Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tonya Denson, a member of the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama ("the ERSA"), and Venius Turner, a member of the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama ("the TRSA"), brought this action on behalf of themselves, individually, as well as similarly situated members of the Retirement Systems of Alabama ("the RSA") against:(1) David Bronner, in his official capacities as chief executive officer and secretary-treasurer of the ERSA, the TRSA, and the RSA and (2) the officers and members of the respective boards of control of the TRSA and the ERSA, in their official capacities (referred to collectively as "the RSA defendants"). Plaintiffs argued the RSA defendants violated their fiduciary duties with respect to their management of their respective retirement systems, and investments of the plans' assets. The RSA defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the trial court denied. The RSA defendants then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court, asking it direct the trial court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss and to grant the motion. Upon review of the trial court record and arguments by the parties, the Supreme Court granted the RSA defendants' petition. The Court directed the trial court to vacate its order refusing to dismiss the complaint and to grant the RSA defendants' motion to dismiss: "The doctrines of sovereign immunity and separation of powers require that the judicial branch honor that delegation and not take upon itself the task of reviewing the investment strategies and decisions of the boards of control, at least not under the circumstances presented here." View "Ex parte David Bronner, et al." on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court granted B.C.'s petition for certiorari review based on the Court's recent decision in "Ex parte L.J.," ([Ms. 1121462, September 30, 2014] So. 3d (Ala. 2014)), in which the Court held that a juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction under 12-15-114 of the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act ("the AJJA") over a termination-of-parental-rights action when the subject of the termination was not a child alleged "to have committed a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in need of supervision." B.C. gave birth to a child in 2008. In 2010, the Limestone Juvenile Court entered a judgment adjudicating A.H. as the father of the child. In 2013, B.C. petitioned the juvenile court to terminate the father's parental rights to the child, alleging he abandoned the child, failed to adjust his circumstances to fit the child's needs, and that he failed to provide any financial support for the child. B.C. did not allege that the child was dependent, delinquent or in need of supervision. At a hearing on the mother's petition, father did not attend, but was represented by counsel, who moved to dismiss the termination proceedings on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The juvenile court ultimately entered an order terminating the father's parental rights. After review, the Supreme Court concluded, based on its holding in "Ex parte L.J.," that the judgment of the juvenile court was not void because it did not find the child to be delinquent, dependent, or in need of supervision. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for that court to consider any arguments that may have been pretermitted by the Court of Civil Appeals' analysis of the effect of 12-15-114. View "Ex parte B.C." on Justia Law

Sarah Grimes appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Kristen Saban in Grimes's civil action against Saban seeking damages for assault and battery. The skirmish arose after a night of drinking in Saban's apartment. The parties were arguing at one another. Saban locked herself in her bedroom and posted things to Facebook about Grimes to which Grimes took exception. Saban eventually opened the bedroom door to show Grimes she removed the post. With Grimes at the threshold, the door opened and "a physical altercation ensued." Grimes argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Saban because, she said, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Saban acted in self-defense. The Supreme Court concluded that there still remained genuine questions of material fact in this case, reversed the summary judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Grimes v. Saban" on Justia Law

