Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In an unpublished order, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued a writ of mandamus directing the trial court in the underlying case to "bar" the prosecution of respondent Margie Kelley, who had been indicted for three counts of capital murder. The State petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate its order. The Court of Criminals Appeals relied on the decision of "Davenport v. Alabama," (968 So. 2d 27 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)) in arriving at its conclusion. In its mandamus petition, the State contended that "Davenport," in holding that an individual cannot be prosecuted for hindering the prosecution of another when the individual was also a principal, or participated, in that crime, misstated the law. The Supreme Court agreed. As such, the State met its burden for mandamus relief, and the Supreme Court granted its petition and issued the writ. View "Alabama v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Tommy Sundy petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss third-party claims asserted against him by accounting firm Frost Cummings Tidwell Group, LLC ("FCT"). Adams Produce Company, Inc. ("APCI"), purchased Crestview Produce of Destin, Inc., from Sundy. As part of the transaction, APCI and Sundy executed a promissory note in the amount of $850,000, and Sundy became an employee of APCI. FCT alleges that, based on representations from APCI and Sundy, certain budget and bonus projections were set for APCI, but those goals were not met. Because of that failure, Sundy was not entitled to bonuses that had been paid to him throughout 2009. With the alleged help and direction of FCT, APCI recharacterized the bonuses as repayments of principal on the promissory note. The nonpayment of certain amounts to Sundy in the context of this action effectively increased APCI's income and decreased its indebtedness. APCI also allegedly entered into an oral, undocumented agreement with Sundy stipulating that it would make him whole in future years for the forfeited bonus payments. In 2009, APCI's shareholders decided to sell the company to API Holdings, LLC. API Holdings alleges that it discovered that, contrary to representations made by FCT in an audit report, APCI's financial statements were fraudulent, causing API Holdings to believe that APC was worth more than it actually was. API Holdings sued FCT asserting claims of negligent misrepresentation, auditing malpractice, fraud, and other claims of professional malfeasance. Among several other claims, API Holdings alleged that FCT had failed to uncover misrepresentations by Sundy and APCI and that FCT had acted fraudulently in confirming the recharacterization of Sundy's bonuses as payments on principal of the promissory note. A few months later, APC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. APC filed an adversarial complaint in FCT's bankruptcy case, alleging that FCT's audit work had painted a false financial picture of APC upon which APC had relied in continuing to operate its business even after reaching the point of insolvency. FCT filed a third-party complaint with the bankruptcy court against Sundy and others. FCT's complaint alleged various theories under Alabama law as bases for FCT to "recover over" against Sundy. Sundy subsequently moved to dismiss FCT's third-party complaint on the basis of 6-5-440, Ala. Code 1975, Alabama's abatement statute. The circuit court denied the motion, and Sundy then filed his petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to have the Supreme Court direct the circuit court to vacate its judgment denying his motion to dismiss and to order the circuit court to dismiss FCT's claims against Sundy asserted in its third-party complaint at circuit court. The Supreme Court concluded that FCT's third-party claims against Sundy were not barred by the abatement statute. The circuit court properly declined to dismiss those claims. Therefore, the Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "In re: API Holdings, LLC v. Frost Cummings Tidwell Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The State Comptroller, Thomas L. White, Jr., appealed a preliminary injunction entered in response to an action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by Karen John, the Alabama Education Association ("the AEA"), Randy Hebson, and the Alabama State Employees Association ("the ASEA"). This was the third time a case involving the question of deductions by the comptroller from a State employee's salary for payment of contributions and dues has come before the Supreme Court in recent months. The comptroller executed payroll deductions for dues from State employees who were members of the AEA and the ASEA. On June 29, 2012, the comptroller issued a "memorandum" to "Affected Organizations" regarding "Act 2010-761 Guidelines (State Comptroller Payroll Deductions, Revised June 2012)." The memorandum also contained a sample "Act 2010-761 Certification Form for Organizations:" if the organization wanted to receive salary deductions from State employees, the form required an individual from the organization to provide a notarized signature and to certify under penalty of being barred from receiving deductions that the organization would "not use any portion of the membership dues collected by payroll deduction from the pay of its members who are State employees for political activity as that term is defined in [the Act]" and that the organization would "provide to the State Comptroller a detailed breakdown of the expenditure of those membership dues not later than the deadline, and using the forms, prescribed by the Comptroller from time to time." The comptroller sent copies of the memorandum to the AEA, the ASEA, and other organizations that were receiving dues from State-employee members via salary deductions. The ASEA submitted its certification to the comptroller, along with a letter from its counsel, stating, in part, that the organization submitted the certification "under protest and without waiving any of its rights as they relate to any ongoing litigation concerning [the Act], or related to the rules and regulations promulgated in your 'Memorandum to Affected Organizations.'" The AEA declined to submit a certification form and thus was deemed ineligible to receive dues via payroll deductions. On August 17, 2012, the AEA, AEA member and State employee Karen John, the ASEA, and ASEA president Randy Hebson sued White in his official capacity as comptroller and the "Office of the State Comptroller" seeking a judgment declaring that the guidelines were void because they had been promulgated without following the procedures required in the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act. The Supreme Court reversed: plaintiffs' action was "due to be dismissed"insofar as it purported to name "the Office of the State Comptroller" as a defendant, and the circuit court was instructed to dismiss the action in that regard. Furthermore, the Court found the circuit court erred in issuing the injunction as plaintiffs did not meet their burden for injunctive relief. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "White v. John et al. " on Justia Law

Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company ("Penn National") was sued by Jacob Walker, an employee of its named insured, seeking underinsured-motorist ("UIM") benefits following an automobile accident. After settling the claims against it, Penn National filed a cross-claim against Michael Bradford, the alleged tortfeasor, asserting a subrogation theory of recovery. The trial court dismissed the cross-claim on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations, and Penn National appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company v. Bradford " on Justia Law

Jean S. Gray appealed two circuit court orders in an action filed against Larry Bain and Sharon Johnston in which Gray sought a judgment declaring that she owned a parcel of land and an injunction preventing Bain and Johnston from asserting any rights to the parcel. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the trial court erred in granting a Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion filed by Bain and Johnston that set aside a settlement of the action. View "Gray v. Bain" on Justia Law

Sara Crossfield appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Limestone County Commission in her action to reverse the Commission's decision to vacate a portion of Dogwood Flats Road in Limestone County. In early 2013, the Commission proposed to vacate a portion of Dogwood Flats Road. Crossfield's property did not abut the portion of Dogwood Flats Road proposed to be vacated; it abutted Dogwood Flats Road approximately 400 feet north of the portion of the road that the Commission proposed to vacate. At a hearing on the matter, Crossfield alleged that she was a "party affected by the vacation of a portion of Dogwood Flat[s] Road" and asked the trial court to set aside the vacation of the road. Crossfield alleged, among other things, that the Commission had obstructed her access to Piney Creek, east and south of Crossfield's property. The Commission moved to dismiss, arguing Crossfield was not affected by the vacation and therefore lacked standing to appeal the Commission's decision regarding Dogwood Flats. The trial court granted the Commission's motion for a summary judgment and dismissed Crossfield's appeal. Crossfield's evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to her as the nonmovant, did not create a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude a summary judgment for the Commission. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Commission. View "Crossfield v. Limestone County Commission " on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals and petition for a writ of mandamus arose out of litigation stemming from the alleged breach of a lease agreement, which litigation was originally initiated by the lessor, Goodall-Brown Associates, L.P. Following the entry of an order compelling the matter to arbitration, the defendants Sloss Real Estate Group, Inc. ("SREG"), the lessee; Sloss Goodall-Brown, LLC, the assignee of SREG; Cadence Bank, N.A., and Second Avenue Holdings, LLC, the successors in interest to Goodall-Brown's original mortgage lender; and Leigh Ferguson, Catherine Crenshaw, Jack Peterson, A. Page Sloss, Jr., Ronald Capello, and Vicki Bolton (collectively, "the individual defendants"), and Sloss Real Estate Company ("SREC"), the alleged alter ego of the individual defendants in conjunction with SREG and Sloss Goodall, unsuccessfully sought dismissal of Goodall-Brown's claims based on the trial court's alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to order the matter to arbitration because, they argued, Goodall-Brown lacked standing to assert the claims. In case no. 1111422, Cadence appealed the trial court's order effectively compelling it to arbitration. In case no. 1111449, the Sloss defendants renewed their contention that the trial court lacked the requisite subject-matter jurisdiction to compel the parties to arbitration. Alternatively, in case no. 1111526, the Sloss defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to void its order compelling the matter to arbitration and to dismiss the underlying action based on Goodall-Brown's alleged lack of standing and that court's resulting lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In case no. 1121455 and case no. 1130054, Second Avenue appealed the trial court's denial of its request to enjoin discovery in the arbitration proceeding ordered by that court as to Second Avenue, pending resolution of the other appeals and petition. Upon review of the cases, the Supreme Court: affirmed in case 1111422; denied the petition in 1111526; and dismissed the appeals in cases nos. 1111449, 1121455, and 1130054. View "Cadence Bank N.A. v. Goodall-Brown Associates, L.P. " on Justia Law

