Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gladys Tellis, Sherry Bronson, Gwendolyn Moody, Nadine Ivy, and Uneeda Trammell (collectively, "the policyholders") initiated separate actions against American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, asserting generally that American Bankers had sold them homeowner's insurance policies providing a level of coverage they could never receive, even in the event of a total loss involving the covered property. American Bankers moved the trial court hearing each action to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration provisions it alleged were part of the subject policies; however, the trial courts denied those motions, and American Bankers appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the five appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion, and reversed those orders denying the motions to compel arbitration. The Court based its decision on its holdings that the policyholders manifested their assent to the arbitration provision in their policies by continuing to renew the policies, that the sale of the policies affected interstate commerce, and that the arbitration provision in the policies was not unconscionable. View "American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Tellis" on Justia Law

In August 2011, Teddy Knox was driving along Interstate 59 in Fort Payne. Officer Matt Wilson of the Fort Payne Police Department stopped Knox's vehicle for improper lane use. During the stop, Officer Wilson became suspicious that Knox might be transporting drugs, and he requested backup from Officer Tony Blackwell, who was a member of the county drug task force and who had his drug-detection dog with him. Lt. Randy Garrison, another member of the drug task force, was also en route to the scene. Officer Wilson eventually issued a warning citation to Knox and told him that he was free to go, but he continued to question Knox about his travel plans. Lt. Garrison and Officer Blackwell arrived at some point during the questioning of Knox. After Officer Blackwell arrived with his dog, Officer Wilson asked Knox if he would consent to a search of his vehicle. Knox refused to consent, and Officer Blackwell then deployed his dog to perform a free-air sniff. The dog "indicated" for the odor of marijuana, and the police eventually searched the vehicle and discovered marijuana. The police seized in excess of 2.2 pounds of marijuana and arrested Knox for trafficking in marijuana, unlawful possession of marijuana, and first-degree unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. Knox filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the marijuana seized during the traffic stop. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court entered a written order granting the motion to suppress. The State appealed; the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment on a ground not raised in the circuit court: that Knox was no longer being detained at the time the search was executed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, surmising that it was likely that the State's failure to raise the absence-of-detention argument before the circuit court may have deprived Knox of an opportunity to present evidence in opposition to that theory. "The primary focus of the suppression hearing was the existence of reasonable suspicion, which was based largely on the police officers' observations. Had the State raised the absence-of-detention argument in the circuit court, it is possible that Knox might have chosen to present evidence as to (1) whether he felt free to leave the scene after he was given his warning citation and (2) whether there was a showing of authority sufficient to constitute a detention. By failing to raise this new issue at trial, the State deprived Knox of an opportunity to present evidence and to make arguments. The State's failure to raise the issue also deprived the circuit court of the opportunity to make factual findings and credibility determinations on this issue." View "Ex parte Knox." on Justia Law

Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company ("Alfa") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to grant its motion seeking to realign the parties to the underlying litigation so that Alfa may "opt out" of participation in the trial. In October 2012, respondent Mark Trotter was injured when a "road sweeper" he was operating was struck by a vehicle being operated by Daniel Elijah Davis, an uninsured motorist. In October 2014, Trotter sued Alfa seeking to recover uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits pursuant to a policy of insurance issued by Alfa to Trotter, which was in place at the time of the 2012 accident. Trotter did not include Davis as a codefendant in his action against Alfa. Alfa subsequently filed a third-party complaint adding Davis as a third-party defendant. Specifically, Alfa's third-party complaint alleged that, to the extent it was determined to be liable to Trotter for UIM benefits, then Alfa was subrogated to and entitled to recover the amount of that liability from Davis. Thereafter, Alfa filed a "Motion to Realign Parties" in which it asked to "opt out" of the litigation. Without explaining the findings on which its decision was based, the trial court denied Alfa's motion. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded after a review of the record, that Alfa has demonstrated a clear legal right to have its motion to realign the parties granted and to allow it to opt out of the underlying litigation. No authority is cited requiring that, in order to make the permitted election, Alfa must first release the right of subrogation to which it was also clearly entitled. View "Ex parte Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company." on Justia Law

Inmate Charleton Thomas petitioned for postconviction relief, which the circuit court summarily dismissed. The Court of Criminal Appeals, by unpublished memorandum, affirmed the summary dismissal of Thomas's petition, concluding that Thomas's Rule 32 petition was untimely because, at the time he filed his Rule 32 petition, Thomas had not paid the filing fee or filed a request to proceed in forma pauperis. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the evidence in the record created a question of material fact as to whether Thomas's in forma pauperis declaration was filed with his Rule 32 petition, so as to render the Rule 32 petition timely. View "Ex parte Thomas." on Justia Law

