Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants Branch Banking & Trust Company ("BB&T"), Rusty Winfree, and Todd Fullington appealed a Circuit Court judgment in favor of Rex ("Sonny") and Claudene Nichols on the Nicholses' claims against the appellants, and on BB&T's counterclaim against the Nicholses. The dispute arose over loans made by BB&T's predecessor-in-interest, Colonial Bank. After a development loan was made, but before it could be paid back, Colonial became insolvent and entered receivership. BB&T purchased much of Colonial's assets, including the loan made to the Nicholses for development of their parcel. After refusing to extend the terms of the original Colonial loan, or to provide any additional funds to finish the development, the Nicholses stopped making payments on their loan and sued alleging fraud, reformation, negligence, wantonness, and breach of fiduciary duty against all appellants. Against BB&T, the Nicholses also alleged a claim of unjust enrichment and sought damages on a theory of promissory estoppel. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in entering a judgment in favor of the Nicholses and on BB&T's counterclaim. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Nichols" on Justia Law

In November 2011, following a physical attack on his father, David Brown, Jeffery Brown was involuntarily committed by the Mobile Probate Court to Searcy Hospital, a long-termcare facility for mental illness operated by the Alabama Department of Mental Health. Brown was 19 years old at the time of his commitment and had a long history of mental illness and psychiatric hospitalizations. At Searcy Hospital Brown was assigned a "treatment team." Dr. Amee Kozlovski, a licensed physician and psychiatrist employed by the Alabama Department of Mental Health, was the head of Brown's treatment team and was responsible for making the ultimate judgment about whether Brown met the criteria for discharge from Searcy. During his time at Searcy Hospital, Brown had several incidents of self-injurious behavior but was otherwise fully compliant with his treatment. The treatment team reached a consensus that Brown had met the conditions for discharge. Despite reservations expressed by Brown's family that he would run away from a group-home facility, Brown was discharged a group home owned and operated by Altapointe Health Systems, Inc. Dr. Kozlovski approved the discharge. Shortly after discharge, Brown left Safe Haven without the knowledge of Safe Haven's staff. Ten days later, Brown's body was found lying on a road in Mobile, apparently been struck and killed by a motorist. David Shamlin, as the court-appointed administrator of Brown's estate, initiated the underlying wrongful-death action, naming as defendants Dr. Kozlovski and Altapointe. The complaint alleged that Dr. Kozlovski had been negligent and/or wanton in numerous respects. Dr. Kozlovski filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the claims against her were barred by the doctrine of State-agent immunity. Based on the trial court record the Supreme Court concluded Dr. Kozlovski was entitled to State-agent immunity from the wrongful-death action asserted against her. Accordingly, she had shown a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to enter summary judgment in her favor. View "Ex parte Amee Kozlovski, M.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff James Freeman, a parolee whose earlier parole from a life sentence for murder was revoked, appealed a trial court's dismissal of his claims against the City of Birmingham; Birmingham Police Officer Dewayne Holyfield, Charles W. Edwards; and Alma Berry, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and conspiracy. Freeman was convicted of first-degree murder in 1975, and was sentenced to life in prison. He was granted parole in 1993. In 1995, Officer Holyfield responded to a complaint that a man was beating a female near 14th Avenue North in Birmingham. Officer Holyfield drove to that address and discovered a female whose neck had been scratched and whose eyes were blackened and swollen. She claimed that Freeman had attacked her. Based on this incident, a warrant was issued the next day for Freeman's arrest. He was arrested and charged with "domestic assault" hours after the warrant was issued. As a result of the arrest, Edwards, then the executive director of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, initiated parole-revocation proceedings against Freeman. Berry was the parole-revocation hearing officer at the proceedings. Berry found sufficient evidence to support the charge of domestic assault against Freeman, and recommended the revocation of Freeman's parole. A member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles adjudged Freeman guilty of domestic assault and revoked his parole. At the time his parole was revoked, no court had adjudged Freeman guilty of domestic assault. Freeman was incarcerated and remained in prison until March 7, 2011, when he was again released on parole. From 1995 to 2011, Freeman was denied parole six times, based in part, he alleges, on his having committed the offense of domestic assault, of which he had never been convicted. In 2012, Freeman reported to the municipal court in Birmingham "to address the 1995 charge of 'domestic assault.'" He claimed that, when he arrived at the municipal court, he learned for the first time that the 1995 charge was assault and battery and not domestic assault. Freeman filed this suit in 2014, more than 18 years after the revocation of his parole in 1995 and 2 years, 11 months, and 29 days after he appeared in the municipal court in Birmingham and allegedly learned of the assault-and-battery charge against him. After review of Freeman's arguments on appeal of the trial court's dismissal of his claims, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the dismissal of those claims. View "Freeman v. Holyfield" on Justia Law

