Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The circuit court entered a judgment finding that Lisa Hanvey had suffered a compensable injury caused by her exposure to chemical fumes during the course of her employment with Madison Academy, Inc. The trial court awarded Hanvey permanent-total-disability benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court granted Hanvey's petition for a writ of certiorari to review whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's judgment awarding Hanvey benefits for a permanent total disability under the Act. After review, the Supreme Court concluded there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that Hanvey was permanently and totally disable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment and remanded the case back to that court for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Lisa Hanvey." on Justia Law

This issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the ownership interests in and control of Autauga Automotive, LLC, a limited liability company that owned and operated a Ford Motor Company franchise in Prattville known as "Gilmore Ford." Frank Moultrie appealed a circuit court judgment which held that the interests of Charles O. Wall II and Moultrie in the profits and losses of Autauga Automotive were 90% and 10%, respectively, but that Moultrie was divested of his 10% interest for failing to pay a required capital contribution. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. That part of the circuit court's judgment holding that Moultrie was divested of his interest in Autauga Automotive by failing to make a capital contribution pursuant to Wall's September 2012 capital call was reversed, and the case remanded back to the circuit court with instructions to enter a judgment in favor of Moultrie on that claim. The case was affirmed in all other aspects. View "Moultrie v. Wall" on Justia Law

Peter Ferrari was employed by DR Horton, Inc. - Birmingham as a land-acquisition manager for its Gulf Coast division. DR Horton asserted that it gave Ferrari confidential information concerning its business and land-acquisition strategies, including its geographical markets for expansion, and that it empowered Ferrari to arrange land purchases for DR Horton. DR Horton asserted that it received information that Ferrari had supplied third parties with confidential information from DR Horton without DR Horton's permission, including DR Horton's planned land acquisitions, future real estate developments, markets for expansion, and plans for construction. DR Horton also claimed it received information that Ferrari had benefited from DR Horton land acquisitions apart from his employment compensation. DR Horton asked for the tax returns of the Ferrari, his wife, his business Ferrari Capital Partners, LLC, and the entities that allegedly received DR Horton's confidential information: FH Properties, LLC; P6 Holdings, LLC; and Prince 5 Holdings, LLC (collectively, Ferrari defendants) in order to verify his assertions, but Ferrari refused to provide such information. DR Horton subsequently contacted those defendant third parties. Brad Zeitlin agreed to meet with DR Horton representatives to discuss real-property transactions involving DR Horton and Ferrari. According to a witness present during the interview, Zeitlin admitted that he had benefited financially from "tying up" property DR Horton wanted to purchase and then selling it to DR Horton. wanted. DR Horton terminated Ferrari's employment. DR Horton filed a verified petition requesting preaction discovery from the Ferrari defendants. The trial court granted the petition. The Ferrari defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to order the trial court to vacate its order and to dismiss DR Horton's Rule 27(a) petition. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing on DR Horton's Rule 27(a) petition before granting the petition. Given that DR Horton expressly sought preaction discovery not for the purpose of perpetuating evidence, but for the purpose of evaluating its claims against the Ferrari defendants, the Court granted the Ferrari defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus, and instructed the trial court to dismiss DR Horton's petition for preaction discovery. View "Ex parte Peter Ferrari et al." on Justia Law

Howard Carl Whited was convicted of sodomy in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Whited to 35 years' imprisonment and ordered Whited to pay $50 to the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Fund and court costs. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Whited's conviction and sentence in a 3-2 per curiam opinion. Whited petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, contending that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicted with "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668 (1984)). After evaluating "all the circumstances surrounding the case at the time of [Whited's] counsel's actions," including Whited's trial counsel's inability to provide a strategic reason for waiving closing argument; the seemingly strong arguments available to Whited from which the jury could possibly conclude that reasonable doubt existed as to Whited's guilt; and the length and highly emotional nature of the State's initial closing argument, the Supreme Court concluded that trial counsel's decision to waive closing argument was an "error[] so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and that the waiver of Whited's closing was deficient under "Strickland." Furthermore, had trial counsel presented a closing argument to the jury, "there is a reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different." The Alabama Court granted the petition, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Ex parte Howard Whited." on Justia Law

Tonya Denson, a member of the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama ("the ERSA"), and Venius Turner, a member of the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama ("the TRSA"), brought this action on behalf of themselves, individually, as well as similarly situated members of the Retirement Systems of Alabama ("the RSA") against:(1) David Bronner, in his official capacities as chief executive officer and secretary-treasurer of the ERSA, the TRSA, and the RSA and (2) the officers and members of the respective boards of control of the TRSA and the ERSA, in their official capacities (referred to collectively as "the RSA defendants"). Plaintiffs argued the RSA defendants violated their fiduciary duties with respect to their management of their respective retirement systems, and investments of the plans' assets. The RSA defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the trial court denied. The RSA defendants then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court, asking it direct the trial court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss and to grant the motion. Upon review of the trial court record and arguments by the parties, the Supreme Court granted the RSA defendants' petition. The Court directed the trial court to vacate its order refusing to dismiss the complaint and to grant the RSA defendants' motion to dismiss: "The doctrines of sovereign immunity and separation of powers require that the judicial branch honor that delegation and not take upon itself the task of reviewing the investment strategies and decisions of the boards of control, at least not under the circumstances presented here." View "Ex parte David Bronner, et al." on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court granted B.C.'s petition for certiorari review based on the Court's recent decision in "Ex parte L.J.," ([Ms. 1121462, September 30, 2014] So. 3d (Ala. 2014)), in which the Court held that a juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction under 12-15-114 of the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act ("the AJJA") over a termination-of-parental-rights action when the subject of the termination was not a child alleged "to have committed a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in need of supervision." B.C. gave birth to a child in 2008. In 2010, the Limestone Juvenile Court entered a judgment adjudicating A.H. as the father of the child. In 2013, B.C. petitioned the juvenile court to terminate the father's parental rights to the child, alleging he abandoned the child, failed to adjust his circumstances to fit the child's needs, and that he failed to provide any financial support for the child. B.C. did not allege that the child was dependent, delinquent or in need of supervision. At a hearing on the mother's petition, father did not attend, but was represented by counsel, who moved to dismiss the termination proceedings on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The juvenile court ultimately entered an order terminating the father's parental rights. After review, the Supreme Court concluded, based on its holding in "Ex parte L.J.," that the judgment of the juvenile court was not void because it did not find the child to be delinquent, dependent, or in need of supervision. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for that court to consider any arguments that may have been pretermitted by the Court of Civil Appeals' analysis of the effect of 12-15-114. View "Ex parte B.C." on Justia Law