The plaintiff in the underlying case, Brian Barze, sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to set aside an order sealing a motion to stay filed by one of the defendants, James Holbrook. Barze filed suit against Sterne Agee Group, Inc., and Holbrook, the then CEO of Sterne Agee. Barze included claims of promissory fraud and fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, conversion, and defamation. In his complaint, Barze alleged that, in spring 2009, Sterne Agee had approached him about leaving his old company and becoming the chief financial officer ("CFO") of Sterne Agee and that Holbrook had told him that, if he joined Sterne Agee, Sterne Agee would pay him severance pay of at least one year's salary and bonus if the job with Sterne Agee did not work out. Barze alleged that he relied on Holbrook's promises and representations when he agreed to accept the job at Sterne Agee and when he left his former employer and gave up his opportunities there. Barze asserted that, after he started working with Sterne Agee, he was presented with an employment agreement to sign; that Holbrook assured him that the employment agreement was signed by all employees; that Holbrook assured him that Holbrook could and would take care of Barze and honor their oral agreement regarding the severance pay of at least one year's salary and bonus; and that Holbrook told Barze that he was committed to Barze as the long-term CFO of Sterne Agee. Barze asserted that, in reliance on Holbrook's assertions, he signed the employment agreement. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not comply with the controlling case law procedure set forth in "Holland v. Eads" (614 So.2d 1012 (Ala. 1993)), it exceeded its discretion when it granted Holbrook's motion and directed the circuit clerk to seal Holbrook's motion to stay the underlying civil action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its July 23, 2014, order granting Holbrook's motion for leave to file his motion to stay under seal and sealing Holbrook's motion to stay. View "Ex parte Barze." on Justia Law

The father Andrew Duerr and mother Anne Marie Duerr were married in 1989, and had four children. The parties divorced in 2003. In October 2011, the father filed a petition to terminate alimony and to modify child support and visitation. In April 2013, the mother filed an answer and a counterclaim in which she sought postminority educational support for N.D., a child of the marriage, who was attending the Cleveland Institute of Music. After conducting a hearing, the trial court, among other things, ordered the father to pay up to $12,000 per semester in postminority support for N.D.'s tuition. The father appealed, arguing the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming the trial court's order awarding postminority educational support for N.D. conflicted with "Ex parte Christopher," (145 So. 3d 60 (Ala. 2013)). After review, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Duerr." on Justia Law

Defendants Courtyard Citiflats, LLC, and Action Property Management, L.L.C. (collectively, "Citiflats"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff Coretta Arrington as untimely filed. On July 18, 2014, Arrington filed, both individually and in her capacity as the administrator of the estate of her deceased minor child, a complaint against Citiflats. Arrington's complaint alleged tort-based claims in connection with the death of Arrington's child as the result of injuries allegedly sustained in 2012, on premises owned and managed by Citiflats. Arrington's complaint was accompanied by an "Affidavit of Substantial Hardship," alleging that Arrington was unable to pay the corresponding filing fee. At the time it was filed, the hardship statement had not been approved by the trial court as required by statute. Arrington's complaint was also accompanied by the summonses necessary for service on the named defendants, which were stamped "filed" by the clerk of the trial court on the filing date. On August 18, 2014, after the July 24, 2014 expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitations, the trial court entered an order approving the hardship statement. On August 19, 2014, the clerk of the trial court issued the previously filed summonses for service. Citiflats filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion seeking to dismiss Arrington's complaint on the ground that the statutory limitations period had expired without the payment of a filing fee or the approval of a hardship statement. The Circuit Court denied Citiflats' motion. Because the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss Arrington's complaint as untimely, it concluded that Citiflats made the requisite showing of a clear legal right to the relief sought. View "Ex parte Courtyard Citiflats, LLC, and Action Property Management LLC." on Justia Law