Paul R. Steinfurth and Paul C. Steinfurth (collectively, "the guarantors") appealed the denial of their postjudgment motion requesting that a judgment entered against them and in favor of Ski Lodge Apartments, LLC, be amended insofar as the judgment held that the guarantors had waived their personal exemptions under 6-10-123, Ala. Code 1975. On or about February 13, 2009, Styles Manager, LLC purchased from Vintage Pointe Apartments, LLC an interest in an apartment complex located in Montgomery. As part of this transaction, Styles Manager executed a promissory note promising to pay Vintage Pointe $800,000. Paul C. signed the promissory note in his official capacity as "manager" of Styles Manager. As security for the performance of the payment of the promissory note, the guarantors, in their individual capacities, executed a "guaranty of payment and performance" of the promissory note. Styles Manager defaulted on the promissory note in 2011. Pursuant to the note, the entire principal amount and all accrued interest was then due on February 13, 2011. Neither Styles Manager nor the guarantors cured the default. Accordingly, on September 27, 2012, Ski Lodge sued the guarantors, alleging breach of the guaranty agreement, in order to collect the outstanding debt on the promissory note. Ski Lodge requested $804,333.36, together with additional accrued interest, in damages. In its complaint, Ski Lodge did not expressly allege that the guarantors had waived their right to a personal exemption. However, Ski Lodge did attach to its complaint copies of the loan documents, which included the promissory note and the guaranty agreement, and stated that each was "incorporated herein by reference." The guarantors filed an answer and counterclaims against Ski Lodge alleging misrepresentation and suppression. The guarantors moved to dismiss Ski Lodge's suit against them, then filed a Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's judgment insofar as the circuit court held that the "judgment is entered pursuant to Alabama law with a waiver of exemptions, according to the terms expressed in the [p]romissory [n]ote and [the] [g]uaranty [agreement] which are the subject matter of this action, as the same were incorporated and adopted into the complaint." The guarantors argued that "waiver was not properly [pleaded]" and that the guaranty agreement did "not provide for waiver of exemptions by" the guarantors. The circuit court ultimately denied the guarantors' postjudgment motion, leading to this appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court's holding that the guarantors waived their personal exemptions was in error. Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Steinfurth v. Ski Lodge Apartments, LLC" on Justia Law

Municipal Workers Compensation Fund, Inc. ("the Fund"), appealed a circuit court's order denying the Fund's motion to vacate a judgment entered on an arbitration award. The Fund entrusted the management and investment of approximately $50 million in assets to Morgan Asset Management, Inc. ("MAM"), and Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. ("Morgan Keegan"). MAM served as an investment advisor for a managed account and certain mutual funds owned by the Fund. Morgan Keegan served as the broker-dealer for the Fund's managed account and had the authority as the broker-dealer to execute transactions in that account as directed by the Fund. A second account at Morgan Keegan held the mutual funds that had been sold to the Fund through a Morgan Keegan broker. The Fund stated that it directed MAM and Morgan Keegan to invest its funds conservatively and that it relied on MAM and Morgan Keegan for sound financial advice and management. However, according to the Fund, MAM and Morgan Keegan disregarded this mandate by recommending that the Fund purchase and hold what the Fund says were unsuitable investments, by overconcentrating the Fund's assets in investments that had undue exposure to the sub-prime mortgage market and in other risky investments, and by misrepresenting and failing to disclose material facts pertaining to the investments. The Fund claims that it sustained losses in excess of $15 million in 2007 and 2008 as a result of the actions of MAM and Morgan Keegan. The Fund initiated arbitration proceedings against MAM and Morgan Keegan by filing a statement of claim with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") pursuant to the arbitration provision contained in its contracts with MAM and Morgan Keegan, asserting claims of breach of fiduciary duty; breach of contract; negligence; fraud; violations of NASD and NYSE Rules; and violations of the Alabama Securities Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded from the admissible evidence entered at trial, the Fund established an evident partiality on the part of one of the arbitrators, and that the Fund was entitled to have the judgment entered on the arbitration award vacated. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Municipal Workers Compensation Fund, Inc. v. Morgan Keegan & Co." on Justia Law

Roland and Sandra Crouch appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of North Alabama Sand & Gravel, LLC, now operating as Alliance Sand & Gravel, LLC, and Austin Powder Company ("Austin Powder") on the Crouches' claim asserting property damage resulting from Alliance Sand & Gravel's blasting operations. The Crouches sued Alliance Sand & Gravel and Austin Powder (collectively, "Alliance"), seeking compensation for damage to their property, which, they say, was caused by Alliance's blasting operations. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Alliance on the Crouches' trespass claim. The Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Alliance on the Crouches' claims alleging an abnormally dangerous activity, wantonness, and nuisance, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Crouch v. North Alabama Sand & Gravel, LLC" on Justia Law

