Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Glenn Bynum and Larry Gipson appealed a trial court's order holding that certain amendments to section 28-2A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 (pertaining to the sale of alcoholic beverages in a municipality), were constitutional. After review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) it was clear that the Alabama legislature intended to omit 3 counties from inclusion in Act No. 2009-546 allowing municipalities with a population of more than 1,000 to hold elections regarding the sale of alcohol in their municipal limits; and (2) it was clear that the legislature did not include a severability clause in Act No. 2009-546. The legislature included a general severability provision in the Alabama Code, which the Supreme Court regarded as an expression of legislative intent concerning the general power and duty of the judiciary to sever and save statutory provisions not tainted by the unconstitutionality of other provisions in the statute. However, the Court reasoned that the inclusion of a severability clause in a particular act was a clear statement of a legislative intent to sever unconstitutional provisions in that act while allowing the constitutional provisions to remain. Municipalities with more than 1,000 residents in 64 counties have held elections on whether to sell alcohol. The exclusion of the 3 counties from the provisions of Act No. 2009-546 violated the Equal Protection Clause where the exclusion was not rationally related to the regulation of alcohol because no basis existed for excluding smaller cities within those 3 counties from participating in a "wet" or "dry" election and allowing smaller cities in the remaining 64 counties to do so. However, using severability to save Act No. 2009-546 was not permissible where it was obvious that the legislature excluded the three counties for no rational reason, and to edit Act No. 2009-546 by severing that language excluding the three counties would be to undermine the clear intent of the legislature. The Supreme Court left "it to the legislature to redraft a constitutionally sound law." Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bynum v. City of Oneonta et al." on Justia Law

Mother Jennifer Ann Vest (Herron) petitioned the Supreme Court to review a Court of Civil Appeals decision to affirm a the Elmore Circuit Court's order imposing on her a five-day jail sentence for contempt. The contempt order arose out of a child-custody-modification action. The father filed a motion with the Elmore Court to modify custody of the parties' minor child. In response, the mother, in her motion to dismiss, clearly stated that there was an action pending in Mobile County involving the parties' child of which the father was aware. She further alleged that venue was proper in Mobile County and that the father had not objected to venue at the Mobile Court. The mother requested that the Elmore Court dismiss the father's motion to modify custody until such time as the Mobile Court addressed the mother's motion regarding the parties' child and her allegations against the father. The Supreme Court found that the Elmore Circuit Court erred in not recognizing the primacy of the Mobile action when the mother filed her motion to dismiss or to transfer the father's motion to the Mobile Circuit Court. Subsequently, the Court of Civil Appeals erred in concluding that the mother had waived the affirmative defense of abatement. Accordingly, the Alabama Supreme Court suspended the provisions of Rule 39(g) and (h), Ala. R. App. P., allowing the petitioner and the respondent to file briefs and to request oral argument, and the Court granted certiorari review of the Court of Civil Appeals' order affirming the Elmore Circuit Court's order holding the mother in contempt. View "Ex parte Jennifer Ann Vest" on Justia Law

Gerald Van Jones, the father, appealed a Court of Civil Appeals' decision that affirmed a trial court's order awarding postminority educational support for his son, Garrette Jones. According to the father, the Court of Civil Appeals erred in refusing to apply "Ex parte Christopher" in this case because the appeal of the trial court's order awarding postminority educational support for Garrette was pending in the Court of Civil Appeals when "Ex parte Christopher" was decided and, therefore, in accordance with that case, the Court of Civil Appeals should have reversed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the father filed an appeal of the trial court's postminority-educational-support order on September 10, 2013; the Supreme Court decided "Ex parte Christopher" on October 4, 2013. Indeed, because this case was pending on appeal in the Court of Civil Appeals when "Ex parte Christopher" was decided, the Court of Civil Appeals erred by not applying that case's holding that a trial court does not have authority to order postminority educational support in this case and by not reversing the trial court's order. View "Ex parte Gerald Van Jones." on Justia Law

