligent failure to remove the clamp she was made to suffer pain, life- threatening medical problems, including severe infections, and mental anguish. "Although the situation with which [the Supreme Court was] presented here [did] not involve the statute-of-limitations defense in the context of fictitious-party practice and the relation-back doctrine, the defendants . . . [were] faced with the extraordinary circumstance of having to further litigate this matter after having demonstrated from the face of the plaintiff's complaint a clear legal right to have the action against them dismissed based on the four-year period of repose found in 6-5-482(a). Having concluded that an appeal pursuant to Rule 5 or an appeal from a final judgment following further litigation is not an adequate remedy in this case, [the Court] conclude[d], based on the particular circumstances of this case, that mandamus is necessary in order to avoid the injustice that would result from the unavailability of any other adequate remedy."View "Tucker, Jr. v. Tombigbee Healthcare Authority " on Justia Law

Michelin North America, Inc. ("Michelin"), petitioned the Supreme Court for writs of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court: (1) to vacate its order allowing plaintiff Betty Brown to conduct an on-site inspection of Michelin's Ardmore, Oklahoma, tire-manufacturing facility (case no. 1121330); and (2) to vacate its order compelling Michelin to answer certain interrogatories and to comply with certain document requests propounded by Brown (case no. 1121341). Brown and her husband, George were traveling in Mobile when the tire mounted on the rear passenger side of their 1992 Ford Explorer sport-utility vehicle failed, causing an automobile accident in which George was killed and Brown was injured. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court granted Michelin's petition in case no. 1121330 and granted the petition in part in case no. 1121341. View "Brown v. Michelin North America, Inc." on Justia Law

Shelby Land Partners, LLC and Alabaster Land Company, LLC each own a 50% undivided interest in a parcel of undeveloped real property located within the municipal limits of the City of Alabaster. At the request of Shelby Land, the property was initially zoned as a "community business district," permitting only commercial uses. In 2009, Shelby Land petitioned the City to rezone the land to permit multifamily residential use in order to pursue the development of a low-income apartment complex for senior citizens on the property. The Alabaster City Council denied Shelby Land's rezoning application. Shelby Land and Alabaster Land then brought this action to appeal the denial of the rezoning request. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Shelby Land and Alabaster Land and ordered the City and the City Council to rezone the land to permit multifamily residential development. The City and the members of the City Council, who were sued in their official capacities, appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "The City of Alabaster v. Shelby Land Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Deborah Voltz, Jasmin Voltz, and Princess Turner appealed a circuit court order dismissing their action against Cameron Dyess. Plaintiffs filed their complaint against Dyess alleging Dyess had negligently and wantonly caused an automobile accident in which the plaintiffs were injured. Plaintiffs attempted service of process on Dyess by certified mail. This service of process was returned unclaimed. A few days later, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. A few months later, plaintiffs attempted to serve the amended complaint on Dyess, this time through personal service by the sheriff. A month after that, without giving notice to plaintiffs, the trial court entered an order dismissing the case for lack of service. On the same date, plaintiffs filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order of dismissal. After making their motion, the sheriff's summons was returned indicating nonservice. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to alter, and dismissed the case. Plaintiffs appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding the trial court erred when it dismissed the action without giving at least 14 days' notice to the plaintiffs that their case was subject to dismissal for failure to effect service. View "Voltz v. Dyess " on Justia Law