Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham ("the Board") petitions for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order granting the motion filed by the Alabama Surface Mining Commission ("ASMC") seeking to transfer the underlying action to Walker County. Shepherd Bend, LLC, joined ASMC's transfer motion. Upon review of the briefs submitted in this case, the Supreme Court concluded the Board demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief it sought; venue was indeed proper in Jefferson County. Therefore, the Court granted the petition and issued the writ directing the circuit court to vacate its order transferring the action to Walker County. View "Ex parte Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham." on Justia Law

Edwin B. Lumpkin, Jr. appealed several Circuit Court orders dismissing three cases he had initiated challenging property-tax assessments made by the Jefferson County Board of Equalization and Adjustments. Lumpkin owned and operated Metro Mini Storage, a chain of self-storage facilities with locations throughout the Birmingham metropolitan area. In 2012, Lumpkin received notice from Jefferson County regarding the assessed value of three of his properties located in that county. Believing the assessed values of these properties to be too high, Lumpkin elected to protest their valuation, and the Board heard his arguments. Acting pro se, Lumpkin filed three appeals in the Jefferson Circuit Court (one for each of the three locations), arguing that the Board's decisions did not reflect the true market value of the properties and that a reduction in assessed value was warranted based on the evidence he had presented. Because Lumpkin's appeals are governed by section 40-3-25 and because he failed to comply with all the requirements of section 40-3-25 for perfecting his appeals, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly dismissed the cases. View "Lumpkin, Jr. v. Alabama" on Justia Law

The City of Florence, the Civil Service Board of the City of Florence ("the CSB") and Keith McDaniel appealed separately a circuit court judgment after a jury rendered its verdict in favor of William T. Ezell. In mid 2011, two positions for promotion to the job of battalion chief became available within the Florence Fire and Rescue Department. Benjamin Cochran, Melvin Brown, Tim Clanton, John T. Muse, McDaniel, and Ezell applied for the positions. The CSB conducted interviews with the candidates on September 1, 2011. Afterward, it promoted Cochran and McDaniel to the two battalion-chief positions. On September 12, 2011, Ezell filed a two-count complaint against the City and the CSB in the Lauderdale Circuit Court. A month later, the City and the CSB filed an answer in which they denied Ezell's allegations. They also asserted that Ezell had failed to join certain indispensable parties. The City and CSB simultaneously filed a motion to dismiss count 1 of the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing that all six applicants were indispensable parties. They then asked that count 1 of the complaint be dismissed or that Ezell be required to add Cochran, Brown, Clanton, Muse, and McDaniel as defendants. The trial court ordered Ezell to amend his complaint to make Cochran, Brown, Clanton, Muse, and McDaniel parties to the suit. Ezell amended count 1 of his complaint and also added the other applicants as defendants. The City and the CSB filed an answer to the amended complaint in which they denied Ezell's allegations and argued that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The jury returned the following verdict: "We are not reasonably satisfied that the decision of the [CSB] was correct and we find that the following 2 individuals should be promoted to Battalion Chief (pick two) ... Benjamin Cochran ... William Ezell." The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict and ordered that the status quo be maintained during the pendency of any appellate proceedings. The City, the CSB, and McDaniel filed posttrial motions, which the trial court denied. McDaniel appealed to the Supreme Court (docketed as case no. 1130372). The City and the CSB also appealed to the Supreme Court (docketed as case no. 1130373). Because Ezell failed to demonstrate that he had a right to appeal the CSB's decision, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain his appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed these appeals with instructions to the trial court to vacate its judgment. View "City of Florence v. Ezell" on Justia Law

