Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kevin Geeslin filed this action challenging a "convenience fee" and "token fee" charged in connection with his on-line electronic filing of a civil action (fees assessed in addition to the statutorily defined filing fee that were mandated by a 2012, administrative order issued by then Chief Justice Charles Malone). That 2012 order made it mandatory for parties to file all documents in civil actions on-line, or electronically in civil actions in Alabama circuit courts and district courts by parties represented by an attorney. "AlaFile" required credit-card payment of filing fees and charges users a "convenience fee" in addition to the filing fees. Geeslin filed a putative class action naming as defendants Chief JusticevMalone in his official capacity and On-Line Information Services, Inc. ("On-Line"), the company that managed and maintained the electronic-filing system for the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts ("AOC"). Geeslin alleged that Chief Justice Malone's order was unconstitutional and that the fees collected over and above the statutorily defined filing fee amounted to an illegal tax. Geeslin sought a judgment declaring the convenience fee and another "token fee" unconstitutional and a refund of the fees paid by him and the other putative class members. The Chief Justice and On-Line moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and Geeslin appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of dismissal as it related to all claims against On-Line, to all claims seeking monetary relief and injunctive relief, and to the action asserted against the Chief Justice under section 1983. As to the declaratory-judgment claim against the Chief Justice, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment of dismissal and rendered a judgment in favor of Geeslin. View "Geeslin v. On-Line Information Services, Inc." on Justia Law

IBI Group, Michigan, LLC, f/k/a Giffels, LLC ("Giffels"), appealed a circuit court order ordering it to arbitrate its claims against Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, f/k/a ThyssenKrupp Stainless USA, LLC ("OTK"), and ThyssenKrupp Steel USA, LLC, f/k/a ThyssenKrupp Steel and Stainless USA, LLC ("TK Steel") (collectively, "the steel companies"), pursuant to an arbitration provision in the contracts at the center of this dispute. Giffels initiated this action after the steel companies commenced arbitration proceedings once it became apparent that the action the steel companies had initiated in the federal district court involving the same contract dispute would be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court thereafter granted the steel companies' motion to stay the action pending the completion of arbitration, and Giffels appealed, arguing that, under the circumstances, the steel companies either had no right to compel arbitration or had waived that right. The Supreme Court found that the language of the arbitration provisions in the contracts executed by the parties gave the steel companies the broad right to select arbitration as a method to resolve any disputes based on those contracts, and, because Giffels failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice as a result of the steel companies' actions, the steel companies did not waive their right to proceed in arbitration. Accordingly, the order of the trial court sending the case to arbitration and staying all proceedings pending the completion of the arbitration of the claims presented in this action was affirmed. View "IBI Group, Michigan, LLC v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Kenneth Adams appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Tractor & Equipment Co., Inc. ("TEC"). Adams and James "Buddy" Money are the only two members of Waste Two Energy, LLC, a company that operated two landfills in Mobile. In early 2011, Money, the managing member of Waste Two, had discussions with representatives of TEC, a company that repairs, rents, and sells heavy equipment, about servicing heavy equipment used by Waste Two in the operation of its business. Waste Two provided a "credit application and agreement" to TEC; Money and Adams were listed as the "officers, partners, or owners" of Waste Two. Money signed the agreement as the "principal of the credit applicant or a personal guarantor;" The names "James Money" and "Ken Adams" were handwritten on two lines below a guaranty provision that were each labeled "Guarantor." Beginning in March 2011 and continuing through July 2011, TEC performed various services on equipment owned by Waste Two. At some point after TEC had performed a substantial amount of work on Waste Two's equipment, a dispute arose between Waste Two and TEC over the amount of money Waste Two owed TEC for the services it had provided. Waste Two filed a complaint in the Mobile Circuit Court, asserting claims of breach of contract and misrepresentation against TEC. TEC filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to its third-party claims against Adams and Money. The court granted TEC's motion. Adams moved for reconsideration, arguing that he did not sign the guaranty to TEC, and that he should not have been held responsible in TEC's claims against Money and Waste Two. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to whether a valid guaranty bound Adams to TEC's alleged debt. Because an affidavit was properly before the trial court, and because the court had no basis for disregarding it, the Supreme Court held the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of TEC on its breach-of-guaranty claim against Adams. View "Adams v. Tractor & Equipment Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Branch Banking & Trust Company ("BB&T"), Rusty Winfree, and Todd Fullington appealed a Circuit Court judgment in favor of Rex ("Sonny") and Claudene Nichols on the Nicholses' claims against the appellants, and on BB&T's counterclaim against the Nicholses. The dispute arose over loans made by BB&T's predecessor-in-interest, Colonial Bank. After a development loan was made, but before it could be paid back, Colonial became insolvent and entered receivership. BB&T purchased much of Colonial's assets, including the loan made to the Nicholses for development of their parcel. After refusing to extend the terms of the original Colonial loan, or to provide any additional funds to finish the development, the Nicholses stopped making payments on their loan and sued alleging fraud, reformation, negligence, wantonness, and breach of fiduciary duty against all appellants. Against BB&T, the Nicholses also alleged a claim of unjust enrichment and sought damages on a theory of promissory estoppel. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in entering a judgment in favor of the Nicholses and on BB&T's counterclaim. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Nichols" on Justia Law