Kevin Towles was convicted of capital murder for killing his son, Geontae Glass, who was under the age of 14 when he was killed. The jury recommended the death sentence, and the trial court sentenced Towles to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Towles's conviction and sentence in a per curiam opinion. The State petitioned for certiorari, arguing the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing Towles's conviction based on the admission of certain testimony by Towles' other son, because the testimony was relevant and admissible to prove Towles's motive for killing Geontae. The State further argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in failing to apply a harmless-error analysis to the trial court's erroneous limiting instruction, which allowed the jury to consider Towles's collateral bad acts for improper purposes. Towles contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in determining that Cameron's testimony was inadmissible to show motive because, he says, there was no logical or factual connection between Geontae's killing and the incidents of abuse testified to by Cameron. In this case, the Supreme Court found that the prior bad acts of assault and physical abuse were not perpetrated by Towles upon the victim Geontae. Rather, the prior assaults and abuse were perpetrated upon Cameron approximately three years before Geontae's murder. "We cannot say that Cameron's testimony relating to the physical assaults he suffered at the hands of Towles approximately three years before Geontae's murder was relevant to show that Towles intended to kill Geontae. Further, where the jury was faced with deciding whether Towles intended to murder Geontae or to assault him for disciplinary issues at school, the admission of the collateral assaults perpetrated by Towles upon Cameron were highly prejudicial. The probative value, if any, of the testimony concerning the collateral assaults upon one son simply does not outweigh the undue prejudice to Towles in his prosecution for the capital murder of his other son." Accordingly the trial court's admission of the collateral-acts testimony to show intent and its limiting instruction to the jury that the jury could consider the testimony for purposes of establishing intent constituted plain error. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals. View "Towles v. Alabama" on Justia Law

S.C., the maternal grandmother, petitioned the Juvenile Court to intervene and to grant her custody of S.D.A., who was 19 months old at the time of trial, and R.D.A., who was 9 months old at the time of trial, both of whom were in the custody of S.L.M. and R.S.M. S.L.M. and R.S.M. are not related to the children. In the petitions, the grandmother alleged that the children were dependent as to the mother and the biological father, that S.L.M. may have been awarded temporary custody of the children, and that it would be in the best interest of the children for the children to be placed in her custody. The maternal grandmother's counsel argued that the children should be placed with a relative and that, because the children's half sister was in the custody of the maternal grandmother, the children should be placed in the custody of the maternal grandmother and be united with their half sister. After considering the evidence, the juvenile court entered orders awarding custody of the children to the maternal grandmother. After S.L.M. and R.S.M.'s posttrial motions were denied, they appealed the judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals. On return to remand, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's judgments. The Supreme Court reversed: the evidence did not support a modification of custody. "Nothing in the record supports the conclusion that modifying custody and removing the children from the home of S.L.M. and R.S.M. would materially promote the children's best interest; therefore, granting the maternal grandmother custody of the children is plainly and palpably wrong." View "In re: S.L.M. and R.S.M. v. S.C." on Justia Law

David Childers and Robert DeShawn Childers ("Shawn") appealed the Circuit Court's judgment quieting title in a certain piece of real property, on which is situated a house, in Leroy Darby. The trial court admitted into evidence the deposition of David, who testified that he had purchased the property at issue at a foreclosure sale in 1995. He stated that he had repaired the house, had cleaned up the yard, and had used the surrounding land to train his horses from 1995 through 2003 or 2004. He explained that he had filed a deed reflecting his ownership of the property but that he had never paid taxes on the property because he had been informed by the "tax office" that he was exempt from taxes because he was 65 years old and totally disabled. According to David, his son Shawn has lived on the property since 2000. Evidence was also presented indicating that the deed filed by David was not for the property at issue but for an adjoining one-acre lot. Additionally, a mortgage-foreclosure deed indicating that the one-acre lot owned by David had been foreclosed on in 2004 was admitted into evidence, and additional evidence was admitted indicating that that property had subsequently been sold several times. After considering the testimony and other evidence, the trial court quieted title in the real property, including the house, in Darby. Shawn and David moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, arguing, among other grounds, that the trial court had erred in quieting title in Darby because, they asserted, the evidence did not establish that Darby was in peaceable possession of the property. The trial court denied the motion, and Shawn and David appealed. The Supreme Court's review of the evidence established that the trial court erred in quieting title in Darby because the evidence did not establish that Darby was in peaceable possession of the property. Darby's testimony that he had only driven past the property several times but had never walked the property or obtained actual possession of the property established that he was not in actual possession of the property. The evidence further established that, although Darby had legal title to the property, Shawn was living on the property. Therefore, because Shawn was in actual possession of the property, the evidence did not establish that Darby had constructive possession of the property. The record, however, did not establish that either Shawn or David had peaceable possession of the property or that either Shawn or David had acquired title to the property by adverse possession. Therefore, the record did not support a judgment quieting title in either Shawn or David. View "Childers v. Darby " on Justia Law