Defendant Adam Dan Hilyer appealed the denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment entered against him and in favor of plaintiff Betti Fortier. In 2013, Hilyer was backing a tractor-trailer rig used to transport logs into his private driveway. At the time, Hilyer was blocking both lanes of traffic on Kennedy Avenue. M.M., a minor, was driving Fortier's van and was traveling westbound on Kennedy Avenue. B.D., M.M.'s brother; R.W., M.M.'s fiancé; and B.H., a friend of B.D.'s, were also in the vehicle. M.M.'s vehicle collided with Hilyer's trailer, and M.M. sustained injuries. In early 2014, the trial court entered a judgment against Hilyer in the amount of $550,000 and found "that the proposed settlement of the claim of the minor, M.M. is just, fair, reasonable, in keeping with the evidence, and is in the minor's best interest." A month later, Hilyer filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, finding that Hilyer, in his motion to set aside the default judgment, met the threshold showing of each of the three "Kirtland" factors. Additionally, Hilyer supported his motion with affidavits and copies of correspondence. Fortier submitted evidence in support of her opposition to the motion to set aside that controverted the facts and evidence submitted by Hilyer. However, after conducting a hearing and taking the matter under advisement, the trial court allowed the motion to set aside to be denied by operation of law without any indication that the denial of the motion was the product of due deliberation and without any indication that the denial was based upon a consideration of the Kirtland factors. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the denial by operation of law of Hilyer's motion to set aside the default judgment and remanded this case for the trial court to consider the Kirtland factors in determining whether to set aside the default judgment. View "Hilyer v. Fortier" on Justia Law

Walter Energy, Inc., appealed a circuit court order that dismissed claims it had asserted against investor Julian Treger, his firm Audley Capital Advisors LLP, and other associated investment entities (collectively, "the Audley defendants") stemming from their alleged involvement in a scheme to improperly manipulate the share price of Walter Energy stock. Walter Energy sued the Audley defendants alleging various claims stemming from their alleged involvement in a "pump and dump" scheme to manipulate the share price of Walter Energy stock. After affording Walter Energy three opportunities to amend its complaint, the trial court dismissed all the claims on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds. Walter Energy thereafter appealed the dismissal of two of its claims to the Alabama Supreme Court; however, upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the dismissal of those claims was proper, and the judgment of the trial court was accordingly affirmed. View "Walter Energy, Inc. v. Audley Capital Advisors, LLP" on Justia Law

Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company appealed a circuit court order certifying the action filed against it by Gloria McCain as a class action. McCain owned a house in Montgomery on which she held a homeowner's insurance policy issued by Baldwin Mutual. That policy provided that any covered property losses would be settled "at actual cash value at the time of loss but not exceeding the amount necessary to repair or replace the damaged property." In July 2005, McCain's house was damaged as the result of a windstorm. She filed a claim with Baldwin Mutual, and Baldwin Mutual thereafter retained an independent adjuster to examine McCain's damaged property and to prepare an estimate to repair the damage. Baldwin Mutual paid McCain's claim in accordance with the estimate prepared by the adjuster. Pursuant to a work-authorization form signed by McCain, Baldwin Mutual paid the funds directly to McCain's contractor. In June 2006, McCain filed another claim after her house suffered damage as a result of a lightning strike. After the same adjuster prepared an estimate, Baldwin Mutual paid the new claim in accordance with the adjuster's estimate. The genesis of the claims underlying this suit was that Baldwin Mutual had wrongfully been reducing the amount paid on claims made on actual-cash-value polices inasmuch as its practice was to deduct some amount for depreciation not only of the damaged materials and the labor costs of initially installing those damaged materials (based on their condition prior to the covered damage and their expected life span), but also of the labor costs associated with the removal of the damaged materials. It was improper and impossible to depreciate those labor costs, McCain argued, because they had not previously been incurred at some defined time in the past; rather, they were being incurred at the time of the current repair. Noting that hundreds or thousands of Baldwin Mutual policyholders were likely negatively affected by Baldwin Mutual's practices in this regard, McCain sought class action certification of her claims. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the class certification, finding that the trial court here exceeded its discretion with a definition proposed by McCain without giving Baldwin Mutual the opportunity to oppose the certification of the proposed class at a hearing conducted for that purpose pursuant to statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Baldwin Mutual Ins. Co. v. McCain" on Justia Law