In November 2011, following a physical attack on his father, David Brown, Jeffery Brown was involuntarily committed by the Mobile Probate Court to Searcy Hospital, a long-termcare facility for mental illness operated by the Alabama Department of Mental Health. Brown was 19 years old at the time of his commitment and had a long history of mental illness and psychiatric hospitalizations. At Searcy Hospital Brown was assigned a "treatment team." Dr. Amee Kozlovski, a licensed physician and psychiatrist employed by the Alabama Department of Mental Health, was the head of Brown's treatment team and was responsible for making the ultimate judgment about whether Brown met the criteria for discharge from Searcy. During his time at Searcy Hospital, Brown had several incidents of self-injurious behavior but was otherwise fully compliant with his treatment. The treatment team reached a consensus that Brown had met the conditions for discharge. Despite reservations expressed by Brown's family that he would run away from a group-home facility, Brown was discharged a group home owned and operated by Altapointe Health Systems, Inc. Dr. Kozlovski approved the discharge. Shortly after discharge, Brown left Safe Haven without the knowledge of Safe Haven's staff. Ten days later, Brown's body was found lying on a road in Mobile, apparently been struck and killed by a motorist. David Shamlin, as the court-appointed administrator of Brown's estate, initiated the underlying wrongful-death action, naming as defendants Dr. Kozlovski and Altapointe. The complaint alleged that Dr. Kozlovski had been negligent and/or wanton in numerous respects. Dr. Kozlovski filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the claims against her were barred by the doctrine of State-agent immunity. Based on the trial court record the Supreme Court concluded Dr. Kozlovski was entitled to State-agent immunity from the wrongful-death action asserted against her. Accordingly, she had shown a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to enter summary judgment in her favor. View "Ex parte Amee Kozlovski, M.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff James Freeman, a parolee whose earlier parole from a life sentence for murder was revoked, appealed a trial court's dismissal of his claims against the City of Birmingham; Birmingham Police Officer Dewayne Holyfield, Charles W. Edwards; and Alma Berry, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and conspiracy. Freeman was convicted of first-degree murder in 1975, and was sentenced to life in prison. He was granted parole in 1993. In 1995, Officer Holyfield responded to a complaint that a man was beating a female near 14th Avenue North in Birmingham. Officer Holyfield drove to that address and discovered a female whose neck had been scratched and whose eyes were blackened and swollen. She claimed that Freeman had attacked her. Based on this incident, a warrant was issued the next day for Freeman's arrest. He was arrested and charged with "domestic assault" hours after the warrant was issued. As a result of the arrest, Edwards, then the executive director of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, initiated parole-revocation proceedings against Freeman. Berry was the parole-revocation hearing officer at the proceedings. Berry found sufficient evidence to support the charge of domestic assault against Freeman, and recommended the revocation of Freeman's parole. A member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles adjudged Freeman guilty of domestic assault and revoked his parole. At the time his parole was revoked, no court had adjudged Freeman guilty of domestic assault. Freeman was incarcerated and remained in prison until March 7, 2011, when he was again released on parole. From 1995 to 2011, Freeman was denied parole six times, based in part, he alleges, on his having committed the offense of domestic assault, of which he had never been convicted. In 2012, Freeman reported to the municipal court in Birmingham "to address the 1995 charge of 'domestic assault.'" He claimed that, when he arrived at the municipal court, he learned for the first time that the 1995 charge was assault and battery and not domestic assault. Freeman filed this suit in 2014, more than 18 years after the revocation of his parole in 1995 and 2 years, 11 months, and 29 days after he appeared in the municipal court in Birmingham and allegedly learned of the assault-and-battery charge against him. After review of Freeman's arguments on appeal of the trial court's dismissal of his claims, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the dismissal of those claims. View "Freeman v. Holyfield" on Justia Law