In August 2000, when Jimmy Williams, Jr. was 15 years old, he was convicted of murder made capital because it was committed during a robbery. In accordance with the applicable law at the time of Williams's sentencing, the trial court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the only possible sentence and one that was mandatory. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Williams's conviction and sentence. In June 2013, Williams petitioned the circuit court, asserting that under the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)), the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole to which he was sentenced in 2000 for an offense committed when he was 15 years old was unconstitutional and, consequently, that he was entitled to be resentenced based on the individualized sentencing factors discussed in Miller. The issue in this case presented for the Alabama Supreme Court's review was whether "Miller" applied retroactively to Williams' case. Because Miller did not categorically forbid a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a juvenile defendant and because Miller did not apply retroactively, Williams's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was legal. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in denying Williams the relief he requested. View "Ex parte Jimmy Williams, Jr." on Justia Law

Richard M. Gilley sued his former employer, Southern Research Institute ("SRI"), seeking compensation he alleged he was owed as a result of his work leading to SRI's procurement of United States Patent No. 5,407,609. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of SRI, and Gilley appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court found that because Gilley did not timely assert a claim based on a January 2005 transaction in his complaint and because the money received by SRI in a July 2007 transaction was not intellectual-property income subject to sharing under the SRI awards policy, the summary judgment entered by the trial court was proper and was therefore affirmed. View "Gilley v. Southern Research Institute" on Justia Law

James H. Goldthwaite lived in his Birmingham house for approximately 45 years. The house was adjacent to or near property on which were actively used railroad tracks owned by Norfolk Southern. The record reflected that Norfolk Southern used one of the railroad tracks located near Goldthwaite's house as a staging or temporary storage area for coal trains, which consist of empty rail cars and cars loaded with coal. In October 2013, Goldthwaite filed a complaint against Norfolk Southern alleging that his "life, health, liberty and possessions" have been harmed by noise and "noxious fumes" from the diesel locomotives that were left running in coal trains that are temporarily stored near his house. Norfolk Southern had the case removed to the United States District Court on the ground that Goldthwaite's claims were completely preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, and that the federal district court had federal question jurisdiction for the limited purpose of dismissing the action. In April 2014, the federal district court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action because Goldthwaite's state-law claims were not completely preempted by the ICCTA. Holding that removal of the action from state court was not proper, the federal district court remanded the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court. On remand, Norfolk Southern moved the circuit court to dismiss the action, arguing, among other things, that Goldthwaite's claims were preempted under the ICCTA because, it maintained, the nuisance action was an attempt to regulate transportation by rail carrier and actions related to the regulation and operation of rail carriers, pursuant to the ICCTA, were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed that Goldthwaite's claims were preempted by the ICCTA, the circuit court erred in denying Norfolk Southern's motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Norfolk Southern's motion to dismiss and rendered a judgment for Norfolk Southern, dismissing Goldthwaite's state court action. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Goldthwaite" on Justia Law

In 2009, Christopher Wilson was working for the City of Sumiton. Christopher and his supervisor, Michael Carr, had been sent to mow grass on Bryan Road. Tony Henderson, the driver of the City's knuckle-boom truck, radioed Carr and asked him and a work crew to come and flag traffic for him while he was operating the knuckle-boom truck on Sullivan Road, "just over the knob." Carr, Christopher, and the crew went to Sullivan Road. While the knuckle-boom truck was backing up, part of it became stuck. The knuckle-boom was sticking out into the road perpendicular to the road; part of it was in the lane of travel on Sullivan Road for traffic coming from Sumiton. Carr testified that, when he received the call from Henderson, it was a situation that had to be attended to immediately and that he and Christopher did not have time to return to Bryan Road to get Christopher's safety vest. At some point, two of the crew who were near Christopher went to the city truck to get cigarettes and weren't monitoring the traffic. Christopher was standing on the side of the road next to the city truck, and he was "kind of" flagging traffic until the crew got their cigarettes. Frank Lemley had gotten off work that afternoon after working 16.5 hours at the Miller Steam Plant. Lemley testified that, as he topped the rise on Sullivan Road, he saw the knuckle-boom truck in the roadway. He testified that Christopher kept going and threw up both hands, thinking that Christopher said "Stop." He testified that he put on his brakes as soon as he saw Christopher and that he "locked [his] truck down and slid 23 feet." Lemley was not able to stop in time, and his vehicle struck Christopher, who later died of his injuries. Terry Wilson, Christopher's father, filed a wrongful-death action against Lemley. The defendant, Frank Lemley, appealed a trial court order granting Terry's motion for a new trial filed after a jury had returned a verdict in his favor. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the jury was presented with conflicting evidence. "When the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Lemley and all reasonable inferences the jury was free to draw are indulged, it is easily perceivable from the record that the jury verdict in favor of Lemley as to the negligence and wantonness claims was supported by the evidence." View "Lemley v. Wilson" on Justia Law