Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At a March 1, 2011 foreclosure sale, Thomas Curtain, Sr. purchased a parcel of real property in Mountain Brook, for $295,000. The foreclosed mortgagors were Charles and Concetta Givianpour, Cameron Givianpour's parents. During their ownership of the property, the Givianpours leased the property to Amy Newell. After Curtain foreclosed on the property, he filed a complaint against Newell in the Jefferson Circuit Court in which he demanded possession of the property, as well as "damages for wrongful retention of said real property." Newell filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Curtain filed a motion with the bankruptcy court seeking relief from the automatic stay; the bankruptcy court granted the motion and lifted the stay. The Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of Curtain, awarding him possession of the property and damages. The bankruptcy court discharged Newell's debt, including any rent owed for continued possession of the property. Cameron Givianpour presented Curtain with a demand for lawful charges for the purpose of redeeming the property. Curtain presented Givianpour a statement which included the purchase price, interest, insurance, and ad valorem taxes on the property. The statement also included a charge for payment of rent on the property for tenant Newelll. Givianpour did not tender the redemption funds to Curtain. Instead, Givianpour filed a complaint against Curtain seeking to redeem the property. In his complaint, Givianpour alleged that the rent charge constituted an illegal or exaggerated charge for which no legal basis existed. Givianpour stated that because of the allegedly unlawful charge he was "unable to ascertain the true amount of the lawful charges owed" and that he "need[ed] the Court's assistance to determine the amount of lawful charges properly owed." Givianpour did not pay any of the redemption funds to the circuit court. Curtain moved to dismiss, alleging that, among other things, that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Givianpour had failed either to tender the amount for redemption or to pay the amount for redemption to court with the filing of his complaint. The circuit court entered an order denying Curtain's motion for a judgment on the pleadings but granting his motion to dismiss Givianpour's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Givianpour filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's judgment, emphasizing that the parties disagreed as to whether the rent charge was a "lawful charge." The Supreme Court concluded that the rent charge on Curtain's statement for redemption constituted an unlawful charge, that such an unlawful charge, over which there was a bona fide disagreement, constituted a valid excuse for failure to tender the redemption amount or to pay it into court, and that payment of the amount not in dispute is not required to invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court to settle the disputed amount. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Givianpour v. Curtain, Sr." on Justia Law

Steven Kraselsky, personal representative of the estate of his deceased mother Marcia Kraselsky, sued Dr. Calderwood and Dr. Calderwood's employer, Huntsville Clinic, alleging that Marcia died as a result of Dr. Calderwood's order that Marcia be given Demerol in spite of the fact that Dr. Calderwood knew she had previously professed to having an allergy to Demerol. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Dr. Calderwood and Huntsville Clinic, and Steven appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. "Assuming, arguendo, that Dr. Calderwood breached the standard of care by ordering that Demerol be administered to Marcia, and, noting again that Dr. Calderwood strongly contests that fact, the summary judgment entered by the trial court is nevertheless due to be affirmed because there is no evidence in the record indicating that the administration of the Demerol to Marcia proximately caused the decline in her health leading to her death." View "Kraselsky v. Calderwood" on Justia Law

In 1999, Cooper and Robert L. Flowers formed C&F Enterprises, LLC. C&F owned a parcel of property in Huntsville, upon which it built a shopping center known as College Plaza. Pursuant to an "Amended and Restated Operating Agreement," MTA, Inc. became a member of C&F. The operating agreement provided that MTA, Flowers, and Cooper each owned a one-third interest in C&F. C&F borrowed $650,000 from the Southern Development Council, Inc. ("SDC"), a community-development program; that debt was memorialized by a promissory note. On the same day, SDC assigned the note to the Small Business Administration ("the SBA"). Cooper and Flowers personally guaranteed the indebtedness owed under the note. A few years later, C&F received a foreclosure letter with respect to the note. Counsel for MTA sent Cooper a letter informing him of MTA's intent to exercise its right of first refusal pursuant to section 16 of the operating agreement. In 2012, MTA filed a complaint against Cooper and Flowers, alleging multiple issues, but of pertinence for this appeal, the complaint alleged a count of contribution and "demand[ed] judgment in [MTA's] favor and against Cooper in the amount of $270,902.00, and Flowers in the amount of $270,902.00." In the alternative, "[MTA] demand[ed] judgment in its favor and against Cooper and Flowers for their individual pro rata contribution shares as determined at trial." Cooper filed a motion to dismiss; the trial court denied the motion. Cooper then answered the complaint. Thereafter, MTA filed a motion for a summary judgment against Cooper and Flowers. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting MTA's summary-judgment motion. Because genuine issues of material fact still remained at the time the trial court granted summary judgment, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in this respect. The trial court's order was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooper v. MTA, Inc." on Justia Law

