Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issues presented in three appeals (consolidated for review) were ones of first impression to the Alabama Supreme Court regarding the state Accountability Act (AAA). Plaintiffs Daniel Boyd (superintendent of the Lowndes County Public School System), Anita Gibson (a teacher and president of the Alabama Education Association) and Senator Quinton Ross, Jr. (representative of the 26th District) sued Julie Magee in her official capacity as the Commissioner of Revenue, and Thomas White, Jr. in his official capacity as the state Comptroller. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the AAA under certain provisions of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 that allowed the substitution of House Bill (HB 84), the creation of certain tax credits, the appropriation of funds for those credits, the repeal of certain tax credits, and the creation of new debt - all in relation to education funding in the State of Alabama. The circuit court entered an order in favor of plaintiffs as to their first eight counts in their complaint. With regard to Counts IX and X, the court concluded the issues were moot. The circuit court then enjoined enforcement of the AAA. The State defendants moved to stay the circuit court order, then appealed. The Supreme Court, after careful consideration of the legislation at issue and the circuit court's order, affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The Court found: (1) no subsequent act of the Legislature mooted any issue presented here; and (2) the AAA was constitutional with regard to all of plaintiffs' allegations that it was not. The case was remanded for further proceedings on those issues deemed moot by the circuit court; the court was affirmed in all other respects. View "Magee v. Boyd" on Justia Law

The State sought emergency relief, and was granted that relief from the Alabama Supreme Court relating to the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples. The State, by and through the relators, contended that respondent Alabama probate judges were flouting a duty imposed upon them by Alabama's "Sanctity of Marriage Amendment" to its Constitution, and the Alabama Marriage Protection Act and that the Alabama Court should direct respondent probate judges to perform that duty. The circumstances giving rise to this action were the result of decisions and orders issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama "Searcy v. Strange," (Civil Action No. 14-0208-CG-N, Jan. 23, 2015)(S.D. Ala. 2015)), and "Strawser v. Strange," (Civil Action No. 14-0424-CG-C, Jan. 26, 2015)) and a subsequent order by that court, in each of those cases, refusing to extend a stay of its initial order pending an appeal. In "Searcy," the federal district court enjoined Alabama Attorney General Luther Strange from enforcing the Amendment and the Act. In "Strawser," the federal district court issued a preliminary injunction where a same-sex couple had been denied a marriage license in Mobile. "As it has done for approximately two centuries, Alabama law allows for 'marriage' between only one man and one woman. Alabama probate judges have a ministerial duty not to issue any marriage license contrary to this law. Nothing in the United States Constitution alters or overrides this duty." View "Ex parte Alabama ex rel. Alabama Policy Institute et al." on Justia Law

In connection with a 1998 nationwide, securities-fraud class action initiated against MedPartners, Inc., a physician-practice-management/pharmacy-benefits-management corporation and the predecessor in interest to CVS Caremark Corporation, the Jefferson Circuit Court certified a class that included the plaintiffs in this case. Based on the alleged financial distress and limited insurance resources of MedPartners, the 1998 litigation was concluded in 1999 by means of a negotiated "global settlement," pursuant to which the claims of all class members were settled for an amount that purportedly exhausted its available insurance coverage. Based on representations of counsel that MedPartners lacked the financial means to pay any judgment in excess of the negotiated settlement and that the settlement amount was thus the best potential recovery for the class, the trial court, after a hearing, approved the settlement and entered a judgment in accordance therewith. Thereafter, MedPartners (now Caremark) allegedly disclosed, in unrelated litigation, that it had actually obtained (and thus had available during the 1998 litigation) an excess-insurance policy providing alleged "unlimited coverage" with regard to its potential-damages exposure in the 1998 litigation. In 2003, John Lauriello, seeking to be named as class representative, again sued Caremark and insurers American International Group, Inc.; National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA; AIG Technical Services, Inc.; and American International Specialty Lines Insurance Company in the Jefferson Circuit Court, pursuant to a class-action complaint alleging misrepresentation and suppression, specifically, that Caremark and the insurers had misrepresented the amount of insurance coverage available to settle the 1998 litigation and that they also had suppressed the existence of the purportedly unlimited excess policy. In case no. 1120010, Caremark and the insurers appealed the circuit court's order certifying as a class action the fraud claims asserted by Lauriello, James Finney, Jr.; Sam Johnson; and the City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System. In case no. 1120114, the plaintiffs cross-appealed the same class-certification order, alleging that, though class treatment was appropriate, the trial court erred in certifying the class as an "opt-out" class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., rather than a "mandatory" class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court in both cases. View "CVS Caremark Corporation et al. v. Lauriello et al." on Justia Law