Sarah Grimes appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Kristen Saban in Grimes's civil action against Saban seeking damages for assault and battery. The skirmish arose after a night of drinking in Saban's apartment. The parties were arguing at one another. Saban locked herself in her bedroom and posted things to Facebook about Grimes to which Grimes took exception. Saban eventually opened the bedroom door to show Grimes she removed the post. With Grimes at the threshold, the door opened and "a physical altercation ensued." Grimes argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Saban because, she said, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Saban acted in self-defense. The Supreme Court concluded that there still remained genuine questions of material fact in this case, reversed the summary judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Grimes v. Saban" on Justia Law

One of the defendants in this case, Robert Bosch LLC, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Etowah Circuit Court to vacate or, in the alternative, to amend the provisions of its order granting the request for production of Bosch's "air bag system Electronic Control Unit" ("ECU") filed by plaintiff Dorothy Kilgo, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Ernest Ronald Kilgo, Jr. In 2011, Kilgo and her husband "Ron" were passengers in a 2008 PT Cruiser that Ron's stepson was driving in Etowah County. While they were waiting for an oncoming motor vehicle to pass through an intersection so that they could make a left turn, the Kilgos' vehicle was struck from behind by another motor vehicle. The impact of that collision propelled the Kilgos' vehicle into the intersection, where it was struck head-on by an oncoming motor vehicle. Ron, who was sitting in the front passenger-side seat, suffered severe injuries and died several days later as a result of those injuries. The front passenger-seat air bag failed to deploy during either the rear or the head-on collisions, and the front passenger-side seatbelt "pretensioner," which is supposed to cause the seat belt to "lock" immediately after a collision, did not activate. However, one of the two front driver-side air bags deployed during the collisions, and the front driver-side seat-belt pretensioner was activated as well. Kilgo thereafter filed a wrongful-death lawsuit, naming several defendants, including, among others, Bosch, who designed and manufactured the ECU in the Kilgos' vehicle. Sometime thereafter, Kilgo served a notice of taking the deposition of a corporate representative of Bosch. The trial court entered an order denying Bosch's motion to amend the protective order and, in that order, required Kilgo to "submit a proposed Order including safeguards it will employ to review the requested discovery." In 2014, Kilgo submitted to the trial court a proposed protective order. On the following day, the trial court entered an amended protective order, which required Bosch to produce the entire algorithm for inspection by Kilgo's two experts, subject to 12 confidentiality and disclosure safeguards set forth in the order. After review, the Supreme Court granted Bosh's petition and issued the writ: the trial court was directed to vacate its protective order and to enter a more comprehensive and restrictive protective order with regard to the algorithm. View "Ex parte Robert Bosch LLC." on Justia Law

C.B. Grant, the administrator of the estate of Phillip Frazier, filed a wrongful-death action. Mitarazza Davis, Frazier's widow, moved to intervene in the lawsuit, alleging that Grant had secured his appointment as administrator of the estate through fraud and requesting that the wrongful-death action be stayed pending the resolution of the dispute over the administration of the estate by the Lowndes Probate Court. The circuit court declared Grant's appointment as administrator of the estate void and declared Davis to be the rightful party to serve as administrator of the estate. The court stayed the wrongful-death action pending the Probate Court's appointment of Davis as the administrator of Frazier's estate. Grant petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order and to lift the stay. After review, the Supreme Court granted the petition in part and denied it in part: the petition was granted insofar as it challenged the circuit court's purported exercise of jurisdiction over matters related to the appointment of an administrator and the administration of Frazier's estate. To the extent the circuit court's order declared the letters of administration issued to Grant to be void and declared Davis the proper administrator of Frazier's estate, the Supreme Court ordered the circuit court to vacate that part of its order. As to Grant's request for relief from the stay, however, the Supreme Court denied the petition. View "Ex parte C.B. Grant, as admin. of the Estate of Phillip Frazier" on Justia Law

Defendants William Mudd, John Whitaker, Phillip Luke, and David Wells, and the law firm in which they were members, Whitaker, Mudd, Simms, Luke, & Wells, LLC ("WMSLW") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court either to dismiss this case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on improper venue or to transfer the case from Chambers County to Jefferson County based on venue being improper in Chambers County or on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. This case stemmed from a dispute when one of the firm's members left, and disagreements arose pertaining to the departing members' share of the accounts, transfer of client files, and other related matters. The departing member sued defendants alleging defamation, libel, oppression of a minority shareholder, misrepresentation, breach of contract and accounting irregularities. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the Chambers Circuit Court to transfer the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court because venue was not proper in Chambers County. View "Ex parte WMS, LLC," on Justia Law