Jeffrey Wright and Myron Allenstein filed separate complaints against A-1 Exterminating Company, Inc.; Terry Buchanan; Edward Wrenn; and David Wrenn (collectively, "A-1"). In the complaints, plaintiffs alleged that, on the date of the initial termite bonds they were issued, A-1 Exterminating promised to identify and recommend the appropriate services to protect the plaintiffs' houses or property from termites. Plaintiffs stated that in their contract with A-1, plaintiffs had paid for the initial service, the issuance of the termite bond, and annual renewal premiums. During subsequent periodic visits to the subject properties, A-1 sprayed liquids and either represented to plaintiffs or led plaintiffs to believe that those applications were treatments for termites. But in the last two years, A-1 had admitted that the periodic sprays were not to prevent or control termites; and that Buchanan, a State-licensed pest-control operator who worked for A-1 Exterminating, had admitted that the spray was a regular, watered-down pesticide that might only be strong enough to kill ants and possibly spiders. The two complaints included counts alleging fraud, including promissory fraud; breach of warranty; negligence, including negligence per se, and wantonness; breach of contract; and negligent training, supervision, and retention. It also included a request for "equitable relief, including unjust enrichment." The trial court entered an amended protective order in both cases. Plaintiffs then filed petitions for the writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court seeking a rescission. The Supreme Court found the protective orders overbroad: "the trial court should balance its interest in protecting A-1's right to a fair trial against the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs and their attorneys. Further, any protective order in this regard must be narrowly tailored so that it uses the least restrictive means necessary to protect A-1's right to a fair trial." The Court granted plaintiffs' petitions for mandamus relief, and remanded the cases for further proceedings. View "Wright v. A-1 Exterminating Company, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Bessie Kirksey appealed a probate court order vacating its order discharging Kirksey as administrator ad litem of the estate of Kirksey's sister, Willie Mae Graves, deceased. Iris Johnson, Darryl Thomas, Dorothy McLemore, John McLemore, Jr., Jerrick McLemore, Frederick Pryor, Jr., Rafeal Santece Powell, Nyya Nicole Marshall, Brandon LeMar Marshall, and Jeffrey Sams (alleged heirs of Graves) cross-appealed the probate court's order insofar as it denied their motion to transfer the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court based on the alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the probate court. The Supreme Court treated the cross-appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus, styled the case accordingly, dismissed the appeal, granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Kirksey v. Johnson et al." on Justia Law

In May 2005, Autrey Nichols purchased a Yanmar model 2210BD tractor from Northside Motors, LLC. The Yanmar tractor came equipped with a front-end loader and a "bush hog" attachment. The Yanmar tractor did not have a rollover-protection structure ("ROPS"). In 2008, Randy Nichols, the plaintiff and Autrey's brother, used the Yanmar tractor to bush hog a neighbor's property. The particular area of the property Randy was to bush hog was a field that contained a hill, the slope of which increased as he moved toward the center of the field. Randy did not "walk" the field to inspect the terrain before bush hogging the field. Randy stated that when operating the tractor, he looked forward and it appeared that the right front tire suddenly "took a dip," causing the tractor to roll over. Randy was thrown from the tractor. Randy suffered severe injuries, including an amputated right arm, a crushed hip and leg, and various other injuries. Before the accident, Randy had more than 30 years' experience operating tractors and other heavy equipment. Randy had operated the subject Yanmar tractor approximately 15 to 20 times without incident before the accident. After purchasing the tractor, Autrey purchased an English-language version of the operator's manual for the tractor. The operator's manual explained that the Yanmar model 2210BD tractor was a gray-market tractor that was originally manufactured for sale in Japan and that was subsequently purchased used by a dealer or broker and imported into the United States. The manual also contained information and warnings on the risk of rollovers, particularly while operating the tractor on slopes; stability issues and the need for ballasts when operating the tractor with a front-end loader; the importance of a ROPS; and the need to inspect unfamiliar terrain before operating the tractor. Autrey did not provide Randy with the manual and did not discuss with him any information contained in the manual. Additionally, the frontend loader and bush hog attachment that accompanied the Yanmar tractor when it was purchased also came with operator manuals, and each was affixed with English warning decals. At the close of Randy's evidence, Yanmar America moved the trial court for a preverdict judgment as a matter of law ("JML"), which the trial court denied. Yanmar America renewed its motion for a preverdict JML at the close of all the evidence, which the trial court also denied. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Randy and against Yanmar America awarding Randy $900,000 in damages. Yanmar America moved the trial court for a postverdict JML or, in the alternative, for a new trial which were also denied. Yanmar America appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that Randy failed to establish by substantial evidence that Yanmar America participated in an activity that increased his risk of harm over any risk of harm that would have existed had Yanmar America chosen not to warn potential users of the gray-market tractors in this case. Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying Yanmar America's motions for a JML on Randy's failure-to-warn claim. View "Yanmar America Corporation v. Nichols " on Justia Law