Glenn Bynum and Larry Gipson appealed a trial court's order holding that certain amendments to section 28-2A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 (pertaining to the sale of alcoholic beverages in a municipality), were constitutional. After review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) it was clear that the Alabama legislature intended to omit 3 counties from inclusion in Act No. 2009-546 allowing municipalities with a population of more than 1,000 to hold elections regarding the sale of alcohol in their municipal limits; and (2) it was clear that the legislature did not include a severability clause in Act No. 2009-546. The legislature included a general severability provision in the Alabama Code, which the Supreme Court regarded as an expression of legislative intent concerning the general power and duty of the judiciary to sever and save statutory provisions not tainted by the unconstitutionality of other provisions in the statute. However, the Court reasoned that the inclusion of a severability clause in a particular act was a clear statement of a legislative intent to sever unconstitutional provisions in that act while allowing the constitutional provisions to remain. Municipalities with more than 1,000 residents in 64 counties have held elections on whether to sell alcohol. The exclusion of the 3 counties from the provisions of Act No. 2009-546 violated the Equal Protection Clause where the exclusion was not rationally related to the regulation of alcohol because no basis existed for excluding smaller cities within those 3 counties from participating in a "wet" or "dry" election and allowing smaller cities in the remaining 64 counties to do so. However, using severability to save Act No. 2009-546 was not permissible where it was obvious that the legislature excluded the three counties for no rational reason, and to edit Act No. 2009-546 by severing that language excluding the three counties would be to undermine the clear intent of the legislature. The Supreme Court left "it to the legislature to redraft a constitutionally sound law." Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bynum v. City of Oneonta et al." on Justia Law

Mother Jennifer Ann Vest (Herron) petitioned the Supreme Court to review a Court of Civil Appeals decision to affirm a the Elmore Circuit Court's order imposing on her a five-day jail sentence for contempt. The contempt order arose out of a child-custody-modification action. The father filed a motion with the Elmore Court to modify custody of the parties' minor child. In response, the mother, in her motion to dismiss, clearly stated that there was an action pending in Mobile County involving the parties' child of which the father was aware. She further alleged that venue was proper in Mobile County and that the father had not objected to venue at the Mobile Court. The mother requested that the Elmore Court dismiss the father's motion to modify custody until such time as the Mobile Court addressed the mother's motion regarding the parties' child and her allegations against the father. The Supreme Court found that the Elmore Circuit Court erred in not recognizing the primacy of the Mobile action when the mother filed her motion to dismiss or to transfer the father's motion to the Mobile Circuit Court. Subsequently, the Court of Civil Appeals erred in concluding that the mother had waived the affirmative defense of abatement. Accordingly, the Alabama Supreme Court suspended the provisions of Rule 39(g) and (h), Ala. R. App. P., allowing the petitioner and the respondent to file briefs and to request oral argument, and the Court granted certiorari review of the Court of Civil Appeals' order affirming the Elmore Circuit Court's order holding the mother in contempt. View "Ex parte Jennifer Ann Vest" on Justia Law

Gerald Van Jones, the father, appealed a Court of Civil Appeals' decision that affirmed a trial court's order awarding postminority educational support for his son, Garrette Jones. According to the father, the Court of Civil Appeals erred in refusing to apply "Ex parte Christopher" in this case because the appeal of the trial court's order awarding postminority educational support for Garrette was pending in the Court of Civil Appeals when "Ex parte Christopher" was decided and, therefore, in accordance with that case, the Court of Civil Appeals should have reversed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the father filed an appeal of the trial court's postminority-educational-support order on September 10, 2013; the Supreme Court decided "Ex parte Christopher" on October 4, 2013. Indeed, because this case was pending on appeal in the Court of Civil Appeals when "Ex parte Christopher" was decided, the Court of Civil Appeals erred by not applying that case's holding that a trial court does not have authority to order postminority educational support in this case and by not reversing the trial court's order. View "Ex parte Gerald Van Jones." on Justia Law

