Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to address whether a juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a termination-of-parental-rights claim when the grounds for the termination did not involve a child alleged "to have committed a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in need of supervision." The Court held that a juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction under 12-15-114 over a termination-of-parental-rights claim when the subject of the termination was not a child alleged "to have committed a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in need of supervision." "[T]he legislature clearly expressed its intent in its 2014 amendments that under the 2008 AJJA the juvenile court have exclusive original jurisdiction over all termination-of-parental-rights proceedings. For this case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded this case for that court to consider any arguments that may have been pretermitted by the Court of Civil Appeals' analysis. View "In re: C.C. v. L.J." on Justia Law

In 2010, Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company (BMIC) filed an "Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Complaint for Declaratory Judgment" against 122 individuals who were insured under various insurance policies issued by BMIC. According to the complaint, the insureds, through their legal counsel, had sent a letter requesting BMIC provide copies of the policy file for each of the insureds, and the letter accused BMIC of "bad faith" as to its treatment of the insureds. According to BMIC's complaint, the various insurance policies at issue provided that BMIC or an insured could invoke an appraisal process if BMIC and the insured could not reach an agreement as to the amount of compensation due the insured for a loss covered under the insured's policy. BMIC asked that the restraining order "enjoin[] the [insureds] from engaging in the appraisal process and stay[] the time in which [BMIC] has to identify an appraiser or otherwise participate in said process." Also, BMIC asserted that "it will be caused immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage should it be required to engage in the appraisal process demanded prior to determining whether [the insureds] separately and severally are entitled to invoke the appraisal process." BMIC appealed the Circuit Court's order modifying a previous order granting BMIC injunctive relief. Based on its review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred by ordering BMIC to engage in the appraisal process before the insureds satisfied their respective post-loss obligations and before BMIC had sufficient information on which it could decide whether it disagreed with the respective claims of the insureds. Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company v. Adair et al. " on Justia Law

The Jackson County Board of Education petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter an order dismissing the complaint of D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. on the ground of sovereign immunity. Pruett Contracting submitted a proposal for renovations to the Pisgah High School gymnasium. The Jackson County superintendent of education executed a purchase order authorizing Pruett Contracting to make certain renovations to the gymnasium, totaling $231,309. Pruett Contracting then began renovating the gymnasium. The Superintendent later received a letter from the State of Alabama Building Commission stating that "all work on the renovation of the Pisgah High School gymnasium [was] to stop immediately" because the project had not been submitted to or approved by the Building Commission. The Board instructed Pruett Contracting to cease all work on the gymnasium. Pruett Contracting submitted an invoice to the Board for the work that had been performed prior to the letter. Months later, because it had not received payment for its work, Pruett Contracting sued the Board, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking recovery of damages on theories of quantum meruit, work and labor done, open account, and account stated. The Board moved the court to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was entitled to sovereign immunity as to the claims alleged by Pruett Contracting and that the court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. Pruett Contracting responded, arguing that this case involved a protected property interest, that immunity was thus precluded, and that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. The Supreme Court concluded the Board established that it was entitled to sovereign immunity and that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this action; therefore, the action had to be dismissed. Because the Board demonstrated a clear legal right to an order directing the Circuit Court to dismiss Pruett Contracting's complaint, the Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Circuit Court to dismiss Pruett Contracting's complaint. View "D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. v. Jackson County Board of Education" on Justia Law

First United Security Bank and its wholly owned subsidiary, Paty Holdings, LLC (collectively, "the bank"), brought suit to recover excess funds received by Tuscaloosa County from the tax sale of real estate owned by Wayne Allen Russell, Jr., and on which First United had a mortgage. The bank foreclosed on its mortgage after the tax sale but before the demand for excess proceeds was made. The issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is an "owner" entitled under 40-10-28, Ala. Code 1975, to receive the excess proceeds from a tax sale of the real property foreclosed upon. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank was entitled to the excess tax-sale proceeds. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "First United Security Bank v. McCollum" on Justia Law

Electric Insurance Company petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to allow Electric, an uninsured-motorist insurer, to "opt out" of the trial of the underlying case. The issue presented by this petition was whether Electric asserted its right to opt out within a reasonable time. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that it did; thus, it granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Bolt v. Electric Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Alabama Rivers Alliance and Friends of Hurricane Creek (collectively, "ARA") petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' decision reversing the trial court's decision to dismiss an appeal by Tuscaloosa Resources, Inc. ("TRI") of a decision of the Environmental Management Commission. The Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") oversees the Commission. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Civil Appeals' decision conflicted with its decision in "Price v. South Central Bell," (313 So. 2d 184 (1975)), and the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in "Personnel Board of Jefferson County v. Bailey," (475 So. 2d 863 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in this case conflicted with "Price" and "Bailey," and accordingly reversed its judgment. View "Tuscaloosa Resources, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Enviromental Management" on Justia Law