Dorothy Crusoe and her granddaughter, Erica Boyd, by and through her mother and next friend, Latricia Witherspoon (collectively, "Crusoe"), appealed a circuit court order denying their motion for a new trial. This case stemmed from an automobile accident that occurred in Bessemer. Crusoe sued Davis under a negligence theory seeking damages for medical expenses and for past and future pain and suffering. Dorothy Crusoe additionally sought damages for lost wages. After hearing the evidence and being instructed on negligence, the jury returned a verdict for Davis. Crusoe filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. She appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in not allowing the policeman who prepared the accident report to testify as to the contents of that report, which testimony, Crusoe alleged, would refute Davis's testimony that her vehicle was not in motion at the time of the accident. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crusoe v. Davis" on Justia Law

Ruth Mary Higgins Baker ("Ruth") petitioned the Supreme Court for review the Court of Civil Appeals' affirmance, without an opinion, of the judgment of the Circuit Court which denied her petition to be appointed the personal representative of the estate of her mother Ruth G. Higgins. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's judgment and, specifically, whether the circuit court had obtained jurisdiction over Higgins's estate. After careful consideration of the trial court and appellate court proceedings, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for that court to dismiss the appeal and to instruct the circuit court to vacate its orders removing the matter from the probate court, denying Ruth's petition for appointment as the administrator with the will annexed of Higgins's estate and appointing another administrator instead. View "Ex parte Ruth Mary Higgins Baker." on Justia Law

John Harper, an incarcerated inmate, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court to review the circuit court's denial of his latest motion for sentence reconsideration. Harper was convicted in 1986 of first-degree armed robbery. Based on that conviction and a prior felony conviction, the circuit court sentenced him as a habitual felony offender to what in 1986 was a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole. Because the circuit court did not consider all the factors and evidence, including records of the Department of Corrections, that Harper presented with his "Kirby" motion, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court did not consider the totality of the circumstances. For the same reasons, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's order denying Harper's Kirby motion. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment and directed that court to remand the case to the circuit court for it to reconsider Harper's Kirby motion. "We note in conclusion that the window for the review of Kirby motions has been closing since the repeal of 13A-5-9.1, effective March 1, 2014. After 28 years of incarceration, Harper is faced with his last opportunity to take advantage of 13A-5-9.1. He has done exactly what a previous court said he must do for reconsideration of his sentence as a current nonviolent convicted offender. Justice demands that he have an opportunity provided by that law for reconsideration of his sentence." View "Ex parte John Alfred Harper." on Justia Law

Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company ("Travelers") appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Dianne and Martin Gray in the Grays' action arising from injuries Dianne suffered as the result of a motor-vehicle accident. In 2010, Lawana Coker and Dianne were involved in a motor-vehicle accident in Elmore County; Coker was without motor-vehicle insurance at the time of the accident. Two years later, the Grays filed in the trial court a three-count complaint naming as defendants Coker and Travelers and a fictitiously named defendant. Travelers answered the complaint, denying the material allegations therein and asserting certain affirmative defenses. Coker, however, failed to answer the complaint. In 2013, the Grays moved the trial court to enter a default judgment in their favor and against Coker, requesting that the trial court assess damages in the amount of $500,000 for Dianne and $50,000 for Martin. The Grays' motion requested no relief as to Travelers. Shortly thereafter, the Grays filed a new summary-judgment motion in which, for the first time, they sought relief against Travelers. The Grays did not base their summary judgment motion against Travelers on the ground that there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether tortious conduct by Coker caused them to suffer injury. Instead, they based their summary-judgment motion against Travelers solely on the fact that they previously had obtained a default judgment against Coker. In this regard, the Grays argued that they were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law against Travelers because, they said, "Travelers as a party defendant had notice and adequate opportunity to intervene and present any defenses and arguments necessary to protect its position with respect to the entry of or the amount of damages in the Default Judgment. By failing to do so, Defendant Travelers legally is bound by the judgment." After review, the Supreme Court reversed: because Travelers as the Grays' UM carrier, was not bound by the default judgment entered against Coker, Travelers was not required to submit evidence in opposition to a motion for a summary judgment that relied solely on that default judgment. Consequently, the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of the Grays and against Travelers. View "Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gray" on Justia Law