Donald Porter, Marc Porter, Porter Capital Corporation, Porter Bridge Loan Company, Inc., Lowerline Corporation, Capital Partners Leasing, Inc., and Capital Partners Leasing, LLC (referred to collectively as "the Porter defendants"), appealed the denial of their motion to compel arbitration of the claims asserted against them by Byron Porter Williamson. Marc and Donald Porter are brothers; they founded Porter Capital Corporation in 1991 and thereafter established the related companies Porter Bridge Loan Company, Inc., Lowerline Corporation, CapitalPartners Leasing, Inc., and CapitalPartners Leasing, LLC. In 1992, the Porters hired their nephew Williamson as an employee of the Porter companies. In 2004, Williamson, Marc Porter, and Donald Porter entered into a shareholders agreement that made Williamson a 10% shareholder in Porter Capital Corporation, Porter Bridge Loan Company, Inc., Lowerline Corporation, and CapitalPartners Leasing, Inc. Following his termination and resignation as a shareholder of the corporations and a member of the limited liability company, Williamson demanded that his shares in the corporations and his interest in the limited-liability company be purchased by the Porter companies pursuant to the agreement. The parties, however, were unable to agree on the value of Williamson's shares and interest. Williamson sued Marc Porter, Donald Porter, and the Porter companies. Citing the arbitration provision of the agreement, the Porter defendants moved to dismiss the action without prejudice or to stay discovery and compel arbitration. Williamson opposed the motion, arguing that some or all of his claims fell within the specific-performance exception of the arbitration provision in the agreement. Following a hearing on the Porter defendants' motion to dismiss or to compel arbitration, the trial court issued an order denying the Porter defendants' motion. The Porter defendants appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the Porter defendants' motion to compel arbitration insofar as that motion related to Williamson's request for specific performance and injunctive relief. With regard to Williamson's remaining claims seeking rescission and alleging misrepresentation and suppression and conversion, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court either to dismiss those claims or to grant the Porter defendants' motion to compel arbitration of them. View "Porter v. Williamson" on Justia Law

Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation ("AMIC") appealed the trial court's order certifying a class in the action filed by the City of Vernon and a class of similarly situated entities that had purchased uninsured motorist/underinsured-motorist coverage ("UM/UIM coverage") from AMIC. Vernon was the original class representative; however, after AMIC filed its notice of appeal of the class-certification order, Vernon settled its claims against AMIC and withdrew as the class representative. Because there was no longer a representative to "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for a new class representative to be substituted for Vernon. The City of Fairfield substituted for Vernon as the class representative. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the underlying dispute: the Court concluded that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this dispute. Initial jurisdiction over this dispute was with the Alabama Department of Insurance and its commissioner. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's class-certification order, and remanded for dismissal. View "Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law

The State appealed an order that dismissed a forfeiture action that sought condemnation of certain devices, currency and other property. In 2011, the State executed a search warrant and seized the devices, currency and property from the premises of Greenetrack, Inc. Greentrack moved for the return of the seized property. The State electronically filed its complaint, with the signature lines for the government deputy attorneys general as "/s/ ________." The certificate of service had similar electronic signature lines. A few days later after these pleadings were filed, the State filed amended petitions, and again, the signature blocks lacked any text on each line following the "/s/." The trial court noted that the petitions appeared to lack signatures. After the hearing, the State amended its filings with typewritten names following the "/s/." The certificate of service listed the same counsel as the second amended petition, but no summons accompanied the second amended petition in the trial court record. The trial court ruled for the return of Greenetrack's property, currency and devices. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding that though the State's petitions did not strictly conform with the stated rules, it did not require striking the State's petitions. "The failure to properly sign the petitions caused no identified prejudice to Greenetrack. … To conclude otherwise would be contrary to the principles of [the Rule] and would elevate form over substance." View "Alabama v. $93,917.50 & 376 Gambling Devices" on Justia Law

The circuit court entered a judgment finding that Lisa Hanvey had suffered a compensable injury caused by her exposure to chemical fumes during the course of her employment with Madison Academy, Inc. The trial court awarded Hanvey permanent-total-disability benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court granted Hanvey's petition for a writ of certiorari to review whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's judgment awarding Hanvey benefits for a permanent total disability under the Act. After review, the Supreme Court concluded there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that Hanvey was permanently and totally disable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment and remanded the case back to that court for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Lisa Hanvey." on Justia Law

This issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the ownership interests in and control of Autauga Automotive, LLC, a limited liability company that owned and operated a Ford Motor Company franchise in Prattville known as "Gilmore Ford." Frank Moultrie appealed a circuit court judgment which held that the interests of Charles O. Wall II and Moultrie in the profits and losses of Autauga Automotive were 90% and 10%, respectively, but that Moultrie was divested of his 10% interest for failing to pay a required capital contribution. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. That part of the circuit court's judgment holding that Moultrie was divested of his interest in Autauga Automotive by failing to make a capital contribution pursuant to Wall's September 2012 capital call was reversed, and the case remanded back to the circuit court with instructions to enter a judgment in favor of Moultrie on that claim. The case was affirmed in all other aspects. View "Moultrie v. Wall" on Justia Law

Peter Ferrari was employed by DR Horton, Inc. - Birmingham as a land-acquisition manager for its Gulf Coast division. DR Horton asserted that it gave Ferrari confidential information concerning its business and land-acquisition strategies, including its geographical markets for expansion, and that it empowered Ferrari to arrange land purchases for DR Horton. DR Horton asserted that it received information that Ferrari had supplied third parties with confidential information from DR Horton without DR Horton's permission, including DR Horton's planned land acquisitions, future real estate developments, markets for expansion, and plans for construction. DR Horton also claimed it received information that Ferrari had benefited from DR Horton land acquisitions apart from his employment compensation. DR Horton asked for the tax returns of the Ferrari, his wife, his business Ferrari Capital Partners, LLC, and the entities that allegedly received DR Horton's confidential information: FH Properties, LLC; P6 Holdings, LLC; and Prince 5 Holdings, LLC (collectively, Ferrari defendants) in order to verify his assertions, but Ferrari refused to provide such information. DR Horton subsequently contacted those defendant third parties. Brad Zeitlin agreed to meet with DR Horton representatives to discuss real-property transactions involving DR Horton and Ferrari. According to a witness present during the interview, Zeitlin admitted that he had benefited financially from "tying up" property DR Horton wanted to purchase and then selling it to DR Horton. wanted. DR Horton terminated Ferrari's employment. DR Horton filed a verified petition requesting preaction discovery from the Ferrari defendants. The trial court granted the petition. The Ferrari defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to order the trial court to vacate its order and to dismiss DR Horton's Rule 27(a) petition. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing on DR Horton's Rule 27(a) petition before granting the petition. Given that DR Horton expressly sought preaction discovery not for the purpose of perpetuating evidence, but for the purpose of evaluating its claims against the Ferrari defendants, the Court granted the Ferrari defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus, and instructed the trial court to dismiss DR Horton's petition for preaction discovery. View "Ex parte Peter Ferrari et al." on Justia Law

Howard Carl Whited was convicted of sodomy in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Whited to 35 years' imprisonment and ordered Whited to pay $50 to the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Fund and court costs. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Whited's conviction and sentence in a 3-2 per curiam opinion. Whited petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, contending that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicted with "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668 (1984)). After evaluating "all the circumstances surrounding the case at the time of [Whited's] counsel's actions," including Whited's trial counsel's inability to provide a strategic reason for waiving closing argument; the seemingly strong arguments available to Whited from which the jury could possibly conclude that reasonable doubt existed as to Whited's guilt; and the length and highly emotional nature of the State's initial closing argument, the Supreme Court concluded that trial counsel's decision to waive closing argument was an "error[] so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and that the waiver of Whited's closing was deficient under "Strickland." Furthermore, had trial counsel presented a closing argument to the jury, "there is a reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different." The Alabama Court granted the petition, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Ex parte Howard Whited." on Justia Law