Paul R. Steinfurth and Paul C. Steinfurth (collectively, "the guarantors") appealed the denial of their postjudgment motion requesting that a judgment entered against them and in favor of Ski Lodge Apartments, LLC, be amended insofar as the judgment held that the guarantors had waived their personal exemptions under 6-10-123, Ala. Code 1975. On or about February 13, 2009, Styles Manager, LLC purchased from Vintage Pointe Apartments, LLC an interest in an apartment complex located in Montgomery. As part of this transaction, Styles Manager executed a promissory note promising to pay Vintage Pointe $800,000. Paul C. signed the promissory note in his official capacity as "manager" of Styles Manager. As security for the performance of the payment of the promissory note, the guarantors, in their individual capacities, executed a "guaranty of payment and performance" of the promissory note. Styles Manager defaulted on the promissory note in 2011. Pursuant to the note, the entire principal amount and all accrued interest was then due on February 13, 2011. Neither Styles Manager nor the guarantors cured the default. Accordingly, on September 27, 2012, Ski Lodge sued the guarantors, alleging breach of the guaranty agreement, in order to collect the outstanding debt on the promissory note. Ski Lodge requested $804,333.36, together with additional accrued interest, in damages. In its complaint, Ski Lodge did not expressly allege that the guarantors had waived their right to a personal exemption. However, Ski Lodge did attach to its complaint copies of the loan documents, which included the promissory note and the guaranty agreement, and stated that each was "incorporated herein by reference." The guarantors filed an answer and counterclaims against Ski Lodge alleging misrepresentation and suppression. The guarantors moved to dismiss Ski Lodge's suit against them, then filed a Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's judgment insofar as the circuit court held that the "judgment is entered pursuant to Alabama law with a waiver of exemptions, according to the terms expressed in the [p]romissory [n]ote and [the] [g]uaranty [agreement] which are the subject matter of this action, as the same were incorporated and adopted into the complaint." The guarantors argued that "waiver was not properly [pleaded]" and that the guaranty agreement did "not provide for waiver of exemptions by" the guarantors. The circuit court ultimately denied the guarantors' postjudgment motion, leading to this appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court's holding that the guarantors waived their personal exemptions was in error. Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Steinfurth v. Ski Lodge Apartments, LLC" on Justia Law

Municipal Workers Compensation Fund, Inc. ("the Fund"), appealed a circuit court's order denying the Fund's motion to vacate a judgment entered on an arbitration award. The Fund entrusted the management and investment of approximately $50 million in assets to Morgan Asset Management, Inc. ("MAM"), and Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. ("Morgan Keegan"). MAM served as an investment advisor for a managed account and certain mutual funds owned by the Fund. Morgan Keegan served as the broker-dealer for the Fund's managed account and had the authority as the broker-dealer to execute transactions in that account as directed by the Fund. A second account at Morgan Keegan held the mutual funds that had been sold to the Fund through a Morgan Keegan broker. The Fund stated that it directed MAM and Morgan Keegan to invest its funds conservatively and that it relied on MAM and Morgan Keegan for sound financial advice and management. However, according to the Fund, MAM and Morgan Keegan disregarded this mandate by recommending that the Fund purchase and hold what the Fund says were unsuitable investments, by overconcentrating the Fund's assets in investments that had undue exposure to the sub-prime mortgage market and in other risky investments, and by misrepresenting and failing to disclose material facts pertaining to the investments. The Fund claims that it sustained losses in excess of $15 million in 2007 and 2008 as a result of the actions of MAM and Morgan Keegan. The Fund initiated arbitration proceedings against MAM and Morgan Keegan by filing a statement of claim with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") pursuant to the arbitration provision contained in its contracts with MAM and Morgan Keegan, asserting claims of breach of fiduciary duty; breach of contract; negligence; fraud; violations of NASD and NYSE Rules; and violations of the Alabama Securities Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded from the admissible evidence entered at trial, the Fund established an evident partiality on the part of one of the arbitrators, and that the Fund was entitled to have the judgment entered on the arbitration award vacated. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Municipal Workers Compensation Fund, Inc. v. Morgan Keegan & Co." on Justia Law

Roland and Sandra Crouch appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of North Alabama Sand & Gravel, LLC, now operating as Alliance Sand & Gravel, LLC, and Austin Powder Company ("Austin Powder") on the Crouches' claim asserting property damage resulting from Alliance Sand & Gravel's blasting operations. The Crouches sued Alliance Sand & Gravel and Austin Powder (collectively, "Alliance"), seeking compensation for damage to their property, which, they say, was caused by Alliance's blasting operations. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Alliance on the Crouches' trespass claim. The Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Alliance on the Crouches' claims alleging an abnormally dangerous activity, wantonness, and nuisance, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Crouch v. North Alabama Sand & Gravel, LLC" on Justia Law

In August 2000, when Jimmy Williams, Jr. was 15 years old, he was convicted of murder made capital because it was committed during a robbery. In accordance with the applicable law at the time of Williams's sentencing, the trial court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the only possible sentence and one that was mandatory. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Williams's conviction and sentence. In June 2013, Williams petitioned the circuit court, asserting that under the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)), the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole to which he was sentenced in 2000 for an offense committed when he was 15 years old was unconstitutional and, consequently, that he was entitled to be resentenced based on the individualized sentencing factors discussed in Miller. The issue in this case presented for the Alabama Supreme Court's review was whether "Miller" applied retroactively to Williams' case. Because Miller did not categorically forbid a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a juvenile defendant and because Miller did not apply retroactively, Williams's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was legal. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in denying Williams the relief he requested. View "Ex parte Jimmy Williams, Jr." on Justia Law