One of the defendants in this case, Robert Bosch LLC, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Etowah Circuit Court to vacate or, in the alternative, to amend the provisions of its order granting the request for production of Bosch's "air bag system Electronic Control Unit" ("ECU") filed by plaintiff Dorothy Kilgo, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Ernest Ronald Kilgo, Jr. In 2011, Kilgo and her husband "Ron" were passengers in a 2008 PT Cruiser that Ron's stepson was driving in Etowah County. While they were waiting for an oncoming motor vehicle to pass through an intersection so that they could make a left turn, the Kilgos' vehicle was struck from behind by another motor vehicle. The impact of that collision propelled the Kilgos' vehicle into the intersection, where it was struck head-on by an oncoming motor vehicle. Ron, who was sitting in the front passenger-side seat, suffered severe injuries and died several days later as a result of those injuries. The front passenger-seat air bag failed to deploy during either the rear or the head-on collisions, and the front passenger-side seatbelt "pretensioner," which is supposed to cause the seat belt to "lock" immediately after a collision, did not activate. However, one of the two front driver-side air bags deployed during the collisions, and the front driver-side seat-belt pretensioner was activated as well. Kilgo thereafter filed a wrongful-death lawsuit, naming several defendants, including, among others, Bosch, who designed and manufactured the ECU in the Kilgos' vehicle. Sometime thereafter, Kilgo served a notice of taking the deposition of a corporate representative of Bosch. The trial court entered an order denying Bosch's motion to amend the protective order and, in that order, required Kilgo to "submit a proposed Order including safeguards it will employ to review the requested discovery." In 2014, Kilgo submitted to the trial court a proposed protective order. On the following day, the trial court entered an amended protective order, which required Bosch to produce the entire algorithm for inspection by Kilgo's two experts, subject to 12 confidentiality and disclosure safeguards set forth in the order. After review, the Supreme Court granted Bosh's petition and issued the writ: the trial court was directed to vacate its protective order and to enter a more comprehensive and restrictive protective order with regard to the algorithm. View "Ex parte Robert Bosch LLC." on Justia Law

C.B. Grant, the administrator of the estate of Phillip Frazier, filed a wrongful-death action. Mitarazza Davis, Frazier's widow, moved to intervene in the lawsuit, alleging that Grant had secured his appointment as administrator of the estate through fraud and requesting that the wrongful-death action be stayed pending the resolution of the dispute over the administration of the estate by the Lowndes Probate Court. The circuit court declared Grant's appointment as administrator of the estate void and declared Davis to be the rightful party to serve as administrator of the estate. The court stayed the wrongful-death action pending the Probate Court's appointment of Davis as the administrator of Frazier's estate. Grant petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order and to lift the stay. After review, the Supreme Court granted the petition in part and denied it in part: the petition was granted insofar as it challenged the circuit court's purported exercise of jurisdiction over matters related to the appointment of an administrator and the administration of Frazier's estate. To the extent the circuit court's order declared the letters of administration issued to Grant to be void and declared Davis the proper administrator of Frazier's estate, the Supreme Court ordered the circuit court to vacate that part of its order. As to Grant's request for relief from the stay, however, the Supreme Court denied the petition. View "Ex parte C.B. Grant, as admin. of the Estate of Phillip Frazier" on Justia Law

Defendants William Mudd, John Whitaker, Phillip Luke, and David Wells, and the law firm in which they were members, Whitaker, Mudd, Simms, Luke, & Wells, LLC ("WMSLW") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court either to dismiss this case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on improper venue or to transfer the case from Chambers County to Jefferson County based on venue being improper in Chambers County or on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. This case stemmed from a dispute when one of the firm's members left, and disagreements arose pertaining to the departing members' share of the accounts, transfer of client files, and other related matters. The departing member sued defendants alleging defamation, libel, oppression of a minority shareholder, misrepresentation, breach of contract and accounting irregularities. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the Chambers Circuit Court to transfer the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court because venue was not proper in Chambers County. View "Ex parte WMS, LLC," on Justia Law

Progressive Direct Insurance Company petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Wilcox Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Progressive's motion to transfer this action from the Wilcox Circuit Court to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. The underlying action stemmed from a motor-vehicle accident that occurred in Tuscaloosa County in 2010, between an automobile driven by Ira Robinson and an automobile driven by Amber Clayton. In 2012, Robinson filed a complaint in the Wilcox Circuit Court against Clayton, a resident of Tuscaloosa, and Progressive, a foreign corporation doing business in both Tuscaloosa and Wilcox Counties. In his complaint, Robinson alleged that he was a resident of Wilcox County and that he had suffered injuries as a result of the negligent and/or wanton conduct of Clayton when the vehicle she was driving collided with the vehicle he was driving. Additionally, Robinson alleged that at the time of the accident he had a policy of insurance with Progressive, which included uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage. Progressive filed a motion to transfer the action to Tuscaloosa County, alleging that venue in Wilcox County was improper because, it claimed, the accident occurred in Tuscaloosa County and both Robinson and Clayton resided in Tuscaloosa County at the time of the accident. Alternatively, Progressive claimed that the action was due to be transferred to Tuscaloosa County on the ground of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that, based on the evidence before the trial court at the time of its ruling, it should have granted Progressive's motion for a change of venue. View "Ex parte Progressive Direct Insurance Company." on Justia Law