Following a two-day trial in May 2013, a Bullock County jury returned a $450,000 verdict in favor of Michael Shepherd on a breach-of-warranty claim he asserted against Barko Hydraulics, LLC. Shepherd purchased a Barko 495ML knuckle boom loader ("the 495ML loader") from G&S Equipment Company in 2008 for use in his logging operation. In November 2010, when the 495ML loader had approximately 4,300 hours on its clock, Shepherd transported it to G&S Equipment for repairs after the hydraulic pumps began making noise. G&S Equipment confirmed that the hydraulic pumps had failed and notified Shepherd that the needed repairs, costing approximately $10,000, would not be covered under the warranty because the warranty period had expired. At Shepherd's request, G&S Equipment contacted Barko, which confirmed that it would not authorize or reimburse G&S Equipment for making the needed repair because of the expiration of the warranty. At that point, Shepherd told G&S Equipment that he could not afford to pay for the repairs to the 495ML loader, nor could he continue to meet his obligation to Wells Fargo (the bank that lent him the purchase money for the loader). He left the loader with G&S Equipment, notified Wells Fargo of its location, and of his intention to make no further payments on it. Wells Fargo subsequently repossessed the loader, sold it, and obtained a $124,184 deficit judgment against Shepherd. Shepherd then sued Barko, G&S Equipment, and Cummins Mid-South, LLC, the manufacturer of certain component parts of the 495ML loader, asserting fraud, negligence and/or wantonness, and multiple breach-of-warranty claims. Shepherd sought both compensatory damages for lost profits and mental anguish and punitive damages. Ultimately, G&S Equipment and Cummins Mid-South were dismissed from the action, and, during the course of the trial, all of Shepherd's claims against Barko except a breach-of-express-warranty claim were withdrawn or dismissed. Barko's subsequent postjudgment motion renewing its previous motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial was denied by the trial court. Barko then appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Court concluded the trial court erred in not granting Barko's postjudgment motions. The case was remanded for entry of an order granting Barko's motion for a new trial. View "Barko Hydraulics, LLC v. Shepherd " on Justia Law

The decedent died in Monroe County in Spring, 2013. She had three adult children who survived her: Alice Harper-Taylor, William C. Harper, and James R. Harper. The decedent's husband died in 2002. Alice filed in Monroe County a petition to probate a 1995 will allegedly executed by the decedent. In her petition, Alice acknowledged that there was in existence a 2007 will that purported to be the will of the decedent, but she challenged the validity of the 2007 will on several grounds, including lack of mental capacity and the existence of a reciprocal will by the decedent's husband that had been admitted to probate in 2002. The Monroe County probate judge recused himself from hearing the petition, and the Supreme Court appointed a special probate judge to hear the proceedings in Monroe County. Meanwhile, in early 2014, William filed a petition in Escambia County to probate a 2007 will allegedly executed by the decedent. Alice filed a motion to dismiss and/or to stay the proceeding in Escambia County until the proper venue for the probate proceeding was determined. The Escambia Probate Court admitted the 2007 will to probate and issued letters testamentary to William, as the personal representative named in the 2007 will. Alice appealed the Escambia Court's decision, while William filed a motion to dismiss Alice's petition to probate the 1995 will in Monroe County. The Monroe Probate Court granted William's motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Alice appealed the Monroe Probate Court's grant of the motion to dismiss her petition to probate the 1995 will (case no. 1130884). In case no. 1130587, Alice appealed the Escambia Probate Court's admission to probate the 2007 will, and in case no. 1130884, she appealed the Monroe Probate Court's order granting the motion to dismiss her petition to probate the 1995 will. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that venue in this case was proper in the Monroe Probate Court, therefore, the Court reversed the Escambia Court's judgment admitting the 2007 will. Furthermore, the Court concluded the Monroe Court erred in dismissing Alice's petition. The case was remanded to Monroe County for further proceedings. View "In the matter of the Estate of Alice Earle F. Harper" on Justia Law

The Practice-Monroeville, P.C., is a medical-practice group located in Monroeville. Allscripts Healthcare, LLC, based in North Carolina with no Alabama offices, sells health-care software to health-care providers. Jackson Key Practice Solutions, LLC is a certified "sales-and-service partner" of Allscripts, selling and servicing Allscripts software, and Anderton is an employee and partial owner of Jackson Key. In May 2011, the Practice and Allscripts entered into a written contract in which the Practice purchased health-care software called "MyWay" from Allscripts through Jackson Key. The contract contained an arbitration provision, which stated in pertinent part: "Any dispute or claim arising out of, or in connection with, this Agreement shall be finally settled by binding arbitration in Raleigh, NC, in accordance with the then-current rules and procedures of the American Arbitration Association ...." The Practice became dissatisfied with the performance of the MyWay software and unsuccessfully attempted to cancel its contract with Allscripts. The Practice sued Jackson Key and Anderton, but not Allscripts, in circuit court. Jackson Key and Anderton moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the contract. Anderton and Jackson Key appealed the Circuit Court's order denying their motion to compel arbitration. After review, the Supreme Court found the circuit court erred in its decision, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Anderton v. The Practice-Monroeville, P.C. " on Justia Law

The issue in these four appeals was whether the $100,000 statutory cap of 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, applied when a peace officer, acting outside his employment, was sued in the officer's individual capacity. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the $100,000 statutory cap did not apply when a peace officer, acting outside his employment, was sued individually. "The limitation on recovery in the second sentence of 11-47-190 is intended to protect the public coffers of the municipality, not to protect municipal employees from claims asserted against them in their individual capacity. [. . .] We recognize that municipal employees were not the intended subject of the legislature's enactment of 11-17-190, and we also recognize that the legislature is better suited to speak comprehensively on the individual liability of municipal employees." View "Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation v. Willie Allen " on Justia Law