Troy Bank sued Citizens Bank seeking to recover damages Troy Bank claimed to have suffered as a result of a check encoding error made by Citizens Bank. Troy Bank alleged that it was entitled to recover damages under Alabama's check-encoding warranty, 7-4-209, Ala. Code 1975. Citizens Bank filed a motion for a summary judgment arguing that it was not strictly liable for its encoding error, but that Troy Bank "had an obligation to mitigate its damages and attempt to avoid loss altogether. [Troy Bank] failed to do this when it sent no written notice of dishonor or nonpayment before its midnight deadline and it allowed final payment to be made from [the accountholder]...." In this case, the encoding warranty, which is applied to determine liability as between banks, operated to shift the liability to Citizens Bank. "To hold that Citizens Bank is not liable for the damage it caused Troy Bank based on Citizens Bank's encoding error would render the encoding warranty useless and strip Troy Bank of a legislatively enacted protection." The Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in its application of the law to the facts of this case. View "Troy Bank & Trust Company v. Citizens Bank " on Justia Law

The State of Alabama petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Pike Circuit Court to vacate its order granting Andre Ellis's motion for a new trial. Ellis was convicted on two counts of first degree rape, and burglary in the second degree. He received an 85-year sentence. Ellis moved for a new trial, alleging, among other things, that the State had failed to disclose crucial evidence in violation of "Brady v. Maryland," (373 U.S. 83 (1963)). The trial court ordered the State to disclose in camera certain evidence and, after conducting a hearing, entered an order dated May 17, 2013, granting Ellis's motion for a new trial based on the State's failure to turn over evidence in violation of Rule 16, Ala. R. Crim. P., and in violation of the principles of law set forth in "Brady." The State moved for consideration, on which the trial court did not rule. The State argued in its petition for mandamus that the trial court exceeded its discretion and its judicial authority in granting Ellis a new trial because the trial court improperly combed the prosecutor's files and incorrectly and improperly analyzed the contents in those files. The State also argued that the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting a new trial because Ellis never laid the proper predicate to compel the State to disclose the statements of the victims as required by state case law. Lastly, the State argued that the trial court exceeded its discretion in entering its order granting a new trial with regard to the rape charge involving one of the victims because Ellis made no allegation in his motion for a new trial regarding a discovery violation in the case in which that victim was the named victim nor did the trial court make any findings as to any alleged discovery violation pertaining to that case. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded the State failed to present exceptional circumstances justifying the issuance of a writ to direct the trial court to set aside its order granting Ellis's motion for a new trial. View "Alabama v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Madeline Nelson and 25 other individuals formerly employed as nontenured teachers or probationary classified employees in the Mobile County Public School System appealed the dismissal of their action against the members of the Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County -- Ken Megginson, Judy P. Stout, Reginald A. Crenshaw, Levon C. Manzie, and William Foster -- and against the superintendent of the school system, Martha Peek. In 2009, the plaintiffs filed an action against the Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County which was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice three years later in light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County v. Weaver," (99 So. 3d 1210 (Ala. 2012)). In 2012, the plaintiffs refiled their action , alleging that their employment was terminated "pursuant to a reduction-in-force implemented by Defendants in response to alleged financial constraints." The plaintiffs further alleged that the failure to rehire them by the conclusion of the following school year was a violation of a written policy of the school system. The circuit court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint: "[t]his action was brought more than three (3) years from the date of accrual. All of the Plaintiffs' claims for mandamus, declaratory or injunctive relief would be barred by the two (2) year statute of limitations set out in 6-2-38(l). Finally, any of the Plaintiffs' claims for backpay or other monetary relief would be barred by the same two (2) [year] statute of limitations under 6-2-38(m)." On appeal to the Supreme Court, plaintiffs primarily contended that the circuit court erred in concluding that their claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations because they stated a breach-of-contract claim, which had a six-year statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs stated a claim of breach of contract and that therefore their claim was subject to a six-year, rather than a two-year, statute of limitations. Accordingly, the circuit court's dismissal was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Nelson v. Megginson" on Justia Law

Robert E. Anderson, M.D. and Selma Doctors Clinic, PC, d/b/a Selma Doctors Clinic ("SDC") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order granting plaintiff Barbara Craig's Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, and to reinstate the final judgment entered in favor of Dr. Anderson and SDC. This matter stemmed from a medical-malpractice/wrongful-death action filed by Barbara G. Craig as the administrator of the estate of her husband William Craig. Dr. Anderson performed hernia surgery on Mr. Craig at Vaughan Regional Medical Center ("VRMC"), following which, he died. Mrs. Craig sued Dr. Anderson, SDC, and VRMC alleging that the defendants were negligent in their care and treatment of Mr. Craig and that their conduct proximately caused his death. The trial court found that Mrs. Craig failed to qualify her expert on the applicable standard of care, and accordingly, was unable to establish that Dr. Anderson violated the applicable standard of care. Mrs. Craig filed a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to vacate the judgment or for a new trial. In the motion, Mrs. Craig contended that the trial court erred in excluding the expert's testimony. The trial court denied this motion, but granted her Rule 60(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., in which she argued that Dr. Anderson had committed perjury and had perpetrated a fraud upon the trial court by testifying that he had performed an ulcer surgery when, in fact, he had not done so. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting Mrs. Craig's Rule 60(b)(3) motion. The Court therefore granted Dr. Anderson's request and issued the writ. View "Craig v. Anderson" on Justia Law