Defendant Adam Dan Hilyer appealed the denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment entered against him and in favor of plaintiff Betti Fortier. In 2013, Hilyer was backing a tractor-trailer rig used to transport logs into his private driveway. At the time, Hilyer was blocking both lanes of traffic on Kennedy Avenue. M.M., a minor, was driving Fortier's van and was traveling westbound on Kennedy Avenue. B.D., M.M.'s brother; R.W., M.M.'s fiancé; and B.H., a friend of B.D.'s, were also in the vehicle. M.M.'s vehicle collided with Hilyer's trailer, and M.M. sustained injuries. In early 2014, the trial court entered a judgment against Hilyer in the amount of $550,000 and found "that the proposed settlement of the claim of the minor, M.M. is just, fair, reasonable, in keeping with the evidence, and is in the minor's best interest." A month later, Hilyer filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, finding that Hilyer, in his motion to set aside the default judgment, met the threshold showing of each of the three "Kirtland" factors. Additionally, Hilyer supported his motion with affidavits and copies of correspondence. Fortier submitted evidence in support of her opposition to the motion to set aside that controverted the facts and evidence submitted by Hilyer. However, after conducting a hearing and taking the matter under advisement, the trial court allowed the motion to set aside to be denied by operation of law without any indication that the denial of the motion was the product of due deliberation and without any indication that the denial was based upon a consideration of the Kirtland factors. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the denial by operation of law of Hilyer's motion to set aside the default judgment and remanded this case for the trial court to consider the Kirtland factors in determining whether to set aside the default judgment. View "Hilyer v. Fortier" on Justia Law

Walter Energy, Inc., appealed a circuit court order that dismissed claims it had asserted against investor Julian Treger, his firm Audley Capital Advisors LLP, and other associated investment entities (collectively, "the Audley defendants") stemming from their alleged involvement in a scheme to improperly manipulate the share price of Walter Energy stock. Walter Energy sued the Audley defendants alleging various claims stemming from their alleged involvement in a "pump and dump" scheme to manipulate the share price of Walter Energy stock. After affording Walter Energy three opportunities to amend its complaint, the trial court dismissed all the claims on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds. Walter Energy thereafter appealed the dismissal of two of its claims to the Alabama Supreme Court; however, upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the dismissal of those claims was proper, and the judgment of the trial court was accordingly affirmed. View "Walter Energy, Inc. v. Audley Capital Advisors, LLP" on Justia Law

Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company appealed a circuit court order certifying the action filed against it by Gloria McCain as a class action. McCain owned a house in Montgomery on which she held a homeowner's insurance policy issued by Baldwin Mutual. That policy provided that any covered property losses would be settled "at actual cash value at the time of loss but not exceeding the amount necessary to repair or replace the damaged property." In July 2005, McCain's house was damaged as the result of a windstorm. She filed a claim with Baldwin Mutual, and Baldwin Mutual thereafter retained an independent adjuster to examine McCain's damaged property and to prepare an estimate to repair the damage. Baldwin Mutual paid McCain's claim in accordance with the estimate prepared by the adjuster. Pursuant to a work-authorization form signed by McCain, Baldwin Mutual paid the funds directly to McCain's contractor. In June 2006, McCain filed another claim after her house suffered damage as a result of a lightning strike. After the same adjuster prepared an estimate, Baldwin Mutual paid the new claim in accordance with the adjuster's estimate. The genesis of the claims underlying this suit was that Baldwin Mutual had wrongfully been reducing the amount paid on claims made on actual-cash-value polices inasmuch as its practice was to deduct some amount for depreciation not only of the damaged materials and the labor costs of initially installing those damaged materials (based on their condition prior to the covered damage and their expected life span), but also of the labor costs associated with the removal of the damaged materials. It was improper and impossible to depreciate those labor costs, McCain argued, because they had not previously been incurred at some defined time in the past; rather, they were being incurred at the time of the current repair. Noting that hundreds or thousands of Baldwin Mutual policyholders were likely negatively affected by Baldwin Mutual's practices in this regard, McCain sought class action certification of her claims. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the class certification, finding that the trial court here exceeded its discretion with a definition proposed by McCain without giving Baldwin Mutual the opportunity to oppose the certification of the proposed class at a hearing conducted for that purpose pursuant to statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Baldwin Mutual Ins. Co. v. McCain" on Justia Law

Dorothy Crusoe and her granddaughter, Erica Boyd, by and through her mother and next friend, Latricia Witherspoon (collectively, "Crusoe"), appealed a circuit court order denying their motion for a new trial. This case stemmed from an automobile accident that occurred in Bessemer. Crusoe sued Davis under a negligence theory seeking damages for medical expenses and for past and future pain and suffering. Dorothy Crusoe additionally sought damages for lost wages. After hearing the evidence and being instructed on negligence, the jury returned a verdict for Davis. Crusoe filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. She appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in not allowing the policeman who prepared the accident report to testify as to the contents of that report, which testimony, Crusoe alleged, would refute Davis's testimony that her vehicle was not in motion at the time of the accident. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crusoe v. Davis" on Justia Law