The Retirement Systems of Alabama ("RSA"), the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama ("TRS"), the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Plan ("PEEHIP"), the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Fund ("PEEHIF"), the Board of Control of TRS ("the TRS Board"), the Board of Control of PEEHIP ("the PEEHIP Board"), David Bronner, as chief executive officer of RSA and as secretary-treasurer of TRS and PEEHIP, and various members of the TRS Board and of the PEEHIP Board in their official capacities ("the PEEHIP defendants") sought mandamus review of the Circuit Court's denial of their motion to dismiss the claims filed against them by James Burks II, Eugenia Burks, Martin Hester, Jacqueline Hester, Thomas Highfield, Carol Ann Highfield, Jake Jackson, and Melinda Jackson, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals ("the public-education plaintiffs"). PEEHIP, which is managed by the PEEHIP Board, provided group health-insurance benefits to public-education employees in Alabama. The public-education plaintiffs alleged that a policy adopted by the PEEHIP Board in 2009 changed the amounts participants and their eligible dependents, and this change violated Article V, section 138.03, Alabama Constitution of 1901, as well as the public-education plaintiffs' rights to equal protection, due process, and freedom of association under the Alabama Constitution, the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The public-education plaintiffs also alleged that the 2009 policy violated Alabama public policy and their right to family integrity as protected by the Alabama Constitution. The public-education plaintiffs sought relief in the form of: (1) a judgment declaring "[the PEEHIP defendants'] practice of denying an allotment for insurance benefits to educators who are married to another educator and who have dependent children to be unconstitutional, discriminatory and unlawful under both State and Federal law"; (2) an injunction preventing the PEEHIP defendants from "denying an allotment for insurance benefits to educators whose spouse is also an educator in the public school system and who have dependent children"; (3) restitution of "amounts ... unlawfully withheld and/or ... amounts [the public-education plaintiffs] have paid for insurance that they would not have paid absent [the PEEHIP defendants'] unlawful conduct" or other equitable relief; and (4) costs and attorney fees. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court granted the petition in part, denied in part, and issue a writ to direct the circuit court to dismiss all the public-education plaintiffs' claims against RSA, PEEHIP, the PEEHIP Board, PEEHIF, TRS, the TRS Board, the members of the TRS Board, and Bronner, in his capacity as chief executive officer of RSA and as secretary-treasurer of TRS; to dismiss all the public-education plaintiffs' state-law claims against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP; and to dismiss the public-education plaintiffs' claims against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP, for monetary relief, pursuant to § 1983. The petition was denied with regard to the public-education plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief, pursuant to section 1983, against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP. The PEEHIP Board and Bronner were entitled to immunity from the state law claims, but not to immunity from the Eleventh Amendment claims for prospective injunctive relief under section 1983. View "Ex parte The Retirement Systems of Alabama et al." on Justia Law

Sergio Acosta petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate an order granting a motion filed by Trinity Bank to strike Acosta's jury demand with respect to all counts in Acosta's counterclaim and third-party complaint in the bank's action against him. The bank filed filed suit seeking a judgment against Acosta for financial losses it incurred after Acosta defaulted on certain "Multipurpose Note and Security Agreement[s]" he had executed with the bank. The bank alleged that Acosta had executed two secured notes and one unsecured note, which, it said, Acosta had failed and/or refused to pay; that the bank had foreclosed on the properties pledged as collateral on the secured notes; and that proper credit had been applied to the notes. The bank sought a judgment for the balance due on the notes, plus interest, fees, costs, and attorney fees. Acosta filed a counterclaim against the bank, as well as a third-party complaint against two of its officers, alleging that he had entered into a business relationship with R&B Properties under the name of SilverPalm Properties, LLC; that loans from the bank were the principal source of funding for SilverPalm; that the financing plan was for SilverPalm to procure from the bank the funds to construct the properties, for SilverPalm to pay the interest on the notes until the properties were rented, and for SilverPalm to pay off the notes once the properties generated sufficient rental income to do so. Acosta and R&B Properties dissolved SilverPalm because of a downturn in the economy; but the bank induced that Acosta was personally liable for the notes previously secured only by SilverPalm The bank at some point advised Acosta that additional security was required to continue financing the notes, that Acosta declined to pledge additional security. The bank then called the notes due and foreclosed on the properties securing the notes. Acosta requested an accounting for the amounts claimed by the bank on the notes and the mortgages securing the notes, and he sought damages based on allegations of wantonness, breach of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. The counterclaim and third-party complaint included a demand for a jury trial. In its motion to strike Acosta's jury demand, the Bank relied on a jury-waiver provision in four Assignments of Rents and Leases that Acosta had executed in consideration of the notes. The trial court initially denied the bank's motion to strike, and then granted it after reconsideration. The Supreme Court concluded that Acosta demonstrated a clear legal right to a jury trial on the claims asserted in his counterclaim and third-party complaint. As such, the Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order striking Acosta's jury demand. View "Ex parte Sergio Acosta." on Justia Law

Tanya Butts petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Clarke Circuit Court to stay the proceedings in the underlying civil case until a criminal case pending against her was completed. Gaines McCorquodale and Butts each owned a one-half interest in Hometown Hospice, Inc. In July 2014, McCorquodale sued Butts, asserting claims based on allegations that Butts had misappropriated funds belonging to Hometown. The trial court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting Butts from any involvement in the operation of Hometown. Butts contended that a stay in the civil case was necessary to protect her constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court denied the petition: Butts was not entitled to a stay of that part of the civil case determining the value of Hometown in accordance with 10A-2-14.34. Because the trial court had not yet ruled on whether the remaining parts of the civil case should be stayed pending the resolution of the criminal case against her, mandamus relief was not appropriate on that issue. View "Ex parte Tanya Butts." on Justia Law