Defendant Linda Manning petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to vacate its order denying her motion to transfer this action to the Montgomery Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. In early 2014, Shannon Richardson filed a complaint in the Macon Circuit Court against Manning, stating claims of negligence and wantonness as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Montgomery County in October 2012. Richardson sustained injuries and was taken by ambulance to Baptist South Hospital in Montgomery after the accident. Law-enforcement personnel who responded to the accident worked in Montgomery County. At all material times, Richardson was a resident of Montgomery County, and Manning was a resident of Macon County. Manning filed a motion to transfer the action to Montgomery County based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Manning's motion for a change of venue based on the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute. Accordingly, the Court granted Manning's petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to enter an order transferring the case from the Macon Circuit Court to the Montgomery Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Linda Manning" on Justia Law

Victor Deng and DM Technology & Energy, Inc. ("DM") appealed a judgment based on a jury's verdict in favor of Clarence "Buddy" Scroggins and Complete Lighting Source, Inc. ("Complete Lighting"), on their claims against Deng and DM alleging breach of contract and fraud. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment in favor of Scroggins and Complete Lighting on the fraud claim and remanded the case for the entry of an order granting a new trial as to that claim. The Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment in all other respects. View "Deng v. Scoggins" on Justia Law

Corner Stone Funeral Chapel, Inc. appealed a judgment ordering a receiver to transfer the assets of a cemetery business to MVMG, LLC, its competitor. Mountain View Memory Gardens & Mausoleum, Inc. owned a cemetery in Rainsville known as Mountain View Memory Gardens and Mausoleum. Jeanette Mince, the sole owner and officer of the corporation, died in 2008, leaving the corporation to her two daughters. Neither daughter was interested in operating the corporation, and they expressed an intention to disclaim any interest in it. In 2009, the Alabama Department of Insurance investigated the corporation's records and discovered that the corporation was in poor shape. The Department found that the corporation had underfunded certain trust funds required to be established by the Pre-need Act, that the corporation was insolvent, that the corporation had ceased doing business, and that the cemetery had effectively been abandoned. The Department found that the continued control of the cemetery by the corporation would be hazardous to pre-need-contract purchasers and beneficiaries in particular and to the people of Alabama in general. Based on the Department's findings, Jim Ridling (in his official capacity as the commissioner of the Department) filed a complaint against the corporation, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions. Ridling also asked the trial court to appoint a receiver to take control of the corporation and eventually to liquidate and dissolve the corporation, subject to the trial court's supervision. During the receivership period, individuals owning plots and vaults in the cemetery formed the MVMG Mausoleum Association during the receivership period to preserve the cemetery. The receiver unsuccessfully attempted to find a buyer for the cemetery, and she eventually concluded that the cemetery was unmarketable. The receiver then recommended that the cemetery and the corporation's other assets be transferred to an entity that would both operate the cemetery and honor, either in whole or in part, the corporation's approximately 1,155 outstanding preneed contracts. Two entities presented proposals seeking the transfer of the assets, of which the cemetery is the main asset: Corner Stone and MVMG, LLC. The receiver recommended that the trial court accept Corner Stone's proposal. Following an ore tenus trial, the trial court disagreed with the receiver's recommendation and decided to accept the LLC's proposal. Corner Store appealed the trial court's decision. "We cannot say that the trial court exceeded its discretion in ordering the transfer of the corporation's assets to the LLC." Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Corner Stone Funeral Chapel, Inc. v. MVMG, LLC " on Justia Law